M. V. ZHARIKOV

Candidate of Economic Sciences Moscow Institute of Foreign Languages

renminbi internationalization Keywords:, renminbi exchange rate, special drawing rights ), Japanese experience of yen internationalization, bilateral swaps

The word "renminbiization", which has recently come into use by experts - economists and politicians - in the context of this article means a set of strategies of China to transfer - in whole or in part - foreign assets of this state into the national monetary currency of the country - the yuan, if initially they were expressed in other currencies, for example, in US dollars. To a certain extent, the term "renminbiization" can be considered identical to another one - "internationalization of the yuan", the meaning of which will also be revealed in this article.

The latest global financial crisis has once again confirmed the enormous importance of US dollars in the international financial system and revealed the problem of their shortage.¹ This shortage was largely caused by European banks, which before the crisis financed huge amounts of dollar-denominated assets with loans from other banks, as well as the US money market and central banks of various countries.² The US authorities responded to the shortage of dollars by entering into very large dollar swaps (contracts between two parties under which they exchange the currency they need in an agreed amount and within a certain time frame) with the central banks of other countries, and with the largest of them - in general in unlimited volumes.

Against this background, the Chinese government has taken a number of initiatives that indicate a transition to a more active strategy of internationalization of the yuan. Such internationalization (in principle, it can be carried out in relation to any currency - not just the yuan) means the active use of this national currency in international settlements with other countries, including the mediation of exports and imports in cross-border capital flows, as well as in the issuance of securities denominated in this particular currency to global markets*.

An additional necessary condition for currency internationalization is its full conversion, i.e. free and unrestricted purchase and sale of this currency by residents and non-residents of the issuing country, in other words, the country using this currency.

According to many economists, this strategy stems from the doubts of experts and authorities (in this case, China) about the ability of the US dollar to continue to perform the function of accumulation/saving in the global monetary system, i.e., to be the world's reserve currency. However, in this regard, it should be noted the special nature of the PRC's balance of payments in relations with other countries. It is characterized by a growing dependence on the international currency. This dependence is the result of a combination of the openness of Chinese markets to foreign investment, a current-account surplus, and a lack of internationalization of the yuan.

JAPANESE EXPERIENCE CURRENCY INTERNATIONALIZATION

Like most industrialized countries, the PRC has a short currency position in its own national currency and a long one in other currencies. In this respect, the Chinese economy is more open than the Japanese one, as shown by the following figures: the share of non-residents in Chinese assets (including foreign direct investment and portfolio investment) is 24% of the country's GDP, while the same indicator in Japan is 17% ³.

The PRC, like Japan, has the second most intensive source of net long currency position growth, namely, a sequential series of adding up the current trade surplus values. Over time, these flows accumulate as a general indicator known as the net international investment position (PIIP). China's net international asset position is almost the same as that of Japan, i.e. it is at the level of 40-50% of GDP*.

Although China's net international assets account for a smaller share of its GDP compared to Japan,its cumulative long foreign currency position is almost at the same level as Japan's. This is the result of a larger share of China's GDP.-

* The term "denomination" and other cognate words derived from it are used in this article to indicate the currency in which a particular asset or security is denominated. This means, for example, that a bond denominated in yuan also has a national value expressed in Chinese currency, and only in that currency.

and insufficient internationalization of the renminbi. Therefore, the strategy of redenomination in yuan of monetary claims* of the PRC to other countries could contribute to the normalization of the balance of payments of this state.

The limited role of the yen as an international currency can be seen as an analogy for developing an internationalization strategy for the yuan. For example, Japan's balance of payments asset account reflects debt securities issued by firms, governments and banks in the rest of the world, which together are equivalent to 35% of the country's GDP, which is almost 2 times higher than its official reserves. According to a report by the Bank of Japan, almost 1/3 of these debt securities, or 11.6% of the country's GDP, are denominated in yen. Based on Japan's experience in internationalizing the yen, a third of all Chinese securities can also be denominated in yuan.

Such a strategy may be a more realistic medium-term goal, as opposed to trying to approach a higher target - for example, in the United States, about 90% of all foreign debt securities are denominated in US dollars. ⁵ Taking advantage of this, Chinese pension funds and insurance companies could significantly diversify the credit risk associated with their operations in China. This can be done by purchasing securities issued by non-Chinese firms and governments, thus avoiding taking on the currency risk that arises from purchasing exclusively yuan-denominated securities.

Let us explain that credit risk diversification means that the participants in a credit contract or agreement are allocated the negative effect of an insured event if one of the parties is unable to fulfill its obligations to service its debt. The diversification of China's credit risk means that it should lend money not only primarily to one country - the United States-but also to many other countries. Then the inability of the United States to meet its obligations to China will not lead to a situation of complete non-return of the financial resources issued to it from abroad.

In addition to private sector purchases of local currency bonds issued by non-residents, the PRC could reduce aggregate currency risk by redenominating more of its monetary claims to the rest of the world in yuan. This is done, in particular, by the Japan Bank for International Cooperation, which willingly issues loans to governments and companies around the world. If you convert the total amount of these loans (as of early 2013) from yen to dollars, they will amount to $119 billion, and loans in foreign currency with a similar transfer to dollars - $41 billion. Loans denominated in yen account for 2.7% of Japan's GDP. This means that as China expands its concessional credit lines in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, it would make sense for it to redenominate its official monetary requirements in yuan.

As for the distribution of China's currency risk to the rest of the world (again, if we take the Japanese experience as a benchmark for comparison), we can see that, for example, in 2002, 36.7% of Japanese exports were denominated in yen. The corresponding indicator for China will be higher. However, it should be noted that imports to China could also be denominated in yuan. Japanese experience confirms that a certain share of imports (for example, in 2002 - 25% of Japanese imports) can be denominated in the national currency.⁶

Provided that the PRC accumulates a significant amount of net monetary claims against the rest of the world, there will be a much greater asymmetry between the indicators considered than in the "Japanese case". This means that the redenomination of renminbi-denominated trading transactions will be reflected accordingly in the growth in the number of corporate and government debt securities denominated in renminbi, i.e. the indirect impact can be very significant.

RMB STRATEGY FOR CHINESE OVERSEAS ASSETS

The use of the yuan to denominate bonds, government loans, and trade transactions can lead to the yuan sooner or later acquiring the status of a hard currency in the international foreign exchange market. International trade in this regard is a favorable area for expanding the influence of the yuan in the financial and economic world. In the period from 2004 to 2007. Daily trade in the yuan expanded so that it was able to bypass Chinese exports and imports in terms of volume.

For comparison, trade in the non-internationalized Indian rupee or partially internationalized South Korean won is 10 times the amount of foreign trade in India and South Korea, respectively. At the same time, the volume of trade in fully internationalized currencies can even exceed 100 times the value of "material" exports and imports. Based on this, the yuan has huge opportunities to expand its use in international transactions.

The strategy of replacing dollar-denominated monetary claims to the rest of the world with yuan-denominated ones will also have an impact on the euro. Namely, the alternative strategy of redenominating China's monetary claims to the rest of the world meant

* Renminbi redenomination of assets held abroad or monetary claims against other countries means the transfer of the nominal value of these assets (initially expressed, for example, in dollars) to the Chinese currency unit-the yuan-at a specific current exchange rate.

We would like to diversify our existing assets into other major currencies other than the dollar. If dollar-denominated bonds are replaced with euro-denominated debt securities, the euro's exchange rate against the US dollar will skyrocket.⁷ Only if dollar-denominated and euro-denominated bonds were absolute substitutes in investors ' portfolios would such diversification by the PRC have no effect on either the dollar or ^the euro8, which is similar to the situation of sterilized intervention, when the intervention of the central bank in the interbank market does not lead to a significant change in the money supply and debt markets. interest rates.

These two strategies - the renminbiization of foreign assets and the diversification of the portfolio of assets in favor of the euro-can be implemented simultaneously. The People's Bank of China recently decided to purchase $ 32 billion in special drawing rights (SDR) - denominated assets from the IMF. this international currency.

If the PRC eventually submits dollars to the IMF in exchange for SDR, this will mean diversifying the portfolio of assets by reducing the share of dollars in them and increasing the share of euros, and-to a lesser extent-in the form of yen and pounds sterling, since these currencies together with the dollar form the SDR basket.

Such diversification in favor of the euro is most likely, although market participants have focused on investing in means of payment, namely, in the yuan, which is stipulated by the agreement between China and the IMF.⁹ Some economists see this as a sign of the internationalization of the yuan, although it is not necessary.

In this regard, it is appropriate to give the following example, which may explain why the use of the yuan in such a transaction will not be of a long-term nature. When the IMF issues a loan to the Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority (SAMA), the latter can receive the loan in riyals. Even if the rial is transferred to a country that borrows from the IMF, the latter will have to accept one of the leading reserve currencies, such as the dollar, from SAMA in exchange for the rial.

Given this feature, longer-term cooperation could follow in the long run if the yuan were to become one of the currencies in the SDR basket. However, at present, the agreement between the IMF and the People's Bank of China should be understood more as a diversification towards the world's leading currencies than using the yuan to redenominate China's monetary claims to other countries.

Ultimately, the impact of the renminbi on the international currency market will depend on the behavior of the IMF borrower. If the latter received a loan from the IMF denominated in SDR in dollar terms, taking into account the increase in the amount of reserves, but at the same time tried to balance its debt denominated in SDR, then it would have to sell a certain amount of dollars for euros, yen and pounds sterling.

Under these assumptions, the impact of the renminbi on the international currency market will be the same in scope as if the PRC had initially diversified its portfolio of assets in SDR with a reduced share of dollars in it. It should also be noted that by exchanging dollar-denominated bonds for IMF bonds, China would have to diversify its portfolio of assets both in the form of precious metals and in the reserve currency.

If the strategy of redenominating China's international monetary claims in yuan were implemented in order to ensure that the yuan plays a role in the international financial system comparable to China's weight in the world as one of the largest trading and industrial countries, this situation would also have implications for the SDR issued by the IMF.

The latest five-year SDR Value report established two criteria for including a particular currency in the SDR basket. According to the first one, a currency can be included in the SDR basket if the scale of exports of goods and services puts it among the four main world currencies. According to the second criterion, if this currency is in free circulation, then it is de facto widely used and actively participates in buying and selling on the international currency market.

The first criterion means that the RMB can be included in the SDR basket right now, although the RMB's share in official reserves is close to zero. By the second criterion, the prospect of the yuan's participation in the SDR basket is remote. In this regard, there is both an aspect of broad currency use that can be stimulated through bilateral agreements with trading partners, and there is a market criterion for trading the yuan in the international foreign exchange market.

Having considered the terms of these two criteria, it is difficult to imagine that the yuan will be included in the SDR basket by the time of the next revision of the value of this currency in 2015 or even in 2020.

HONG KONG - CHINA'S "WINDOW" INTO THE PROCESS OF FINANCIAL GLOBALIZATION

The modern world economic system is characterized by the process of financial globalization, the essence of which is the merging and interpenetration of national and regional monetary, financial and credit systems. This leads to the formation of a single global financial market and space. This, in particular, is reflected in the apparent departure of the Chinese government from its previous tough stance on the internationalization of the yuan.

Beijing has taken a number of steps aimed at increasing the use of the yuan internationally.-

Table 1 ¹¹

Bilateral currency swap agreements with the People's Bank of China in 2008-2009

Note: all six swaps have a maturity of 3 years and can be extended by mutual agreement of the parties. Swap agreements with the Bank of the Republic of Korea and the Central Bank of Argentina are still under development, and final agreements on them have not yet been signed.

transactions. First of all, the People's Bank of China signed bilateral swap agreements denominated in yuan with the central banks of 6 countries (18 at the end of 2012 - from our article)in 2008 - 2009 for a total of 650 billion rubles. yuan ($95 billion) (at the end of 2012-2.01 trillion yuan ($320.3 billion). Binder A. I., Kononov A. Yu. Mezhdunarodnaya kul'turnaya konkurentsiya [International Currency Competition] / / Accepted for publication in Asia and Africa Today, 2013, No. 12). These agreements allow the exchange of RMB and the local currency of the transaction partner for a period of at least three years (see Table 1).

Such swap agreements can be considered as a potential basis for the second initiative, which deals with the mediation of China's foreign trade with the yuan. In April 2009, the State Council of China approved a pilot scheme for cross-border yuan mediation of trade transactions, which initially expanded to Shanghai and four other Chinese cities in Guangdong Province, and then to Hong Kong.

In December 2010, the Central Bank established a pilot point for international renminbi payments in Xinjiang, promoting the use of the renminbi in Central and West Asia. At the beginning of 2012, the experiment was extended to the entire territory of the country (see: Binder A. I., Kononov A. Yu....).

China is also negotiating with Brazil and Malaysia on the possibility of using national currencies in the settlement of bilateral trade, supported by swap agreements.

According to some estimates, 20 to 30% of China's annual foreign trade turnover can be carried out in yuan, provided that transactions on the current account with capital are more liberalized.¹⁰ As noted above, such an experiment will lead to a wider use of the renminbi to denominate China's monetary claims against other countries and debt obligations towards China.

The third initiative concerns China's public finances and the issuance of yuan-denominated bonds in Shanghai and Hong Kong. The Government of the country could also follow the Japanese experience in this situation and expand preferential credit lines in yuan to foreign countries. For example, according to the China Development Bank, in 2009, 4.65% of the total amount of YUAN-denominated loans totaling 2.9 trillion yuan was made outside the main territory of the country, amounting to 135 billion yuan. RMB, or about $20 billion.

Subject to the expansion of such loans in the future, they can be appropriately denominated in RMB. In a similar situation, in order to increase the share of monetary claims of the People's Republic of China expressed in yuan to the rest of the world, the government of this country is invited to issue additional "Panda bonds", which are issued by non-residents, denominated in yuan and traded on the national stock market of China ¹².

In 2005, the International Finance Corporation and the Asian Development Bank issued "Panda" bonds in the amount of 1.13 billion and 1 billion rubles. RMB, respectively, although the funds raised in this way were supposed to be used to finance local operations of issuers. Finally, in addition to Chinese financial institutions, a number of selected foreign banks operating in the country were authorized to issue RMB-denominated bonds in Hong Kong (see Table 2).

In turn, the Ministry of Finance of the People's Republic of China decided to issue government bonds denominated in yuan in the amount of 6 billion yuan. RMB in September 2009 in Hong Kong. This is the first bond issue of its kind, which was implemented with two goals: to increase the role of the renminbi in the international market and to create the basis for other renminbi bond issues in Hong Kong.

Despite the fact that such an operation would lead to an increase in China's foreign liabilities denominated in the national currency (or a corresponding increase in the long position of this country in foreign currency),

Table 2 ¹³

RMB-denominated bond issues in Hong Kong, 2007-2009

* Shanghai Inter-Bank Offered Rate - the money supply rate of the interbank market in Shanghai.

such a strategy could expand the role of the yuan in offshore financial transactions.

While most of this analysis focuses on the positive aspects of the impact of the internationalization of the yuan on the Chinese economy, the following questions should also be kept in mind: under what conditions will debtors redenominate their obligations in yuan, and why should parties to a transaction located outside the PRC have RMB - denominated debt on their balance sheets if this currency is located in the are you at risk of a sharp rise in prices against other foreign currencies?

One of the fundamental conditions for RMB internationalization is that borrowers in other countries should be prepared to have RMB-denominated liabilities on their balance sheets. And if the value of the yuan is seriously undervalued, and the currency is at risk of a significant jump in the exchange rate against, for example, the US dollar, then it will be very difficult to force foreign borrowers to take on debt denominated in yuan.

EFFECTIVE RMB EXCHANGE RATE

The problem of a sharp appreciation of the yuan is widely discussed by many economists, who believe that the value of this currency is undervalued. Theoretical and practical research shows that the yuan should actually have a higher exchange rate relative to other currencies. ¹⁴ However, the degree of this underestimation varies significantly from study to study.¹⁵ Most of them exaggerate or, on the contrary, underestimate the level of the real value of the yuan.

Some Chinese economists point to the uncertainty associated with any calculation of the degree to which the value of the renminbi is undervalued16. Their arguments are based on the well-known empirical observation of the relationship between the exchange rate and real income, according to which prices, especially for non-tradable goods and services, tend to be higher in countries with higher per capita incomes.

The same economists have shown that their basic argument holds true when considering other possible determinants of the exchange rate model, including economic openness, the current trade balance, the budget deficit, the level of capital flow control, and corruption. Based on this model, it is possible to obtain quite significant quantitative discrepancies in the assessment of the value of the yuan, although it is difficult to say that the alleged discrepancy arises due to the presence of clear signs of underestimation of the value of the latter.

However, IMF economists express doubts about the reliability of the results of such studies.¹⁷ They argue that this approach may lead to a number of undervalued valuations of the renminbi18. They also indicate that in generally accepted models of the equilibrium exchange rate, there are small changes in the main parameters, various explanatory characteristics, and periodical parameters.-

The results of the analysis can lead to large variations in the estimation of the equilibrium exchange rate.

Insufficient empirical evidence does not exclude the possibility of underestimating the value of the yuan. The evidence obtained from these data is so small that it is impossible to exclude a number of hypotheses put forward to measure the value of the yuan when referring to them. In this regard, we should most likely not talk about undervaluing or overstating the yuan, but rather about the need to develop weighty recommendations for implementing policies on yuan reserves, since governments and companies of China's trading partners somehow need to decide whether or not to redenominate their debts in yuan.

From an economic point of view, the Chinese authorities adhere to a gradualist approach (i.e., gradual, step-by-step, progressive implementation of reforms as an alternative to the "shock therapy" implemented in Russia in the early 1990s). and they focus on socio-economic stability in the country. Therefore, a significant rise in the price of the yuan should be considered as a risk of disruption of the national economic policy of the People's Republic of China and a threat to the development of industrial and trade relations with other countries in Asia and the world.

This means that, given China's policy of gradualism, expectations about the prospects for a sharp appreciation of the yuan cannot block the process of internationalization of the yuan.

SPECIFICS OF CHINA'S MONETARY POLICY

Most observers believe that the monetary policy of regulating the yuan's exchange rate has returned after the short period of 2005-2008, when the yuan's exchange rate rose against the US dollar, back to the dollar peg that was typical for 1994-2005 and the current stage of dollar-yuan relations and interdependence. Given this position, the internationalization of the yuan would certainly depend on the prospects for further pegging to the dollar. At that time, all the liquidity advantages of dollar markets caused a process of inertia, while the yuan's position as a reserve currency was unlikely to create any significant competition with the US dollar.

The worst - case scenario for such a hypothesis would be that external yuan debtors would face higher interest rates than dollar-denominated loans, given the long-term growth of the yuan's exchange rate against the dollar.

If the Chinese authorities were to break away from the dollar peg in practice, taking into account a temporary departure from such a policy during the global financial and economic crisis, even in this case, the yuan would still have a chance that in the future more loans will be borrowed in this currency in other countries of the world. In this regard, some economists19 provide evidence that the currency regime of the yuan in the period 2005-2008 was not just an attempt to move away from the dollar peg. At that time, the Chinese authorities managed the yuan against a basket of currencies weighted on the basis of the PRC's trade balance, which is similar to the practice of long-term regulation of the Singapore dollar.

Several facts support this argument.

1. Reports from the People's Bank of China and the State Administration of Foreign Exchange in 2008 pointed to the effectiveness of the RMB exchange rate determination by the Bank for International Settlements in discussing its trends, ²⁰ which may have meant increased attention to the need to find effective instruments for measuring the RMB exchange rate. ²¹ This position is a clear sign of a departure from the tradition established during the Asian financial crisis. According to some Chinese economists, given the high level of competitiveness and price stability, an effective policy regarding a stable exchange rate of the yuan is more beneficial to the PRC than bilateral dollar stability and pegging to the dollar.²²

2. During 2006-2008, the effective exchange rates of the renminbi and the US dollar mostly moved in opposite directions, clearly demonstrating the loss of influence of the dollar cycle on the effective exchange rate of the renminbi during this period; this situation is another sign that the renminbi is moving away from a purely dollar peg.

3. Finally, the same Chinese economists report that during this period the exchange rate of the renminbi tended to approach the level determined by the increase in its value relative to the basket of currencies weighted by the size of the trade balance; in this connection, it should be noted that, similar to the nature of Singapore's monetary policy, the effective level of the renminbi exchange rate%change in both directions.

However, in July 2008, the yuan sharply returned to a tight peg to the US dollar and significantly rose in exchange rate against the background of strengthening of the latter. This means that in the summer of 2008, the PRC changed the policy of managing the exchange rate of the yuan.

A two-year experiment with managing the yuan's exchange rate based on a basket of currencies weighted by the size of the foreign trade balance was ended due to the deepening global financial crisis. The return to dollar stability required that the effective level of the renminbi exchange rate go beyond the upper limit of the 2% swing limit. Given the strengthening of the dollar in the second half of 2008, the Chinese authorities had to create conditions for a significant depreciation of the yuan against the dollar in order to keep it at a stable level of the effective exchange rate.

The change in the yuan exchange rate management policy can be put in a number of general concerns about the existing weakness of the yuan's peg to the dollar due to the very painful structural deficit of the PRC's foreign trade balance with the United States. In addition, this process may indicate the emergence of a new priority to strengthen market confidence due to global financial instability caused by the specifics of the dollar's performance as the world's reserve currency.

The sharp rise in the dollar exchange rate at the end of 2008 was unexpected for many observers and forced to reconsider the strategies of specialists not only in the field of currency trading, but also in asset portfolio management.

Given the restoration of normal trading conditions in the global foreign exchange market, investors ' attitude to China's policy in managing the yuan's exchange rate is gradually changing, thanks to which it is strengthening in comparison with the currencies of the country's main trading partners. As mentioned above, the yuan, which is less pegged to the US dollar, would be a more attractive currency for borrowing. Hence, pegging to the dollar hinders the internationalization of the yuan.

* * *

The experience of Asian countries from mid-2006 to mid-2008 also demonstrates that East Asian currencies show relative stability due to the similarity in the characteristics of their foreign trade baskets.²³ For example, given the similarity of these baskets, if the PRC were to manage the yuan on an effective exchange rate model, while Malaysia was doing the same, but only in relation to its national unit, the ringgit, this could mean a sufficient level of stability in the ringgit - to-yuan exchange rate. This would indicate an informal approach to currency stabilization, both based on the effective exchange rate model and in the case of bilateral relations between East Asian countries, combined with strengthening confidence in the monetary policies of these countries.

A more stable exchange rate of the yuan against other currencies of East Asian countries will eventually help to increase its use within the region. However, the events of 2008 demonstrate that such policies are ineffective when severe capital outflows from regional markets have a negative impact on currencies that are protected by various levels of control, or when the strengthening of the US dollar causes an asymmetry in policies based on the exchange rate setting model of a foreign trade basket.

In general, the potential return of yuan exchange rate management to the 2006-2008 policy is not a reason for China's trading partners to abandon their plans to denominate their debts in yuan.

To a certain extent, China's monetary policy can be interpreted as an attempt to provide the rest of the world with an alternative source of financing in the form of YUAN loans. But if China's trading partners consider that the yuan is subject to sharp jumps, then the prospects for its internationalization are very weak. And if these same trading partners abandon the yuan as an alternative to the dollar with a more or less likely upward trend in relation to other leading world currencies, then even in this case, the internationalization of the Chinese national currency is unlikely.

The full internationalization of the renminbi will ultimately require the liberalization of current account transactions in China. However, the measures that China is taking in this direction give reason to believe that its authorities are testing the internationalization of the yuan within the framework of existing capital flow control norms.

^{McGuire P., Peter G. von.} 1 The US dollar shortage in glodal banking. // BIC Quarterly Review. 2009. N 1, p. 47 - 63.

^{Baba N., McCauley R., Ramaswamy S.} 2 US dollar money market funds and non-US banks // BIS Quarterly Review. 2009. N 1, p. 47 - 63.

^{Ma G., Zhou H.} 3 China's evolving external wealth and rising creditor position // BIS Working Papers. 2009. N 286, p. 7.

⁴ Ibid., p. 8.

^Takagi 5 S. Internationalising the yen, 1984 - 2003: unfinished agenda or mission impossible? // BIS Papers. 2011. N 61, p. 75 - 92.

⁶ Ibidem.

^{Blanchard O., Giavazzi F., Sa F.} 7 The U.S. current account and the dollar // NBER Working Paper. 2005. N 11137, p. 19.

^{Genberg H., McCauley R., Persaud A., Park Y. -C.} 8 Official reserves and currency management in Asia: myth, reality and the future // Geneva reports on the world economy. 2005. N 7, p. 10.

⁹ People's Bank of China. Note purchase agreement between the People's Bank of China and the International Monetarv Fund. Beijing, 2009.

^{Cui L., Chang S., Chang J.} 10 Exchange rate pass-through and currency invoicing in China's exports // HKMA China Economic Issues. 2009. N 2, p. 10.

¹¹ Ibidem.

^{Yu Y.} 12 Panda bonds could help China avoid the risks of US Treasury bonds // East Asia Forum www.//www.eastasiaforum.org/2008/ 12/19/panda-bonds-could-help-china-avoid-the-risks-of-us-treasury-bonds/

¹³ People's Bank of China...

^{Frankel J.} 14 On the Yuan: the choice between adjustment under a fixed exchange rate and adjustment under a flexible rate // CEFifo Economic Studies. 2006. N 52 (2), p. 246 - 275.

^{Goldstein M., Lardy N.} 15 Debating China's Exchange Rate Policy. Washington, 2008.

^{Cheung Y. -W., Chinn M.D., Fujii E.} 16 The overvaluation of renminbi undervaluation // Journal of International Money & Finance. 2007. N 26, p. 762 - 785.

^{Dunaway S., Li X.} 17 Estimating China's equilibrium real exchange rate // IMF Working Paper. 2005. N 05 (202), p. 3 - 9.

^{Dunaway S., Leigh L., Li X.} 18 How robust are estimates of equilibrium real exchange rates: The case of China // Pacific Economic Review. 2009. N 14, p. 361 - 375.

^{Ma G., McCauley R.N.} 19 The evolving renminbi regime and implications for Asian currency stability // BIS Working Papers. 2010. N 321, p. 1 - 15.

²⁰ People's Bank of China. China's Monetary Policy Report. Beijing, 2008.

²¹ State Administration of Foreign Exchange. China Balance of Payments Report 2007. Beijing, 2008.

^{Fung S., Klau M., Ma G., McCauley R.} 22 Implications of refined renminbi effective exchange rates with Asian entrepot and intra-regional trade - in Cheung Y. -W., Wong K. -Y. China and Asia: economic and financial interactions. London, 2009, p. 178 - 193.

^{Ma G., McCauley R.N.} 23 Op. cit.

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