The political course of the Soviet Union towards China was developed under the leadership and direct participation of V. I. Lenin in the first years after the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution. In the constantly changing conditions of the development of Soviet-Chinese relations, the Communist Party and the Soviet Government invariably and consistently implemented Lenin's policy. The resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU of January 31, 1977 "On the 60th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution" emphasizes:: "Today, at a new stage in the development of our country, when the unprecedented tasks of communist construction are being solved and the task of ensuring lasting peace on earth is of great importance, the consistency and unbreakable continuity of the Leninist course of our party is being demonstrated with renewed force."1 .

Soviet historians constantly paid great attention to the development of the problem "V. I. Lenin and China"2 . The initial period of the history of Soviet-Chinese relations was also studied .3 However, this topic is not yet exhausted. This article aims to show Lenin's role in shaping the fundamental principles of the Soviet Union's policy towards China.

Lenin and the Bolshevik Party had been deeply studying China's problems even before the victory of the Great October Revolution. In the first issue of the Iskra newspaper, Lenin's article "The Chinese War" was published, in which, based on the class interests of the Russian and international proletariat, the international significance of China was characterized. Lenin emphasized the irreconcilable contradictions between the Chinese people and their reactionary rulers. He wrote that " the Chinese people... it suffers from the same evils that the Russian is suffering from - the Asiatic government, which extorts taxes from starving peasants and suppresses all aspirations for freedom by military force - the oppression of capital, of labor-

1 Pravda, 1. II. 1977.

2 V. N. Nikiforov. Lenin on China and the Chinese Revolution. Voprosy Istorii, 1952, No. 3; Wang Ming. Lenin, Leninism and the Chinese Revolution, Moscow, 1970; Yu. M. Garushyants, V. I. Lenin on the role of popular masses in the Chinese Revolution of 1911. "Peoples of Asia and Africa", 1966, N 3; G. V. Efimov. To Lenin's assessment of the Revolutionary Democrats of China. "V. I. Lenin and problems of the history of Asian countries", L. 1970; "Lenin and the National liberation Movement in the countries of the East", M. 1970; " Lenin and China. Proceedings of the All-Union Scientific Conference dedicated to the 100th anniversary of the birth of V. I. Lenin", Moscow, 1970; "Lenin and the Problems of modern China", Moscow, 1971.

3 M. S. Kapitsa. Soviet-Chinese Relations, Moscow, 1958; R. A. Mirovitskaya. Movement in China for Recognition of Soviet Russia, Moscow, 1962; S. L. Tikhvinsky. Sun Yat-sen. Foreign Policy Views and Practice, Moscow, 1964; A. N. Kheifets. Soviet Russia and neighboring countries of the East during the Civil War (1918-1920). Moscow, 1964; his. Soviet diplomacy and the peoples of the East. 1921-1927 Moscow, 1968; "Leninist policy of the USSR in relation to China", Moscow, 1968.

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who has also ascended to the Middle Kingdom. " 4 Lenin and the Bolshevik Party welcomed and strongly supported the revolutionary struggle of the Chinese people. The resolution "On the Chinese Revolution" adopted at Lenin's initiative by the Sixth (Prague) All-Russian Conference of the R. S. D. L. P. stated that the conference " states the world significance of the revolutionary struggle of the Chinese people, which brings liberation to Asia and undermines the rule of the European bourgeoisie, welcomes the Republican revolutionaries of China, and testifies to the deep enthusiasm and full sympathy with which the proletariat of Russia the success of the revolutionary people in China " 5 .

While appreciating the Chinese Revolution highly, Lenin showed its weaknesses and negative features. Emphasizing that its first successes were attributed to the alliance of peasant democracy and the liberal bourgeoisie, 6 he noted the counter-revolutionary tendencies inherent in the liberal bourgeoisie, "whose leaders, like Yuan Shih-kai, are most capable of treason: yesterday they were afraid of Bogdykhan, cringed before him; later, when they saw the strength, when they felt the victory of the revolutionary party." they betrayed Bogdychan, and tomorrow they will betray the Democrats for the sake of a deal with some old or new "constitutional" Bogdychan. " 7 In addition, he pointed out the weakness of China's democratic forces: "The proletariat in China is still quite weak , and therefore there is no advanced class capable of resolutely and consciously fighting to bring the democratic revolution to an end. The peasantry, without a leader in the person of the proletariat, is terribly downtrodden, passive, dark, and indifferent to politics." This, according to Lenin, also explained the major shortcomings of the leader of China's revolutionary democracy, Sun Yat-sen: "dreaminess and indecision, which depend on his lack of proletarian support." 8 Considering Sun Yat-sen "a revolutionary democrat, full of nobility and heroism," Lenin also wrote about the weaknesses of his ideology: "It is absolutely reactionary to dream that capitalism can be 'prevented' in China, that a 'social revolution' is easier in China because of its backwardness, and so on. "9
Lenin defined the place of tsarism in the general system of colonial policy of the capitalist powers in China, drawing attention to the fact that tsarism was involved in the colonial exploitation of the Chinese people later than other European powers, at the turn of the XIX and XX centuries. "The policy of plunder,"he noted in 1900," has long been pursued in relation to China by the bourgeois governments of Europe, and now the Russian autocratic government has joined it. " 10 Lenin pointed out the main directions of the predatory colonial policy of Russian imperialism in China: the capture of Port Arthur, the construction of the CER on the territory of Manchuria under the protection of Russian troops, and participation in the division of China by the imperialist powers that had begun .11 During the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, while exposing the policy of tsardom, he again pointed out Manchuria as the object of tsardom's colonial policy in China. Shortly after the outbreak of the war, Lenin wrote a leaflet of the Central Committee of the RSDLP "To the Russian Proletariat". This appeal, widely distributed by local Bolshevik organizations, protested against the colonial policy of tsardom in China: "Why is the Russian worker and peasant now fighting to the death?-

4 V. I. Lenin. PSS. Vol. 4, p. 383.

5 V. I. Lenin. PSS. Vol. 21, p. 155.

6 See V. I. Lenin. PSS. Vol. 22, p. 191.

7 V. I. Lenin. PSS. Vol. 21, pp. 402-403.

8 V. I. Lenin. PSS. Vol. 23, pp. 139, 140.

9 V. I. Lenin. PSS. Vol. 21, pp. 402, 404.

10 V. I. Lenin. PSS. Vol. 4, p. 379.

11 See ibid., p. 380.

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nin with the Japanese? Because of Manchuria and Korea, because of "Yellow Russia"12 . The appeal of the Odessa Committee of the RSDLP, compiled by V. V. Vorovsky, stated: "We do not need Manchuria or Korea, and, consequently, we do not need to fight for them."13 In the following years, Lenin and the Bolsheviks opposed the imperialist Russo-Japanese agreements of 1907-1916 directed against the Chinese people. In their struggle against the enslavement of China by the imperialist Powers and tsardom, Lenin and the Bolsheviks focused on protecting the interests of Chinese workers. Lenin denounced the brutal exploitation of Chinese workers in the construction of the CER 14 - Bolshevik organizations established in the CER exclusion zone and Harbin fought to improve the living conditions of Chinese workers, especially in enterprises owned by Russian capital 15 .

Thus, in 1900-1917. Lenin developed the Bolshevik Party's policy on the development of the revolutionary process in China and Russian-Chinese relations. It was organically linked to the general line of the Bolsheviks on the national-colonial question. Lenin's policy on the Chinese question was to actively support the national liberation and democratic movement and focus on a close alliance with the workers and peasants of China. The Bolshevik Party advocated the overthrow of tsarism and the end of the imperialist colonialist policy in China, and the establishment of equal and friendly relations between Russia and China. This policy was directed both against tsarism and international imperialism, and against Chinese reaction. Lenin's analysis of Russian-Chinese relations and Lenin's assessments also included a list of diplomatic acts that gave Russian-Chinese relations an unequal character and were to be annulled and replaced by new, equal treaties and agreements. This is the treaty of 1896. on the union and construction of the CER, the Boxer Protocol of 1901, which tsarist Russia, along with other imperialist powers, signed, and the Russo-Japanese agreements of 1907-1916, including secret ones.

Lenin and the Bolshevik Party never questioned the legitimacy of the historical borders between Russia and China, which had been negotiated long before tsardom embarked on a colonial policy in China.

Immediately after the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution, the Soviet government, headed by Lenin, began to implement the previously developed policy towards China. The Peace Decree has become a program for establishing new, equal relations between the two countries. In addition to the general principles proclaimed by the Decree on Peace, the provision that the content of secret treaties, "since it is aimed, as in most cases, at providing benefits and privileges to Russian landlords and capitalists, at withholding or increasing annexations of Great Russians, the Government declares unconditionally and unconditionally that the content of secret treaties is not limited to the general principles of the Peace Decree. immediately canceled " 16 . Explaining in his final speech on the report on peace at the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets, which adopted the Decree on Peace, this provision, Lenin noted that " predatory governments not only agreed to plunder,

12 V. I. Lenin. PSS. Vol. 8, p. 170.

13 V. V. Borovsky. Articles and materials on foreign policy issues, Moscow, 1959, p. 63.

14 See V. I. Lenin. PSS. Vol. 4, pp. 380-381.

15 For more information, see A. N. Kheifets. Revolutionary ties between the peoples of Russia and China at the beginning of the XX century. Voprosy Istorii, 1956, No. 12.

16 V. I. Lenin. PSS. Vol. 35, p. 15.

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but among such agreements, they included economic agreements and various other points on good-neighborly relations... We reject all points about looting and violence, but we will cordially accept all points where good-neighborly conditions and economic agreements are concluded, and we cannot reject them. " 17
The adoption of the Decree on Peace meant the annulment of the secret treaty between Russia and Japan on the division of Manchuria into "spheres of influence", signed simultaneously with the Russian-Japanese agreement of July 30, 1907; secret articles of the Russian-Japanese agreement of July 4, 1910 on the" spheres of special interests " of Japan and Russia in China; secret Russian-Japanese convention of 8 July 1912; secret articles of the Russo-Japanese agreement of July 3, 1916. Some of the documents that included these secret agreements were made public in December 1917 in the first publication of documents prepared by the NKID18 . The Peace Decree put an end to Russia's participation in the imperialist policy of dividing China into "spheres of influence" and "spheres of special interests." As for the Russo-Chinese treaties that were of an unequal nature - the treaty of 1896 and the Peking Protocol of 1901-the Soviet Government considered that bilateral negotiations should take place, as a result of which these unequal treaties would be annulled and replaced by a new general Soviet-Chinese treaty.

The NKID began such negotiations with the Chinese envoy in Petrograd in November 1917. According to Li Bo-tan, a member of the Chinese mission in Petrograd, who participated in these negotiations, "a coherent political program was developed for the close rapprochement between the Russian and Chinese democracies." 19 However, it soon became clear that the Soviet Government, in the further development and practical implementation of its policy towards China, also had to take into account some new factors that had a strong influence on the development of Soviet-Chinese relations. The reactionary Beijing government was one of the first to engage in anti-Soviet intervention .20 Immediately after the victory of the October Revolution in Harbin and in the entire exclusion zone of the CER, which, in accordance with the treaty of 1896 in force at that time, was under the control of the Russian administration, the situation became extremely complicated. Workers of the CER, soldiers of the military units that guarded the road, enthusiastically greeted the news of the formation of the Soviet government in Petrograd headed by Lenin. Meanwhile, the imperialist powers were preparing to seize the CER. The Peking government was also in collusion with them, concentrating its troops to attack Russian workers and soldiers.

Lenin, proceeding from the fact that the Treaty of 1896 remains in force until the conclusion of new treaties with the Chinese Government, sent the following telegram to the Harbin Soviet on December 4 (hereinafter referred to in the new style) in 1917:: "In the name of the Soviet of the Workers 'and Peasants' Government, we order that all power be taken into our own hands and that commissars be appointed to the Manchurian, Frontier, and Khabarovsk Customs offices. N 541. Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars Lenin " 21 . When the leaders of the Harbin Soviet, who showed indecisiveness, instead of immediately following Lenin's instructions, sent

17 Ibid., p. 20.

18 See "Collection of secret documents from the archive of the former Ministry of Foreign Affairs". Ptgr. 1917, N 1, pp. 5-8; N 2, pp. 70-71.

19 Izvestia, 6. VI. 1918.

20 See B. G. Sapozhnikov. China and Imperialist Intervention in the Soviet Far East (1918-1922). Voprosy Istorii, 1976, No. 4.

21 " Historical review of the Chinese Eastern Railway. 1896-1923". T. P. Harbin, 1923, p. 594; see also " Vladimir Ilyich Lenin. Biographical chronicle", vol. 5, Moscow, 1974, p. 75.

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In response to a request to Petrograd, the NKID, guided by the political line developed by Lenin, repeatedly proposed that the Harbin Soviet take power, which was carried out on December 12, 1917. As for the Beijing government, it took the path of military action against Soviet Russia. Grossly violating the norms of international law, the Chinese militarist troops entered Harbin on December 25, dispersed the Harbin Soviet, surrounded the barracks of Russian soldiers, opening artillery, rifle and machine-gun fire on them. As a result of the anti-Soviet action of the Chinese militarists, power in Harbin and the CER exclusion zone passed into the hands of the White Guards. The Beijing government was also one of the first to embark on an economic blockade of the Soviet Country. On January 6, 1918, Chinese customs were ordered not to allow any goods to enter Soviet Russia.

These events were within Lenin's field of vision. On January 17, 1918, he interviewed I. Yost, who had arrived in Moscow and witnessed the violence committed by Chinese militarists against Russian soldiers in Manchuria. Vladimir Ilyich sent I. Iost to the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs with a note: "Com. Zalkind! Please listen to the submitter. Maybe we can send him to Siberia. (His report on Manchuria seems interesting.) Lenin"22 .

The anti-Soviet actions of the Chinese government forced a change in the agenda of the Soviet-Chinese negotiations held in Petrograd. In addition to the previously discussed issue of concluding a new general agreement between Russia and China, the situation on the CER in connection with the actions of Chinese troops and the issue of ending the economic blockade of Soviet Russia became the subject of negotiations. Soviet proposals to resolve the current situation created by the Chinese authorities on the CER proceeded from the political line expressed in Lenin's telegram to the Harbin Soviet. They were developed by an interdepartmental meeting chaired by People's Commissar of Finance V. R. Menzhinsky. The Soviet side considered that the Treaty of 1896 would remain in force until the conclusion of a new Soviet-Chinese treaty. It was proposed to transfer the administration of Harbin and other cities in the CER exclusion zone to the local Soviets of workers 'and Peasants' deputies - Russians and Chinese-and to create a civil militia of Russians and Chinese on a parity basis. 23 The instructions of the NKID to the International departments of the regional Soviets of February 22, 1918 stated: "With regard to the East China Road, it should be remembered that the Treaty of 1896, which we have recognized and China has not yet protested, remains in force, and, consequently, China retains its supreme rights to the territory through which the road runs, and it is obliged to protect it, without interfering with the internal schedule of the road and in our self-government." The instruction stated that "the current Beijing government is not the representative of the will of the Chinese people." 24
The anti-Soviet position of the Beijing government, which stood as a united front with the imperialist powers, led to the breakdown of the Soviet-Chinese negotiations. In March 1918, the Chinese envoy, together with the Entente diplomats, left Soviet Russia. Even before the start of the general intervention of the Entente countries in the Far East, Chinese militarists took a number of anti-Soviet actions. In mid-January 1918, a high-ranking Chinese official arrived in Blagoveshchensk and told the local authorities that if measures were not taken to ensure the safety of Chinese and other foreigners, the city would be occupied by the Chinese authorities. Reported

22 " Vladimir Ilyich Lenin. Biographical Chronicle", vol. 5, pp. 176-177.

23 "Nash vek" (Petrograd), 27.1.118.

24 " Documents of the Foreign Policy of the USSR "(DVP), Vol. I. M. 1957, pp. 110-111.

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and the transfer of Chinese cavalry to Blagoveshchensk 25 . Threatening to seize Kyakhta (Troitskosavsk), the Chinese authorities forced the local council to resign and transfer power to the bourgeois City Duma .26 In March - September 1918, China signed several military agreements with Japan on joint actions against Soviet Russia. Manchuria was turned into an anti-Soviet springboard. On June 24, 1918, the Peking government issued a decree sending Chinese troops to Vladivostok, and on August 24 issued an official declaration on sending troops to Siberia .27
The Chinese authorities provided all possible support to the gangs of Semenov and other White Guards. In the spring of 1919, Lenin was given a report on the number of interventionist troops for March 1919, in which, in particular, it was reported: "So far there have been a certain number of Chinese troops in the Primorsky region. After the Amur events (meaning the fighting of the partisans of the Amur region. - A. Kh.), the Japanese demanded the strengthening of Chinese units... China's forces can be estimated at little more than one division. " 28 In addition to the ground forces, there was a Chinese cruiser in Vladivostok, and several gunboats on the Amur. It is characteristic that after the expulsion of the White Guards from the Amur region, the Chinese militarists violated the border and sent their troops to Blagoveshchensk. In the report of the border commissar of the Amur region to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Far Eastern Federal District dated December 31, 1920, it was noted: "The Chinese, seeking to seize as many privileges as possible, did not confine themselves to just keeping in the mountains. In Blagoveshchensk, parts of their troops entered immediately after the coup... Armed Chinese began to interfere in the life of the city. " 29
Blinded by class hatred and in the service of foreign colonialists, the Chinese reactionaries betrayed the national interests of their people. In response to the Soviet government's refusal to accept payments under the "boxer indemnity", the Beijing government signed an agreement with the former tsarist envoy N. A. Kudashev regarding the terms of payment of the indemnity and transferred the corresponding amounts to Kolchak. 30 The participation of the Chinese reaction in the counter-revolutionary struggle against the Country of Soviets could not but affect Soviet-Chinese relations. The working people of Soviet Russia rose up to fight the White Guards and foreign (including Chinese) interventionists. But at the same time, the Soviet Government stressed that it saw a fundamental difference between the policy of the reactionary Beijing government and the true national interests of the Chinese people.

Soviet diplomacy, directed and directed by Lenin, took the most energetic measures to concretize and convey to the broad strata of the Chinese people the principles of Soviet Russia's foreign policy based on the ideas of internationalism, equality of rights and friendship of peoples. Developing the main provisions formulated in Lenin's Decree on Peace, the Soviet Government, in early July 1918, in G. V. Chicherin's report to the Fifth All-Russian Congress of Soviets, set out in a detailed form a program for further friendly relations with China. "We have notified China," Chicherin said, " that we refuse to seize the tsarist government in Manchuria and Eastern Siberia.-

25 "Voice of Primorye", 30. 1. 1918.

26 TsGAOR USSR, f. 130, op. 2, d. 494, l. 104.

27 V. P. Savvin. Relations of Tsarist Russia and the USSR with China. Moscow-L. 1930, p. 94.

28 See A. N. Kheifets. Soviet Russia and neighboring countries of the East during the Civil War (1918-1920). Moscow, 1964, pp. 363-364.

29 TsGA RSFSR DV.

30 See M. S. Kapitsa. Op. ed., p. 10.

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we are seizing China's sovereign rights in the territory through which the most important trade artery - the East China Railway-runs, the property of the Chinese and Russian peoples, which has swallowed many millions of people's money and therefore belongs only to these peoples and no one else. And even further, we believe that if part of the Russian people's money invested in the construction of this road is reimbursed to them by China, China can buy it back without waiting for the terms stipulated by the contract imposed on it by force. We have withdrawn from China all the military guards attached to the consulates sent there by the tsarist government and the Kerensky government to maintain the autocracy and arbitrariness of the old Russian officials. We agree to give up the extraterrestrial rights of our citizens in China, Mongolia, and Persia. We are ready to renounce the indemnities imposed on the peoples of China, Mongolia, and Persia under various pretexts by the former Russian Government. We would only like these millions of people's money to be used for the cultural development of the masses and for the rapprochement of the Eastern democracies with the Russian one. " 31
The Leninist program of the Soviet Government on the Chinese question was further developed in the appeal of the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR to the Chinese people and the governments of Southern and Northern China of July 25, 1919, the draft of which was discussed in Moscow at a meeting of Chinese workers and Red Army soldiers. The appeal stated that, having defeated Kolchak, the Red Army was approaching the borders of China. In this connection, the Soviet government considered it necessary to once again bring to the attention of the Chinese people "what has been said to them since the Great October Revolution of 1917." The appeal confirmed that the Decree of Peace declared all secret treaties concerning China destroyed, and recalled the negotiations on the annulment of the Treaty of 1896, the Protocol of 1901, and all agreements with Japan of 1907-1916 that were disrupted in March 1918 by the Chinese side. As noted in the appeal, the Entente countries " forced the Chinese troops to help in this criminal and unheard-of robbery." The appeal stated that the Soviet government had abandoned " the conquests that the tsarist government made by taking Manchuria and other regions from China. Let the peoples living in these regions decide for themselves within the borders of which State they wish to be and what form of government they wish to establish at home. " 32
In this case, it was a question of both Manchuria and External Asia and a significant part of Inner Mongolia, which were the" sphere of influence " of tsarist Russia. While renouncing any claim to these territories, the Soviet Government did not believe that the fate of the Mongolian people should be decided by Chinese militarists. Almost simultaneously with the adoption of the document under consideration here, the Soviet Government sent an appeal to the "Mongolian people and the Government of Autonomous Mongolia", which, in particular, stated: "No foreigner has the right to interfere in the internal affairs of Mongolia. In abrogation of the agreement of 1913, Mongolia, as an independent country, has the right to communicate directly with all other peoples without any guardianship on the part of Peking and Petrograd." In this appeal, it was proposed to "immediately enter into diplomatic relations and send envoys of the free Mongolian people to meet the Red Army"

31 G. V. Chicherin. Articles and Speeches on International Policy Issues, Moscow, 1961, p. 59.

32 DVP. Vol. II. Moscow, 1958, pp. 221-222.

33 Outer Mongolia achieved de facto independence from China in 1911-1913.

34 Cit. by: V. P. Savvin. Decree op., pp. 87-88.

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The second important provision of the appeal to the Chinese people was a statement of refusal to receive a "boxing indemnity". At the same time, it was emphasized that the Soviet government was forced to repeat this statement for the third time, and it was noted that the corresponding amounts continue to flow to the White Guards. This was followed by a statement from the Soviet Government that all special privileges of Russian merchants related to the right of extraterritoriality and consular jurisdiction were abolished. On the basis of these proposals, official relations between the two countries were to be established, and as a result of negotiations, the above-mentioned unequal treaties were replaced by a new, equal Soviet-Chinese treaty. "The Soviet Government," the document concluded, "invites the Chinese people, represented by their Government, to enter into official relations with us immediately and send their representatives to meet our army." 35
By advocating the abolition of unequal treaties and expressing its willingness to give up privileges, the Soviet Government did not see this as a unilateral act of the RSFSR. It believed that the old treaties would become invalid only when a new, equal agreement was concluded, which would take into account the interests of both States. Naturally, it took into account and protected the national interests of the Soviet state. Thus, the Council of People's Commissars did not consider it possible to support the proposal put forward at the meeting of Chinese workers and Red Army soldiers in Moscow to include in the text of the appeal of the Council of People's Commissars to the Chinese people a statement on the transfer of the CER to China without any remuneration .36 Subsequently, a Soviet note to the Chinese Government stated:"The Chinese Government will acquire the rights deriving from the principles of the Soviet declarations only if these principles are formalized by a bilateral act of international significance." 37
Under conditions when the reactionary Beijing government blocked the implementation of Lenin's program of establishing friendly Soviet-Chinese relations, the Soviet government attached special importance to rapprochement with the progressive, democratic forces of China and the Chinese working people who found themselves on the territory of Soviet Russia. When Sun Yat-sen sent a telegram of welcome to Lenin from Shanghai via Canada in the summer of 1918, the Council of People's Commissars instructed Chicherin to write a reply letter to the Chinese revolutionary .38 Assessing the significance of this document, the chairman of the Union of Chinese Workers in Russia, Liu Tse-rong, said:: "One can imagine the joy of those Chinese revolutionaries who, through the fiery ring of war and revolution, heard the voice of the Soviet Government of Russia in its appeal to the peoples of the East, and especially in Comrade Chicherin's letter to the pride of China, Sun Yat - sen."39
On August 28, 1921, Sun Yat-sen sent a letter to Chicherin expressing his feelings of friendship for the Soviet people and his desire to use the experience of Soviet Russia for the cause of the Chinese Revolution. He asked me to convey his best wishes to "my friend Lenin." 40 Shortly after receiving the letter, on November 6, 1921, Chicherin sent this letter to Vladimir Ilyich. Chicherin asked Lenin if he knew Sun Yat-sen personally. The next day Vladimir Ilyich replied,

35 DVP. Vol. II, pp. 222-223.

36 V. A. Antonov-Ovseenko. Agreement on the Sino-Eastern Railway. (historical and political essay). Izvestia, 12. VI. 1924.

37 DVP. V. VI. Moscow, 1962, p. 538.

38 Ibid., vol. I, pp. 415-416.

39 "The First Congress of the Communist International", Moscow, 1933, p. 243.

40 DVP. T. V. M. 1961, pp. 84-85.

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that he and Sun Yat-sen had not met and there had been no correspondence between them until then. He believed that with Sun Yat-sen, "you need to be nice in every possible way, write more regularly."41. On January 26, 1922, Lenin sent the following note: "vol. Chicherin! Do you remember when you sent me Sun Yat - sen's letter? In it, he also said something about being friends with me, and you asked me if I knew him? Was this letter addressed to you or to me? Do you still have it in your archive? and my response with your request? If so, can you send it to me (to Fotieva's address)? If not, what do you remember about it?"42 . Two days later, Sun Yat-sen's required letter was delivered to Lenin. Responding to his note, G. V. Chicherin said that a representative of the Kuomintang headed by Sun Yat-sen is in Moscow and de facto relations will be established with the government of Sun Yat-sen .43
In a letter to Sun Yat-sen sent in early February 1922, Chicherin wrote:: "All our sympathies are, of course, on the side of the people's, progressive, liberation forces of China. But the Beijing government, whatever it is, is the official government of the Chinese state, and we strive to establish normal relations with it." The letter went on to say: "Comrade Lenin also read your letter with the greatest interest and follows your activities with warm sympathy."44
The available sources do not allow us to find out why Lenin requested Sun Yat-sen's letter in early 1922. Perhaps he wanted to write or wrote a personal message to the leader of the progressive forces of China. In this regard, the testimony of Sun Yat-sen's widow, Sun Jing-ling, is of interest: "Sun Yat-sen left us more than a dream. He left behind, as the great Lenin put it in a letter to him, a continuous zeal for the revolution."45 The literature has suggested that there was a direct exchange of letters between Lenin and Sun Yat-sen .46
Lenin paid much attention to the Chinese workers who found themselves in the odes of the First World War on the territory of Russia. At the end of November 1918, he interviewed representatives of the Union of Chinese Workers in Russia47 . Due to the fact that the Beijing government, by its anti-Soviet actions, grossly violated China's national interests, shortly after this meeting, the Soviet Government recognized the right of the Chinese Workers ' Union to represent the interests of Chinese citizens in Russia. The building of the former Chinese mission in Petrograd was transferred to this organization .48 At the beginning of December 1918, the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs sent a special letter to the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission to all Soviets of Deputies and local extraordinary commissions, in which, in particular, it was stated: "It is necessary to explain to the bodies dependent on you that Chinese and other Eastern countries' citizens in Russia can by no means be counted among the bourgeois classes and degrees responsible for the policies of their corrupt governments. " 49
41 See V. I. Lenin, PSS. Vol. 54, pp. 602-603; A. I. Kartunova. Sun Yat-sen is a friend of the Soviet people. "Questions of the history of the CPSU", 1966, N 10, p. 30.

42 V. I. Lenin. PSS. Vol. 54, pp. 141-142.

43 See Lenin's Collection XXXVI, p. 410; A. I. Kartunova. Decree op., p. 31.

44 DVP. Vol. V, pp. 83-84.

45 Sun Jing-ling. Sun Yat-sen is a great revolutionary-the son of the Chinese people. "People's China", 1956, N 22, p. 9.

46 See A. I. Kartunov. Op. ed., p. 33,

47 Izvestia, 3. XII. 1918.

48 Izvestia, 26. XII. 1918.

49 DVP. Vol. I, p. 599.

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Chinese workers actively supported the Soviet government's policy towards China. On May 3, 1919, the chairman of the Union of Chinese Workers in Russia, Liu Tse-rong, and the chairman of the Union of Chinese Citizens in Ukraine, Zhu Shao-yang, addressed Lenin with a proposal to send a delegation of their organizations to China "provided that it included a representative of the Soviet government who was invested with the necessary powers and was familiar with China."50
Lenin received Liu Tse-rong several times. "Lenin asked me about China, about the Chinese revolution," Liu Tse-rong recalls, about a meeting that took place in November 1919. " I was young and still far from a proper understanding of international politics, and I knew too little about events in China to tell him anything new or interesting for him. I myself learned a lot of valuable things from my conversation with Vladimir Ilyich, having heard from him a number of deep thoughts on the fate of China, the struggle of the Chinese people against imperialism, and the importance of rapprochement between the peoples of China and Soviet Russia." Vladimir Ilyich took a detailed interest in the situation of the Chinese workers and the work of their union. On the certificate issued to Liu Tse-rong by the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, he wrote the following note in red ink:: "For my part, I earnestly request all Soviet institutions and authorities to render every possible assistance to Comrade Stalin. Lau Siu-jau 51.Sov Ave. Narcom. V. Ulyanov (Lenin) " 52 .

The Chinese workers expressed their deep gratitude to Lenin and the Soviet Government for a truly internationalist policy. In September 1919, a representative of the Union of Chinese Workers in Russia handed over to the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs a gift for Vladimir Ilyich and a letter with the following content: "I ask the Department of the East not to refuse to forward to Comrade V. I. Lenin the enclosed box of green tea received from China and sent to him by Chinese

On the occasion of Vladimir Ilyich's fiftieth birthday, Chinese workers sent him a poem of congratulations embroidered in silk: "WE CONGRATULATE COMRADE LENIN ON his FIFTIETH BIRTHDAY.

The working people of the universe are now in revolt To transform the weak countries of the poor into a new world. The peasants and workers of all countries look at Lenin with admiration.

Congratulations to all Chinese workers in Russia " 54 .

On October 16, 1920, Liu Tse-rong sent a letter to Lenin from Petrograd: "Dear Vladimir Ilyich, When I leave for China, I send you my heartfelt greetings and many thanks for your always good attitude towards me, and especially for your attentive and sympathetic attitude towards the union I lead. " 55
Of inestimable importance to the liberation struggle of the Chinese people was Lenin's elaboration of the problems of the national liberation struggle of the oppressed peoples of the East and the revolutionary process in China. Lenin's teaching, accepted by the best representatives of the revolutionary movement in China, became the basis on which the Chinese people were able to develop their own ideas.

50 See A. N. Kheifets. Soviet Russia and neighboring Eastern countries during the Civil War (1918-1920), pp. 360-361.

51 Documents of the time transcribed Liu Tse-rong's name in this way.

52 Liu Tse-rong. Meetings with the great Lenin. "Memories of Vladimir Ilyich Lenin". Vol. 5. Moscow, 1969, p. 251.

53 "Letters to V. I. Lenin from abroad", Moscow, 1966, p. 132.

54 Ibid., p. 138.

55 CP IML.

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Marxist internationalists created the Communist Party of China. V. I. Lenin showed concern for the first Chinese Communists, both those who, once in Soviet Russia, joined the ranks of the RCP (b), and those who created communist organizations in their homeland. At the Third Congress of the Union of Chinese Workers in Russia, held in Moscow in June 1920, a Communist faction was formed and sent a message to " The leader of the Proletariat of the Whole World, Comrade Lenin. To Lenin." The message read: "The Communist Group of the Third Congress of Chinese Workers welcomes you, our dear leader and teacher... The Russian Socialist Republic is our fortress and hope. We will achieve the emancipation of the Chinese workers and peasants, and then the 500 million working people of China will reach out to the proletariat of Russia. The Bureau of Chinese Communists is now organized in Moscow, which has taken it upon itself to carry out this basic goal of the workers and peasants into practice. " 56 During the Third Congress of the Comintern, Lenin met with one of the founders of the first communist organizations in China, Qu Qiu-bo .57 The remarkable Chinese communist internationalist Li Da-zhao said: "Lenin is the best friend of weak and small nations, the most devoted servant of the oppressed, a noble and courageous fighter who devoted himself to the cause of world revolution. Lenin's words: if the success of the world revolution demands the greatest sacrifice from the Russian people, they will not hesitate to make it-a vivid confirmation of their nobility, courage, and greatness! " 58
Lenin's instructions on the tactics of Communists in national liberation revolutions, formulated at the Second Congress of the Comintern, contributed to the creation of a revolutionary base in southern China, led by Sun Yat-sen. In carrying out Lenin's policy, the Central Committee of the RCP (b) and the Soviet Government effectively supported the revolutionary struggle of the Chinese people. In March 1923, the Soviet government decided to provide financial assistance to the government of Sun Yat-sen and send a group of advisers to him. In September, a delegation from Sun Yat-sen's government arrived in Moscow. The Secretary of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), Y. E. Rudzutak, and other Soviet party, state, and military leaders, in the course of negotiations with the Chinese delegation, followed Lenin's line on the liberation struggle of the Chinese people. A broad program of assistance to the Government of Sun Yat-sen and the revolutionary army he was creating was developed. But at the same time, the Soviet leaders emphasized that the revolutionary struggle is by no means limited to creating an army and conducting combat operations. After discussing the situation with the Chinese delegates, the RVS of the USSR came to the conclusion that "at present, Sun Yat-sen and the Kuomintang Party must direct all their efforts to political work in China, otherwise any military operation under the current conditions will be doomed to failure... The issue of political preparation is the most important one for China at the present time. True, we should not forget the military work, but military operations on a large scale can only be started when a lot of political work is done, and internal prerequisites are prepared that will significantly facilitate the military part of the work. " 59
Lenin attached great importance to the struggle of the Mongol people against the oppression of the imperialist Powers and the colonialist policy of the Chinese militarists and the usurious trade regime.

56 CP IML.

57 Qu Qiu-bo. Lenin. "Memories of Vladimir Ilyich Lenin". Vol. 5, p. 441.

58 Lee Da-jao. Selected articles and Speeches, Moscow, 1965, p. 213.

59 See A. I. Kartunova and V. K. Blucher in China 1924-1927, Moscow, 1970, p. 18.

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capital formation. In September 1920, he received a delegation of Mongolian revolutionaries. When the delegates asked Vladimir Ilyich how he felt about their struggle for the liberation of Mongolia from the Chinese military, which was under the influence of Japan, Lenin gave a detailed analysis of the situation of Mongolia and noted that the only correct way for all its workers is to fight for the state and economic independence of their country .60 The military, political, and economic assistance given to the Mongolian people on Lenin's initiative contributed to the victory of the people's revolution in Mongolia. Lenin and the Soviet Government consistently defended the independence of People's Mongolia from the aggressive encroachments of the imperialist Powers and Chinese reaction. On November 5, 1921, the Soviet-Mongolian agreement was signed in Moscow, the main political content of which was the recognition of Mongolia's independence and the establishment of friendly relations between Soviet Russia and revolutionary Mongolia, which was entering the path of non-capitalist development. On the day of signing the agreement, Lenin had a detailed conversation with the Mongolian delegation .61 In January 1922, he again met with envoys of the Mongolian people, participants of the First Congress of the Peoples of the Far East. In the book published in Japan by congress delegate Hajime Yoshida, "Notes on a Meeting with Lenin", it is reported that Vladimir Ilyich told the representatives of Mongolia something like this:: "Mongolia has freed itself from Chinese capitalism, it intends to become independent, but we must not lose our vigilance. China wants to plunder it and is now only looking for an opportunity. Therefore, you, comrades, have a great responsibility for the future. " 62 During the negotiations with China, the Soviet side invariably pursued a Leninist policy of supporting Mongolia's national independence. Explaining the position of the Soviet government, L. M. Karakhan noted on August 30, 1922: "This new fact - the Mongolian Republic-cannot be discounted." To recognize unconditionally the right of China to rule in Mongolia means to completely disregard "the fact of the existence of the Mongolian Republic, the treaty that we concluded with it. This means giving Mongolia to the Chinese in the most treacherous way. " 63
The Soviet policy was supported by the democratic forces of China. A representative of the workers 'organizations declared on November 7, 1922, at a reception at the Soviet mission in Beijing:" The Chinese proletariat has spoken out in favor of the independence of Mongolia... Why allow Chinese militarists who oppress the Chinese people to go and oppress Mongolia? " 64
Based on the concrete situation prevailing in China, Lenin and the Soviet Government believed that the establishment of official relations with the then Beijing government, despite its reactionary policies hostile to the national interests of the Chinese people, would strengthen the position of the Chinese democratic forces and deal a blow to the imperialist Powers that oppressed the Chinese people. This step would have served the state and national interests of Soviet Russia, which sought to normalize relations with its eastern neighbor. The failure of the anti-Soviet intervention of the imperialist powers, in which the Beijing government also participated, and the intensification of the democratic and anti-imperialist movement in China forced

60 Pravda, 12. VI. 1936.

61 See V. I. Lenin, PSS. Vol. 44, pp. 232-233.

62 Cit. by: V. Tsvetov. ...Our correspondent reports from Russia ... Moscow, 1969, pp. 87-88.

63 Cit. by: V. Sokolov. Breaking the diplomatic blockade. "International Life", 1974, N 11, p. 114.

64 Pravda, 11. XI. 1922.

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the Beijing government is maneuvering. The Chinese militarists could no longer reject any contact with the Soviet State.

In March 1920, the Beijing government decided to send a military and diplomatic mission to Soviet Russia, headed by General Zhang Si-lin. On March 14, the mission arrived in Harbin, but its further advance was soon suspended, and it was not until May that it crossed the front line (between Semenov's gangs and the Far Eastern Front troops) and asked for help getting it to Verkhneudinsk. On June 29, Zhang Si-lin sent a telegram from Verkhneudinsk to Lenin and Chicherin asking them to let him go to Moscow, but he did not give any information about the nature of the mission and its powers. In this regard, Chicherin telegraphed to the Beijing Ministry of Foreign Affairs for confirmation of the status and powers of the mission 65 . However, the Beijing government remained silent, not wanting to make Zhang Si-lin's mission official.

In the memoirs of Liu Tse-rong, the question of the future fate of Zhang Si - lin's mission is stated as follows: "It became clear that the Chinese government did not dare to ask the Soviet government to officially accept the mission... I decided then to go directly to Vladimir Ilyich and ask him if he would find it possible to order the mission to pass to Moscow without waiting for a reply from Beijing... I presented my thoughts to Vladimir Ilyich. He considered it possible for the mission to arrive in Moscow without official notification from Beijing ... " 66 . During this conversation, which took place on August 11, 1920, Lenin wrote the following note to the Secretary of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), N. N. Krestinsky: "Com. Krestinsky! Comrade Lau, Chairman of the Union of Chinese Workers in Russia, needs to talk to you about a number of issues. I would very much like to give him this opportunity. " 67
At Lenin's direction, the RSFSR People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs requested the Government of the Far Eastern Federal District to provide a special train to the Zhang Si-lin mission, but the mission unexpectedly postponed its departure. She arrived in Moscow only on September 5, 1920. On September 27, Zhang Si-lin received the "Appeal of the Government of the RSFSR to the Government of the Republic of China". It expressed confidence that "there are no issues between the Russian and Chinese people that cannot be resolved for the common good of both peoples", and at the same time noted: "Unfortunately, something prevents the rapid establishment of friendly relations between Russia and China. Your Mission, which could have been convinced of our sincere and friendly attitude towards China, has not yet received proper instructions to proceed with the formation of friendship between the two peoples." In an effort to speed up the establishment of such relations, the Soviet government formulated the main points of an agreement that could be concluded between the two countries. One of them read: "The Russian and Chinese governments agree to conclude a special agreement on the procedure for using the Chinese Eastern Railway for the needs of the RSFSR, and the Far Eastern Republic also participates in the conclusion of the agreement, in addition to China and Russia." The document also included the obligations that, in the opinion of the Soviet Government, the Beijing government should have assumed in order to eliminate the abnormal situation that arose as a result of the participation of Chinese militarists in the anti-Soviet intervention.

65 DVP. T. III. M. 1959, p. 19.

66 Liu Tse-rong. Op. ed., pp. 252-253.

67 V. I. Lenin. PSS. Vol. 51, p. 256.

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Thus, the main provisions of Lenin's policy towards China, formulated in the Decree on Peace, Chicherin's statement at the Fifth All-Russian Congress of Soviets, and the Soviet Government's Address of July 25, 1919, were set out here in the form of articles of the new Soviet-Chinese treaty, which the Soviet Government was constantly striving to conclude .68 However, the Chinese government soon disavowed Zhang Si-lin's mission and invited her to return to Beijing. V. I. Lenin received Zhang Si-lin on the eve of the latter's departure, on November 2, 1920. Considering the arrival of the Chinese mission as an important step towards familiarization and rapprochement with the Soviet Republic, he expressed confidence that this connection will be strengthened, since China and the RSFSR share common goals in the struggle against imperialism. 69
Despite the contradictory, inconsistent, and anti-Soviet nature of the Beijing government's policy, Zhang Si-lin's visit to Moscow marked the beginning of de facto relations between the two countries. At the same time, contacts were established between China and the Far Eastern Federal Republic, whose diplomatic activities were also directed by Lenin. He attached particular importance to negotiations with the Manchurian authorities on the restoration of railway communication between the Far Eastern Federal Republic and China. The candidacy of a representative of the Far Eastern Federal District to conduct these negotiations was proposed by F. E. Dzerzhinsky on Lenin's personal instructions. His choice fell on a student of the military academy P. F. Zhuykov-Alexandrovsky. Before leaving for the DDA at the end

1920 the Soviet representative was received by Lenin in the presence of Dzerzhinsky and Karakhan. During the conversation, Vladimir Ilyich said to Zhuikov-Alexandrovsky: "Manchuria, where you are going, is a solid nest of different White Guard rump: the unfinished army of ataman Semenov, and the Japanese occupation division also retreated there. Nearby, on the territory of Mongolia, the gangs of Baron Ungern are operating. The Japanese and White Guard intelligence services will be watching you, Comrade Zhuikov-Alexandrovsky, trying to prevent the success of your mission. Your task is to conclude an agreement with the Government of Northern China as soon as possible on opening the border with the Far Eastern Federal District and establishing communication via the Chita and China - Eastern Railways."70 V. I. Lenin's order was fulfilled. On March 6, 1921, representatives of the Far Eastern People's Republic and the Manchurian authorities signed an agreement on the opening of the border and the resumption of railway communication.

In an effort to normalize relations with China, the Soviet government established contacts with local Chinese authorities, while taking measures that were supposed to protect Soviet territory from attacks by white gangs based on Chinese territory and supported by Chinese reaction. After the defeat of the interventionists and the White Guards, there were about 100 thousand White emigrants in China. Many of them held command posts in the armies of the Chinese militarists, in the police and in the Chinese okhrana .71 In May 1921, the military governor of the Tarbagatai district of Xinjiang Province appealed to the command of the Turkestan front with a request to assist in defeating the White Guards who were rampaging in some areas of Xinjiang. On May 17, an agreement was signed between the command of the Turkfront and the authorities of Xinjiang on the entry of the Red Army into Chinese territory. June 25, 1921 Military Governor of Tarbagh-

68 DVP. Vol. III, pp. 213-216.

69 Izvestia, 9. XI. 1920.

70 P. F. Zhuykov-Alexandrovsky. Diplomatic assignment. "Forever alive. Memoirs of contemporaries about Vladimir Ilyich Lenin". Moscow, 1965, pp. 264-265.

71 "Siberian Soviet Encyclopedia", Vol. II. Novosibirsk. 1932, p. 680.

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The Dudong Jiangxiang District of Thailand sent a letter of gratitude to Lenin for freeing the district from the white gangs .72 On September 12, the "Agreement on the entry of Red troops of the RSFSR into the borders of the Republic of China for the elimination of white detachments located in the Altai District"was signed .73 As a result of the successful actions of the Soviet troops, the Altai (Sharasuminsky) district was liberated from the white gangs by the end of September.

Soon the Peking government expressed its readiness to receive a Soviet representative for negotiations. The formation of the Soviet mission in China was in Lenin's field of vision. The Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) decided to appoint A. A. Ioffe as the representative of the RSFSR in Beijing. However, due to the fact that the Chinese side strongly delayed visa processing, he was sent to another job. Meanwhile, in October - November 1921, an agreement was reached to convene a conference with the participation of the RSFSR, the Far Eastern Federal District and China to consider the issue of the CER 74 . On October 10, Chicherin sent a letter to the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), which stated: "To delay these negotiations means to lose the East China railway." He offered to send Yu. Yu. Markhlevsky to China urgently for negotiations on the CER, and to approve A. K. Paikes as a delegate of the RSFSR at the conference in Dairen. On this letter Lenin wrote to the members of the Politburo: "Hurry! I suggest that you either vote immediately in writing, or convene the Politburo for half an hour. I suggest that we agree to Markhlevsky and Paikes (who goes to Dairen and who goes to Chita, let Chicherin decide). " 75
In December 1921, Paikes arrived in Beijing as an Extraordinary Representative of the RSFSR on a special mission to the Government of the Republic of China. However, the Beijing government sabotaged the start of the Soviet-Chinese negotiations in every possible way. The Soviet government, on the other hand, persistently sought to normalize Soviet-Chinese relations along the state line. In the summer of 1922, as it was supposed earlier, it appointed Joffe as the head of the Soviet mission in Beijing. V. I. Lenin closely followed the activities of the Soviet mission in Beijing. He regularly received copies of documents sent by the mission to the Chinese authorities and public organizations, clippings from newspapers published in China containing materials on Soviet-Chinese relations, and other documents .76
The further development of Soviet-Chinese relations took place against the background of the steady strengthening of the young Soviet state. The People's Revolutionary Army of the Far Eastern Democratic Republic and the partisans dealt crushing blows to the Japanese occupiers and the White Guards, who were relying on the support of the Chinese reaction. Soon all Primorye was cleared of interventionists. After the liberation of Vladivostok, the Far Eastern Federal District self-destructed, and the entire Russian Far East was reunited with the RSFSR. The power of the Soviets was permanently established in the vast territory along the entire Russo-Chinese border. In his last public speech (at the plenum of the Moscow Soviet on November 20, 1922), V. I. Lenin declared:: "Vladivostok is far away, but this is our city." 77 The joy of the Soviet people on the occasion of the liberation of Vladivostok was shared by the progressive Chinese public. The Chinese Communist Party organ Xiangdao Zhoubao published an article titled "Greetings to the workers of Vladivostok" 78 .

72 "Soviet-Chinese Relations 1917-1957", Moscow, 1959, pp. 55-56.

73 DVP. Vol. IV. Moscow, 1960, pp. 320-322.

74 Ibid., p. 796.

75 V. I. Lenin. PSS. Vol. 44, p. 140.

76 CP IML.

77 V. I. Lenin. PSS. Vol. 45, p. 303.

78 " Tribune "(Harbin), 28. XI. 1922.

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The sharp deterioration of Vladimir Ilyich's health at the end of 1922 deprived him of the opportunity to personally deal with state affairs, including issues of Soviet-Chinese relations. But the Central Committee of the party and the Soviet Government steadily pursued Lenin's political course. The growth of the international prestige of the Country of Soviets and the rise of the revolutionary movement of the Chinese people forced the Beijing government to normalize Soviet-Chinese relations. On May 31, 1924, the "Agreement on General Principles for the Settlement of Issues between the USSR and the Republic of China" was signed in Beijing, based on the provisions developed by Lenin.

The above materials show what a huge and invaluable contribution Lenin made to the development of the political course of the Country of Soviets towards China and to the development of Soviet-Chinese relations. This course was based on a class - based approach-supporting the Chinese workers and all the progressive forces of the country in their struggle for national and social liberation. At the same time, Lenin resolutely and uncompromisingly exposed the Chinese reaction and organized a rebuff to its attempts to encroach, together with other interventionists, on the revolutionary gains of the Soviet people and the inviolability of the borders of the Soviet republics. The Soviet Government, led by Lenin, put an end forever to the colonialist policy of tsarism, and steadily advocated the development of truly equal and friendly relations between the two countries. The Communist Party and the Soviet Government, fulfilling the precepts of the great Lenin, consistently implemented this policy towards China. The Leninist policy of the Soviet Union was an important factor contributing to the victory of the Chinese Revolution and the formation of the People's Republic of China in 1949.

The political course developed by Lenin in relation to China is the compass that determines the CPSU's policy in Soviet-Chinese relations at the present stage. In the Report of the Central Committee of the CPSU to the XXV Congress, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, L. I. Brezhnev, emphasized:: "With regard to China, as well as other countries, we firmly adhere to the principles of equality, respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, and non-use of force." 79 Lenin's approach to the problems of Soviet-Chinese relations is of lasting importance, it meets the fundamental interests of the peoples of both countries, the interests of social progress and the strengthening of universal peace.

79 "Materials of the XXV Congress of the CPSU", Moscow, 1976, p. 11.

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