This article examines the "Tibetan question" in a broad historical context, the contemporary religious situation in Tibet and the Tibetan protest movement. It shows two diametrically opposed paradigms of the Tibetan issue - Chinese and Tibetan. The Chinese paradigm reduces the "Tibetan question" to the issue of the Dalai Lama's status, while the Tibetan - to the issue of the Tibetan political status in relation to the Chinese state. Chinese authorities are trying to solve the problem through economic modernization, which they regard as the key to achieving stability and national unity. The author, however, shows the limits of the purely economic approach without taking into account the religious and political factors. The article deals with the escalation of the Tibetan protests in the form of the Buddhist self- immolations. The main cause of such escalation is a stalemate in the Sino-Tibetan dialog, further complicated by the Dalai Lama's old age. As the prospect of a breakthrough is hardly visible, the old confrontation seems to be the most probable scenario: Beijing does not make concessions to the Tibetan issue, while Dharamsala continues to adhere to tactics of pressure on the Chinese government through the internationalization of the "Tibetan issue".

Key words: Tibet, China, Tibetan Question, Tibetan Buddhism, Tibetan protests, self-immolations.

Garry I. "The Tibetan Question" and Tibetan Buddhism in China: Reforms and Conflicts. Gosudarstvo, religiya, tserkva v Rossii i za rubezhom [State, Religion, Church in Russia and Abroad]. 2016. N 4. pp. 148-173.

Garri, Irina (2016) "Tibetan Question" and Tibetan Buddhism in China: Reforms and Conficts", Gosudarstvo, religiia, tserkov' v

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PRIOR to 1959, Tibet1 had a peculiar system of government called " unity of religion and politics "(Tib. chos-srid zung - ' brel, kit. zhengjiao heyi). In it, the Royal Sangha, represented by the supreme ruler, the Dalai Lama, and his Government, played a dominant role. Understanding Tibet as a religious state was the main essence of the Tibetan national identity. Religion was the center of the entire spiritual life of the Tibetan people, as the entire Tibetan culture, its philosophy, art, architecture, medicine, astrology, literature, purely religious in its basis, were concentrated and developed around it.

After the Tibetan uprising and the flight of the 14th Dalai Lama and his entourage to India in 1959, the system of" unity of religion and politics " ceased to exist, religion was separated from the state, and the Buddhist Sangha of Tibet completely lost its central position in politics and economics. Four years after Mao Zedong's death in 1976, full-scale reforms began in Tibet and the country as a whole. The liberalization of the economy and social sphere, coupled with huge investments in the region, caused a rapid increase in incomes, the restoration of monasteries, and the revival of culture. Tibet is now a national region of China with one of the highest GDP indicators, and Lhasa is seen by foreign tourists as a modern city with all modern amenities and entertainment available.

However, an unexpected result of liberalization for the authorities was the demonstrations of Buddhist monks in 1987. Tighter controls and the curtailment of liberal policies on religion and social services, on the one hand, and an even greater flow of investment aimed at developing the western regions of the PRC, on the other, drowned out the Tibetan protests. However, the deep-seated discontent spilled out at the first opportunity. In the run-up to the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games, unrest spread across all Tibetan regions, including-

1. Here, by Tibet, we mean the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) and the Tibetan Autonomous Regions in the Chinese provinces of Sichuan, Qinghai, Gansu, and Yunnan. The total area of the Tibetan regions is 2200 thousand square kilometers. According to the 2010 national Census, the population of Tibetans was 6,282,187. In the TAR, Tibetans are the majority of the population, while in the Tibet Autonomous Regions they are a minority, living together with Han Chinese, Hui Muslims and other ethnic minorities.

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the broadest segments of the population participated. And in 2009, the first self-immolation of a Kirti Monastery monk took place, following which Tibetan self-immolations turned into an unprecedented resistance movement, numbering more than 140 cases from 2009 to the present.

The Central Government of the People's Republic of China, at the Third Forum of the CPC Central Committee in 1994, defined Tibet as a two-pronged task-developing the economy and maintaining stability. Moreover, development was defined as the key to achieving stability and unity of the nation. There is no doubt that a two-pronged problem is internally interrelated, the solution of one component is impossible without taking into account or simultaneously resolving the other. However, in our opinion, the stability of Tibetan society is less determined by economic development and modernization, and more by religious and political factors, which is the main reason for the unresolved Tibetan issue and the escalation of tension in Tibet. In this article, we will try to justify our point of view on the basis of Chinese sources and data from our field research in the Tibetan regions of the PRC.2 It will attempt to conceptualize the Tibetan issue, which we understand as a combination of de jure and de facto factors. Under the former, we understand the political form of government in Tibet, namely the position of Tibet within the PRC, and under the latter , the religious and political situation in Tibet. To achieve this goal, the paradigms of the "Tibetan question" and the religious situation in the Tibetan autonomous regions will be analyzed, which will help identify the causes of the Tibetan protest movement. Our research, focused on the Tibetan question and Tibetan Buddhism in the context of history and modernity, will address the growing field of interdisciplinary research on religion and politics, as well as transnationalism and globalization.

Paradigms for solving the "Tibetan question"

Tibet occupies a special place in the People's Republic of China and in the world. One of the proofs of its uniqueness is the existence of the so-called "Tibetan question"3. And the question

2. The author has been conducting annual field research in Tibet since 2011.

3. See: Harry I. Buddhism and politics in the Tibet region of China (II half of XX-XXI centuries). Ulan-Ude: BSC SB RAS Publishing House, 2009; Harry I. Tibetskiy vo-

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this approach exists in several paradigms, depending on which its interpretation can change dramatically. In the Chinese paradigm, the Tibetan question is considered a problem of the status of the Dalai Lama4, in the Tibetan paradigm-a problem of the political and historical status of Tibet5. You can also talk about other paradigms - from the point of view of Realpolitik6, or the problem of human rights 7, or the "exotic country of mystical spirituality" (Shangrila 8), or, conversely, a country where "degraded" forms of Buddhism are widespread 9. At the heart of the main paradigms of the Tibetan question is the conflict over the political status of Tibet in relation to China. As Melvin Goldstein quite correctly pointed out:

The Tibetan issue existed long before the establishment of the People's Republic of China, and it also predates the recent Western interest in universal human rights. In fact, if there were no human rights violations in Tibet, and if Tibetans could, for example, express peaceful political dissent, the Tibetan question would still be in all respects the same.-

proc - representation fight // Bulletin of the BSC SB RAS. Ulan-Ude, 2013, No. 3 (11), pp. 161-165.

4. See: Toushi Dalai. Xizang shehui jinbu yu fenlie jituande moluo (1997) Lasa; Xizang renquan yanjiu (1999), series of articles on this subject in the journals "Chinese Tibet" (Zhongguo Xizang), "Beijing Review", "China Reconstructs".

5. См.: Shakabpa, Ts. (1984) Tibet: A Political History. New York: Potala Publications; Praag, Van Walt (1987) The Status of Tibet. History, Rights and Prospects in International Law. Boulder: Westview Press; Bogoslovsky V. Tibet district of China. Moscow: Nauka Publishing House, 1978; Moskalev A. Teoreticheskaya baza natsional'noi politiki PRC (1949-1999). Moscow: 2011; Kuzmin S. L. Otnosheniya "mentornik-pokrovitel" i problema statusa Tibeta [The theoretical basis of the National policy of the PRC (1949-1999)]. Proceedings of the scientific conference with the participation of foreign scientists (Ulan-Ude-Baikal, July 6-8, 2012). Ulan-Ude. pp. 261-273; Kuzmin S. L. Tibetskoe gosudarstvo: istoricheskie fakty i mezhdunarodnoe pravo / / Eurasia: statum et legem (Eurasia: state and law). 2015. N 1 (4). pp. 148-157.

6. См.: Goldstein, M.G. (1997) The Snow Lion and the Dragon: China, Tibet, and the Dalai Lama. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press.

7. См.: The Question of Tibet and the Rule of Law (1959), International Commission of Jurists; "China. Violations of Human Rights" (1984), Amnesty International Publications. London; "Repressions in Tibet, 1987-1992" (1992), Amnesty International Publications. London.

8. The mystical land of Shangrila, which is supposedly located in Tibet , is a utopia from the book "Lost Horizon" (Lost Horizon, 1933), written by writer James Hilton and became a bestseller in the West.

9. См.: Rockhill, W. (1891) The Land of the Lamas: Notes of a Journey Through China, Mongolia and Tibet. Cornell University Library.

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Kim is as controversial as he is now. The Tibetan question is a question of control over a territory, who governs it, who lives there, and who decides what should happen there.10
The main opponents in the interpretation of the" Tibetan question "are two forces: the Chinese government and the Tibetan diaspora represented by the Dalai Lama XIV and his" government in exile", now called the Central Tibetan Administration (in Dharmasala, India). Let us dwell on the arguments of the main parties to the conflict in more detail.

The Chinese paradigm of the Tibetan question is based on the understanding of Tibet as an integral part of China. According to the widespread concept of a unified China in the PRC, it has been ruled for thousands of years by changing dynasties of various ethnic groups of a single family of the peoples of China.11 With regard to Tibet, it is argued that since the Mongol Yuan Dynasty (1279-1368), Tibet has always been more or less formally dependent on the central government that ruled China at this time in its history. By the middle of the 18th century, during the Qing Dynasty, first Eastern Tibet (Kham and Amdo) and then Central Tibet, under the rule of the Dalai Lamas, were included in the empire, whose territorial heritage was claimed first by the Republic of China (1911-1949), and now by the PRC. The construction of the image of "Chinese Tibet" (Zhongguo Xizang) by official Beijing has long been based on simplified symbols: the image of old Tibet in the form of "hell on earth", the emphasis on China's unifying and civilizing mission, the emphasis on the liberation of the Tibetan masses from the yoke of serfdom, the development and progress of modern Tibet. As for the popular discourse in China, it should be noted that the stereotype of medieval backward Tibet is gradually changing towards a kind of" orientalism " - the romanticization of the image of Tibet, its culture and religion.

The "Tibetan Paradigm" emerged as a result of the publication and missionary activity of representatives of the Tibetan diaspora. Dharamsala sources regarding the status of Tibet state that Tibet has been in the midst of its two-thousand-year history.

10. Goldstein, M.G. (1997) The Snow Lion and the Dragon: China, Tibet, and the Dalai Lama. Berkeley: University of California Press.

11. См. Fei Xiaotong (1989) "Zhonghua minzude duoyuan yiti geju", Beijing daxue xuebao.

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It was an independent state. During the Yuan (1279-1368) (Mongol) and Qing (1644-1911) (Manchu) dynasties, the lama rulers of Tibet, on the one hand, and the Mongol Khans and Manchu emperors, on the other, developed a system of relations between a religious mentor and a secular patron (mchod-yon), which completely lost its significance with the fall of the dynasty Qin. Therefore, according to this logic, the Chinese government has no right to assert its authority over Tibet based on these relations. After the Dalai Lama XIII declared independence of the country in 1912 and its participation as an equal representative in the triple (China, England, Tibet) During the Simla Conference of 1913-1914, Tibet was a fully independent state until 1951. Therefore, from the point of view of the Government of the Dalai Lama XIV, the introduction of troops of the People's Liberation Army of China into Tibet in 1951 is an act of aggression and illegal occupation of Tibet. Thanks to the work of the Dalai Lama, the sympathies of a huge number of people in the world are on the side of this image of Tibet. However, in our opinion, this stereotype, like the Chinese one, is based on political myth-making and denial of history.

"The Tibetan question" de jure and de facto

A comparative analysis of opposing points of view, if you remove the ideological factor from them, reveals that the Chinese side is more based on de jure facts, while the Tibetan side is more based on de facto position. The historical relations between China and Tibet were regulated by the norms of Eastern diplomacy, which allowed both sides to exist with their own concepts of the world order, which are unpromising to assess using modern political and legal norms. However, with the involvement of a third party in the face of Western powers, the Western concept of sovereign power has spread to the East. Here, too, formal norms of international law played a decisive role in the outcome of events, as is clearly seen in the example of Tibet and Mongolia.

In the 18th century, Qing China reached the peak of its power by adding Mongolia, the Jurgar Khanate, East Turkestan, and Tibet to its empire. In the 19th century, the situation changed, and Qing China itself turned into a tasty object

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the claims of the imperialist Powers, first of all of England. Not surprisingly, the power of the Qing governors in the conquered territories began to wane, as did the empire's interference in the internal affairs of the vassal territories, and by the beginning of the twentieth century, Qing China's control over them was already more symbolic than real.

Tibet became the "field" of the so-called Great Game, or Anglo-Russian rivalry on the Asian continent, which the Dalai Lama XIII wanted to play in order to free himself from Qing dependence.12 However, Britain had no strategic interests in Tibet other than containing the notorious "Russian threat." Russia was also not particularly interested in such a remote region from its borders. Its purpose, as George Curzon famously put it, was "to keep England in Europe by giving her trouble in Asia."13 For this reason, both Britain and Russia, despite their active involvement in Tibetan affairs, preferred to avoid getting involved in the Sino-Tibetan conflict. In this regard, in a series of sensitive blows for the Dalai Lama and Tibet was the signing in 1906 of the Anglo-Chinese convention without the participation of Tibet, in which England unilaterally confirmed the political dependence of Tibet on China. In 1907, China's suzerainty over Tibet was confirmed by an Anglo-Russian agreement. Qing China, on the eve of its fall, decided to restore its rule over Tibet in practice and sent an army of many thousands under the leadership of the "butcher" General Zhao Erfeng in 1910.

However, as soon as the Qing began to establish real power control over Tibet, their power came to an end in China itself - in 1911, the Xinhai Revolution overthrew the Qing dynasty, which provided the Mongols and Tibetans with a unique chance to get rid of Chinese rule. In Tibet, the Chinese governor (amban) was captured and all Chinese troops and officials were expelled, and Tibet for the first time since the XVIII century.

12. See: Shaumyan T. Tibet v mezhdunarodnykh otnosheniy nachala XX V. [Tibet in International Relations of the early XX century]. Collection of Russian archival documents, 1900-1914. Moscow: Vostochnaya literatura, 2005; Andreev A. Tibet in the politics of tsarist, Soviet and Post-Soviet Russia. St. Petersburg: SPbU Publishing House, Nartang, 2006; Mehra, P. (2005) The Yanghusband Expedition: An Interpretation. New Delhi: Gyan Publishing House; Mehra, P. (1969) "The Mongol-Tibetan Treaty of January 11, 1913", Journal of Asian History 3(1).

13.Cit. by: Andreev A. Tibet in the politics of Tsarist, Soviet and post-Soviet Russia. P. 63.

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the century turned out to be completely free of the Chinese presence 14. In 1913, the Dalai Lama issued a proclamation to his subjects confirming his authority as ruler of Tibet, which later became known as the Tibetan Declaration of Independence. However, the Simla conference that followed in 1913-1914 did not confirm the formal independence of Tibet, but only established the autonomy of Tibet under the suzerainty of China.

However, after the fall of the Qing Empire, Tibet was a de facto independent country for forty years from 1911 to 1951. However, he was not able to take advantage of this time to gain de jure independence. The country's modernization program initiated by the Reformist Party led by Tsarong was curtailed as a result of conservative opposition, and Tibet was once again isolated, completely immersed in internal Tibetan affairs and internecine power struggles. In 1951, Mao Zedong managed to defeat the Tibetans at the Battle of Chamdo and impose a 17-point Agreement on Tibet, which for the first time in Tibet's history clearly stated that Tibet was part of China. Thus, the half-century struggle of Tibetans to gain political independence ended in defeat.

With a similar political status during the fall of the Qing Empire, Mongolia was able to gain independence with the support of first tsarist Russia and then the Soviet Union. Melvin Goldstein sees this analogy as the "bad friend syndrome": "Western powers show friendship for Tibet, but refuse to help achieve the main goal of political independence and actually support China's claim to real domination." 15
Considering the main paradigms of the Tibetan question, it is obvious that the Tibetan question consists of two components - de jure and de facto. The Chinese side was able to secure its sovereignty over Tibet de jure so that no country in the world questions it. In 1988, the Dalai Lama abandoned the idea of Tibetan independence and proposed his own compromise path for integrating Tibet into the PRC, which concludes:-

14. См.: Goldstein, M.G. (1989) A History of Modern Tibet, 1913-1951. The Demise of the

Lamaist State. Berkeley: University of California Press.

15. Goldstein, M.G. The Snow Lion and the Dragon: China, Tibet, and the Dalai Lama, p. 34.

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Tibet should be granted real autonomy along the lines of the "one country and two systems" model that exists in Hong Kong and Taiwan. However, the Tibetan diaspora and a large number of Tibetans inside Tibet, with broad international support, continue to challenge China's sovereignty over Tibet, armed this time with a human rights strategy, and accuse China of violating human rights and repressing the Tibetan religion. To what extent are the charges true? To answer this question, let's look at the religious and political situation in modern Tibet, or the de facto situation, in more detail.

Current religious situation in Tibet 16

The Chinese Constitution states that freedom of religion is a fundamental right of Chinese citizens, and the Chinese Government believes that it respects and protects this right in accordance with Law 17. Is it so? At the beginning of the reforms, the Tibet Autonomous Region was the most backward in the country: "28 % of the population lived in poverty and was deprived of even enough food and clothing to support their existence, 320 thousand families were completely dependent on emergency government assistance to survive."18. I visited Tibet for the first time in 1986, and although it was already the sixth year of reform, I found appalling poverty and crowds of beggars on the streets of Lhasa. As a result of a number of government programs, Tibet has been flooded with huge investments, which have led to stable GDP growth-an average of 12 % per year between 1993 and 2014. In 2014, the region's GDP was 92.5 billion rubles. yuan (US $ 15.11 billion), doubling since 199419. The material conditions in the Tibetan regions are now comparable to the interior of the PRC (but not to the more developed coastal regions).-

16. See: Garry I. R. Tibetskiy buddhizm v sovremennykh realiyakh Kitay [Tibetan Buddhism in the modern realities of China]. Ulan-Ude: Vestnik Buryatskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta [Ulan-Ude: Bulletin of the Buryat State University]. 2015. pp. 160-163.

17. See: People's Republic of China. Kontsutsiya i zakonodatel'nye akty [Constitution and Legislative Acts].

18.Cit. by: Smith, W. (1996) Tibetan Nation. A History of Tibetan Nationalism and Sino- Tibetan Relations, р. 568. HarperCollins Publishers India.

19. "Tibet's 2014 GDP growth up 12 pct", Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the United States of America [http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/zt/zgxz/t1225807.htm, accessed on 1.11.2016].

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mi). The security of Tibetans working in state institutions and coming to Western countries for various forums has significantly exceeded the standard of living of their compatriots from the diaspora.

Huge funds were allocated for the restoration of monasteries, the restoration of the Buddhist education system, and the creation of various religious bodies loyal to the state. If at the beginning of 1950 there were about 4-5 thousand monasteries in Tibet20, then as a result of the "democratic reforms" (1959-1966), 80% of monasteries were destroyed, and after the "cultural revolution" (1966-1976), only 8 monasteries and 800 monks remained in the Tibet Autonomous Region21. Since 1980, a real boom in the restoration of destroyed monasteries began A large number of monasteries and temples were built, which was attended by almost all Tibetans, and huge public funds were invested, so that by 1998, according to the Chinese Government's White Paper, there were already 1,787 places of worship in the Tibet Autonomous Region and 46,380 Buddhist monks and nuns.22 Among the most ambitious projects for the restoration of the most famous cultural heritage sites, such as the Potala Palace, Jokhang Temple, Drepung, Sera, Ganden, Tashilunpo monasteries, etc., the central government in the list of its special merits notes the allocation of funds for the restoration of the Panchen Lama stupas, which amounted to 6.7 million yuan, 111 kg of gold, more than 2 thousand kg of silver and a large amount of jewelry, as well as 66.2 million yuan and 650 kg of gold for the construction of the stupa and the Panchen Lama Hall X 23. Other ambitious projects sponsored by the Government include pub-

20. According to Chinese data, we counted 4,549 monasteries and 282,450 monks throughout ethnographic Tibet (See Jia Guangrong (1994) Zhongguo Zangchuan fojiao siyuan. Beijing, pp. 66, 76, 117). The Dalai Lama gives a figure of 6,200, his sister-about 4,000 (Dawa Norbu (1997) Tibet: The Road Ahead, p. 285. New Delhi: HarperCollins Publishers India). On average, the approximate figure is 4-5 thousand rubles.

21. См. Ma Rong (1997) Xizangde jingji xingtai ji qi bianqian, p. 31. Beijing.

22. White papers of the Chinese government 2 (2000), p. 299. Beijing. Interestingly, the same figures are given by the Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China for 2013 ("IV. Cultural Preservation and Freedom of Religious Belief" [http://www. china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/2013-10/22/content_30367967.htm, accessed on 1.11.2016]). There is no doubt that at present the real number of monasteries has far exceeded this number, and we are talking only about officially registered monasteries.

23. White papers of the Chinese government 2, p. 300.

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The publication of the Tibetan Buddhist Canon consists of 124 volumes of the critical edition of the Danzhur and 108 volumes of the Ganzhur, each of which has an average of 1,100 to 1,500 pages.

The state pays great attention to creating loyal religious structures and attracting loyal clergy to state bodies. The Tibet Autonomous Region and each of its seven county-level cities have their own Buddhist association. The TAR Buddhist Association has its own magazine and printing house for publishing Buddhist texts. Major projects to restore Buddhist education include the Tulku Higher Buddhist Academy (Rinpoche), established in 1987 by the Panchen Lama in Beijing, or Living Buddhas in Chinese (khofo), and the Tibetan Institute of Buddhism, opened in 1983 under the auspices of the Tibetan branch of the Chinese Buddhist Association. Both institutions are financed from the state budget. In addition, each large and medium-sized monastery now has its own Buddhist institute, supported by the monastery's funds and tuition fees. In 1981, the Tibetan Institute of Religions was established as part of the Tibetan Academy of Social Sciences, and in 1984, the Faculty of Buddhology and the Department of Religion were established at the Tibetan University. Tibetan monks also study at the Institute of Religions at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and the Institute of South Asia at Peking University.24
Thus, according to Chinese sources, the government has made great efforts to restore Buddhism in Tibet, the religion is now flourishing in Tibet, and Tibetans enjoy full religious freedom. Indeed, monasteries and temples have now been restored all over Tibet, and new ones are being built in large numbers. Every famous monastery considers it its duty to build a Buddhist university, and monasteries and Buddhist universities in Eastern Tibet have reached a special scale. All of them are filled with monks and nuns, and pilgrims make offerings, pray, and make sacred rounds. Rinpochas (living Buddhas) conduct Buddhist teachings that attract a large number of students, including an impressive number of ethnic Chinese. Driving ultra-expensive jeeps, Rinpoche and maroon-robed monks have become commonplace not only in all of Tibet-

24. See Garry V. Buddhism and Politics in the Tibet region of the PRC, pp. 19-20.

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those, but also in all major cities in China. After a short visit to Tibet, Chinese and foreign tourists usually come to the conclusion that everything has returned to normal in Tibet, and Tibetans have finally found the long-awaited religious freedom.

In fact, religious freedom, which can be observed superficially, exists only within the limits of what is permitted. Beijing does not intend to return Tibetan Buddhism to its former functions, as this would undoubtedly pose a danger to the stability declared by the state as the most important priority of state policy. Therefore, the PRC is trying, on the one hand, to "correct the mistakes" of the "cultural revolution", on the other - not to allow religion to get out of the control of the state.

Various tools are used for this purpose. Legislative measures include the following: in 1994, a Decree on measures for the management of Places of Worship was adopted, article 4 of which states that monasteries should refrain from any activity that promotes separatism and should not have any links with foreign monasteries. 25 In 2007, a decree was issued by the State Administration for Religious Affairs of the Russian Federation. religious cases on "Measures to manage the rebirths of Living Buddhas in Tibetan Buddhism", which requires the mandatory approval of all tulkus (rebirths) by state authorities, otherwise they are declared illegal 26. There are restrictions on the size of monasteries and the number of monks, a ban on the creation of new religious organizations, a ban on monastic life before the age of 18, restrictions on the religious activities of representatives of the popular religion (for example, shamans), criticism of some traditional Tibetan religious rites (for example, fortune-telling), a ban on photos of the Dalai Lama, etc.D. 27

25. Zhonghua renmin gongheguo zongjiao huodongchang suo guanli tiaolie [http://www. share.com.cn/tianyun/zjtl.htm, accessed on 1.11.2016].

26. Zangchuan fojiao huofo guanlibanfa [http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2008/ content_923053.htm, accessed on 1.11.2016].

27. Despite all these restrictive measures, the authorities often overlook their violations. The ban on portraits of the Dalai Lama has not been implemented in Eastern Tibet for a long time, they are in the main place in almost all monasteries, except for the most important ones that are often visited by officials. All monasteries have a large number of novice children, and the number of monasteries has also long been out of state control.

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It is obvious that all these laws are aimed at countering the influence of the foreign Tibetan diaspora on the religious situation inside Tibet. And this is the main contradiction of the PRC's religious policy in Tibet, since all the religious leaders of Tibet are members of the diaspora. No amount of financial investment in the construction of monasteries, schools, hospitals, or grandiose infrastructure can ease the frustration of Tibetans about the lack of their religious hierarchs in Tibet28. The situation is such that the top leaders of the main schools of Tibetan Buddhism - the Dalai Lama, Sakya Trizin, Karmapa, such famous Tibetan teachers as Dudjom Rinpoche, Tartang Tulku, Namhai Norbu Rinpoche and many others were and are still in exile.

The lack of official links between Tibetan monasteries inside and outside Tibet is the main difficulty in restoring the Tibetan monastic system. The fact is that the monastic system in Tibet is developing spontaneously, despite all the restrictions of the authorities. In addition to officially authorized religious educational institutions, there are a large number of unofficial ones, that is, operating without any permits. Serta Buddhist University in the Ganzi Tibetan Autonomous Region of Sichuan Province (East Kham) is particularly well-known among them. It was created by Nyingma Kenpo lama Jigme Phuntsog, who was in a troubled relationship with the authorities. Currently, Larung Gar is home to a veritable university campus, where tens of thousands of students study Buddhism, including a large number of ethnic Chinese.29
The main problem of all these educational institutions is the lack of qualified teaching staff, caused by the break in the tradition of Buddhist education during the "democratic reforms" and "cultural revolution". In 1959, with the flow of refugees from the country, about 5-6 thousand 30 monks emigrated, including many high-ranking monks.-

28. PMA (author's field materials) - interviews with Tibetans.

29. PMA in the Ganzi Tibet Autonomous Region, 2011. According to the latest data, the authorities decided to reduce the number of residents of the town to 5,000 people. On July 22, 2016, the destruction of student cabins began (Nian youguan Seda Larong Wuming foxueyuancengshe beizhe, xiuxingzhe beizhude caifang (2007) [http://woeser.middle-way.net/2016/07/2007.html, accessed on 1.11.2016]).

30. Grunfeld, T. (1996) The Making of Modern Tibet, p. 187. M.E. Sharpe.

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many famous lamas, Tulkus, and highly educated monks were the flower of Tibetan Buddhist scholarship. In the south of India, their efforts restored traditional Tibetan monastic education. In Tibet, the situation is different. The surviving learned monks of the older generation, who have experienced all the vicissitudes of the "cultural revolution", have returned to their monasteries and are raising a new generation of monks. However, they are all very old and pass away one by one, the middle generation has not been able to get a full-fledged monastic education, and the young ones need many years of intensive study in 15-20 years to get a geshe degree - "doctor of Buddhist philosophy". As the political conflict prevents them from establishing contacts with Tibetan monasteries in India, older monks fear that the new generation of Tibetan clergy will not be ready to take over the traditional education system in the near future, when the older generation leaves.31 The situation is compounded by the fact that anti-Chinese unrest often involves the most talented and promising of the young monks, as a result of which many of them are punished or forced to flee the country.

An important factor in religious problems is the close control of the authorities over religious activities. Video recorders are installed in all large monasteries, a large number of plainclothes policemen are constantly present, and army units are dispersed nearby. The authorities have significantly restricted the travel of Tibetan monks to India for study and the arrival of Tibetan lamas from abroad. Particularly objectionable are the "patriotic education" sessions that are imposed on monasteries after each case of unrest, during which monks are forced to renounce the Dalai Lama and sign letters in support of the CCP.

Thus, we can see that the real religious situation in Tibet is far from the authorities ' claims of full religious freedom. Economic "development" has not brought "stability" to China and Tibet, and the Tibetan protest movement at the current stage has resulted in a self-immolation movement unprecedented in world practice. It is obvious that such a manifestation of protest against the policy of the authorities is fraught with the most dangerous outbreaks. To understand the evolution and causes of Tibetan discontent,

31. PMA. Interviews with Tibetan monks, 2011-2012.

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It is necessary to trace the main stages of the Tibetan protest movement from the beginning of the announcement of reforms in 1980 and up to the present.

Tibetan protest movement: Beijing-Dharmasala standoff, 2008 riots and self-immolations

Wang Lixiong, a well-known Chinese writer and researcher of the national question in the PRC, said: "With the further development of China, ethnic problems will probably become the main challenge for the PRC."32 The Tibetan protest movement confirms this prediction. The first wave of Tibetan protests in 1987 resulted from the failure of the Sino-Tibetan dialogue initiated by the architect of the Chinese "perestroika" Deng Xiaoping.

In this situation, Dharmasala, the "capital" of Tibetan emigration in India, decided to internationalize the Tibetan issue and seek support from the international community. On September 21, 1987, the Dalai Lama harshly criticized Chinese policy in Tibet, accused the PRC of violating human rights, and called for negotiations on the future status of Tibet. On September 27, a group of monks from the largest Drepung Monastery organized the first open anti-Chinese demonstration in 28 years, supported by representatives of other monasteries. In response to the two-year-long protests, the authorities responded with beatings of monks, numerous arrests, and eventually the shooting of demonstrators.33
The end of the 1980s was the most difficult period for Beijing since the reforms announced 10 years ago and promising the most brilliant prospects: in addition to opposition from Tibetans and Uighurs, there was also a bloody drama of Chinese students performing in Tiananmen Square. China's Image

32. PMA. Interview with Wang Lixiong. Beijing, 2014.

33. At the 44th Session of the UN Commission on Human Rights in Geneva, the Chinese delegation acknowledged that police had shot at Tibetans, resulting in deaths and injuries. The delegation made the confession following the testimony of Robert Barnett (now Director of the Modern Tibetology Research Program at Columbia University, USA), a witness to the incident. He also provided the commission with 10 sworn statements from other witnesses (Shakya, Ts. (1999) The Dragon in the Land of Snows. A History of Modern Tibet Since 1947, p. 523. New York: Penguin COMPASS).

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the situation in the international arena has deteriorated sharply. The awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to the Dalai Lama on October 5, 1989, was a sign of the success of the internationalization of the Tibetan issue and a blow to the policy of liberalization. The Chinese government responded by tightening its policies on religion, culture, and language, and focused on Tibet's economic integration with the rest of China.

The second wave of protest movement in Tibet is associated with the Beijing Olympic Games in 2008. By this time, there was a complete departure from the liberalization policy initiated by the CPC General Secretary Hu Yaobang (1980-1987). Extensive economic growth due to huge investments has intensified the uncontrolled migration of the Han population to Tibet, which has led to the aggravation of interethnic relations and the marginalization of the majority of Tibetans from the state's economic development. Another round of fighting against the "Dalai clique" 34, a ban on his photos, strict control over religious activities, restriction of the functions of monasteries, suppression of any political activity - an incomplete list of the activities of the first secretary of the party Committee of the Tibet Autonomous Region, Chen Kuyuan, during almost a decade of his stay in power.

Dharamsala responded by increasing its influence on Tibetans within Tibet. The struggle over the rebirth of Panchen Lama X resulted in an unprecedented confrontation, which resulted in the nullification of the tradition of the second most important hierarch of Tibet, the Panchen Lama. Recognized in May 1995 by the Dalai Lama as the 11th reincarnation of the Panchen Lama, a boy named Gedun Choki Nima disappeared without a trace immediately after the announcement, and Gyaltsen Norbu, recognized by the Chinese government, is not considered a true incarnation in the eyes of Tibetans due to the fact that he was not recognized by the Dalai Lama. 35 The escapes from China of the famous Kumbum Monastery abbot Arjya Rinpoche in 1988,36 and Karmapa XI in 1999 multiplied the list of famous refugees from Tibet. In connection with the aggravation of the struggle between Beijing and Dharamsala, I observe-

34. A standard cliche that refers to the Central Tibetan Administration in Dharamsala, which is not recognized by Beijing.

35. См.: Hilton, I. (1999) The Search for the Panchen Lama. New York, London: W.W. NORTON & COMPANY.

36. Arjia Rinpoche (2010) Surviving the Dragon. A Tibetan Lama's Account of 40 years under Chinese Rule. New York: RODALE.

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There were demonstrations of support and loyalty to the Dalai Lama, such as the rejection of the Dorje Shugden cult by the majority of Tibetans, 37 and the collective burning of furs and skins of rare animals in response to the Dalai Lama's request to refrain from using the skins of rare animals.

Despite the fierce external confrontation, however, informal relations between Beijing and Dharamsala continued to take place thanks to the mediation of the Dalai Lama's elder brother, Gyalo Thondup. In 2002, the negotiation process resumed, and six rounds of negotiations were held until 2007, but, like the first ones, they also did not bring any visible results. It is clear that the Chinese government resumed negotiations in 2002 because of the upcoming 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing. Trying to buy time, Beijing sought to maintain the status quo. Dharamsala tried to take advantage of the games to put pressure on China.

In October 2006, the International Campaign for Tibet (ICT) launched a "Race for Tibet" (Beijing 2008: Race for Tibet), calling on China to end human rights abuses in Tibet and involve the Dalai Lama in finding a solution to the Tibet problem. 38 The campaign was rapidly gaining momentum. In addition to a wide range of the world community, more and more officials from all over the world joined the support of Tibetans. The apogee of all these events was the awarding of the Dalai Lama on October 17, 2007 with the Gold Medal of the US Congress, which was presented to the laureate personally by US President George W. Bush.

In 2008, the campaign spread into Tibet. Clashes between Tibetans and police began during the Tibetan New Year celebrations in February. By March, the situation had escalated, as this month is "sensitive" for the whole of Tibet - March 10 marks the anniversary of the March 1959 uprising. On its occasion, the Dalai Lama made an annual address,

37. Dorje Shugden was a popular "guardian of the faith" deity, but the Dalai Lama came to the conclusion that the deity was harmful and his cult led to a degeneration of faith, so he asked the Tibetan faithful to abandon his cult. The Chinese government immediately sided with the cult's defenders.

38. "Beijing 2008: Race for Tibet. October 2006", International Campaign for Tibet [www. savetibet.org, accessed on 1.11.2016].

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in which he, on the one hand, condemned China's repression in Tibet, on the other, confirmed his desire to continue dialogue with the Chinese government and expressed support for the holding of the Olympic Games in China. On the same day, demonstrations of monks began in Lhasa, which quickly turned into mass protests and a powerful wave swept all the Tibetan regions of the PRC. The monks ' demonstrations were initially peaceful, but as a result of the so-called "March 14 incident", the protests turned violent against the Han and Muslim populations. Many police, fire and other vehicles, shops, offices, banks belonging to Chinese and Hui Muslims were burned, a mosque was attacked and its main gate was set on fire, and an entire Lhasa market was burned.39
It should be noted that this time the authorities reacted to the unrest in a different way.40 When violence escalated on the streets of Lhasa on March 14, they did not act for several hours, allowing the situation to spiral out of control. Troops were brought up from all sides, and a film crew was brought into the area of unrest. Ten hours later, news reports in the country and around the world showed footage focused on Tibetan violence against Han Chinese, and only after that was a harsh crackdown on the riots.41
The 2008 Tibetan riots were the largest manifestation of protests since the 1959 Tibetan uprising. What was the reason for them? This is a question for which there is no definite answer. The authorities blamed the Dalai Clique for organizing riots and violence in Tibet. Dharamsala categorically rejected Beijing's accusations, in turn, saying that the events in Tibet are the result of China's policy of repression. Since all foreigners were expelled from Tibet, all independent information was blocked, and the Western media mostly circulated news based on unverified sources from the Tibetan side. So, for example, the Central Tibetan Administration on April 25 for-

39. The chronicle of the events of 2008 is given in: Harry I. Buddhism and politics in the Tibet region of the PRC, pp. 247-261.

40. Various kinds of protests are not uncommon in China. The usual tactic of the authorities is complete silence of the problem and rapid suppression.

41. Wang Lixiong. Why is the Tibetan issue not being resolved? // Wang Lixiong. Reflections on Tibet / translated by I. Garry. Ulan-Ude: Buryaad-Mongol Nom, 2015, p. 154.

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It revealed that 203 Tibetans were killed, more than a thousand injured, and more than 5,715 arrested between March 10 and April 25. However, on August 22, Samdong Rinpoche, in an interview with Asia News, admitted that there were no mass murders of this scale in Tibet. According to the Xinhua news agency, 19 people were killed by rioters, 7 schools, 5 hospitals, more than 100 houses were burned, and 17 people were convicted of participating in mass riots.

In addition to the "Dalai clique," Beijing blamed forces hostile to China for organizing the riots. The view that the Tibetan issue is being used as a means of weakening and deterring China is widespread in the PRC.42 According to this conspiracy theory, China, which is economically and militarily powerful, poses a threat to the existing world order, which is dominated by Western forces, and therefore a new cold war is unleashed against China, in which ethnic problems are used to disintegrate it, following the example of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, Iraq, etc.

It is clear that the monk demonstrations in Lhasa occurred as a spontaneous and possibly organized support for the Dalai Lama's speech on the 49th anniversary of the Tibetan uprising and the international campaign for Tibet. The escalation of the conflict to a huge scale and outbreaks of violence were largely due, in our opinion, to the accumulated dissatisfaction of Tibetans with excessively restrictive Chinese policies. Many in the West see the ongoing protests as a desire for Tibetans to achieve independence from China. This interpretation still does not stand up to criticism, given the fact that the Dalai Lama himself has long abandoned the idea of independence and supports the creation of real autonomy within the PRC. There is also an opinion that there is dissatisfaction among Tibetans with the socio-economic consequences of the reforms. However, most researchers point to policies that restrict political and religious rights as the root causes of Tibetan dissatisfaction. As Robert Barnett rightly points out, this policy includes " insults to the Dalai Lama in the Chinese media, interference in monasteries and religious practices, and demands that nomads in eastern Tibet conduct religious activities."

42. См.: Xu Mingxu, Yuan Feng (2006) "The Tibet Question and New Cold War", in B. Sautman, T. Dreyer (eds) Contemporary Tibet: Politics, Development and Society in a Disputed Area. M.E. Sharpe.

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a more sedentary lifestyle, refusing to continue the process of dialogue with the Dalai Lama, and promoting Chinese as the main language of instruction in Tibetan schools. " 43
After the unrest and unrest in all Tibetan regions, they were severely suppressed, including the closure of the entire ethnographic Tibet for several months for foreigners to enter, total blocking of information, widespread searches, and arrests of a huge number of people. Pressure on the Chinese government from outside and from within nevertheless forced the Chinese authorities to enter into negotiations, which took place on May 4, 2008 in Shenzhen. [44] However, the powerful earthquake of 7.9 on the Richter scale that followed on May 12 in Sichuan Province allowed Beijing to postpone the next round of negotiations, scheduled for June 11. And on August 8, China, despite all the challenges that have befallen it, began hosting the Olympic Games and ended them with its impressive victory. The 8th round of Sino-Tibetan talks took place after the Games on October 31-November 5 and once again failed to produce any results.

The third wave of the Tibetan protest movement is associated with the self-immolation movement. The main commentator of this movement inside the PRC was the Tibetan poet and writer Tsering Oser, who in March 2013 became the winner of the US State Department's "Brave Woman" Award (International Women of Courage Award). Let's focus on one of her posts analyzing this movement 45.

Since 2009, when the first self-immolation of a monk of the Kirti Monastery in the Ngaba Tibetan Autonomous Region named Tapei took place, there have been 135 cases. 46 The highest number of self-immolations occurred in March and November 2012. March is the month when the majority of Tibetan protests traditionally take place in connection with the commemoration of the 1959 Tibetan Uprising. There were 11 self-immolations this month. In November 2012, the 18th CPC National Congress was held, where a new generation of Chinese leaders was approved. This was peak sa-

43. Barnett, R. (2012) "Political Self-Immolation in Tibet: Causes and Infuences", Revue d'Etudes Tibetaines 25: 41-64.

44. "Statement by Special Envoy of His Holiness the Dalai Lama", Kasur Lodi Gyaltsen [http://www.tibet.net, accessed on 1.11.2016].

45. Tsering Oser Tibetan self-immolations as an act of self-sacrifice / / ARD / translated from Chinese by I. R. Garry. 16.06.2014 [http://asiarussia.ru/articles/3163/, accessed from 1.11.2016].

46.To date, more than 140 cases have been reported.

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mosozhzheniy - 28 people. The movement was started by monks, and until 2012 they were the majority of self-immolations. "During the eight days of the congress, nine people burned themselves alive - a clear indication that Tibetans want to force a new generation of Chinese leaders to change policy in Tibet, and turn self - immolations into actions leading to change - only in this way should the reason for self-immolations of Tibetans be understood," writes Auxerre. Since 2012, lay people have joined the movement, so that by April 2014, 47 of the 135 cases were monks, and all the others were lay people from all walks of life in Tibetan society, of which the largest number, 67, were farmers and pastoralists.

In his assessment of this terrible movement of Tibetans for their rights, Tsering Oser states::

Having become a self-immolation commentator, giving interviews to numerous people from outside, I always emphasize that Tibetan self-immolations are not suicides, but self-sacrifice! These self-immolations cannot be measured by Buddhist precepts; they are the result of modern politics. This raging flame is lit by national oppression, this is the Tibetan torch that illuminates the darkness, this is the continuation of the protests of 2008, namely, the most fearless and forced continuation, as the monks of Sera Monastery said: "We must rise up!" And, finally, the Tibetan self-immolations are a very obvious political protest, and not a protest of any kind. other nature 47.

The Tibetan self-immolation movement has caused great concern in the world and a large number of different interpretations, ranging from mutual accusations on the Chinese and Tibetan sides to extensive research by analysts.48 In my opinion, the analysis of the Chinese researcher of the national question in China, Wang Li, deserves the greatest attention-

47. Tsering Auxerre. In the same place.

48. The most balanced discussion of the self-immolation movement took place at the seminar "Tibet on Fire: Ritual or Political Protest?", which was attended by leading experts in Tibetology. See: "Tibet is burning - Self-Immolation: Ritual or Political Protest?", Revue d'Etudes Tibetaines [http://himalaya.socanth.cam.ac.uk/collections/journals/ret/pdf/ret_25.pdf, accessed on 1.11.2016].

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Xiong's husband tsering oser 49. In his opinion, the main reason for the Tibetan self-immolations is evidence of the inability of the two opposing forces - the Chinese government and the Tibetan diaspora-to resolve the Tibetan issue. He's writing:

Tibetans within Tibet have finally learned to rely on themselves. From their point of view, the reason that the Tibetan issue is not being resolved is that hopes for progress are constantly pinned on the outside world: Tibetans inside Tibet rely on the Tibetan diaspora; the Tibetan diaspora primarily relies on the international community, then on the Chinese government. The main strategy, in the end, is to use the pressure of the international community to force the Chinese Government to compromise .50..Today's self-immolations of Tibetans inside Tibet call out to a new generation of Tibetan leaders: we must not go down this path again!51

Conclusion

In the 36 years since the reforms announced in 1980 in Tibet, the Chinese government has tried to "correct the mistakes" of the "cultural revolution" and win the loyalty of the Tibetan people. The authorities have chosen economic development and modernization of the region as the main means to achieve this goal, which has led to impressive results in doubling GDP and significantly increasing the welfare of Tibetans. However, as the results of the study showed, betting on economic development did not bring stability to Tibet. Since 2008, an escalation of the protest movement has taken the form of self-immolations in all Tibetan regions of the People's Republic of China, which has now reached more than 140 cases.

In our opinion, the main reason for the escalation of tension in Tibet is religious and political problems and the stalemate in resolving the "Tibetan issue". All that

49. Wang Lixiong. Burning testaments. Why do Tibetans burn themselves? // Wang Lixiong. Reflections on Tibet / translated by I. Garry. Ulan-Ude: Buryaad-Mongol Nom, 2015.

50. Ibid., p. 142.

51. Ibid., p. 147.

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The situation has worsened due to the advanced age of His Holiness the Dalai Lama. At the beginning of 2015, rumors of secret talks between the two sides were circulating in the Chinese media and on the Internet, but the new conflict over the next rebirth of the Dalai Lama and the unprecedented security measures in Tibet during the celebration of his 80th birthday suggest another failure and a continuation of the confrontation.

There is no doubt that both sides are preparing for the time of the Dalai Lama's passing, and each of them has its own strategy of action. In the tactical actions of both sides, however, there is no prospect of breaking the stalemate, and therefore a confrontational scenario along the old pattern seems most likely: Beijing does not make concessions on the Tibetan issue, Dharamsala adheres to the tactic of putting pressure on the Chinese government by internationalizing the "Tibetan issue" and encouraging the protest movement of Tibetans. Given the exhaustion of the Tibetan patience limit, as evidenced by numerous self-immolations, there is a risk that the situation will get out of control of the authorities at the time of the Dalai Lama's departure-a worst-case scenario that is equally unfavorable for both sides. What is the right way to respond to the challenges of this situation? - a difficult question facing both Beijing and Dharamsala.

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