L. V. ZABROVSKAYA

Doctor of Historical Sciences

Institute of History, Archeology and Ethnography of the Peoples of the Far East, Far Eastern Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences (Vladivostok)

Keywords: People's Liberation Army of China (PLA), CCP and army, military elite

The economic reforms initiated by Deng Xiaoping in 1978 radically changed the structure of Chinese society. The PRC has transformed from a socially uniform country with universal equalization to a society with significant socio-economic stratification. Against the background of the continuing poverty of the overwhelming majority of the population, well-to-do strata have emerged, which can be attributed to the middle class of Western countries in terms of income and consumption of social goods.

Despite the measures taken by the government, the social protection system in China still remains at a fairly low level. Market relations also make a negative contribution. This is due to the increasing commercialization of secondary and higher education, the healthcare system, as well as significant disparities between different regions of the country. First of all, the difference in living standards between the rich coastal and poor central regions of the PRC is striking.

These and other changes that were unfavorable for a part of the Chinese population increased the level of social tension, which led to an increase in anti-government protests and protests not only in poor areas inhabited by ethnic minorities, but also in the central Chinese provinces. To maintain law and order, the Chinese authorities are increasingly resorting to the help of units of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and the police (People's Armed Police). This policy leads to an increased role of the military in Chinese society.

The involvement of the military in the suppression of protest actions, apparently, cannot be considered as "the beginning of a change in the political regime." Throughout the CCP's history, such problems have most often been solved by the military. At the same time, the leaders of modern China have always tried to protect the military from active participation in the country's political life.

PLA - AN ARMED FORMATION OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY

The Chinese military is organically linked to the CCP. The PLA played a crucial role in the rise to power of the Communists led by Mao Zedong. Many Chinese Communist leaders, including Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping, took an active part in the armed struggle of the Chinese people against the Japanese invaders.

In the future, the Chinese military continued to play a significant role in the political life of Chinese society. For example, party functionaries were able to attract employees to their service stations-

to Ron the military, who restored order after the Cultural Revolution, and in October 1976 removed the gang of four. In 1978, the army supported Deng Xiaoping's rise to power, and in 1989, it dispersed protesters from Tiananmen Square. These events reinforced the image of the PLA as the last arbiter in China's turbulent political life.

Deng Xiaoping, who headed the Central Military Council in 1981, began to pay increased attention to the leadership of the PLA, turning it into a professional military elite. To this end, the military ranks that were abolished in 1965 were restored in 1988. During Deng Xiaoping's leadership, 17 Chinese military leaders were awarded the highest military rank - Full General (Shangjiang). It is characteristic that at that time this title was awarded to military personnel aged 69 - 70 years. In doing so, Deng Xiaoping supported those who failed to advance during the Cultural Revolution.

In subsequent years, the age of military personnel at the time of awarding the highest military rank decreased to 61-62 years, which may indicate a generational change in this environment of Chinese society and the arrival of people who did not have revolutionary experience in the PLA, but received a modern military education.

Another special feature that characterized the new nominees to the PLA's top generals was what provinces of China they were originally from. In 1981-2009, 29 military personnel from Shandong Province, representatives of all branches of the armed forces, received the rank of full general, i.e. 24.4% of the total number of those who were awarded it.

This is not surprising if we take into account the military traditions of this region of China during the "Chunqiu" and "Warring States" periods**, as well as the appearance in those years of such legendary generals as Sun Tzu, Wu Tzu, Sun Bin, etc. Another legendary figure - originally from Shandong Province - was General and politician Zhuge Liang, and in the Ming era*** - Admiral Qi Jiguang.

The largest number of full generals today are from the other four provinces: Hebei, Henan, Liaoning, and Jiangsu. In 2009, all of the above-mentioned provinces were represented by 77 generals, or more than 65% of the total number of Chinese top generals. In other words, the highest military echelon of China consists mainly of Han* * * * - natives of the central Chinese provinces. Indeed, during the 35 years of economic reforms (1978-2013), only three non-Han Chinese-a Korean and two Manchus - were promoted to full generals.

There are no female full-time generals in the PLA. The fact of their absence, as well as representatives of national minorities, in the PLA's top command structure is explained by the established traditions and the complexity of their promotion through the ranks.

Since 1978, the highest military rank has been awarded mainly to representatives of the land branches of the armed forces - the most numerous in the Chinese army. 84 people became full land generals against 34-representatives of the Navy, Air Force and police.

General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee Jiang Zemin (1989-2002) was the first to award the highest military rank to police officers, and this trend was supported by Hu Jintao (2002-2012).

Currently, there are 7 full generals serving in the 660,000-strong People's Armed Police. The Chinese leadership sees the police as a force that protects national security and social stability, and promotes "people to live in peace and stability." ¹

Another feature of modern nominees for the highest military rank is that not only the commanders of the branches of the armed forces become full generals, but also the leadership of leading higher educational military institutions - the University of National Defense, the National University of Defense Technologies and the Academy of Military Sciences. During the period of economic reforms, 19 heads of these educational institutions were promoted to full generals.

The positions of full generals were promoted in equal proportions not only by representatives of the command staff, but also by political workers who were called upon to exercise the control of the Chinese Communist Party over the PLA. Moreover, under Hu Jintao, the number of political commissars who were promoted to full general is higher than the number of representatives of purely military professions. This means that Chinese leaders intend to continue to control the armed forces from within. In addition, at the end of Hu Jintao's rule, the top echelon of the country's military leadership was reorganized and replaced with younger and more loyal generals: the elderly were retired with full pay and the right to work in their previous positions for two months a year.

* The Central Military Council of the People's Republic of China - the highest state body for the leadership of the Armed Forces of the People's Republic of China (Editor's note).

** The Spring and Autumn Period (also known as the Chunqiu period) is a period of Chinese history from 722 to 481 BC, corresponding to the Chunqiu Chronicle, which is considered to be compiled by Confucius. The Warring States period is the period of Chinese history from the fifth century BC to the unification of China in 221 BC. ed.).

*** The Ming Era was the period of power of the Ming Dynasty, which ruled in China from 1368 to 1644 after the liberation of China from the Mongol Yuan Dynasty. ed.).

**** Han Chinese are the largest ethnic group in China (92%), and they are the world's 1st largest ethnic group (19% of the total population). Historically, in Russian, the Han Chinese are called Chinese.

MILITARY PERSONNEL IN THE CENTRAL STRUCTURES OF THE PARTY

At the same time, over the years of economic reforms, the military's membership in the CPC Central Committee has significantly decreased. This is especially noticeable in the composition of the CPC Central Committee and the Politburo under Hu Jintao. In the CPC Central Committee, the number of generals decreased from 39 in 2002 to 23 in 2012, and in the Politburo-from 5 in 1987 to 2-after the XVIII CPC Congress held in November 2012.

It is characteristic that these two full generals, along with membership in the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee, are vice-chairmen of the Central Military Council. And one of them - General Fan Changlong, a native of Liaoning Province, graduated from the Central Party School and is a party worker. The other is General Xu Qiliang, a native of Shandong Province, who represents the air force that runs China's space projects.² These appointments indicate the areas that will be a priority in the construction of the army in the next five to ten years.

The Politburo Standing Committee has not had a single military member since 1997. This may indicate that, despite all the attention and concern of the Chinese leadership for its armed forces, it is taking serious measures to limit the influence of the military in the central structures of the party.

However, in a number of provinces where Hu Jintao's influence was quite strong (Anhui, Jiangsu, Shanxi, Henan, Inner Mongolia), an additional 2 to 5 military personnel were added to the number of permanent members of the provincial party bureaus.

The declining representation of the military in central government is attributed to the fact that Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao were both civilians. After they came to power, the military's influence on China's political life declined. At the same time, civilian leaders have not been able to completely abandon their reliance on the armed forces and police, not only because of the need to maintain order in the country, but also to preserve their own power.

The absence of military representatives from the Standing Committee of the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee since 1997 has led foreign experts to conclude that "the Chinese elite is divided into civilian and military" and that there may be a qualitative shift in the social structure of Chinese society.³

Speaking of the Chinese military, it should be borne in mind that they can also be divided into "young" and "old", between which there is a significant competition for positions and privileges, as well as disagreements on the development of the Chinese armed forces and Chinese society as a whole. If we talk about the top of the military (the"old ones"), they are against political reforms and for the leadership of the army by the CCP. The "young" ones put forward demands that the army should become a state structure, and not a "punishing sword of the party".

During the period of economic reforms, the number of Chinese military personnel significantly decreased - from 4 million in 1985 to 2.2 million in 2011.* At the same time, the ratio of combat and service structures was optimized, and modern logistics systems were created. In addition, along with the growth of the military budget and the increase in the number of various benefits and salaries in 1998-2003, a number of measures were taken to significantly reduce the commercial activities allowed to military personnel. Most of the 10 thousand PLA commercial structures were liquidated or transferred to the jurisdiction of civil services5.

An important problem is the quality of recruits. In the 70s, 80s, and 90s of the last century, military service was considered a special privilege, allowing you to become a member of the CCP, and after completing your service, get a job at a state-owned enterprise. However, over the past 10 to 15 years, government policies aimed at families with one child have dramatically worsened the quality of the army. If in 1996 there were no more than 20% of ordinary people who were only children in the family, then in 2006 there were already about 70% of them. According to military experts, conscripts who are spoiled by the attention of their families weaken discipline, which leads to desertion and an increase in cases of leaving the barracks. All this is directly related to-

but it affects the combat readiness of the armed forces.

Cases of armed groups of soldiers leaving their barracks and committing criminal offenses have become more frequent.⁶ This is causing alarm in Chinese society. Punishing the guilty does not lead to strengthening discipline. At the same time, the country's military leadership cannot refuse to accept college graduates - as a rule, people from one-child families-for service.

During the reign of Hu Jintao, the position of the military in the life of Chinese society began to gradually change in the direction of reducing their role and importance, the share of the military in the distribution of various socially significant goods decreased, which most of all affects them. At the same time, the Chinese press published articles about corruption in the ranks of the PLA, the use of official position, and misuse of financial resources. The press constantly publishes revealing publications about the illegal actions of generals who secretly own nightclubs, restaurants, sell military property and land, and take bribes when recruiting recruits. "Corruption is the main enemy that destroys the army," said Professor Liu Mingfu of National Defense University ⁷. Although China is actively fighting corruption of this kind, it is not yet possible to completely defeat it.

Due to such negative facts, the General political administration of the PLA issued a 10-point decree ordering all senior officers, starting from lieutenant colonel and above, to pass training camps lasting at least 15 days in ordinary units stationed in remote and poor regions. During the training camp, the generals will have to serve under the same conditions as the junior commanders. At the same time, they will not have any privileges, experiencing all the hardships and hardships of the army. The PLA's press organ, the Jiefang Daily, noted that such measures "will help to purge the military spirit of laziness, indiscipline, and rid generals of bureaucratic ailments and the habit of living in luxury."⁸

All this causes alarm among the military. Therefore, they have not missed a single opportunity to emphasize the importance of the armed forces for protecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country, openly speculating on both internal and external problems (the aggravation of territorial disputes over the Senkaku, Spratly, Paracel Islands, etc.). additional funding for the army and navy.

A COURSE FOR ACCELERATED MODERNIZATION

It should be noted that as China's global role grows, the Chinese leadership pays more and more attention to the development of the armed forces and the modernization of the world's largest army. China's growing interests abroad are forcing the Chinese leadership to adjust its former image of a shadowy power.

It is the accelerated modernization of the armed forces, in accordance with the requirements of the time, that Hu Jintao emphasized in his speech in November 2012 to the delegates of the XVIII Party Congress: "It is necessary, in accordance with the new requirements of the state development and state security strategy, to focus on the full implementation of the historical mission of the army in the new century. And at a new stage, implement a new military-strategic course for active defense, increase the ability to perform various military tasks, and above all, to win victory in local wars that are going on in the context of informatization"*.

All previous generations of Chinese leaders did not forget about the needs of the army, but the "fifth generation" of leaders who replaced Hu Jintao's team has much greater financial and technical capabilities. Given that China is increasingly facing security challenges in recent years, and the United States has not abandoned plans to strengthen its military alliances in the region, the process of building up the PLA's power will certainly continue.

According to official Chinese data, China's military spending in 2013 reached $114.5 billion, or 2% of GDP. It is planned to increase funding by 10-12% annually, so that by 2020 military spending will amount to $225 billion.⁹

Between 2001 and 2010, China's military spending increased by 189%. For comparison, in the 1980s and 1990s, the Chinese authorities spent only 2 - 2.6% of GDP annually on these purposes( see Table), since in the initial period of economic reforms, preference was given to four priority areas - agriculture, industry, science and technology. The increase in military spending since the 2000s has been consistent with the growth of the country's economy. Moreover, the military budget was distributed in the proportion of 60: 20: 20, i.e., expenditures on the ground forces, as the most numerous, amounted to 60%, and the Air Force and Navy received, respectively, 20% of China's moderately increasing military expenditures annually.¹⁰

In addition to the rise in the cost of new weapons systems for the PLA, one of the reasons for the increase in military spending is also the increase in world oil prices and

* http://rus.ruvr.ru/201211_09/Armija-Kitaja-nauchitsja-pobezhdat-v-lokalnih-vojnah

Table

China's military expenditures (1989-2013)

Sources: Renmin jiefang jun chubanshe (Practical Encyclopedia of the Chinese Military Budget). Beijing, 1993. pp. 112, 251; SIPRI Year Book 1999. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1999. P. 348; Peng Guangqian. Zhongguo guofang (Defense of China). Beijing, Wuzhou chuanbo chubanshe (Publishing House "Five Continents"), 2004. pp. 124, 126; SIPRI Year Book 2011... 2011. P. 183; SIPRI Year Book 2012... 2012. P. 191, 198, 205; Gabuev A. To take raw materials. 18.03.2013. p. 14.

a corresponding increase in spending on petroleum products for the armed forces, as well as additional costs due to a significant increase in the salary of officers and enlisted personnel in the face of competition with the civilian sector for attracting and retaining talented personnel in the army. Other reasons include increased spending on informatization of troops, development and modernization of military infrastructure and logistics systems, as well as on the increasing participation of the PLA in international military cooperation.

Foreign sinologists believe that the figures shown in the table are underestimated by at least two times and do not reflect all items of expenditure.¹¹ However, China's total military spending is small compared to the United States, which, according to estimates by the Stockholm Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), spent 39% of global military spending in 2012, while China spent only 9.5% ¹². At the same time, for more than 20 years, as mentioned above, the share of military spending did not exceed 3% of China's GDP.

It should be noted that the civilian leadership of the country effectively controls military spending, preventing inflating the military budget. According to the Constitution of the People's Republic of China and the National Defense Law developed on its basis, the mission of the Chinese armed forces is "to strengthen national defense, repel aggression, protect the motherland, and protect the peaceful labor of the people" ¹³.

¹ http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/ China_Military_Power_Report_2009.pdf

² Beijing Review. 2012. Vol. 55. No. 47. November 22. P. 17 - 18.

³ See, for example: Brodsgaard Kjeld Erik. Cadre and Personnel Management in the CPC // China, An International Journal. Singapore. August 2012. Vol. 10, No. 2. P. 69 - 83.

⁴ SIPRI Year Book 2011. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2011. P. 160.

⁵ Yearbook of SIPRI: armaments, disarmament and International Security / Translated from English by IMEMO, Moscow, Nauka Publ., 2005, p. 331.

^{Minemura Kenji.} 6 China's one-child policy creates wimpy military recruits, deserters -http://ajw.asahi.com/article/special/pla/AJ201302060009a (10.06.2013)

^{Minemura Kenji.} 7 Corruption among top military officials kept under wraps in China -http://ajw.asahi.com/article/special/pla/AJ201302070003a (14.07.2013)

^{Solov'ev E.} 8 General untrained. Military leaders of the People's Republic of China will be reminded of the hardships and hardships of military service in practice. 25.04.2013.

⁹ SIPRI Year Book 2011... P. 159.

¹⁰ Ibid. P. 160.

^{Minemura Kenji.} 11 China's real defense budget almost double official figure, military sources say - http://ajw.asahi.com/article/ special/pla/AJ201303050045a (10.08.2013)

¹² http://sipri.org/research/armaments/ milex/milex-graphs-for-data-launch-2013/states-with-the-highest-military-expenditure (16.08.2013)

^{Guangqian Peng.} 13 Zhongguo guofang (Defense of China). Beijing, Wuzhou chuanbo chubanshe (Five Continents Publishing House), 2004, p. 31.

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