Libmonster ID: CN-1253
Author(s) of the publication: A. A. KIREEVA


MGIMO (U) of the Russian Foreign Ministry

Japan Keywords:Chinaterritorial disputeSenkaku/Diaoyu

The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute has become one of the most intense territorial conflicts in East Asia, and has surpassed the foreign policy complications associated with Japan's claims to the Southern Kuril Islands and islands. Takeshima (Dokdo), a city under the administrative administration of the Republic of Korea (South Korea)*. Senkaku/Diaoyu are de facto controlled by Japan, but sovereignty over them is disputed by the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China on Taiwan (hereinafter referred to as Taiwan). This territorial dispute has been going on for a long time, with no visible prospects for settlement, but also without developing into a military conflict.1 "The conflict in East Asia can become much more dangerous than any escalation in the Middle East," says American expert I. Buruma. - It may involve Taiwan and the Korean Peninsula. In addition to the potential loss of life, it would cause great damage to the global economy and directly pit the United States against China. " 2

The importance of this issue is shown by the fact that it was discussed during the first large-format meeting between US President Barack Obama and Chinese President Xi Jinping in June 2013 at the Sunnylands estate (California).

As US Presidential aide T. Donilon noted at a briefing following the summit, the two leaders discussed this issue "for quite a long time." Obama noted that, ultimately, the United States does not have a definite position on sovereignty over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. The President believes that both sides "should strive not to escalate tensions, but to de-escalate, to negotiate through diplomatic channels, and not to act in the East China Sea."3. At the same time, Washington has repeatedly stated that the Senkaku are subject to the Japan-US Security Treaty. In other words, if the dispute turns into a military conflict, Washington will intervene on the side of Japan.


The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands are of great military, strategic and economic importance. In Japan, some experts are in favor of building a radar complex, a military base or a submarine base on the largest island of the archipelago - Uotsuri/That would pose a significant threat to the Chinese side4. Other experts believe that the dispute over islands has become one of the factors that make it almost impossible to improve long-term and stable relations between China and Japan. 5 Moreover, according to the Japanese researcher U. Suganuma, "if there is an outbreak that can ignite a third Sino-Japanese war, it will be a question of belonging to the Diaoyu" 6.

Senkaku Island (Japanese: Senkaku-seto or Senkaku-ratto) or Diaoyu (kit, name, Taiwanese name - Diaoyutai and Tiaoyutai) is a group of 8 islands in the East China Sea with an area of 6.3 square kilometers, the largest of which is Uotsuri Island/Diaoyu-has an area of 4.3 square kilometers. The islands have a basalt base, and some of them have vegetation. They are completely uninhabited, they were not from-

* For more information, see: Rusakov E. M. Ni prava (mezhdunarodnogo), ni zdravogo smysla [Neither Law (international), nor Common sense].

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Senkaku Islands, Diaoyu/Tiaoyutai, located between China, Japan and Taiwan, is of great strategic importance.

marked with traces of human activity 7. The archipelago is located almost midway between Taiwan Island and the Ryukyu Islands of Japan, approximately 170 km northeast of Taiwan, 410 km southwest of Okinawa, and 330 km east of mainland China8.

The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands themselves have no economic value, but the surrounding area contains large reserves of gas and oil, as well as rich fish resources. According to the latest data from the US Energy Information Administration, oil reserves in the East China Sea range from 60 to 100 million barrels, and gas-250 trillion cubic meters.9 Most of these resources are located in the Okinawan Basin, which is also claimed by China, considering that it is "a natural extension of the Chinese continental shelf in the East China Sea, which extends to the Okinawan Basin" 10.

Given that Japan imports most of its energy resources, and China's oil and gas needs are growing rapidly, the possibility of developing potential reserves located near the islands has become one of the key factors contributing to the escalation of the conflict.

The Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute concerns sovereignty and is directly linked to domestic politics, especially given the rise of nationalist sentiment in both countries. Repeatedly, attempts by one side to reinforce claims to sovereignty over them have led to a surge of nationalism in the other. At the same time, according to foreign experts, this factor limits the ability of the countries ' leaders to compromise: the leaders of China and Japan cannot afford to appear weak in this dispute, fearing loss of authority in the eyes of their own population.

In Japan, the Senkaku has become an important nationalist symbol used by radical right-wing forces to criticize their government. In China, however, nationalist sentiments are more likely associated with accusations against Japan as an aggressive power, in which militarism is once again reviving. 11

For centuries, Japan was perceived in China as a country that adopted the achievements of Chinese civilization and was part of the system of nominal suzerainty that the Middle Empire built in the region. China's defeat at the hands of its former "vassal" in the War of 1894-1895 and Japan's aggression against China in 1937-1945 dealt a severe blow to Chinese national pride. As Japanese researchers conclude, China would never have ceded an inch of its territory to Japan, even if major energy resources had not been found on Senkaku / Diaoyu.12 For the Chinese, these islands are not just an integral part of China's territory, but a "sacred land". In this regard, the Xinhua news Agency put it this way: "Every Chinese person is concerned about their fate, wants to know their past and present, and closely monitors their future." 13

For both China and Japan, the issue of sovereignty over Senkaku/Diaoyu is also linked to other territorial disputes. Each side fears that the resolution of this conflict under unfavorable conditions will set a negative precedent. For the PRC, this concerns, first of all, the conflict in the South China Sea around the Spratly Islands/Nansha and Paracel Islands/Shisha, for Japan-South Kuril Islands and Takeshima/Dokdo 14.


The historical justification of the right to a territory is often used in order to get the maximum possible support both within the country and in the international arena. As a result, two groups of scientists were even formed, justifying the "pro-Chinese" and "pro-Japanese" positions with the help of a whole set of proofs.15

Japan's official position is based on the assertion that the Senkaku are an integral part of Japan's territory, both historically and on the basis of international law, so the issue of sovereignty over the islands is not a matter of dispute.16

The Japanese side assumes that in 1895 it obtained the legal right to own these islands after conducting a series of surveys in 1887 and

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1892, which showed that the Senkaku were uninhabited and there was no evidence of their belonging to China. Based on this information, the Japanese Government decided on January 14, 1895, to erect a marker post to officially include these territories in Japan.17 According to the Japanese version, this decision was in accordance with international law as the occupation of terra nullius - "no man's land", which could become the territory of the state that claimed it, if before that it did not belong to anyone and was not controlled by anyone. 18

Thus, according to Japan's position, the Senkaku Islands were not part of Taiwan or the Pescadores, which China ceded to Japan under the Treaty of Shimonoseki, signed in May 1895 following the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895. 19

After the incorporation of Senkaku into Japan, they were used for business by the Koga family from Okinawa, who took possession of them in 1932. 20 As proof, the following is also cited: a letter of thanks in 1920 from the Consul of the Republic of China in Nagasaki to the residents of Ishigaki Island for rescuing shipwrecked Chinese sailors on the "Senkaku Islands belonging to the Japanese People". Japan"; article in the Chinese newspaper "People's Daily" dated January 8, 1953, in which the Senkaku Islands were named part of the Ryukyu Islands; "Atlas of the World" published by the PRC in 1958 (second edition in 1960), on which the islands are marked as the territory of Japan; renaming of the islands - from Senkaku to Diaoyu-in Chinese textbooks only in 197021

The Chinese position is that China's sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands was established long before Japan "discovered" them. According to Chinese historians, documents mentioning these islands and their use for defense date back to the Ming (1368-1644) and Qing (1644-1911) dynasties. The islands served navigational purposes as a base for Chinese fishermen, as well as as a sea line of defense in the 16th century.22 Thus, in 1372, the Diaoyu became a navigational reference point for the ambassadors of the Chinese Empire on their trip to collect tribute from Wang (ruler) of the Ryukyu State, which was part of the Chinese system of nominal suzerainty. Almost 500 years before the Japanese annexation of the Ryukyu Islands in the second half of the 19th century. Diaoyu Province was visited 24 times for this purpose. The first written mention of Diaoyu in the book "Traveling with a Fair Wind" dates back to 1403. They were also described in the chronicles of the visit of the Chinese envoy to the Ryukyu Islands in 1534 and in later sources that described similar visits (1562, 1719).

Thus, China was the first to discover, name and describe these islands. 23 In addition, the Diaoyu was the maritime border with the Ryukyu State. 24 In 1893, two years before the annexation of the islands by Japan, Empress Cixi issued an imperial edict, according to which the Diaoyu Islands were granted to a Chinese alchemist who collected on them rare medicinal herbs 25.

The Chinese position is that the Diaoyu Islands were administered and under Chinese jurisdiction as part of Taiwan several centuries before the Japanese Cabinet decided to annex them to Japan, which means that they were not the same terra nullius - "no man's land", as the Japanese claimed, but were part of Taiwan. 26 This position is reinforced by the fact that the Diaoyu Islands were part of the fact that on Japanese maps Senkaku/Diaoyu were marked as Chinese territory (for example, in 1785)27, and on official maps "Complete map of the Ryukyu Islands" in 1874 and "Chronicles of Okinawa" in 1877. they were not marked at all 28.

From the Chinese point of view, Japan can be blamed for the IMN-

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In 1885, the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs declared that Japan should "wait for a better understanding of the situation", and that the Japanese government should not be able to achieve a realist expansion, since the islands were incorporated into Japan not in 1885 along with Daito Island, as the Japanese governor of Okinawa claimed, but already in 1895, when Japan's victory over China was obvious. 29 In 1885, the Japanese Foreign Minister at the right time, " as there are already strong concerns in China about the possible occupation of the Diaoyu by Japan, and the installation of markers will only cause additional suspicion.30

The parties also interpret the 1995 Shimonoseki Treaty differently. According to the Chinese position, the Diaoyu Islands were transferred to Japan along with Taiwan: Article 2 of the document states that China cedes the "island of Formosa (Taiwan)to Japan together with all the islands belonging to or belonging to the above-mentioned Formosa Island. " 31 Accordingly, they were to be returned to China after the end of World War II by the Cairo Declaration of 1943 and the Potsdam Declaration of 1945.

The Cairo Declaration of 1943, signed by US President F. D. Roosevelt, British Prime Minister W. Churchill, and the head of the Kuomintang Government of China, Chiang Kai-shek, stated that the goal of the three powers 'policy in the Far East was to stop and "punish the aggression of Japan" and to return to the Republic of China all the territories it had torn away, including Manchuria (north-eastern prov. China, Formosa Island (Taiwan) and Pescadores (Penghu)32. The Potsdam Declaration of 1945 stated that "Japanese sovereignty will be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku, and such smaller islands as we specify." 33

The Senkaku Islands were not specifically mentioned in these documents, but, as noted above, China believes that they relate to the island. Taiwan, and with it were to be returned to China.


In the San Francisco Peace Treaty signed in September 1951, "Japan renounces all rights, legal grounds and claims to Formosa and the Pescadores Islands" 34, which is reflected in article 2 of the second chapter.

It should be noted that the San Francisco Peace Treaty was largely a " product of its own era "(i.e., the Cold War era), and reflected the interests of the drafters and, above all, Washington, whose policy was to create security alliances with the countries of the region to counter the "spread of communism". Since the San Francisco Treaty was drawn up and concluded without the participation of the USSR and the PRC, the territorial settlement took place without taking into account the position of the countries of the socialist camp, and many territorial problems were specially created or left unresolved in order to protect the strategic interests of the United States. Not all the territories that Japan gave up were defined in the treaty, which laid the foundation for further disputes over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, Takeshima/Dokdo and Kuril Islands 35.

All territories designated in Article 3 of the second Chapter of the San Francisco Treaty: Nansei Seto south of 29 degrees north latitude, including the Ryukyu Islands and Daito, Nampo Seto, were under the administrative control of the United States and were returned to Japan by the early 1970s, without falling under the UN trusteeship system, as it should have been under the terms of the contract. The main issue in determining the legal status of the Senkaku /Diaoyu Islands under the San Francisco Peace Treaty was whether they were part of the Japanese prefecture of Okinawa or part of Taiwan, which Japan had abandoned.

At the San Francisco Peace Conference, U.S. Secretary of State's Adviser John F. Kennedy Dulles said that Japan retains "residual sovereignty" over Senkaku/Diaoyu, but this provision was not enshrined in the text of the treaty. Some researchers attribute the uncertain status of these territories to the fact that the United States decided to drive a wedge between Japan and China* in order to leave them a potential dispute in the future.36

The official position of the PRC is that the San Francisco Treaty is considered illegal and invalid, since China did not participate in the preparation, development and signing of the treaty and, therefore, does not recognize it.37


The conflict over the disputed islands surfaced in the late 60s and early 70s.

In 1968, a study by the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCA-TO) was published, which found that the mainland shelf of the East China Sea near Senkaku/Diaoyu may contain a rich oil field, according to then estimates, with potential reserves of 10 to 100 billion cubic meters. barr. 38 The second catalyst was negotiations for Japan to regain administrative control of Okinawa from the United States, which had controlled it since the end of the Pacific War.

In mid-1969, the Tai authorities-

* This assessment of the reasons for the uncertain status of disputed territories is inaccurate. The main role was played by disagreements between the United States and Great Britain, which recognized the PRC in January 1950, over whether to transfer these territories to the Kuomintang government in Taiwan or the PRC. For more information, see: Rusakov E. M. Japanese-Chinese contradictions in the post-war period (1949-1973) (diss). Moscow, 1973, p. 9 (approx. ed.).

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Bae was declared China's right to exploit the Senkaku/Diaoyu hydrocarbon reserves offshore, and on September 4, 1970, Taiwan's Foreign Minister, Wei Daoming, declared the islands to belong to the Republic of China. Japan strongly protested, but in an effort to prevent an escalation of the situation, representatives of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan held a meeting at which they agreed to conduct joint exploration and development of the Yellow and East China Seas from the beginning of 1971 and to establish a Joint Oceanic Company for the exploration of deposits. Chinese officials remained silent, but the Xinhua news agency issued a critical comment on the matter.39

Japan's official position is that prior to the discovery of oil offshore in the East China Sea in 1968, neither Taiwan nor the PRC claimed sovereignty over Senkaku for 20 years after the war and the signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty.40 According to the Japanese position, Senkaku, in accordance with Article 3 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, was first transferred to US control as part of Okinawa Prefecture, and the US military since 1958 for many years leased these islands from the Japanese to conduct military exercises there (rent in the amount of $11 thousand a year received, in particular, owner of Kobase Island Zenji Koga, son of the first Japanese owner who lived in Naha (Okinawa)41. The Senkaku Islands were then returned to Japan under the Agreement on the Return of the Ryukyu Islands of June 17, 197142, according to which the United States returned administrative rights to Okinawa Prefecture to Japan, and the returned territories included Senkaku 43. In 1972, a unit of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces was stationed on Okinawa, and the water area adjacent to Senkaku, became patrolled by ships and aircraft of the Japanese Coast Guard 44.

Taiwan's Foreign Ministry protested before signing the agreement on June 11, 1971, saying that it was a violation of the allied agreements of the Pacific War period and the San Francisco Peace Treaty, since the status of this territory should be determined by the "main allied Powers". This position was due to the fact that Taiwan retained the interest in obtaining Okinawa expressed by Chiang Kai-shek during World War II. The document also stated that the Republic of China would never give up its sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands, which "belong to the province of Taiwan and form part of the Republic of China".

The PRC also criticized the agreement, but for a different reason, calling it a "dirty deal", since it assumed the preservation of US military bases in Okinawa. And on December 30, 1971, the Chinese Foreign Ministry officially declared the islands a territory of the PRC, based on their historical affiliation. It was stated that the inclusion of the Diaoyu in the territories that the United States was returning to Japan was a violation of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the PRC and that the PRC would make every effort to liberate Taiwan and the islands that belong to it, including the Diaoyu. Beijing Radio noted that US control of the islands was illegal from the very beginning, which means that the US did not have the right to transmit illegally occupied islands. 45 Accordingly, the Chinese position is based on the fact that the issue of the Diaoyu Islands came to the fore due to their illegal transfer to Japan under the 1971 Agreement on the Return of the Ryukyu Islands, and the San Francisco Peace Treaty is not a treaty that finally settled this issue, since neither Taiwan nor the PRC signed it, and, This means that the agreement between the United States and Japan does not change the essence of the matter, i.e., it does not call into question the sovereignty of the PRC over the Diaoyu 46.

According to the Agreement on the Return of Okinawa of June 17, 1971, which entered into force on May 15, 1972, the United States returns to Japan "all administrative rights, judicial proceedings and jurisdiction" over the Ryukyu and Daito Islands that the United States had under Article 3 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty. According to the Joint Protocol to the treaty, the borders of the Ryukyu and Daito Islands were established in accordance with the official declaration of the American Civil Administration of Ryukyu No. 27 of 1953, which determined that the borders of Nansei seto south of 29 degrees north latitude included the Senkaku Islands, which was confirmed in Protocol 47.

However, Washington, by returning Okinawa and the surrounding islands back to Japan, made a reservation that it was aware of the existing territorial dispute between Japan and China and returned only administrative rights to the possession of this territory to Japan, which does not affect the claims of China, Taiwan and Japan to sovereignty over the islands. Thus, the United States took a neutral position, leaving the applicants to decide this issue themselves. In a phrase often used by the State Department, " the United States did not want to be caught between two fires." Subsequent US administrations maintained a position of neutrality during the escalation of the dispute in 1996, 2010, and 2012.48 While Washington repeatedly confirmed that Senkaku/Diaoyu were subject to obligations under the 1960 Japan-US Treaty on Mutual Cooperation and Security, according to article V of which each party must act in accordance with its own constitutional procedures in response for an armed attack on a territory under the administrative control of Japan 49.

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The dotted line marks the border of the exclusive economic zone of Japan, the line - the PRC, between them is the disputed area in which the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and - partially - oil and gas fields are located.


Not wanting to escalate the conflict, on March 11, 1970, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Trade and Industry announced that it would not issue licenses for exploration and mining on Senkaku, and agreements on joint development of deposits with Taiwan and South Korea were never implemented.50 During the normalization of relations in 1972, China deliberately did not include the territorial issue on the agenda of negotiations, so that it would not interfere with the restoration of relations between the two countries. Although Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka tried to raise the issue of the disputed islands during the talks, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai said:: "We won't talk about it now. After all, these are just tiny points that are even difficult to notice on geographical maps. They only became a problem because oil was found around them. " 51

A serious round of tension in the conflict occurred in 1978 during negotiations on the signing of the Sino-Japanese Treaty of peace and Friendship, when some nationalist Japanese politicians tried to bargain for the recognition of Japanese sovereignty over Senkaku/Diaoyu by the Chinese side in exchange for the inclusion of an "anti-hegemonic" article in the text of the treaty, which was actually aimed against the Soviet Union.

After the breakdown of negotiations in April 1978, about 140 armed fishing vessels with Chinese flags on board entered the Senkaku/Diaoyu water area. This action was intended to demonstrate that the PRC will not tolerate Japanese territorial claims to the disputed islands and is ready to exert military pressure if necessary.52

However, the leaders of both countries did not want the situation to escalate further, so steps were taken to resume negotiations. Deng Xiaoping promised at a press conference in May 1978 that such actions would not happen again, which was apparently due to the PRC's interest in economic cooperation with Japan ahead of the start of the reform and opening-up policy a few months later.

When signing the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship at the initiative of Deng Xiaoping, it was decided not to include the territorial issue in the text of the treaty, but to postpone it indefinitely. For several decades, the famous statement of the leader of the People's Republic of China has defined the official position on the issue of disputed islands: "It is okay if the resolution of this issue is postponed for some time, say, for ten years. Our generation is not yet smart enough to find common ground on this issue. Our future generation will be smarter. It will undoubtedly find a mutually acceptable solution. " 53

However, Tokyo claims that Japan has never, including during the signing of the communique on the establishment of relations in 1972 and the treaty on peace and friendship in 1978, recognized the very existence of the problem of sovereignty over Senkaku, so it is wrong to say that there was an agreement to postpone the issue for the future or to maintain the status quo.54


In 1990, there were incidents involving the construction of a lighthouse on disputed islands and the Japanese Youth Federation's application for official status. They provoked a series of demonstrations in Taiwan and Hong Kong with the support of the Diaoyu Islands Defense Movement formed in the early 1970s. 55 A significant outburst in 1996 was caused by Japanese Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto's visit to the Yasukuni Shrine and the entry into force of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. It establishes the" sovereign rights "of the State in relation to the exploration and exploitation of the natural resources of the exclusive economic zone (a part of the sea 200 nautical miles from the baseline) or similar "sovereign rights" on the continental shelf (the natural extension of the land territory to the outer boundary of the submarine).-

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or up to 200 nautical miles, if the limits of the underwater margin of the mainland do not reach this limit), which includes the mineral resources of the bottom and its subsurface 56. However, in the East China Sea, the distance between the two countries ' territories does not reach 400 miles and is only 360 mi57.

In 1992, China adopted the Declaration on the Territorial Sea and Adjacent Zone, which states that the territorial sea of the People's Republic of China is the waters adjacent to the territory of the People's Republic of China, which consists of the mainland, Taiwan and all adjacent islands, including the Diaoyu, Penghu (Pescadores) and others. 58 By signing the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, For example, Japan in 1996 and China in 1998 introduced their own economic exclusive zones, each of which includes Senkaku/Diaoyu 59. Since China and Japan could not reach a compromise, each side has its own understanding of the maritime border. Japan, based on the principle of equidistance, drew the border along the median line, which divides the East China Sea exactly in the middle between the coast of the PRC and the end of the Japanese archipelago. China does not recognize this median line, and the maritime boundary as understood by the PRC runs along the border of the continental shelf (which exceeds 200 nautical miles from the baseline), much to the east of Japan (340 nautical miles from the coast of the PRC up to the Okinawan Depression, which, according to the Chinese side, is a natural maritime boundary separating China from Japan)60.


In the late 1990s and early 2000s, various incidents occurred in the area of the islands related to the beginning of geological exploration of the PRC on the shelf of the East China Sea. In 2004-2005, the conflict was provoked by the landing of activists of the Diaoyun Islands Defense Movement on Uotsuri Island/In Diaoyu, they were detained and sent to Shanghai.

The two countries ' struggle for energy resources has intensified. Chinese companies have unilaterally started developing the large Shirakaba/Chunxiao field, and the three smaller islands located near it-Kasi/Tianwaitian, Kusunoki / Duanqiao, and Kike / Cansue-are located just 5 nautical miles west of the median line, which Japan considers the border separating the two countries ' exclusive economic zones. Tokyo fears that the PRC may start or is already producing oil and gas from deposits that extend under Japanese territory, as the production area connects to parts of the Japanese economic zone.

In 2005, the Japanese government decided to grant a license for geological exploration in the East China Sea, which was obtained by Teikoku Oil.61 Increased tensions over the disputed islands have coincided with an escalation of the textbook problem. In April 2005, mass protests, often aggressive in nature, swept across all major cities of the People's Republic of China. There were attacks on the Japanese Embassy in Beijing and the consulate in Shanghai. Although in late April, Chinese President Hu Jintao and Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi agreed on the need to overcome differences, including territorial disputes and historical issues, the Chinese side did not apologize for the aggressive protests and did not provide compensation for the damage caused.62

In 2006, during talks between Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, an agreement was reached to turn the East China Sea into a "sea of peace, cooperation and friendship", 63 and on June 18, 2008, at the end of the 12th round of joint negotiations on the development of the East China Sea, an agreement was signed under the auspices of the Ministry of under the title " Sino-Japanese principled consensus on the issue of

* We are talking about a scandalous version of a Japanese high school history textbook, which suppresses and even justifies the crimes of Japanese militarists during World War II, as well as distorts other historical facts (editor's note).

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East China Sea", according to which the Chinese side welcomes the participation of Japanese companies in the development of the Shirakaba/Chun-Xiao field, and the Asuna-ro/Longjing field will have the status of a "joint development zone"64.

In 2009, Japan's Democratic Party (DPJ) Prime Minister, Yukio Hatoyama, said at a meeting with Chinese President Hu Jintao that he wanted to "turn the sea of problems into a sea of brotherhood", and it was agreed to start working-level talks on this issue in the near future65. However, despite the rhetoric, the 2008 Sino-Japanese agreements have not yet led to real results in the joint development of energy resources in the East China Sea, and the agreements on the development of a "joint development zone" have not been implemented.

(The ending follows)

Koo M.G. 1 The Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute and Sino-Japanese political-economic relations: cold politics and hot economics? // The Pacific Review. May 2009. Vol. 22, No. 2, p. 206.

Buruma Ian. 2 A Dangerous Rift Between China and Japan. As the U.S. urges restraint, Asia's two great powers play politics with the past and court a crisis // The Wall Street Journal, 11.05.2013.

3 The White House. Press Briefing By National Security Advisor Tom Donilon. 8.06.2013 - 2013/06/09/press-briefing-national-security-advisor-tom-donilon

Unryu S. 4 Sovereign Rights and Territorial Space in Sino-Japanese Relations: Irredentism and the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. Hawaii: University of Hawaii Press, 2000, p. 13; Pan Z. Sino-Japanese Dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands: The Pending Controversy from the Chinese Perspective // Journal of Chinese Political Science. 2007. Vol. 12, No. 1, p. 71 - 72.

Pan Z. 5 Op. cit., p. 87.

Unryu S. 6 Op. cit., p. 151.

Stepanov E. D. 7 Politika nachin s granitsy: nekotorye voprosy pogranichnoy politiki PRC vtoroi poloviny XX v. [Politics begins with the Border: Some issues of the border policy of the PRC in the second half of the XX century]. Moscow, Institute of the Far East of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 2007, p. 209; Pan Z. Op. cit., p. 71.

8 Senkaku seto ni tsuite (On the Senkaku Islands), p. 2 / / Website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. January 2013 - senkaku/pdfs/senkaku. pdf

9 East China Sea // US Energy Information Administration. 25.09.2012 -

10 China is ready to submit documents to the UN regarding the outer limit of the continental shelf in the East China Sea. 16.09.2012 - - 09/16/c_131853 842.htm

Pan Z.Op. 11 cit, p. 72, 85 - 86.

Unryu S. 12 Op. cit., p. 13 - 14.

13 Shenshende lintu diaoyu zhudao (Diaoyu Islands, Sacred Territory of China) / / Xinhua - 2003 - 01/23/content_703922.htm

Pan Z. 14 Op. cit., p. 85.

Unryu S. 15 Op. cit., p. 1 - 2.

16 Senkaku seto.., p. 1.

17 Nittu kankei (Senkaku seto o meguru joho) (Japanese-Chinese relations (information about the Senkaku Islands) / / Website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. Январь 2013 - senkaku/index.html; Helfin W.B. Diayou/Senkaku Islands Dispute: Japan and China, Oceans Apart // Asian-Pacific Law and Policy Journal. 2000. Vol. 18, No. 1, p. 6.

Pan Z. 18 Op. cit., p. 77.

19 Nittu kankei..; Pan Z. Op. cit, p. 81-83.

Koichi S. 20 China's Territorial Claims at Sea: The East China and South China Sea (Part I) // Eurasia Border Review. Slavic Research Centre. Spring 2012. Vol. 3, No 1, p. 27.

21 Senkaku seto, pp. 8, 11-12.

Pan Z. 22 Op. cit., p. 77 - 78.

23 Diaoyu shih zhonggode gu lintu " baipishu (quanwen) (White Paper "The Diaoyu Islands are an integral part of China's territory") / / Xinhua. 25.02.2012 - 2012 - 09/25/с_113202698.htm

24 Asian Approaches to International Law and the Legacy of Colonialism. New York, Routledge, 2013, p. 93.

25 Ibidem; Pan Z. Op. cit., p. 77. However, there are studies that call this document a forgery. See: Koichi S. Op. cit, p. 26.

Pan Z. 26 Op. cit, p. 77 - 78.

27 However, there is a point of view that these maps were redrawn from ancient Chinese navigation charts and cannot be considered official. For more information, see: Koichi S. Op. cit, p. 25-26.

Helfin W.B. 28 Op. cit., p. 4.

Pan Z. 29 Op. cit, p. 78,81.

Lee I., Ming F. 30 Deconstructing Japan's Claim of Sovereignty over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands // The Asia-Pacific Journal. 31 December, 2012. Vol 10, Issue 53, No. 1 -

31 Treaty of Shimonoseki. Signed at Shimonoseki 17 April 1895 -

32 Diplomatic Dictionary in 3 volumes (ed. Gromyko A. A. et al.). T. P. M., Nauka, 1985, p. 7.

33 Ibid., p. 408.

34 San Francisco Peace Treaty. Signed at San Francisco, 8 September 1951 -; in Russian, see: History of the War in the Pacific, vol. V. M., 1958, pp. 337-359.

Hara K. 35 Cold War Frontiers in the Asia-Pacific: Divided Territories in the San Francisco System. London: Routledge, 2007, p. 3 - 5, 12.

36 Ibid., p. 159,175 - 176.

37 Xinhua. 30.05.2013 - - 05/30/ cJ32420334.htm

Koo M.G. 38 Op. cit, p. 213.

Stepanov E. D. 39 Edict. soch., pp. 210-211; Koo M. G. Op. cit, p. 213.

40 Senkaku seto, p. 7.

Stepanov E. D. 41 Edicts. soch., pp. 209-210; Manyin A.M. Senkaku (Diaoyu/Diaoyutai) Islands Dispute: U.S. Treaty Obligations. CRS Report for Congress. 22 January 2013, p. 9.

42 Agreement between the United States and Japan on the Ryukyu and Daito Islands. Washington and Tokyo. 17 июня 1971 г. - .html

Stepanov E. D. 43 Edict. soch., p. 212.

44. Semin A.V. 44 Japan-China Relations: state, problems and trends (late XX-early XXI centuries). Moscow, Institute of the Far East of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 2008, p. 70.

Stepanov E. D. 45 Edict. soch., pp. 212-213; Hara K. Op. cit, p. 179.

Pan Z. 46 Op. cit, p. 79.

Manyin A.M. 47 Op. cit, p. 3 - 4.

48 Ibid., p. 4 - 5; Hara K. Op. cit, p. 179 - 180.

Manyin A.M. 49 Op. cit, p. 5 - 6. 50KooM.G. Op. cit, 215 - 216.

51 Cit. by: Stepanov E. D. Edict. soch., p. 214.

52 Ibid., pp. 214-215; Koo M. G. Op. cit, p. 217.

Stepanov E. D. 53 Edict. soch., pp. 215-216; Koo M. G. Op. cit., p. 218.

54 Senkaku seto, p. 10.

Koo M.G. 55 Op. cit, p. 219 - 222.

56 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. 1982 / / UN website - convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_r. pdf

Pan Z. 57 Op. cit, p. 83 - 84.

58 Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone of 25 February 1992 // China. United Nations f

Pan Z. 59 Op. cit, p. 75.

60 Ibid., p. 84.

Rongxing G. 61 Territorial Disputes and Seabed Petroleum Exploration: Some Options for the East China Sea // The Brookings Institution. September 2010, p. 29 - 30.

Koo M.G. 62 Op. cit, p. 225 - 226.

Ryosei K. 63 Indirect support from Japan key to China's reform // The Asahi Shimbun. 21.04.2007 - 070726.pdf

Ronxing G. 64 Op. cit., p. 30.

65 Asahi shimbun. 22.09.2009.


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