E. A. BORISOVA

Candidate of Historical Sciences

Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences

PRESENT AND FUTURE

Keywords: China, hydrocarbons, energy resources, Power of Siberia, ESPO, Russian export

Over the past few years, Russia has been actively expanding its trade and economic ties with China. The main focus is on the export of Russian oil and gas. Russia is successfully competing with the countries of the Persian Gulf and Africa for access to the Chinese oil market. As for Russian gas, it has yet to make its way to the Chinese market. And this task is much more difficult than it seems.

Until the end of the 1990s, the main consumers of hydrocarbons in the world (including Russian ones) were the United States, Western Europe, and Asia Minor. Since the mid-2000s, the focus has shifted to China and India.¹ Nevertheless, Europe ² has always remained the main consumer of Russian energy resources until today. However, as a result of the deterioration of Russian-European economic ties caused by the divergence of approaches to Ukraine and Crimea, Russia began to show more interest in Asian markets. China has become Russia's key partner in the Asia-Pacific region. Over two years of strained relations with Europe and the United States, Russia and China have signed a number of major economic agreements. The most ambitious of them concerned the export of Russian energy resources.

POWER OF SIBERIA, ALTAI AND OTHER ROUTES

In May 2014, Gazprom and the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) signed a contract in Shanghai to supply Russian gas to China via the eastern pipeline route. The Power of Siberia gas trunk pipeline has been built specifically for this project since September 2014 (see map 1). It will be supplied with gas from the Kovykta and Chayandinsky fields. The launch of this route, originally planned for 2019, was later postponed to 2021. The contract for a period of 30 years provides for the export of 38 billion US dollars to China. cubic meters of Russian gas per year with prices linked to the oil basket and a "take or pay"condition*. For Gazprom, this is the largest gas supply contract in its entire history. During the term of the agreement, more than 1 trillion cubic meters of gas should be sent to China.

Another document was signed in Beijing on November 9, 2014. The participants are the same-Gazprom and CNPC. It concerned the supply of 30 billion cubic meters of gas-now via the western route "Altai" ("Power of Siberia-2") (see map 1), and also for 30 years.

According to the Memorandum, which is

The publication was prepared within the framework of the RGNF-supported research project N 15 - 37 - 11129 (Research of socio-cultural, environmental and technological aspects of the prospects for energy export from Russia).

* "Take-or-Pay" (English Take-or-Pay - TOR) - a common rule for constructing contracts for the supply of certain types of goods to large buyers: the supplier undertakes to provide the goods up to the maximum volumes specified in the contract, the buyer undertakes in any case to pay a certain part of these volumes, regardless of whether the buyer is responsible for the delivery of goods to large buyers., how much he actually purchased during the period under review (author's note).

Map 1. Gas supply routes from Russia to China.

Source: Kommersant - http://www.kommers ant.ru/doc/2612 958

only a statement of intent and is less binding than a contract, deliveries through this gas pipeline will be carried out from the same fields whose resources are used to sell raw materials to European countries. Negotiations on developing cooperation in this area are still stalling. In May 2015, only the main terms of delivery were agreed upon and an agreement was signed on them. A price decision is expected to be made at a later date.

In addition to " gas " contracts, agreements were also signed with China on oil supplies. November 10, 2014 Russia and China have agreed on additional volumes of supplies to the contract signed in June 2013* between Rosneft and CNPC. It was signed for a period of 25 years, during which the Russian Federation pledged to supply China with $ 365 million. approximately 14.6 million tons of oil per year) on the branch of the Eastern Siberia - Pacific Ocean (ESPO) - Skovorodino - Mohe oil pipeline (to Daqing). Starting from 2020, 9 million tons of these will be sent annually to the Tianjin Oil Refinery under construction, which is jointly owned by the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China.

Russian oil supplies to China via the Skovorodino-Mohe ESPO pipeline branch are already underway. They started in 2011 and amount to about 15 million tons per year. Before the construction of ESPO (see map 2), oil was delivered to China by rail tank cars.

In total, Rosneft State Corporation has committed to supply 720 million tons of oil to China within 25 years. The first major long-term contract with the China National Petroleum Corporation was signed in 2009 for the supply of 15 million tons of oil annually for 20 years.

The additional 5 million tons per year agreed in November 2014 for 2015-2017 will be delivered by tankers through the port of Kozmino until the completion of the extension of the Mohe - Daqing branch, which is delayed due to the fault of the Chinese side. The launch of the second route option, scheduled for late 2015, has been postponed for 2 years.

Its capacity will also be 15 million tons per year. Thus, a total of 30 million tons of Russian oil can be delivered annually via the Mohe - Daqing branch.

In September 2015, Rosneft reached another agreement with the Chinese side to increase crude oil supplies. An additional 4 million tons are allocated annually to the China Petrochemical Corporation (ChinaPetrochemicalCorporation / SinopecGroup) for petrochemical production. The agreement is concluded for 3 years; it provides for the possibility of increasing deliveries and extending the agreed terms.

China also announced its desire to buy shares of Russian companies holding licenses for the development of a number of fields in the Russian Federation. So, among other documents, on November 9, 2014 in Beijing, framework agreements were signed between Rosneft and the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) on the possible purchase by the Chinese of more than 10% of the shares of Vankorneft, which owns the license for the development of the Vankor field.

This transaction did not take place due to the fact that the parties did not agree on the price issues. As a result, 15% of Vankorneft's shares were sold to an Indian company. And in May 2015, it became known about the possible entry of the Chinese with a share of up to 49% in the projects of two other large deposits - Russkoye and Yurubcheno-Tokhomskoye. The Chinese nsf showed interest in them-

* The estimated value of the contract at the time of signing was $270 billion, which is considered an unprecedented amount for the industry. The agreement provides for an advance payment from China in the amount of $70 billion.

Map 2. Eastern Siberia-Pacific Ocean oil pipeline.

Source: Giprotruboprovod.

a chemical corporation. This option is possible through the purchase of shares of the East Siberian Oil and Gas Company (VSNK) and Tyumenneftegaz by Chinese investors.

So far, these projects are only being discussed. The transfer of control over the project of the Eastern Petrochemical Company, which involves the construction of a petrochemical complex for the production of polymers in the Primorsky Territory, to the Chinese concern ChemChina is also being discussed.

Today, Chinese companies are already involved in a number of Russian projects for the exploration, production and processing of hydrocarbons. Thus, Sinopec Petrochemical Corporation jointly with Rosneft owns Udmurtneft and is also involved in the Sakhalin-3 project. CNPC cooperates with Rosneft State Corporation in the exploration and production of hydrocarbons in the Irkutsk Region, participating in the JV Vostok-Energy LLC^!. It also has a stake in NOVATEK's Yamal CIS project. Together with the China Silk Road Foundation, they own a combined 30% of the project.

OUR COMPETITORS IN THE CHINESE OIL MARKET

Today, Russia is among the leading oil exporters to China (see Chart 1). In May 2015, in terms of monthly supply volumes (3.92 million tons), it even took the 1st place for the first time since 2005. However, the success was short-lived. Russia is fighting for leadership with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia( KSA), Angola, Iraq and Oman. China also supplies oil to Iran, Venezuela, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Kuwait, Colombia, South Sudan, Congo, Brazil and Kazakhstan.

In July 2015, the leading exporters were again Saudi Arabia, which supplied 4.2 million tons, and Angola-3.83 million tons of oil, while Russia received 3.77 million tons. In August, Russia was also replaced by Iraq, taking the 3rd place among suppliers. But in September, Russia delivered 4,042 million tons to China, which is 42.3% higher than in September 2014, and 30.9% higher than in August of the same year'¹. In October, the situation changed once again. Deliveries to Russia decreased by 16% compared to September, which is again from-

Chart 1. Main oil suppliers to China in 2014 (%).

Source: US Energy Security Agency (EIA).

This put it on the 3rd place after KSA and Angola, which, on the contrary, managed to increase exports to China by 0.8 and 27%, respectively.

Overall, Russia is increasing its share of Asian exports, creating serious competition for Saudi Arabia. If the Kingdom is trying to occupy a traditional Russian niche in the European market, then Russia is successfully crowding the Saudis in their territory - in Asia, which accounts for about 70% of oil exports from KSA.

By the way, in 2015 Saudi Arabia was able to supply oil to Poland for the first time, because the price it offered, despite significant transportation costs, was lower than the price offered by the Russian side. However, Russia's success in Asia is more significant than the Saudis ' success in Europe: despite dumping, the Kingdom's share in the European market fell from 13% to 10% in 6 months of 2015.

As for the Asian markets, some OPEC countries began to lose their positions in 2014. Oil imports to China from the largest OPEC member countries decreased in 2014: from Saudi Arabia-by 8%, from Venezuela-by 11%. But Russian supplies increased by 36%. As a result, Russia increased its share in this market from 9% to ¹¹% in 2014, and the KSA share in the Chinese oil market decreased from 19% in 2013 to 16% in 2014.5 OPEC countries were forced to lower prices for Asian producers in order to maintain their previously won positions in this market. customers.

In the future, Iran is also ready to compete for the Chinese market. Today, its share in Chinese oil imports is about 8%^. The share of Russian oil in Chinese oil imports, according to data for January - September 2015, is slightly more than 12%.

During this period, China's oil imports totaled 248.62 million tons, an increase of 8.8% compared to the same period last year. Deliveries from Saudi Arabia increased by 5.1% to 38.451 million tons, and from Russia - by 30% to 30.306 million tons. Thus, Russia remains in 2nd place in this indicator; Angola is in 3rd place with an indicator of 29.233 million tons (a decrease of 3.5%) 7.

The main supplier of oil to China among our companies is Rosneft. Rosneft's shipments to the east, where its main customer is China, totaled $ 33.5 million in 2014. 15.6 million tons were delivered via the ESPO pipeline branch to Daqing, China, in accordance with long-term contracts concluded. Another 7 million tons went to China via Kazakhstan's Atasu-Alashankou oil pipeline. The remaining volume of oil, both to the Chinese market and to the markets of other Asian countries, is delivered through the Pacific ports of Kozmino and De Kastri8. Gazprom Neft, Surgutneftegaz, LUKOIL and Bashneft also send small volumes of oil to China. The total volume of Russian oil exports to China in 2014 was 33.11 million tons ⁹. According to Transneft, in 2015 the total export of Russian oil to China was approximately 36.44 million tons.

OPPORTUNITIES FOR EXPANDING RUSSIAN HYDROCARBON EXPORTS TO CHINA

With gas, everything is clear. Our potential opportunities are huge. The main thing is to implement the signed agreements on the construction of the Power of Siberia and Altai gas pipelines. The only question is, will they actually be implemented? But more on that below.

As for oil exports, our capabilities in this area today are highly dependent on the capacity of the Russian oil pipeline leading to eastern markets. True, this is not the only possible export route, but it is the main one. Its final destination is the port of Kozmino on the Pacific coast of Russia. From there, oil is shipped by tanker to China, Japan, South Korea, Singapore and other countries. Most of the oil through this port - about 37% - is sent to-

It is exported to Japan, more than 25% - to China, and South Korea is on the 3rd place - about 17%. Pumping volumes along the main ESPO route to the Pacific Ocean depend on the port of Kozmino's oil handling capacity, which is limited to 30 million tons of oil per year. In 2014, the port received 24.6 million tons of oil.

Approximately half of Russia's oil flows to China, as already mentioned, through the ESPO Skovorodino-Mohe branch to Daqing, China. A total of ¹⁶ million tons of oil were delivered to the north of China via this route in 2015.10

Previously, it was planned that the ESPO expansion would occur by 2030, but later the dates were postponed to 2020. By this time, the capacity of the ESPO-1 (Taishet - Skovorodino) pipeline system will reach 80 million tons per year, and the capacity of the ESPO-2 (Skovorodino - Kozmino) pipeline system will reach 50 million tons per year. That is, all 80 million tons of oil will go to Skovorodino, and then the two streams will split: 30 million-to the border of China via the Skovorodino-Mohe oil pipeline, 50 million-further, in the direction of the port of Kozmino.

Once these plans are implemented, oil supplies via the ESPO pipeline will be distributed as follows: Kozmino port - 24 million tons of oil per year, Komsomolsk Refinery - 8 million, Khabarovsk Refinery - 6 million, VNHK - 12 million. t per year. The Daqing branch line will supply China with 30 million tons per year11. Russia is already ready to supply even more oil via this route, but China is still not keeping up with the development of the receiving infrastructure.

During negotiations with Russia's Transneft in June 2015, representatives of China's CNPC asked to consider the option that, starting in 2018, the annual volume of oil pumped through the Skovorodino - Mohe pipeline will be only 20 out of 30 million tons, and the remaining 10 million will be transported through the port of Kozmino and the territory of Kazakhstan. For the Russian side, this option is unacceptable, as it will entail a "radical adjustment of the investment program" ¹².

Kozmino Port's facilities are limited and there were no plans to expand them. Moreover, a number of Russian companies are competing for the transportation of their own oil through ESPO-2. Given that the main volumes are occupied by the state Corporation Rosneft, Surgutneftegaz, Gazpromieft, Irkutsk Oil Company and LUKOIL, which also use this direction, there are still insufficient volumes for them. And with the planned increase in the share of Rosneft, these companies generally risk being left out of business...

Russia, as already mentioned, also uses the capabilities of Kazakhstan's Atasu-Llashankou oil pipeline. The volume of pumping in this direction depends on the quotas provided by Kazakhstan to the Russian company, and they, in turn, depend on the volume of oil production in this state. Currently, 7 million tons of Russian oil pass through this route annually. The agreement on these volumes with Kazakhstan for a period of 5 years with the possibility of automatic renewal is valid from January 1, 2014. According to the Russian-Kazakh intergovernmental agreement signed on December 24, 2013, Russia also has the opportunity to increase its supplies via this route to 10 million tons per year. The maximum throughput capacity of the Kazakhstan "pipe" is 20 million tons of oil per year.

Thus, in 2020, Russia, at least in theory, will be able to supply to China annually:

- 30 million tons of oil in the direction of Skovorodino-Mohe;

- 7-10 million tons via Kazakhstan;

- 24 million tons via the port of Kozmino.

However, it is not yet known how much of this volume will be sent to China, and how much to other Asian markets.

In total, if possible railway routes are not included in the calculations, Russia will be able to supply approximately 60 million tons of oil to China annually.

TODAY, CHINA NEEDS OUR OIL AND GAS. AND TOMORROW?..

China remains the world's largest consumer of energy resources, accounting for

Figure 2. Structure of energy consumption in China in 2014 (%).

Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2015.

Table 1

Oil production and consumption in China (million tons)

Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy, 2005-2015.

23% of the world's energy consumption. Among fossil fuels, natural gas accounted for the largest consumer growth in China in 2014 (+ 8.6%). It is followed by oil (+ 3.3%), and then coal (+ 0.1%) ¹³. Such indicators fit well into the national energy development strategy of the PRC, which relies on the gradual transfer of energy systems from coal (the main fuel in China-see chart 2) to gas.

Oil consumption in 2014 in China (excluding the territory of Hong Kong) amounted to 520.3 million tons, of which 211.4 million tons were covered by domestic production. Annual production growth is slow. So, in relation to 2013, it was only 0.7% ^of gdp, although this corresponds to 5% of the global production growth, which is not so small. Crude oil imports in 2014 totaled 309.2 million tons ¹⁵. At the same time, oil production in China is growing much slower than oil demand (see Table 1).

According to Chinese experts, in 2020, the need for oil imports will amount to 350 million tons. For 2030, the forecast figures are 450 million tons. Such data is provided by Han Jinkuang, president of the Institute of Planning and Engineering of PetroChina^. In general, oil forecasts are much more stable than gas: all experts recognize that the need for oil imports will grow evenly every year.

Along with the increase in gas consumption, its production is also growing, but it is not keeping up with the growth in consumer demand (see Table 2). In 2014, production reached 134.5 billion cubic meters (in 2004 it was only 42.8 billion rubles)¹⁷.

Significant investments in geological exploration allowed China to increase its proven natural gas reserves from 1.5 trillion cubic meters. The country has several relatively large natural gas fields, accounting for a total of 1.8% of the world's reserves.

In 2015, gas consumption in China, according to preliminary data, amounted to about 230 billion cubic meters, and about 90 billion cubic meters. China imported. In the next few years, China's dependence on gas imports will grow. If in 2010 the share of external supplies of natural gas was 15% of the volume of its consumption, in 2014 it reached 27.5%. In 2014, the Chinese market received 58.4 billion cubic meters of gas from abroad. Of these, 53.5% (31.3 billion) are via pipelines from Central Asia and Myanmar, 46% (27.1 billion) are LNG, mainly from Australia, Indonesia and Qatar.¹⁹

Table 2

Natural gas production and consumption in China (bcm)

Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy, 2005-2015.

WILL THE POWER OF SIBERIA WEAKEN OVER TIME?

And now is the time to say that in 2021, when our gas starts to flow to China via the Power of Siberia pipeline, it is not a fact that it will be in demand in this country. The following figures can be used as proof.

According to forecasts of the State Committee for Development and Reform of the People's Republic of China, the volume of natural gas consumption in China in 2020 will amount to 360 billion cubic meters. cubic meters with own production of 220 billion cubic meters. That is, the demand for gas imports in 2020 will be approximately 140 billion cubic meters. By this time, the capacity of pipelines and receiving terminals, according to the calculations of the Ministry of Natural Resources of the People's Republic of China, will reach a much larger volume - 173.6 billion cubic meters of gas per year. Of these, 80 billion will go to the Central Asia - China (TCC) pipeline, 80 billion to LNG terminals, and 12 billion to the Myanmar pipeline ²⁰. Planned gas supplies from Russia are not taken into account in these forecasts at all.

In addition, there is no guarantee that the above volumes will be fully selected by the economy and housing of the PRC. Thus, in 2014, China's liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminals were used at only ⁵⁵% of their capacity, compared to 67.2% in 2013.2 This is due to the slowdown in the Chinese economy and falling oil prices, which made this fuel more affordable than LNG. The pipeline from Myanmar was also only 25% full. This is also due to the high prices of LNG and the availability of alternatives in the form of other resources, since this pipe mainly pumps gas delivered by sea, i.e. LNG that is previously re-gasified.

The gas pipeline from Turkmenistan - the main natural gas supply route to China-after its expansion, according to the long-term contract, will also not be fully filled-by 81% (65 billion cubic meters).

However, it should be borne in mind that more than half of the imported LNG (about 45 million tons / 63 billion cubic meters) to China will have to be delivered annually under long-term contracts, and only much smaller volumes can be purchased on the spot market, where the price of LNG is much higher and depends on oil prices.

Thus, the main volumes of pipeline and liquefied gas imports by China are contracted. This means that China's demand for Russian gas is 68 billion cubic meters. m per year is rather hazy in the near future. Despite this, the Russian-Chinese gas agreements have been signed and their implementation has begun. Positive forecasts for these projects can only be based on expectations for the expected significant growth of energy consumption in China in the medium and long term. However, it is also necessary to take into account possible transfers of coal-fired thermal power plants to gas.

Both government agencies and private research institutes, as well as major energy companies, are engaged in forecasting the situation with respect to energy demand and production in the long term around the world. For example, the International Energy Agency, the Chinese government, CNPC, BP, and ExxonMobil are involved in forecasting energy consumption and domestic gas production in China in 2030-2035.

However, the range of their estimates is so wide that it makes no sense to give them here. The only conclusion that can be drawn from these forecasts is that, despite a significant reduction in the energy intensity of the Chinese economy, gas demand will continue to grow. Gas production in the country will also grow at an accelerated pace, but most likely it will not be able to cover all domestic demand. Although the presence of huge reserves of so-called unconventional shale gas in China adds to doubts about the growth of Chinese shale gas imports in the relatively distant future.

WHAT ARE THE PROSPECTS FOR "GAS PROJECTS"?

As you know, China is a very difficult negotiator. Negotiations on Russian gas supplies to China began in 2004, and it took more than 5 years to sign only a framework agreement on the terms of gas supplies from Russia to China in the amount of up to 68 billion cubic meters annually in 2009.

The main stumbling block in negotiations has always been the issue of price. In negotiations with the Russian Federation on the gas price, the PRC initially demanded to set a price of $200 per thousand cubic meters, while European countries at that time bought Russian gas at a price of $400 per thousand cubic meters. m. Today, prices have significantly decreased, amounting to less than $200 per thousand cubic meters. m. and only after that the Chinese negotiators agreed to the formula proposed by Russia for linking the gas price to the oil basket for the Power of Siberia project.

As for the price of gas that will be sent via the western route "Altai" ("Power of Siberia-2"), no compromise solution has been found so far. Given the current prices for raw hydrocarbons, Gazprom is unlikely to be able to push through favorable terms for itself. The question arises: will new large-scale gas sales projects to China be profitable?

Gazprom is confident that even at current prices, gas supplies to China via the eastern route via the Power of Siberia gas pipeline will be profitable. "It seems premature to talk about the unprofitability of a contract signed for 30 years in a country where gas consumption will grow, "said E. Burmistrova, General Director of Gazpromexport.²²

However, why is a new route of Russian gas supplies being discussed with China, now from the Far East, when there are signed agreements on two major and promising projects? After all, this route is a direct competitor to the Power of Siberia gas pipeline. A memorandum on the new route was signed with the Chinese side on September 3, 2015, although so far this route is nothing more than an idea.

At this stage, it is only planned to "...conduct commercial and technical studies of the possibility of deliveries from the Far East, and on the basis of these studies, the volume of deliveries, terms and point of intersection on the Russian-Chinese border will be determined"² - ⁵. But the implementation of this idea will require less money than the construction of a gas pipeline from Yakutia, since the Sakhalin - Khabarovsk - Vladivostok gas pipeline already exists. It can pump up to 30 billion cubic meters of gas per year. Part of it will provide gas supply to the regions of the Far East and the implementation of the Vladivostok LNG project.

The remaining volumes may be intended for China. This, of course, is less than 38 billion cubic meters. m per year, but at least this project looks more realistic. Moreover, one of the shareholders of the Sakhalin-3 project, from which gas is pumped into this pipe, is the Chinese oil and gas company Sinopec. So there are more chances to get financing from the PRC here than the Power of Siberia project, in which the Chinese side refused to invest its own funds even in the form of loans.

There is another problem. The development of the fields from which the Power of Siberia gas pipeline is planned to be filled has not even begun yet. This will also require significant financial investments.

As representatives of Gazprom previously pointed out, the profitability of the Power of Siberia could only be achieved at a price of at least $300 per thousand cubic meters. Russian natural gas, when pegged to oil prices, now costs less than $200 per thousand cubic meters. m. And, according to most analysts, in the near future we should not expect any significant increase in prices for hydrocarbon fuel. Moreover, no one can predict what will happen to prices in 2021...

One of the decisive factors in determining the price of hydrocarbon fuels today is the "shale revolution". So, due to the production of its own shale oil, the United States reduced crude oil imports from OPEC countries to record lows and even became an exporter, which dramatically changed the global market situation. Against this background, the struggle between the main resource-producing countries for old and new sales markets has intensified. In order to" secure " buyers, as well as undermine the economy of shale oil companies, OPEC countries sharply reduce the prices of their own raw materials. And since the price of gas is linked to the price of oil, it is unlikely that gas prices will rise.

Moreover, the production of not only shale oil, but also shale gas is growing. Moreover, the world's recoverable reserves of unconventional gas (shale and coal methane) are almost 40% more than the reserves of traditional taz ²⁴. And the country with the largest reserves of unconventional gas is just China (42.5 trillion cubic meters, according to the Federal Institute of Land and Natural Resources -BGR and the German Agency for Subsoil Use-DERA)*. - the second largest importer of hydrocarbons with its reserves of this fuel (23.3 trillion cubic meters) - are in 4th place after China, Argentina and Algeria ²⁵.

In China, the development of shale gas deposits has only just begun, but its production is growing rapidly. The Ministry of Land and Natural Resources of China predicts an increase in shale gas production from 200 million cubic meters. m in 2013 to 30 billion cubic meters. m by 2020 The extent to which these plans are feasible is not yet clear. Obviously, the scale of production of this resource will be affected primarily by the price of traditional and liquefied gas, unless the cost of production of unconventional gas is equal to the cost of production of traditional gas, which is quite realistic, given the speed of development of modern technologies. In 2015, China extracted 6.5 billion cubic meters of this fuel. However, will China have enough water required to extract hydrocarbons from shale?

All this suggests that the prospects for Russian gas exports to China are not obvious and depend on many factors.

Even more questions arise when it comes to the prospects of the main gas pipeline (MGP) "Altai", although the cost of its construction is much lower than that of the Russian Federation.

* The US International Energy Agency (SHA) estimates China's unconventional gas reserves at 50 trillion cubic meters, of which 36 trillion is shale gas, 9 trillion is coalbed methane, and 3 trillion is low-permeable gas. author's note).

"Forces of Siberia". This route should be shorter, and it is planned to build it from existing fields.

The main problem with this project is that it is a direct competitor to the already working gas pipeline that runs to China from Turkmenistan through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. This Central Asian route delivered 26 billion cubic meters of Turkmen gas to the north-west of China in 2014, and by 2017, due to the planned expansion of the system's capacity, which the Chinese side is ready to finance, deliveries can be increased to 80 billion cubic meters of gas per year. CNPC and the State Concern Turkmeigaz signed an agreement on the supply of 65 billion cubic meters of Turkmen gas annually, starting in 2021.

The Russian-Chinese negotiations on the western route are also negatively affected by a noticeable decline in the Chinese economy's growth rate, forcing a revision of energy consumption forecasts. Therefore, the prospects for the Altai pipeline, which will end in the same territories as the TUKK - Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region gas pipeline, are even more dubious than the prospects for the Power of Siberia .

Russian gas companies can only be encouraged by the fact that demand for gas is growing all over the world. China, in an effort to reduce C0 ₂ emissions, is reducing coal consumption by gradually reorienting production to blue fuel. The same trends are evident in other countries.

The "golden age of natural gas" is coming, and experts at the Moscow Power Engineering Institute (MPEI) and the International Energy Agency predict that it will last until the end of the century.²⁶ Due to the transition from modern fossil fuel energy to future carbon-free energy, "there is no real alternative to gas"²⁷. This is explained both by increasing environmental restrictions that force the gradual abandonment of coal use, and by the inability to fully switch to renewable energy sources in a short period of time. Oil consumption has its own resource limitations, being already close to its historical peak.

Political instability in the world will certainly affect the hydrocarbon market.

^{Abramova I., Fituni L.} 1 Competing for Africa's Natural Resources // International Affairs. A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations. 2009. T. 55, N 3. С 47.

^{Khasbulatov R. I., Fituni L. L. et al} 2 Mezhdunarodnaya torgovaya politika [International Trade Policy]. Textbook, Moscow, 2014. Series 61. Bachelor and Master. Academic course.

^{Safonova T.} 3 Cooperation between Russia and China in the oil industry: prospects for the Russian economy / / Transport of oil, 9.05.15 - http://www.transport -nefti.com/blog/4933/

⁴ Russia again became the largest oil supplier to China in September / / Interfax. 21.10.2015.

^{Kuznetsov A.} 5 Russia has pushed OPEC countries in the market of oil supplies to China / / RBC, 23.01.2015-http://www.rbc.ru/economics/23/01/2015/54c20ecd9a794 782()890YZ

^{Koroleva A.} 6 Bor'ba za Kitay [The Struggle for China]. ExpertOnline, 22.09.2015.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Oil export // Роснефть - http://www.rosneft.ru/ Downstream/crude oilsales/gas condensate_exports/

⁹ Oil exports from Russia to China may grow slightly in 2015 - Unipec President // OilCapital.ru, 25.03.2015 - http://www.oilcapital.ru/export/264750.html

¹⁰ CNPC confirmed its readiness in 2015 to accept another 400 thousand tons of oil to be diverted from the SUN / / Transneft, 11.06.2015 - http://transneft.ru/news/view/id/4032/

¹¹ The fourteenth meeting of the Expert Council of JSC "AK "Transneft" was held / / Transneft, 23.03.2015 -http://transneft.ru/newsPress/view/id/3142/

¹² CNPC confirmed readiness in 2015...

¹³ ВР Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2015.

¹⁴ Ibidem.

¹⁵ Ibid.

^{Elyubaeva A.} 16 Rapid growth of oil and gas consumption in Asia is expected. Kapital.kz, 29.09.2015 -http://kapital.kz/economic/44067/ozhidaetsya-bystryj-rost-potrebleniya-nefti-i-gaza-v-azii.ht ml

¹⁷ ВР Statistical Review of World Energy...

¹⁸ Ibidem.

¹⁹ Ibid.

^{Dorokhina O.} 20 Kitayskaya raschitel'nost ' [Chinese diligence]. Appendix Oil and Gas, 19.11.2014 http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2612958

²¹ SPG goes to Europe? // Vesti Ekonomika, 26.02.2015 - http://www.vestifinance.ru/articles/53811/ print

²² Gazprom Export: gas supplies to China at an oil price of $50 are not unprofitable / / Ruposters, 7.09.2015 -http://ruposters.ru/news/07 - 09 - 2015/postavki-gaza-kitaj

²³ Gazprom and CNPC agreed on the third gas supply route to China / / Interfax, 03.09.2015.

^{Klimenko V. V., Tereshin A. G.} 24 Velikaya gazovaya revolyutsiya i ee osnovnye posledstviya dlya mira i Rossii [The Great Gas Revolution and its main consequences for the World and Russia]. Dynamics of the crisis. Ser. "Socio-economic history". Issue XXXIX: IBA, 2015, p. 31.

²⁵ Energy Study 2012. Reserves, Resources and Availability of Energy Resources / The Federal Institute lor Geoscienccs and Natural Resources, German Mineral Resources Agency. Hannover: BGR/DERA, 2012.

^{Tereshin A. G., Klimenko A. B., Klimenko B. B.} 26 The Golden Age of gas and its impact on global energy, the global carbon cycle and climate // Heat and power engineering. 2015. N 5. P. 4.

²⁷ Ibid.

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