J. BERGER, Doctor of Historical Sciences

Historically, China's place in the world was largely determined by the peculiarities of Chinese civilization. Today, the rapidly growing economic power of the country and its ever-expanding world economic relations play an increasingly important role. But the civilizational factor has not lost its significance. Its role, many Chinese researchers believe, will increase as China becomes one of the leading powers of the new world order. In its turn, the Chinese civilization, updated according to the requirements of the time and at the same time based on a powerful tradition that goes back centuries, can make a significant contribution to the rise of China. The authors of a number of works today return to the idea of the outstanding Chinese reformer Liang Qichao that the revival of the Chinese nation is inseparable from the revival of the great Chinese civilization. Moreover, the rise of Chinese civilization in the era of information and globalization is seen as its emergence as a "universal civilization"("pu shi wenming") .1

China's modernization strategy is designed to last at least until the end of the century. Only then will China be able to match many of the most important indicators of the economy and the quality of life of its population with the most economically developed countries. But gaining a position that allows China to become a global power and influence the situation around the world can happen much earlier. In this sense, the next 15-20 years are considered to be decisive and most favorable for solving long - term strategic tasks. During this time, one of the leading researchers of China's grand strategy, Hu Angang, believes that it is necessary to move from the status of a regional power with global influence, as China today seems to be, to the status of a global power2.

A CENTURY-LONG UPGRADE

China considers building up its total national power (zuyuse goli) to be the main means of achieving its strategic goals. This concept is widely used not only in the works of Chinese scholars, but also in leading party documents, including the report at the last 16th CPC National Congress.

The total national power, or the real strength of the state, is measured by many factors-from natural resources to the international situation, but the main thing still belongs to the economy. This implies a focus on accelerated economic growth as the main path leading to achieving the strategic goal. The main levers for ensuring high rates of economic growth are market reforms and inclusion in the processes of globalization.

There are two main directions in assessing the total national power. Followers of the former (Hu Angang and his colleagues) prefer material factors, which usually include demographic and natural resources, as well as economic, military, scientific and technical potential. If we take these indicators into account, then by the end of the first twenty years of this century, China's lag behind the United States, according to Hu Angang, will decrease from three to two times, and China on this basis will become "a world power capable of playing the role of a leader" ("zhudao nengli du shijie qianguo").

Much attention is paid to the comparison of the total national power of China, calculated according to this method, with the corresponding data for the United States, Japan, India and Russia, in the monograph of Meng Honghua, one of Hu Angang's closest collaborators.3 According to these calculations, China's share of world GDP (based on purchasing power parity of national currencies in 1998 prices) will increase from 11.2% to 22.2%, while the US share will fall from 21.4% to 20%. A similar advantage of China over the United States by 2020 also provides a comparison of human capital. The only type of strategic resources where China's gap with the United States, according to Meng Honghua, not only does not decrease, but, on the contrary, increases, is military - strategic resources. Hence the recommendation: to further build up the real strength of the state, combine economic construction with defense.

Proponents of the other direction in determining the total national power attach some importance to non-material factors, the so-called "soft national power" (ruan goli). Thus, Huang Shofeng includes politics, foreign relations, culture and education, as well as the consistency factor (setong) in his calculations. These immaterial, subjective, difficult to calculate, but undoubtedly influential "soft forces" are assigned certain coefficients 4 in the calculations. This corrects the shortcomings of the first model, although at the same time, of course, the subjectivity of assessments increases even more.

To strengthen the modern "soft power", it is proposed to

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use not only those elements of traditional Chinese culture that meet the spirit of our time, but also incorporate universal values and spiritual achievements of other civilizations. Particular importance is attached to strengthening the attractive power of the Chinese development model. But to do this, first of all, you need to improve the model itself. It should ensure not only economic efficiency, but also the harmony of relations between people, between the individual and the state, between man and nature. The presence of adequate "soft power" allows optimal use of "hard power", while the insufficiency of the former makes it pointless to build up the latter.

If we draw a parallel with the terminology used by ancient Chinese thinkers, we can see that the supporters of the first direction focus on "strength" (li), and the supporters of the second-add to it such factors as " virtue "(te), " pickiness in choosing friends "(tse jiao), etc. The former thus call for "strengthening strength" (yang li), and the latter for"strengthening virtue" (yang de). Ancient Chinese strategists usually gave equal importance to both "li" and "te", based on the fact that relying on strength alone does not guarantee victory.

The same attitude seems to be followed by the current Chinese leaders.

As an example of the use of "soft power" in interstate relations in ancient times, the system of tribute is often referred to. This system, according to a number of current researchers who have a very clear perception of history, allowed the countries that were part of it to enjoy the fruits of Chinese civilization and thereby find acceptable ways to solve the problems that arose when they communicated with the Chinese. China's position towards its tributary neighbors is characterized as a " cultural great power "(wenxua dagoji), which is separated from the "true", expansionist great power, aimed at dominating other peoples, absorbing their territory and plundering them. The existence of the latter during the many thousands of years of Chinese history is not denied, for example, during the reign of the Yuan (Mongol) dynasty (13th-14th centuries), but it is considered an exception rather than the rule.

It is noteworthy that in the geopolitical constructs of the modern and especially future world order, current Chinese authors almost invariably place their country in the same place that their ancestors assigned to the Middle Empire. However, it uses a more modern discourse. Thus, China is placed at the intersection of two major global axes of the current and future development of world history. One of them is the Eurasian arc, which includes Europe, Russia, China, and India, and the other is the Pacific - East Asian ellipse, which covers the United States, Japan, and again China and India. The latter zone traditionally embodies the most important state interests of China: economic, political, and military. But the relatively new territory for China, which is covered by the Eurasian arc and includes Central Asia, the Middle East and South-Eastern Europe, is also considered extremely important.5

From these premises, it is concluded that the rise of China leads to fundamental changes in the global economy and politics. The changes affect to a greater or lesser extent all major states-from the Euro-

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From the European Union to the United States, Russia, India, and Japan, encouraging them to reevaluate their own strategy and partnerships with each other from a new perspective.

OPENNESS TO THE OUTSIDE WORLD

China's impact on the outside world is closely linked to the internal transformation in China itself. The deeper and more radical they are, the greater their impact on the rest of the world. The opposite is also true: the more China is drawn into the orbit of the global economy and politics, the faster the internal order in China, its culture, public consciousness, and way of life change. This is a fundamental difference from the old China, which lived in a closed environment. Even during Mao's reign, the synchronicity of historical movement inside and outside the country was minimal.

Fundamental changes in relations between China and the rest of the world have been marked since the movement towards a market economy began in China. Since then, Beijing's economic policy has been guided by a two - pronged formula - "gaige kaifang", i.e. "reform and openness". The reforms were aimed at moving away from a centrally planned economy. Openness meant more and more access to China for foreign investment, technology, and ideas, on the one hand, and massive entry of Chinese goods into world markets, on the other. The creation of a huge number of enterprises with foreign capital in China, among which branches of almost all the largest multinational companies soon appeared, caused and ensured a rapid increase in Chinese exports, since the bulk of Chinese export goods were produced and produced at such enterprises.

Later, Beijing's foreign economic policy was supplemented by another important policy - "going beyond" (zou chuqu), which means that China seeks not only to import foreign capital, but also to place its own abroad. The maximum economic liberalization carried out under the auspices of an authoritarian political regime created favorable opportunities for implementing this model, primarily because it turned out to be acceptable to a huge number of foreign investors, first small ones, mainly from the Chinese diaspora, and then large ones - from Japan, Europe, and America.

All of China's economic achievements in recent decades have been crucially linked to its integration into the global economy. The focus on global markets has become one of the main drivers of China's economic growth. China is not only an object, but also a subject of globalization processes: they strengthen and expand them, introduce their own specifics, and strive to establish their own rules of the game. Globalization and the rise of China are thus mutually stimulating.

China has given foreign capital access to almost all sectors of its economy, with the exception of some that are of military and strategic importance. The total amount of foreign direct investment from 1979 to the end of 2005 was $ 622.4 billion. In 2005, such investment inflows totaled $ 60 billion, which puts China in third place after the United Kingdom and the United States, far ahead of all other countries. Foreign investment not only increases exports and tax revenues to the treasury, but also contributes to China's development of advanced management experience and new technologies.

The rapid increase in foreign trade turnover leads the rest of the economy, primarily the manufacturing industry, which works more for export than to meet domestic demand. 9 free trade zones were created, with 27 countries and regions covering a quarter of China's foreign trade turnover in 2004. In the period from 1980 to 2005, the value of exports and imports increased 37-fold: from 38.1 billion rubles. China's GDP grew to $ 1,422. 1 billion, while China's GDP was $ 1.65 trillion.

Over the past five years, the average annual growth rate of foreign trade has exceeded the dynamics of the economy as a whole by 2.5 times. China's share of global imports and exports of goods increased from 3.6% in 2000 to 6.2% in 2004, although its share in the global economy does not exceed 4%. If China ranks sixth or seventh in the world in terms of the size of its economy, in 2005 it ranked third in terms of foreign trade, after the United States and Germany. It is expected that this year China will surpass Germany in terms of foreign trade and come out in second place, second only to the United States. As for the size of the economy as a whole, it is cautiously estimated that during the current five - year period (2006-2010), China will surpass France ($2 trillion), Great Britain ($2.14 trillion) and approach the German level ($2.7 trillion).

Foreign trade directly provides jobs for more than 80 million people. The foreign trade surplus in 2005 was $ 100 billion. China's foreign exchange reserves exceeded $ 800 billion. From January to September 2005, net exports accounted for 43% of economic growth.

The strategy of "going beyond", or, more simply, the external expansion of Chinese capital, both public and private, is primarily aimed at providing the rapidly growing Chinese economy with the missing sources of raw materials and energy. It is implemented with the most active support of the state.

The most significant achievements in the acquisition of foreign assets by Chinese state-owned companies were recorded in 2005, the last year of the 10th five-year plan. Major mergers and acquisitions have been noted in the development of oil fields and in the field of information technology. The total amount of capital invested by the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) abroad reached $ 7.5 billion. In 2005, the corporation managed to acquire 100% of the shares of the Kazakhstan Oil Company in the amount of 4.18 billion rubles. United States dollars. Another significant transaction was the purchase of this corporation together with another Chinese giant-the Chinese petrochemical company.

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The Canadian Oil Company Corporation has $ 1.42 billion worth of assets in Ecuador. China's Lianxiang Corporation (Lenovo) has become the world's third-largest personal computer manufacturer, with sales of $ 13 billion, thanks to its acquisition of assets from IBM. Non-governmental company" Huawei " from Shenzhen has established its representative offices and sales and technical service centers around the world, its products are sold in more than 90 countries, including Germany, France, Spain, Brazil, Korea. At the end of 2005, the company entered into a framework agreement with the British Vodafone group, becoming the largest supplier of Chinese telecommunications equipment to its global network. Huawei takes part in the creation of mobile communication networks in France and the United States.

THE RISKS ARE INCREASING

At the same time, such intensive involvement of China in the global economy also has its shadow sides. First, the Chinese economy is constantly becoming more dependent on foreign trade and foreign capital, and, consequently, on the global economic and political environment. The Chinese economy's dependence on exports and imports, as measured by the ratio of foreign trade to national GDP, has been growing rapidly in recent years. In 2001. it was 44%, in 2002 - 51%, in 2003-60%, in 2004-70%, and in 2005-80%. In Japan, the United States, and India, this figure does not exceed 20-25%. Chinese industries such as clothing and footwear, DVD players, motorcycles, cameras, refrigerators, televisions, and air conditioners are particularly dependent on exports.

Multinational companies buy up Chinese enterprises, taking advantage of their relative cheapness, take over their sales channels and supplies of raw materials and energy, national trademarks. Over 80% of Chinese supermarkets have been placed at the disposal of TNCs. In recent years, they have launched a massive offensive against large national manufacturing enterprises, including the leading machine-building and electrical industries.

Excessive dependence on global markets significantly increases political and economic risks for China, especially in the event of unforeseen market fluctuations. We are talking not only about exports, but also about imports. An increasing part of China's manufacturing industry depends on the import of raw materials, oil, technologies, and components. If there are long-term disruptions in their supply, it can cause irreparable damage to the Chinese economy.

Second, by accumulating huge foreign exchange resources thanks to a surplus in foreign trade and a huge influx of foreign direct investment, China is essentially converting high-yielding domestic assets into low-yielding external ones.

Third, the growth of exports, as well as China's economic growth in general, is still taking place through the use of China's so-called comparative advantages, in other words, at the expense of huge reserves of cheap labor and the depletion of poor natural resources - land, water, vegetation, and energy, which is accompanied by a violation of the ecological balance and serious environmental pollution. The Yangtze River basin and the Pearl River Delta are particularly affected by pollution. This is a growing concern both in China and in the world, especially in China's neighboring countries. At the same time, there is increasing pressure on Beijing, primarily from the United States, to encourage it to revalue the yuan and thereby reduce the price advantages of Chinese exports.

Fourth, in different countries, there is a growing direct opposition to the growing influx of cheap Chinese goods, which creates considerable difficulties for local national production. In 2005, 63 anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and anti-protectionist investigations were initiated against China for more than $ 2 billion in 18 countries. Among them were European countries, the United States, Turkey, South Africa, India, and Brazil. The investigations covered almost the entire range of mass Chinese exports, including televisions, pipes, shoes, textiles, furniture, and water products. Such protests affect not only China's economic but also its political relations with both developed and developing countries.

The development of the manufacturing industry in China and the mass entry of its products into the world market destroyed the system of division of labor formed in the 1960s in East Asia between Japan and the "four small dragons" (South Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia, Singapore)-the so - called "crane wedge". This, among other reasons, ultimately led to the 1997-1998 East Asian crisis. The growth of the Chinese economy and exports has dealt a severe blow not only to Asia, but also to Latin America. So, China won over Mexico in the fight for the US market. In 2002, wages in China were four times lower than in Mexico, which contributed to a sharp drop in foreign direct investment inflows to Mexico. According to the calculations of the investment company Goldman Sachs, Mexico's losses in the international settlement system due to Chinese influence amounted to 4% of its GDP.

In 2005, opposition to the import of Chinese textiles to the United States and Europe reached the largest scale in the history of the PRC. Beijing urges Washington not to politicize trade issues. However, these calls are unlikely to be heeded, as the US deficit in US-China trade, including re-exports via Hong Kong, has reached $ 201.6 billion. Tensions in bilateral economic relations are not expected to ease in 2006, but may even increase due to the midterm elections to the US Congress.

Barriers are also being created to Chinese companies, especially state-owned ones, acquiring foreign enterprises. In 2005, an attempt by a Chinese offshore oil development company to buy an American one was thwarted

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oil and gas company Unocal for a huge sum of 18.5 billion. United States dollars. Unocal went to the American company Shevron, which paid two billion rubles. less. Similarly, the Chinese company "Huawei" had to abandon plans to acquire the assets of the British Marconi.

Finally, and fifthly, China has begun to influence the world's raw material markets. Prices are being inflated for almost all goods imported by China: nickel, palm oil, wheat, cotton, not to mention oil.

Thus, the transformation of China into one of the most active players in the global economy not only gives favorable chances for its development, but also risks aggravating relations with other states.

CHINA IN ASIA

In the late 80's and early 90's of the last century, the foreign policy strategy and, accordingly, the theory and practice of Chinese diplomacy in Asia and the rest of the world were largely determined by Deng Xiaoping's attitude to "hiding their capabilities" (Tao Guang yang hui). This has to some extent constrained China's regional and global activity. With the growth of economic openness and real power, China has become increasingly interested in participating in international institutions, reorganizing and renewing them, and in some cases taking a leading role in them.

China's attitude to regional economic and security cooperation has changed accordingly. In November 2001, China proposed creating a free trade zone with the ASEAN countries within 10 years. Such a zone, according to Beijing, has a chance to become the third most important global market along with the united Europe and the United States. From this point of view, it could significantly contribute to accelerating economic growth in both China and the ASEAN countries. China attaches not only economic but also political importance to the creation of the zone, believing that with the implementation of this plan, it can gain a decisive influence on decision-making that determines the fate of the entire East Asian region.6

In an effort to speed up the process of economic integration, China has unilaterally opened its market to some agricultural products from ASEAN countries. Since July 2005, a general bilateral reduction in customs duties has begun, which is planned to be mostly completed in 2010. In 2005, the volume of trade between China and the ASEAN countries reached $ 120 billion. Over the past five years, China has provided $ 3 billion in concessional loans and assistance to ASEAN countries. He expects to allocate the same amount in the next three years. In addition, it is planned to provide soft loans in the amount of $ 5 billion for state support of investments of Chinese enterprises in the ASEAN countries. At the same time, cooperation in the development of the resources of the South China Sea and the Mekong River basin, as well as partnership in the field of security, is developing.

According to Chinese experts, the successful development of relations between China and the ASEAN countries at the beginning of the century was greatly facilitated by the special global situation, primarily by the fact that after the events of "September 11" the US attention was diverted from this region. Japan's opposition to increasing Chinese influence, which has played a very large role in the region over the past decades, has been weakened by the stagnation of its economy and a number of other factors. China has managed to limit Japan's ambitions to a certain extent by holding meetings in the 10+3 format (ASEAN + China, Japan and South Korea).

For China, strengthening its position in the region has become the implementation of the policy of optimizing the situation in its immediate environment, "turning neighbors into partners" (yu lin Wei shan, and lin Wei ban). More broadly, this course is aimed at consolidating China's status as a regional power and strengthening its security, not only on the continent, but also in the waters of the South China Sea. Neighboring states in the region are seen as the most important link, as the front line for strengthening security and building China's defense strategy. The positive development of multilateral relations makes it possible to sideline disputes over the state ownership of a number of potentially oil-rich areas of the water area.

All this, however, does not mean that China has already gained a dominant position in the region. Moreover, some Chinese analysts believe that the most favorable period for strengthening China's influence has passed, and the stage of acute rivalry in the region with other powers has begun.

The beginning of President George W. Bush's second term is marked by Washington's closer attention to ASEAN and its relations with China, as well as the United States ' desire to step up all-round cooperation with the Association's countries, primarily in the field of economy and trade. Japan has not abandoned its claims to leadership in the region.

Hence, Beijing concludes that it is necessary to intensify efforts to further strengthen economic integration and assert the cultural identity of China and Southeast Asia. There are also proposals to develop military cooperation, including arms exports, assistance in modernizing the armed forces, and the creation of joint security mechanisms. They also offer to buy or lease civilian ports and bases in Southeast Asian countries in order to create a common defense system. Such measures could significantly limit the freedom of action of China's rivals in the region.

The new generation of ASEAN leaders, however, has their own ideas about the geopolitical and economic status and interests of the Association's members. They are determined to maintain an independent, middle position in the concert of powers, keep an equal distance from both the United States and China, maintain a balance of interests in the region and avoid unilateral orientation.

COUNTERING THE THREE FORCES

Another important testing ground for Chinese political activity on the Asian mainland is Central Asia. Beijing sees this region as important because of its strategic location.-

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the economic situation, the availability of urgently needed oil and gas resources for China.

In contrast to South-East Asia, national and regional security was given the highest priority from the very beginning. Back in the first half of the 1990s, the problems of military confrontation inherited from the Cold War era were resolved and tensions along the entire length of the former Soviet-Chinese border were eliminated. Then, at the initiative of China, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) established here focused on countering the "three forces": separatism, extremism and terrorism.

The role of the SCO in the development of the region's economy is also gradually increasing. At the same time, Beijing is seeking to increase its economic presence. Energy, transport and agriculture are identified as priority areas of cooperation. Central Asia is considered by Beijing primarily as an important energy and raw material base for Chinese industry, and eventually as a market for Chinese goods. In 2004, at a summit in Tashkent, Chinese President Hu Jintao proposed providing $ 900 million in trade credits to other SCO members. Governments of several Central Asian republics have expressed a desire to host branches of major Chinese companies and give them the right to develop local resources. The Chinese side confirmed its readiness to take part in the construction of a number of facilities. Enterprises with Chinese or mixed capital have been established in light industry and agricultural production. China seeks to import oil, natural gas, non-ferrous metals, mineral fertilizers, wool, and cotton from Central Asian countries in exchange for exports of household electrical equipment and machinery.

It is planned to create a Central Asian Free Trade Zone by 2020. The implementation of this project would dramatically reduce the delivery time of Chinese goods to Europe: it will take only 12 days for cargo from the port of Lianyungang in eastern China to reach Amsterdam, instead of the 56 days required today for transportation by sea.

China's main trade and economic partner in Central Asia is Kazakhstan. It accounts for 3/4 of all Chinese foreign trade in the region. China-Kazakhstan trade is expected to reach $ 3 billion by 2010. Representative offices and branches of large Chinese state-owned companies and banks have been established in Kazakhstan, as well as hundreds of Chinese medium and small private enterprises employing tens of thousands of people. As noted above, the acquisition of a Kazakh oil company was a significant success for China. The significance of the deal is highlighted by the fact that China had to endure a very tough battle with two Indian concerns in order to buy this company, which is registered in Canada. The construction of the first stage of the oil pipeline from Kazakhstan to China significantly contributes to the development of bilateral relations. Chinese investment and economic presence is felt in almost all sectors of the national economy of Kazakhstan, as well as in the daily life of the local population, which is not always perceived positively and can even generate anti-Chinese sentiments.

CHINA'S POWERFUL COMPETITOR

In China's relations with the countries of South Asia, security concerns significantly prevail over those of economic cooperation and co-development, although there is a significant gap between the two countries.-

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long-standing and may become more important over time. This priority order is determined by two interrelated circumstances. First, South Asian countries are bordered by two autonomous regions of the People's Republic of China inhabited by ethnic minorities - Xinjiang and Tibet, where separatist sentiments are most strong, which therefore cause the greatest concern in Beijing. Secondly, in the South Asian region itself, the stability of the political situation is constantly undermined by the forces of international terrorism, national division and religious extremism. Beijing is also concerned about the US desire to strengthen its military presence in the region.

China has a difficult relationship with India. The origins of some of Beijing's wariness about India are well known: These include unresolved border issues, the presence of a suspected separatist Dalai Lama in India, the pro-Western sympathies of a large part of the Indian political elite, and the competition with China for access to global energy sources. India is suspected of trying to push China into Southeast Asia. It is seen, along with the United States, as a possible instigator of an anti-Chinese pact to protect democracy, like NATO, which could also include Japan, Singapore, Malaysia, Australia, the Philippines and pro-Western Arab countries. At the same time, Russia is sometimes mentioned as one of China's possible abusers in Southeast Asia, which supplies India with modern naval weapons that can allow it to establish control over the Indian Ocean, including such an important artery for China as the Strait of Malacca.

But the main concerns are not so much about security and politics as about India's potential to outpace China in economic growth. We are not talking about a short-term or even medium-term perspective. China has a solid head start here. It started market-based economic reforms a full decade earlier than India. The inflow of foreign investment in China is an order of magnitude greater than in India. China has accumulated incomparably more foreign exchange reserves. China's manufacturing industry is significantly more powerful than India's. China has been much more successful in creating a modern infrastructure that lays the foundation for further economic capacity-building. China's annual economic growth rate is 2-3% higher, and it also significantly outperforms India in a number of important social indicators, including literacy, child mortality, and the proportion of people who have emerged from poverty.

At the same time, India has a number of basic advantages that may allow it to successfully compete with China in the more distant future. India significantly surpasses China in such an important area of the modern economy as the provision of high-tech services, in particular, in the production of software products. It has a more advanced financial and banking system. The Indian economy is much more focused on the domestic market and domestic consumption than the Chinese one, primarily due to the presence of a more powerful middle class with a high purchasing power than in China, which gives the Indian economy greater stability. India has a good chance of developing a number of manufacturing industries, such as textiles and automobiles, not to mention pharmaceuticals.

India has made more progress than China in improving corporate governance and demonopolizing the economy. Of no small importance for the coming rivalry between the two Asian giants is the fact that the political and judicial-arbitration systems in India are modeled on the British ones, while in China they still retain significant features of the archaic, pre-market system. India has a much higher prevalence of English than China, which gives it a good chance to join the global economy and catch up with China in this regard. Finally, over the next few decades, the demographic factor will start to play out in India's favor. The rapid aging of the population in China, associated with a strict government policy of birth control, will respond in a few decades with a decrease in the working-age population.

The Sino-Indian rivalry does not exclude, however, the desire of both countries to smooth out sharp corners. Measures aimed at strengthening mutual trust are of paramount importance. It is especially important for both China and India that their relations with third countries are not directed against each other. China, in particular, is making considerable efforts to promote the recent Indian-American and Japanese-Indian rapprochement.-

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It has not acquired an anti-Chinese orientation.

In 2005, during the visit of Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao to India, the two sides announced their desire to build a strategic partnership. A number of cooperation documents were signed, which announced plans to create the world's largest free trade zone and bring the volume of bilateral trade to $ 30 billion by 2010, which would allow China to become the largest foreign trade partner of India and bypass the United States in this regard. Today, India owns only 0.8% of China's foreign trade, while China owns 5% of India's foreign trade.

Major state-owned companies in China and India have started cooperation in the energy sector, which is crucial for both countries. Such cooperation will allow not only to curb the rise in prices for oil supplies by OPEC countries to Asia, but also to agree on joint acquisition of assets of oil-producing and refining enterprises in third countries and on mutual participation in mutually beneficial projects, including the construction of pipelines from oil-rich countries such as Iran. Some deals of this kind have already been concluded. Both countries declare their readiness to learn from each other's valuable experience in solving similar development problems.

2006 was declared the Year of Sino-Indian Friendship. This circumstance is used, in particular, to coordinate the energy strategy and to continue negotiations on solving the most acute problems in relations between the two countries, including border issues.

POLITICS IS "COLD", ECONOMICS IS "HOT"

In North-East Asia, the contradictions associated with China's progress to the status of a leading regional and global power are most clearly manifested. On the one hand, it seeks to influence the economic development of the region and the strengthening of collective security. In particular, Beijing actively participates in efforts aimed at eliminating the nuclear threat from the DPRK. On the other hand, the strengthening of China's economic position makes significant adjustments in relations with its main partner and at the same time competitor in the region - Japan. Although the Japanese economy will be stronger than China's for quite some time yet, the dynamism of China's rise has essentially already ended Japan's leading role in Asia. However, the latter is unlikely to be able to accept this, which is the basis of the contradictions between Beijing and Tokyo.

In the recent past, Sino-Japanese economic and political relations have had different vectors and have developed almost independently of each other: from time to time, escalating political tensions have not hindered the strengthening of economic ties. As the Chinese used to say, " Politics is cold, the economy is hot "(Zheng Leng shing zhe). Today, the divides between politics and economics are breaking down.

Previously, it was possible to talk about the economic interdependence of Japan and China. Today, the Chinese economy is experiencing dynamic growth against the background of the slow recovery of the Japanese economy from long-term stagnation. As a result, China is becoming less dependent on Japan than Japan is on China. The growth of China's trade with the outside world is significantly outpacing the growth of its trade with Japan. Japan's share of China's foreign trade fell from 24% in 1994 to 13% in 2005. As a result, it lost the role of China's main partner, which it had held from 1993 to 2003, losing the first place to Europe, and the second to the United States. For Japan, on the other hand, China has become a leading foreign trade partner: its share (along with Hong Kong) in Japanese exports increased from 5% in the early 1990s to 22%, while the share of the United States fell from 25% in 1999 to 13%.

In 2003, Japan's annual GDP growth was 2.5%, including 0.7% provided by exports of Japanese goods to mainland China, Hong Kong and Taiwan. If we also take into account the indirect impact of Chinese economic growth on the Japanese economy, then this figure, according to some Chinese analysts, should be increased to 1% 7.

In parallel with the change in the balance of economic relations in favor of China, the contradictions between the two countries, previously limited mainly to politics, are beginning to affect the economy more and more. This is especially evident in such a highly politicized area as energy. It became the scene of the sharpest confrontation between China and Japan. Chinese analysts say that such a confrontation extends to almost all the new oil-bearing territories of the planet-from North Africa to Russia, not to mention the disputed waters in the East China Sea, where the situation sometimes escalates to the limit.

Japan is the only country in Asia with which China's relations are not only not improving, but also becoming more tense. 2005 was marked by the largest number of different conflicts since the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1972.

According to the official website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, among the problems that complicate bilateral relations, the problems of history are in the first place. They are considered more important than the problems of Taiwan, the disputed Diaoyu Islands, Japanese-American security cooperation, war reparations, and the use of chemical weapons by the Japanese in China. The interpretation of the historical past is considered as one of the most sensitive aspects of mutual understanding and interaction between the states and peoples of China and Japan. It is noted that although Japan has officially condemned its aggression against China and expressed its regret to the Chinese people, nevertheless, "extremely small Japanese rightists" try from time to time to deny or justify Japanese aggression. This theme was also heard in the speeches of top Chinese officials during their visits to Japan, until they were interrupted.

So is the Chinese public. According to surveys, the overwhelming majority of Chinese believe that the main obstacle to the development of Sino-Japanese relations is Japan's perception of its own culture.

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previous aggression. When asked what you associate Japan with, the majority of respondents say: "With the Nanjing Massacre" and "With Japanese aggression in China."

China reacts sharply to the publication of history textbooks, which contain attempts to justify Japanese aggression in Asia. Sharp protests in China are caused by visits by the Japanese Prime Minister to the Yasukuni Shinto Shrine, where the memory of the main Japanese war criminals executed by the International Tribunal for the Far East is kept.

Some Chinese analysts believe that a Sino-Japanese struggle for economic and political leadership in Asia is inevitable in the long run, and they are convinced that China will ultimately prevail. Sometimes this confidence is based on China-centric geopolitical ideas.

CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES

The United States is the main factor in China's long-term international strategy. Chinese leaders refer to Sino-American relations as the" problem of problems " (Zhong zhong zhi zhong). Some Chinese researchers, assessing their current state and predicting further development, note the contradiction that exists between different levels of relations. It is noted that at the strategic level, Sino-American cooperation can last quite a long time, but at the level of grand strategy, it inevitably runs into a difficult barrier to overcome. The difference between these levels is that the strategy may not take into account the values and ideology of a partner or opponent and proceed from pure pragmatism, while for a large strategy, values and ideology are considered basic.8

This difference is evident both in politics and in everyday consciousness. In strategic terms, the United States usually seeks to maintain the balance of power, to prevent the emergence of a strong rival in Europe and Asia. The search for allies is also aimed at this. Pragmatism, however, comes into conflict with a moral, ideological, and even religious imperative. The position of the American neoconservatives, Chinese analysts believe, is by no means connected with the rise of China: they are able to adopt laws of economic competition. But even if China were to make serious economic concessions to the United States, differences in other areas would still remain intractable, since the American value system requires the constant reproduction of new enemies as old ones disappear. 9

Beijing is doing its best to keep US-China relations at the level of strategic interaction and dialogue and prevent them from turning into a moral and ideological confrontation. In an effort to ensure a foreign policy environment conducive to modernization and economic development, China is determined to avoid confrontation and, even more so, a cold war with the West, especially with the United States. At the same time, it opposes the creation of hostile alliances around China, and also seeks to extinguish hotbeds of tension along the perimeter of its borders: between India and Pakistan, on the Korean Peninsula, in Afghanistan. To this end, China is making efforts to further strengthen its partnership with Russia, the EU, and developing countries, and to maintain normal Sino-American relations.

As China gains a stronger regional and global position, US wariness towards China increases. This concerns, first of all, the role of China as a potential strategic rival of the United States in the Asia-Pacific region. At the same time, there is growing interest in developing economic ties with China, as well as in its participation in the creation of institutions that contribute to strengthening peace and security, countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and combating terrorism and extremism.

In September 2005, US Undersecretary of State R. Zollick, speaking at a meeting of the National Committee on US-China Relations, suggested that China should become a "responsible shareholder" of the international system. As such, Beijing was expected to actively support this system and assume a very wide range of obligations. China was asked to allay concerns about modernizing its military, take steps to reduce its huge trade surplus with the United States, put an end to the theft of American intellectual property, cooperate more closely with the United States in energy, and moderate cooperation with "bad" regimes. Paying tribute to China's role in holding the six-party talks on North Korea's nuclear disarmament, R. Zollik also demanded its assistance in carrying out "broad economic and political reforms"in this country. He called on Beijing to support American policy towards Iran and Sudan, while expressing concern about China's "maneuvers" aimed at gaining power advantages in Asia. Finally, the prescriptions for purposeful modification of the political system of China itself were quite unambiguously formulated. In this regard, it was said that it was "wrong" to calculate that the CCP could maintain its monopoly on power.10

Chinese analysts saw the presence of certain advantages in this approach. Their particular attention was drawn to the introduction of a new concept of "shareholder"in relation to China. It is estimated that it was used seven times in R. Zollik's speech. In China, different versions of the translation of this term into Chinese and, accordingly, different interpretations of its content were proposed. In most cases, it was recommended to use descriptive phrases such as "li hai gongxi ren" or "li hai xiang guan zhe" in translation, which imply people who are related to each other by material interests. However, in some cases, the interpreters went further, arguing that this means not just mutual investment of capital in a certain enterprise, but also joint management of it, shared responsibility for the results of management, for risks.11 A parallel was drawn between the new concept and the one that is close to non-traditional.-

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mu in the sense of the term "partner". The latter was used during the Clinton presidency, but when George W. Bush came to the White House, it was dropped and replaced with the term "strategic competitor".

Today, when the depth and scope of cooperation and strategic dialogue in Sino-American relations is incomparable to the Clinton era, the Republican administration, not wanting to resort to the old concept, has found a new one. At the same time, it seems to some commentators even preferable to the previous one, since it excludes inequality, the division of parties into main and subordinate, large and small, possible in partnership.

At the same time, Chinese analysts also note that the promise of cooperation is combined with the requirement to meet certain conditions. It is noted that the main goal of the approach formulated by R. Zollik is to prevent China from challenging the authority of the United States, to encourage it to participate in building an international order that meets long - term American interests. In this context, recognizing its responsibility for China means: in the economy - agreeing to balance trade, in foreign policy-supporting the United States in its showdowns with "problem countries", in the military field-increasing transparency, in domestic politics-improving democracy. China's responsibility, then, is ultimately to safeguard and support the new Americanized order in the international community. Such an order includes not only ensuring freedom for American capital and individual freedom in the American way, but also the realization of long-term US state interests. 12

The United States 'ambivalent attitude towards China is also demonstrated by the latest "Quadrennial Defense Review", published by the US Military Department in February 2006. On the one hand, it reflects the changes that have taken place in American policy towards China since the fight against terrorism was declared the main strategic goal of the United States. On the other hand, there are invariable motives for the potential threat to the United States in connection with the growth of China's military power.

The review notes that the United States welcomes China's constructive, peaceful role in the Asia-Pacific region and its partnership in responding to common security challenges. China is also encouraged to pursue a peaceful path of economic growth and "political liberalization."

At the same time, Chinese analysts draw attention to the fact that the authors of the new American defense review treat China and Russia differently, on the one hand, and India on the other. If the first two countries are not classified as "partners", then the Indian-American relations are characterized as "global partnership". This is seen as a significant difference from the 2002 National Security Strategy Report, which considered it important to cooperate with all three countries in the fight against terrorism. In addition, earlier documents did not directly mention the "Chinese threat". Today, China openly qualifies as the country with "the greatest potential strength for military rivalry with the United States." It is emphasized that China continues to develop large-scale military industry and build up strategic weapons and offensive capabilities beyond its national territory. It is said that since 1996, excluding only 2003, China's defense spending has increased by more than 10% annually and that China will be able to conduct asymmetric military operations in the future, especially electronic, network, and space warfare. They also emphasize the lack of transparency of China's military policy and the danger of disrupting the military balance in the region, which are associated with the strengthening of Chinese armed power13.

The prospects and current state of bilateral relations were discussed during the visit of Chinese President Hu Jintao to the United States in April 2006. The talks between the two leaders confirmed the previously stated positions and agreements. George W. Bush tried, without much success, to persuade the Chinese head of state to take a tougher stance on Iran and, according to tradition, called, but not too persistently, to give the Chinese people more freedom. Hu Jintao, speaking at Yale University, assured the audience of his commitment to democracy, but rejected the suggestion that China would copy foreign models of political systems. His main emphasis was on explaining the peaceful aspirations of his country. Earlier tensions over China's too large surplus in bilateral trade and the theft of American intellectual property were eased by contracts signed on the eve of the visit for the purchase of 80 Boeing aircraft worth $ 16 billion and operating systems from Microsoft worth $ 1.2 billion.

CHINA AND RUSSIA

Most Chinese and Russian researchers believe that China and Russia are united by long-term overlapping interests, first of all, their urgent need for lasting peace and sustainable, long-term development, which is the objective basis of their strategic partnership.

The geopolitical position of the latter is crucial for the partnership between China and Russia. Developers of Chinese geopolitics have always - whether in ancient times or in modern times-seen the greatest threat in the possibility of a strategic encirclement of the country. Today, in the Chinese special and mass literature, one can find claims that the United States is trying to encircle China. Meng Honghua, a specialist in China's grand strategy, writes that the United States puts pressure on China's security from two sides - from the east and from the west, and if we take into account the "soft presence" of the United States in South and Southeast Asia, then the danger can be considered three-sided.14 In this regard, the importance attached to maintaining security along the vast length of China's borders with Russia is understandable. Russia is seen as a giant strategic rear of China in its progressive advance to the east and south.

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south-east. We should not forget about the transit potential of the Russian territory for China's relations with Europe.

Until recently, in the Sino-Russian strategic partnership, the political factor prevailed over the economic one. During recent high-level meetings, both sides expressed their desire to strongly strengthen the economic base of the partnership in the coming years. Specific targets for expanding trade volumes and increasing Chinese investment in the Russian economy for 2010-2020 are identified. The implementation of the political will shown by the leaders of both countries will require considerable efforts, but a breakthrough in this area is already visible.

For China, Russia is of primary interest, primarily as a supplier of raw materials and a market for Chinese goods. Cooperation in the energy sector is considered in China and Russia as one of the important areas for further strengthening strategic cooperation. The joint declaration signed on March 21, 2006 in Beijing by Chinese President Hu Jintao and Russian President Vladimir Putin emphasized that Sino-Russian energy cooperation is one of the main components of the strategic partnership between the two countries and that both sides intend to implement projects for the construction of pipelines for oil and gas supplies from Russia to China as well as jointly develop oil and gas fields on the territory of the two states.

China expects to receive increasing volumes of oil from Russia in order to diversify its oil imports and thereby reduce its dependence on supplies from the Middle East. An increase in Russian gas and electricity supplies to China is also promising. It is planned to deepen cooperation in the field of high and information technologies, nuclear energy, aviation and space, automotive industry, ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy, forestry and a number of other industries. At the same time, it is necessary, and this is recognized by both sides, to qualitatively improve the structure of Russian-Chinese economic cooperation and, in particular, to increase the share of high-value-added goods in the total volume of bilateral trade. Special attention is paid to cooperation in environmental protection and prevention of man-made disasters.

Favorable prospects are opening up for cooperation between neighboring regions of Russia and China. Recently, the Russian government has shown a willingness to increase attention to the development of the Russian Far East. Together with the recently adopted policy of the Chinese government to eliminate the backlog of Northeast China, this creates good opportunities for the co-development of these territories, including by attracting large Chinese investments to Russia and using Chinese labor services on a contractual basis.

It is very important for Russia to join the process of regional integration. This trend is much more pronounced in China today than in Russia, and both Chinese experience and Chinese support can be very valuable for the Russian economy in the Asia-Pacific region.

The documents on the Sino-Russian strategic partnership emphasize that it is not directed against third countries. However, it is clear that strong mutual relations help both sides to better cope with external pressure on each of them. China needs Russia's support to solve the Taiwan problem, and Russia needs China's support to ensure its leading role in the post-Soviet space. Joint efforts in the fight against international terrorism, extremism and separatism are extremely important. It is difficult to overestimate the importance of comprehensive mutual cooperation between China and Russia in such a sensitive region for both countries as Central Asia. Neither China nor Russia is interested in a possible power vacuum being filled by forces hostile to both sides or simply outside the region.

The strategic goals that China sets for itself do not in the least contradict the interests of Russia. Russia has no reason to fear global or regional competition from China. China's security is not only not opposed to Russia's security, but, on the contrary, it can fully serve to strengthen it. Russia's emerging grand strategy is fully capable of matching China's grand strategy.

China and Russia have repeatedly expressed their desire to create a new, more democratic world order. A developing China and a developing Russia can make a significant contribution to the formation of a multipolar world order that is both safer and fairer than the current unipolar one.

Zhang Jianxing.Zhongto 1 jueqi: tongxiang dago zhi lu di Zhongguo tse (The Rise of China: China's Strategy towards Great Power). Beijing, 2005, pp. 19-20.

2 Zhongguo da zhanliue (China's Grand Strategy). Chief Editor. Hu Angang. Hangzhou, 2003, p. 10.

Meng Honghua. 3 Goujian Zhongguo da zhanliue du kuangjia: guojia shili, zhanliue guannian yu guoji zhidu (Building the Foundations of China's Grand Strategy: the Real Power of the state, strategic doctrines and international institutions). Beijing, 2005, p. 392.

Huang Shofeng. 4 Zonghe goli xin lun (New theory of Aggregate National Power). Beijing, 1999, p. 72.

Zhang Jianxing. 5 Edict. soch., pp. 207-218.

Meng Honghua. 6 Edict. soch., p. 275.

7 Zhongguo qingyan bao. 26.02.2006.

Zhang Jianxing. 8 Edict. soch., p. 270.

9 Ibid., p. 274.

Zoellick R. 10 Whether China: From Membership to Responsibility? Remarks to National Committee on U.S-China Relations - http://state.state.gov/s/d/rem/53682.htm

Ma Xiajun. 11 Shem shi Zhong Mei guanxi du da ju (What is the main context of Sino-American relations?). Shueyoshi shibao. 23.11.2005.

Song Xiaojun. 12 Zhongguo zehenlun (Analysis of the "Chinese Responsibility Concept". Хуаньцю) - http://theory.people.com.cn/GB/49150/49152/4085030.html

Liu Jianfei. 13 Suzao Zhongguo: Meiguo dui hua zhanliue xin dongxiang (Sculpt China: A New Direction in US Chinese Strategy). Zhongguo dan zheng ganbu luntang. 2006, март - http://theory.people.com.cn/GB/40557/44058/46724/60535/4222338.html

Meng Honghua. 14 Edict. soch., p. 95.

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