A. I. BINDER

Candidate of Economic Sciences Far Eastern Federal University (FEFU)

A. Y. KONONOV

DFU postgraduate student

China Keywords:, yuan, monetary policy, internationalization

One of the phenomena of the current stage of global economic development is the unprecedented rapid development of the Chinese economy, as a result of which the country has taken a leading position in the world economy: "Over 30 years, China's GDP in comparable prices has increased by about 20 times, and per capita-by 15 times"¹.Until quite recently, the PRC was considered only as "one of the main architects of regional economic cooperation"in the national literature. ²

Literally before the eyes of just one generation of people, a radical change in China's position in the global economy took place. Currently, the PRC ranks 1st in the world in terms of export ³, 2nd in terms of GDP ⁴, 2nd in total foreign trade ⁵. In this regard, the monetary policy of the People's Republic of China cannot fail to assume certain obligations to the international monetary system.

These commitments are as follows: in modern economic conditions, the country's monetary policy is no longer solely an internal issue of China; its discussion becomes a regular topic of meetings of the G8, G20 meetings, other representative international forums, as well as meetings of the American Congress.

The PRC is aware of its new status. At the last World Economic Forum in Davos (January 2013), Yi Gang, Vice Governor of the People's Bank of China (PBOC), which functions as the country's Central Bank, outlined the guidelines of the state leadership on the problem of international currency competition: "The main direction of the PBOC's policy is to achieve fair competition in the world renminbi (yuan) market with the dollar US and Euro"⁶.

To achieve this goal, it is necessary to link the relevant internal (availability of a full range of financial instruments*, a package of exchange-traded and OTC derivatives**, market liquidity***) and external economic conditions. China's success in this area is clear: published in April 2013 The World Bank (WB) report shows that in a number of aspects, for example, the size of the financial sector of the World Bank (WB).-

* Financial instrument - a financial document (currency, security, monetary obligation, etc.), the sale or transfer of which ensures the receipt of funds.

** Derivative - an agreement (contract) for the realization of rights and/or fulfillment of obligations for its parties in relation to the underlying asset that underlies this financial instrument (contract).

*** Market liquidity - the ability of the market to amortize changes in supply and demand so that they do not cause significant price fluctuations in the market.

China can already be considered as a "developed financial system". At the same time, the WB report notes low indicators for stability criteria - the result of excessive lending in the 2000s; the task is to "deepen" financial markets ⁷.

Let's focus on the foreign economic aspect of the problem. As Russian experts rightly point out, "... the Chinese leadership has seen that external influence beyond the control of regulation from Beijing can negate the achievements of even the most correct national strategy. " ⁸

Now it is important to correctly determine the place of the PRC in modern world trade. The growing role of China in international trade can be seen from statistics showing that over the past two decades, the volume of imports and exports of the PRC has increased markedly; their total volume in 2012 was $3.87 trillion, or 47% of Chinese GDP.

Despite the fact that China's total trade currently lags slightly (by $15.85 billion ⁹) behind the corresponding indicator of the United States, its share of GDP (49.9%) in China is higher than that of the United States (24.8%) and a number of other countries (Japan has 28.6%, Russia - 45.7%, India-45.8%, Great Britain-46% ¹⁰).

Already, China accounts for almost 10% of the world's total trade. Its main partners are the United States (about 12% of total world trade), Japan (9%), the Republic of Korea (7%), and Germany (5%)¹¹. At the same time, China is the second trading partner for the United States ¹², the first for Japan ¹³ and Korea ¹⁴, and the fifth for Germany ¹⁵.

The foreign economic relations between China and Russia are more complicated, as their economies occupy qualitatively opposite niches. If China is the engine of the modern world economy, then the situation in our country is completely different. "Unfortunately, we are objects of the global economy rather than active subjects of it," writes Academician R. S. Grinberg, "in the sense that our well-being depends heavily on the export of 5-7 types of raw materials and energy resources"¹⁶. This is reflected in the low (just above 2% ¹⁷) share of Russia in China's foreign trade turnover (China's share in Russia's foreign trade turnover exceeds 10%¹⁸), which confirms the asymmetry of economic ties between the two countries.

The development of the Russian Federation is very problematic without the Chinese market. After all, the PRC is the main importer of Russian timber: 34% of it is exported to China ¹⁹. The PRC is the second importer of chemical products (9.3%) ²⁰ and weapons (15%) ²¹.

In our opinion, an important external economic criterion that characterizes the prospects for the transformation of the yuan into a global currency is the desire of trading partners to conduct financial transactions in the Chinese currency. The success of the PRC in promoting the national currency on the international stage was confirmed by researchers of the International Monetary Fund (IMF)²², who found that the pace of internationalization of the yuan directly depends on the preferences for using this currency in international transactions.

The fund's experts concluded that in 2010, China became the second largest country in the world in terms of interaction of trade flows (after the Netherlands), while in 2000, China ranked only 5th in terms of this indicator, which characterizes the promotion of the national currency in the international arena (after Spain, France, Italy and the Netherlands). In addition, China has increased its presence in global trade by increasing the number of trading partners. China was the only non-European country in the top five in terms of economic connectivity in both 2000 ^{and 201023}

According to a triennial report from the Bank for International Settlements, transactions in yuan accounted for less than 1% ($77.1 billion)in 2010. of the total turnover of foreign currency markets. A similar situation was typical for the currencies of other emerging markets - in all cases, the US dollar dominated (85%).

But a year later, at the end of 2011, the volume of foreign trade settlements in yuan reached 2.08 trillion. RMB ($330 billion), or 6.6%, and in 2012 - 2.94 trillion, or 12% of the total trade turnover. ²⁴ HSBC (Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation) forecasts published in March 2013 that over the next three years, 30% of China's total trade flows will be carried out in the United States. RMB, which will put it among the top three most used currencies (after the dollar and euro)25. A significant portion of renminbi payments - up to 80% - are made by Chinese importations26; foreign traders hold on to the Chinese currency in anticipation of an increase in the exchange rate, and trade settlements are one of the channels for this.

The deepening internationalization of the national currency of the People's Republic of China is reflected in the development of the spot market and the derivatives market (see Table 1).

* Spot-settlement conditions under which payment for a transaction is made immediately (usually within two days).

Table 1

Distribution of global foreign exchange market turnover between currencies and derivatives (% of average daily turnover, April 2010)

* "Outright" - a simple urgent currency transaction with the condition of payment of payments at the forward rate in strictly defined terms agreed by the parties.

** Swap - a trade and financial exchange operation in which the conclusion of a transaction on the purchase (sale) of securities, currency is accompanied by the conclusion of a counter-transaction, a transaction on the reverse purchase (sale) of the same product after a certain period of time on the same or other terms.

Источник: Bank of International Settlement Triennial Bank Survey, 2010.

Note that China's spot operations account for 24% of the total volume of foreign exchange transactions, which is less than the corresponding indicator for both issuing countries (USA, Japan, Great Britain, Switzerland) that are seriously focused on using this financial instrument, and for emerging market countries where it exceeds 30%.

Table 2 shows a comparison of the absolute turnover of major currencies in the swap and derivatives markets.

The lack of development of the markets for derivatives and slots for operations in yuan can be attributed to the limited presence of China in them. Only in 2005 did the Chinese government allow a limited number of Chinese organizations (non-financial companies, non-bank financial institutions) to participate in the currency swap markets. Also, by the mid-2000s, the first steps were taken towards expanding China's markets: in order to activate this process, China lifted restrictions on bank trading in equity and commodity derivatives in 2005.

At the same time, the country's economy already has a significant presence of commodity futures* in the derivatives markets. According to the International Futures Industry Association, the share of concluded trading contracts on Chinese exchanges is about 7% of all trades on 78 world exchanges. And while this fact inspires optimism in terms of expanding financial influence and prospects for internationalization of the yuan, from an economic point of view, there is no complete confidence that the large-scale commodity derivatives market is useful for the country.

Meanwhile, the Chinese leadership is firmly convinced that a diverse and liquid derivatives market is needed to further advance the yuan along the path of the world currency. In particular, this idea was voiced by Huang Zemin, a member of the People's Political Consultative Conference of China, who argued that a healthy functioning of the derivatives market is the main condition for the transformation of the renminbi.²⁷

In contrast to other countries in this area, the PRC has another resource - Hong Kong, the presence of which gives China an advantage in terms of geographical coverage of the distribution of foreign currency turnover. In 2010, Hong Kong accounted for 5% of the total turnover of the global foreign exchange market, as well as 73% of the total cross-border settlements of the PRC, in 2011 this figure reached 86%²⁸.

Hong Kong, as a de facto independent entity from the financial markets of the PRC, provides natural protection for the financial security of mainland China, acting, among other things, as an old state.-

* Futures - a standard futures exchange contract for the purchase and sale of the underlying asset, in which the parties (seller and buyer) agree only on the price level and delivery time.

Table 2

Turnover of foreign exchange sheaf and derivatives markets (average daily value of $ bn, April 2010)

Источник: Bank of International Settlement Triennial Bank Survey, 2010.

It will serve as a trading platform for a number of important reforms. As early as 2004, Hong Kong residents were allowed to open deposit accounts in RMB. There is an increase in the issuance of RMB-denominated debt in Hong Kong. Since March 2006, the Hong Kong interbank market has introduced a system of payment in RMB, including processing of money transfers and payments from bank cards.

Although the scale of settlement remains modest at the moment, China's initiatives to introduce new financial instruments for the offshore renminbi market and increase their diversity are a sign of the prospects for the Chinese currency to gain regional status in East Asia. A further step may be to increase the number of free trade zones in East Asia that meet the requirements of optimal currency zones (the need to strengthen China's partnership relations with neighboring countries; activate financial activities aimed at stopping the process of dollarization in the region; abandon the policy of linking the exchange rates of national currencies to the US dollar).

According to Wang Jiaqiang, Chief macroeconomics and Finance analyst at the Bank of China's Institute of International Finance, the internationalization of the yuan should follow the following scenario: "The Chinese currency will be recognized in neighboring countries, then in the region, and only then the yuan will enter the path of international recognition." ²⁹

Multilateral negotiations and consultations need to address serious issues related to transparency in the control of economic relations between China and East Asian countries; challenges in determining the availability of financial reporting data; and coordination of major monetary policy issues, which are already being actively discussed by the Chiang Mai Multilateral Initiative*, the regional equivalent of the IMF and a powerful reservoir of resources, which provides certain mechanisms and platforms for moving forward in the direction of currency cooperation.

To expand the geographical use of the yuan in international trade and financial transactions, the PBOC has now entered into a number of bilateral swap agreements with the central banks of other countries. This process began in the early 2000s. At the same time, China implemented bilateral swap agreements using national currencies: with the Philippines (yuan/fi-

* The Chiang Mai Initiative is a multilateral swap mechanism that unites the countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the People's Republic of China (including Hong Kong), South Korea, and Japan.

Fig. Portfolio structure of China Investment Corporation, 2011 (%)

Source: China Investment Corporation.

Lippin peso); with the Republic of Korea (yuan/won and won/yuan); with Japan (yuan/yen and yen/yuan); with Malaysia (US dollar/ringgit); with Indonesia (US dollar/rupee); with Thailand (US dollar/baht).

Since 2008, China's bilateral swap agreements with foreign banks have directly supported the widespread international use of the yuan, providing for payments between partners only in the national currency. The number of bilateral agreements concluded is growing every year; at the end of 2012, there were 19 of them, and the total amount was 2.01 trillion. yuan ($320.3 billion ³⁰).

It should be noted that the signing of bilateral swap agreements contributed to: increasing the speed of capital turnover in yuan; developing the process of free conversion of capital transactions; increasing the role of the PRC in international investment and financial transactions; opening up new markets; and forming financial instruments in yuan. Despite its incomplete convertibility, the role of the yuan in the portfolio of reserves of a number of banks is growing, which, in our opinion, also indicates the transformation of the PRC currency. It was initiated by the Central Banks of Malaysia, Nigeria, Chile and Japan ³¹.

The process is evolving: in April 2013, the Central Bank of Australia announced plans to invest about 5% of its international reserves ($2 billion, or more than $ 13 billion). RMB) in Chinese government bonds. The status of these deposits will probably not be recognized by the IMF, but this fact does not stop the Central Banks of various countries from considering assets in yuan as a reliable tool for reducing pressure on the balance of payments. These processes contribute to increasing the importance of the yuan in the context of competitiveness among the world's reserve currencies, as well as the structure of global capital flows.

In this regard, it is important to emphasize that the level of China's foreign exchange reserves is approximately 40% of the country's GDP ($3.31 trillion). according to the results of 2012, ³²), which is much higher than the total external debt of the PRC, and which characterizes the country as a reliable creditor.

China does not disclose the structure of its foreign exchange reserves, but experts believe that financial instruments denominated in US dollars account for more than 50% ³³. According to official data from the US Treasury, China holds about 21.6% of the US national debt (as of February 2013,34). The total declared volume of China's foreign exchange reserves denominated in treasury bills and agency bonds (mainly in the form of long-term Treasury bills) as of June 2012 was $1.59 trillion.35 The structure of US investments in Chinese securities is quite different (most of the investments-97% - are shares), and their total volume is "modest" $76.8 billion.³⁶

The main channel of capital flows in the United States is the accumulation of reserves. In our opinion, this creates significant risks for China: the huge and growing volume of US government debt ($16.8 trillion) is likely to adversely affect the development of the entire global economy. Moving away from the policy of further investing in US securities will allow China to change the structure of foreign investment. This function is, to some extent, regulated by the national government. The China Investment Corporation and other large companies are already actively moving to investments that generate higher returns than US or European Treasury bills.-

Table 3

Total government debt of China and the United States (in absolute terms and as a share of GDP)

Источник: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database.

obligations of countries holding reserve currencies (see figure). The net profit of the Chinese Investment Corporation in 2011, according to the report published by the company, was $48.422 million ³⁷.

At the same time, at this stage, the US dollar still remains the main world reserve currency. Its status was only jeopardized by the growing importance of the euro (a 7% increase in the euro's share in global foreign exchange reserves between 1999 and 2003). Despite this, the US currency faces serious challenges related to the prospects for US macroeconomic stability. While the US Federal Reserve (Fed) is obviously trusted globally for its achievements in combating inflation, the growing US national debt poses a certain threat.

The paradox is that, given the complexities of the Japanese and euro zone economies, along with the demand of developing countries to accumulate reserves for "safe" assets, this increasing debt can "cement" the dollar's dominance in the global financial system. The total volume of US gross national debt is about 107% of GDP and, according to the IMF forecast, may reach 114%, or $22.5 trillion, by 2017 (see Table 3).

China and the United States share a chasm in the availability of safe and liquid assets; the state of US financial markets suggests that the US currency as a buffer is resisting threats to its dominant status. And rather than chase the US by increasing its debt, China, in our opinion, should develop its own financial markets and increase the availability of highly rated assets denominated in yuan.

The yuan already plays a role in international trade transactions and appears in the reserve portfolios of central banks in a number of developing countries. There is a similar historical precedent: the US dollar has grown from a currency with a limited international position to a serious competitor to the pound sterling in just over a decade.

At the 5th BRICS Summit in March 2013, the issue of expanding the structure of world currencies in the SDR (Special Drawing Rights)basket became acute*³⁸. As of March 2012, SDR accounted for approximately 4% of ³⁹ official reserve assets, so the direct effect of including the renminbi in the SDR basket will not be particularly noticeable. But the very fact of this event is significant, since even the likelihood of such a merger will encourage central banks around the world to add yuan-denominated assets to their reserve portfolios.

The future transformation of the PRC currency may be seriously affected by the IMF, which, on the one hand, expresses its intention to strictly apply the convertibility criterion (which is quite logical), based on the fact that any currency included in the SDR basket will presumably be considered as an official reserve currency. On the other hand, in the person of the head of the ^IMF, he calls for reforming the international monetary system by adding emerging market currencies, in particular the yuan, to the basket of the International Monetary Fund and expanding their use in every possible way, while stimulating the stability of the global financial system40.

At the same time, we note that at the time of a rapid rise in the-

* SDR is an artificial reserve and payment instrument issued by the IMF.

After World War II and its transformation into the world's reserve currency, the dollar was backed by US dominance in the global economy, an advantage in research and military strength, as well as the investment activity of American enterprises and financial companies. China has not yet achieved such a position - it will take many years.

Even more elusive prospects in this area, in the presence of different initial economic conditions from the PRC, the ruble. In the past few years, the possibility of its transformation into a global currency has also been discussed at the highest level.

The national currency of Russia, in contrast to the yuan, is fully convertible, and its use in world trade settlements, like the yuan, is constantly growing (from 0.3% in 1998 to 0.9% in 2010, according to the Bank for International Settlements). The ruble plays an important role in the CIS, which means that it can become a central coordinating factor in the overall trade policy of this region, and there are some positive signals for the successful promotion of its internationalization. In particular, mutual settlements in rubles between the CIS countries are currently gaining momentum, bypassing the Russian Federation; more than half (51%) of settlements within the EurAsEC (which includes 5 CIS member states and 3 observer countries) are made in rubles.

At the same time, in the European and global range, the scale of the ruble is commensurate with the political and economic influence of Russia (33rd place in terms of the criterion of interconnectedness of economies). And even the signing of agreements by the BRICS countries to promote the use of national currencies (New Delhi, March 2012) did not affect skepticism about the economic potential of the Russian Federation.

Academic circles believe that Russia, which has a low level of GDP (about 2.8% of global GDP in 2012, according to IMF statistics), lagging behind the same indicator of the euro zone, the United States and China, respectively, by 8.23, 7.76, and 4.07 times, currently has no prospects in the process of turning the ruble into a world currency.

In addition, the role of the national currency in export transactions becomes significant for unique products with low demand elasticity or differentiated exports (as in China).

(In the case of the Russian currency, we are currently seeing that Russia's exports rely heavily on raw materials and energy resources that are traditionally traded in dollars, and oil and gas prices that affect the ruble exchange rate are becoming a threat to its stability. A brief analysis shows that the ruble is also far from meeting the necessary requirements for a number of other observations.)

First, the reserve currency should be characterized by macroeconomic stability and a low level of inflation, which in Russia, according to the Federal State Statistics Service, in 2002-2008 was above 10%, in 2009-2010 - about 10%, and only in the last two years has decreased to 7%. In this regard, we emphasize that in China, according to the National Bureau of Statistics of the People's Republic of China, a similar level (more than 10%) was last recorded in 1995; since then, the average annual rate has been 2.3%.

Secondly, the economy of the issuing country should have a significant financial depth - while the market capitalization of our country is 5% and 24% of the corresponding indicators of the United States and China. In addition, the banking system, despite its relative stability, is sufficiently politicized (according to the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, as of July 1, 2013, the first 5 banks of the Russian Federation account for 51% of the assets of the entire sector).

Third, Russia needs to improve its regulatory framework. The shortcomings of the Russian leadership in this area are: a poorly developed bankruptcy law, an opaque system of property rights. In addition, in 2012, our state ranked only 133rd in the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index and 112th in the World Bank's Doing Business rating, which makes us think about the reliability of storing potential savings in rubles.

The risks of the modern Russian economy do not allow us to talk about the possibility of rapid transformation of the ruble into a world currency. Modern currency competition is extremely acute, and at this stage the yuan is ahead of the ruble in all these aspects.

Returning to China's economic difficulties, we note the problem of its international behavior: authoritative researchers agree that the PRC has not yet proved that it can act responsibly (here, in particular, it is worth mentioning the incessant accusations of unjustifiably undervaluing the yuan's exchange rate) and that the Chinese authorities have not yet proved that they can act responsibly.-

regional centralization of the banking sector ⁴²). There are inconsistent messages coming from Beijing, and the words don't match the actions. As V. P. Andreev notes in an authoritative Russian magazine, China began to reform its monetary and financial regulation " ... when the needs of its own economy and its increased involvement in global economic processes demanded it."⁴³

However, the success of internationalization of the renminbi will depend on: the interaction of market forces and a well-thought-out strategy; the introduction of full convertibility of the renminbi; the liberalization of the domestic financial system; increasing the flexibility of the renminbi exchange rate; strengthening the country's financial system; the development of domestic currency, bond, and stock markets; and improving the legal system of the PRC.

We agree with the opinion of economist Li Caiquan: "The Chinese economy needs to go its own way, the PRC will not be able to create another dollar...", taking advantage of the gradual movement of real sectors to the East. The Chinese economy in its foreign strategy needs to show itself in the United States and Europe, and look for a new space for development.⁴⁴

International currency competition forces China to back up significant foreign economic gains with comparable results of domestic, more painful reforms.

^{Klinov V.} 1 Features of modern dynamics of the world economy// Economic issues. 2010. N 9. P. 82.

^{Bulatov A. S.} 2 Mirovaya ekonomika [World Economy]. Moscow, 2007, p. 537.

³ The World factbook country comparison - https://www.cia. gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/ rankorder/2078rank.html

⁴ International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database. April 2013 - http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2013/01/ weodata/WEO Apr2013all.xls

⁵ Renminwang (Internet Center of the editorial office of the newspaper "People's Daily"), 16.02.2013 - http://finance.people.com.en/n/2013/0216/ cl004 - 20491738.html

⁶ http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013 - 01/27/c_13213 1454.htm

⁷ Global financial development report 2013. Rethinking the role of the state in finance - http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTGLOBAL FINRE PORT/Resources/8816096 - 1346865433023/8827078 - 1346865457422/GDF 2013 Report.pdf

^{Dynkin A. A.} 8 Mirovaya ekonomika: prognoz do 2020 godu [World Economy: Forecast until 2020]. Moscow, 2007, p. 304.

⁹ Reuters. 14.02.2013.

¹⁰ World Bank - http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.IMP. GNFS.ZS

¹¹ Zhongguo tongji nianjian 2012 (Statistical Yearbook of China 2012). Beijing, 2013.

¹² Merchandise trade by region and selected economies, 2001 - 2011 -United States - http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/its2012_e/ appendixe/all.xls

¹³ Merchandise trade by region and selected economies, 2001 - 2011 -Japan - http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/its2012_e/appen-dix e/al3.xls

¹⁴ Merchandise trade by product, region and major trading partner, 2010 - 2011 - Korea, Rep. Of - http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/ statis e/its2012_e/its 12_appendix_e.htm

¹⁵ Foreign Trade. Ranking of Germany's trading partners in foreign trade (with turnover and foreign trade balance) - https://www.de-statis.de/EN/FactsFigures/NationalEconomyEnvironment/ForeignTrade/TradingPar tners/Tables/OrderRankGe rmanyTradingPartners.pdf?_blob=publicationFile

^{Grinberg R. S.} 16 Svoboda i pravosudost ' [Freedom and Justice]. Russian temptations of false choice, Moscow, 2012, p. 209.

¹⁷ Quote from official data of the Customs Service of the People's Republic of China -http://www.customs.gov.cn/publish/portal0/tab400/modulel5677/info 424739.htm

¹⁸ Quote from official data of the Federal Customs Service of the Russian Federation - http://www.customs.ru/attachments/article/17364/ WEB UTSA_09.xls

¹⁹ ITAR-TASS. 04.12.2012.

²⁰ Quote from the Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China -http://russia.mofcom.gov.cn/article/speechheader/201212/2012120847 5889. shtml

²¹ RIA Novosti. 18.03.2013.

²² Enhancing surveillance: interconnectedness and clusters - http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2012/031512.pdf; Changing Patterns of Global Trade - http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/ eng/2011/061511.pdf

²³ Assessing Systemic Trade Interconnectedness - An Empirical Approach - http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2011/wpll214. pdf

²⁴ China internet information center. 12.06.2012 http.V/www.china.org. cn/business/2012 - 06/12/content_25631043.htm

²⁵ Reuters. 26.03.2013.

²⁶ Eastmoney. 06.07.2012 - http://finance.eastmoney.com/news/ 1350,20120706220588577.html

²⁷ Hexun Qiho (China Futures Information Portal), 08.03.2012 - http://futures.hexun.com/2012 - 03 - 08/139080103.html

^{Prasad E.,Ye L.} 28 The Renminbi's role in the global monetary system. Washington D.C., 2012. P. 38 - 39.

^{Zhou Yu.} 29 Renminbi huilv jizhi (Renminbi Currency Mechanism). Shanghai. 2007. P. 262.

³⁰ Wantchinatimes, 26.03.2013 - http://www.wantchinatimes.com/ news-subclass-cnt.aspx?id=20130326000117&cid=1102

³¹ Zhongzhengwang (China Securities Information Portal), 25.04.2013 - http://www.cs.com.cn/hw/hqzx/201304/t2013 0425 3962144.html

³² State administration of foreign exchange - http://www.safe. gov.cn/

³³ Dollar share of china FX reserves dives to 54% in June from 65% in 2010 - http://www.dowjones.com/products/djfxtrader/articles/ Dollar ShareOfChinaFXReservesDives.asp

³⁴ Major foreign holders of treasury securities http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/tic/ Documents/mfh.txt

³⁵ US Department of Treasury - http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/tic/Documents/mfh.txt

³⁶ US Department of Treasury - http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/tic/Pages/ticsec2.aspx

³⁷ China investment corporation annual report 2011 http://www.china-inv.cn/cicen/include/resources/CIC_2011_ annualreport_en.pdf

³⁸ Fifth BRICS summit Declaration and Action Plan - http://www. brics5.co.za/fifth-brics-summit-declaration-and-action-plan/

³⁹ International Monetary Fund - http://www.imf.org/external/ pubs/ft/ar/2012/eng/pdf/a 1 .pdf

⁴⁰ IMF Executive Board Discusses Criteria for Broadening the SDR Currency Basket - http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pn/2011/pnll 137.htm

⁴¹ Bloomberg. 27.11.2012.

^{Prasad E} 42., Ye L. Op. cit. P. 18.

^{Andreev V. P.} 43 Yuan on the way to the world currency / / Asia and Africa today. 2012, N 10.

^{Zhong Shi.} 44 Zhongguo waihui chubei ruhe baituo meiyuan zaiqian zhi (How to break the Chinese reserves with the system based on American debt) / / Zhongguo qingnian bao. 19.09.2011.

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