A. BONDARENKO (Barnaul)

In the last decade, the importance of Xinjiang for the People's Republic of China has increased significantly. This is due to the fact that it is becoming one of the main raw material regions of the country - the main supplier of oil, and in the future, coal. Another factor that draws particular attention to the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) is that it is in this region that separatists continue to operate, including those associated with the Muslim international terrorist network.

The Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region is a region with huge growth potential, but its growth is constrained primarily by weak infrastructure development (compared to the coastal provinces of China) and strained relations between indigenous peoples and Han Chinese.

XINJIANG'S PLACE AND ROLE IN THE CHINESE ECONOMY

In terms of economic indicators, Xinjiang lags far behind the average Chinese level of development. The XUAR's GDP in 2004 was 220 billion rubles. This figure is estimated at RMB, or 1.6% of the overall Chinese figure, and ranks 25th out of 31 provincial - level administrative divisions in the PRC ^.1 Since data on the development of the XUAR in 2004 have not yet been fully processed, we present data for 2003 (see the table).

Despite a significant lag in a number of indicators (foreign trade turnover, the size of foreign direct investment), the economy of Xinjiang has strong positions in agriculture (viticulture, cotton growing, camel and small cattle breeding), as well as in the extractive industry (mainly in oil production).

However, the development of huge deposits of coal and oil (according to Chinese estimates, about 80% of the country's total reserves), gas, non-ferrous metal ores, manganese, graphite, mica, mercury, and uranium is just beginning. The level of industrial development of natural resources does not exceed 30% yet. In short, for the PRC, this region is truly a storehouse of strategic raw materials.

In the industrial structure of the XUAR, the leading place belongs to three industries: oil, chemical and light (mainly leather). These sectors are associated with the region's economic development strategy and the concept of forming a new northern "belt of openness" (meaning the openness of previously closed areas to economic and humanitarian contacts with the outside world). In 2004, according to the Statistics Bureau of the People's Republic of China, XUAR produced 22.3 million tons of oil. The region's share in total Chinese oil production increased from 5% in 1990 to 12.7% in 2004 (3rd place in the country).

About 1,500 specialized enterprises operate in the light industry of the region. Most of them are small, but only 33 are large and medium-sized. Their owners are mostly private owners, only in the Chuguchak border economic cooperation area the state form of ownership prevails. The authorities encourage the development of enterprises by creating a system of benefits and preferences.

Xinjiang's development has a chance to significantly improve

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Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in the Chinese economy in 2003

Source: Zhongguo tongji nianjian 2004 (Statistical Yearbook of China 2004), Beijing, 2004. Direct regional investments are indicated.

It should be accelerated in the context of the strategy put forward by the Chinese leadership for the development of Western territories and their entry into the external arena. It is about cooperation between Xinjiang and the border republics of Central Asia within the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).

There is already some groundwork here. In Xinjiang, since the late 1970s, cities and districts that were previously closed to foreigners began to open up. Currently, there are already several such districts in the XUAR, which were formed mainly in 1992-1994.

An important factor for the development of Xinjiang is the development of transport infrastructure. In 1992, a steel highway was laid from Kazakhstan to Xinjiang, resulting in a Euro-Asian railway artery, and the countries of the Asia-Pacific region have a chance to take the shortest route to the Mediterranean, the Black Sea and the Caspian basins.

China is trying to solve the problem of backwardness of the country's western regions at an accelerated pace. This is seen as the key to the success of the ongoing market reforms and political stabilization in the region. That is why the accelerated development of the western regions is considered as one of the most important strategic directions of the 10th five-year plan (2001-2005). For this purpose, it is planned to increase investment in infrastructure. At the same time, great importance is attached to the following factors:-

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development of science and technology, education, and environmental protection measures.

The first tangible results from the implementation of this strategy are expected by the country's leadership in the next decade (2006-2015).

INTRAREGIONAL POLITICAL ISSUES

The active introduction of elements of Chinese culture alien to the national identity of the indigenous peoples of Xinjiang, methodically implemented by Beijing, nevertheless did not lead to their cultural assimilation. On the contrary, the reaction to the mass migration of Han Chinese to Xinjiang, which especially intensified in the 50s and 70s of the last century, was the growth of separatist sentiments among indigenous peoples.

The practice of nation-state building in the PRC is such that the rights to autonomy are delegated not directly to the national minority, but to self-government bodies in autonomous regions. At the same time, indigenous peoples should be widely represented in the local government apparatus. However, even if the number of civil servants recruited from indigenous peoples is growing in the local government apparatus, then as they move up the bureaucratic ladder, they lose touch with their community or nationality. Often, Uighurs, Kazakhs, and other minority groups do not count on the help of such officials.

Another issue is related to Xinjiang's natural resources, which are legally owned by the local bureaucracy. However, it has failed to create incentives for private capital to develop resources. As a result, the XUAR, despite its huge wealth, continues to "live in debt". From 1969 to 2003, the State budget of the People's Republic of China spent 13.5 billion rubles on the development of the autonomous region. RMB (about $ 1.65 billion), including RMB 7.7 billion. RMB as a targeted allocation to the local budget for capital construction ² . In 2004, the XUAR's own revenues accounted for about 37% of its expenses. Therefore, the claims of separatist ideologues that China is "robbing the natural resources of Xinjiang" can be considered untenable.

The development of the region's raw materials resources requires a large number of qualified personnel, which until now Xinjiang did not have. Most of the scientific and technical personnel and skilled industrial workers are Han Chinese. There are practically no institutes or educational institutions for training national specialists and skilled workers. Therefore, Beijing sends specialists from Central and Eastern China, mainly Han Chinese, to Xinjiang, especially in the hard - to-reach oil-bearing areas of the Tarim basin, which continues to fuel separatist sentiments.

The demographic problem is no less serious for the region. Official data on population growth show that after the mass migration of Chinese people in the last decade stopped, the population of the province is growing mainly at the expense of non-Han ethnic groups. National minorities are opposed to the Chinese Government's birth control policy. This, in turn, complicates the political situation in the region.

According to the latest Chinese census, the population of XUAR was 19 million at the end of 2000 (up from 17 million in 1995). Its national composition is as follows:

- Uyghurs - more than 8 million people; Han Chinese-more than 6 million; Kazakhs-1 million 800 thousand; Dungans-400 thousand; Kyrgyz-about 200 thousand; Mongols-160 thousand people.³ According to other sources, the Han Chinese population was 42% of the population in 2001. And in 1949, they were only 5%. This is the result of the "Sinicization" carried out by the authorities in the 1950s and 70s. ⁴

From 1955 to the present, 15 large-scale separatist uprisings have taken place in the Xinjiang Autonomous Region. All of them had religious overtones-Islam is the predominant religion among the Uyghurs, especially the rural population. In the mid-1990s, the national issue in the province became so acute that it seemed that Xinjiang could turn into a hotbed of armed struggle for independence. Uyghur information structures were established in Russia, Kazakhstan, and Western Europe, receiving instructions from a single coordination center in Pakistan. Groups appeared in the Xinjiang mountains to prepare bases for guerrilla warfare. In the period from 1992 to 1997, about 30 underground organizations were identified, 162 people were killed and more than 440 were injured in armed clashes ^.5

Beijing opposes separatism not only by force, but also by diplomatic methods. The creation of the SCO, whose members are China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, provided, among other things, for the coordination of anti-terrorist actions of these states. Accordingly, Uyghur information centers in Moscow and Alma Ata were closed. Meanwhile, in Munich (Germany), a similar center is still successfully operating.

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UNDER THE SLOGAN OF "INDEPENDENCE"

After the US launched military action against the Taliban in Afghanistan, Beijing increased security measures in Xinjiang. The Chinese-Afghan border was closed. Additional troops were sent to XUAR. Foreign journalists were denied access to Xinjiang"for security reasons." The number of intelligence officers on flights has been increased. In mid-October 2002, the newspaper Ili Wanbao (Evening Ili) reported on the death sentences of five "national schismatics". Seven other separatists were sentenced to various prison terms. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Sun Yuxi said at a press conference in Beijing that China considers the actions against Uighur separatists "its participation in the fight against international terrorism." The Chinese government, he said, has evidence that Xinjiang militants "have established close ties with international terrorist forces." According to the diplomat, the convicted "schismatics are responsible for bombings, murders, robberies and other serious crimes." ⁶

At the end of 2002, the Chinese Foreign Ministry again appealed to the governments of world powers to prosecute individuals and organizations suspected of helping Uighur separatists and facilitate their extradition to China.

In 2003, China officially announced a list of Muslim organizations and individuals suspected of involvement in terrorist activities, including the following groups: the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), the East Turkestan Liberation Organization (ETLO), the World Uyghur Youth Congress (WUYC), and the East Turkestan Information Center (ETIC). The Ministry of Public Security of the People's Republic of China also announced a list of 11 individuals accused of terrorism, most of whom are leaders of the above-mentioned organizations ^.7

For China, the "Uighur problem" is not yet off the agenda. Moreover, in the West, there is a certain activation of the Uyghur diaspora. Thus, in April 2004, a meeting of two leading Uyghur movements was held in Germany, as a result of which they merged into a single organization called the World Uyghur Congress (WUC). At this meeting, Erkin Alptekin, the son of the former leader of the government of the East Turkestan Republic, which existed from 1946 to 1949, was elected the first president of the WUC.

In September 2004. The World Uyghur Congress formed a "government" with Anwar Yusuf Turani as Prime Minister. Other members currently live in Kazakhstan, Turkey and Australia. The "government" declared its goal to "tell the world about East Turkestan and create a foundation for freedom and independence." ⁸

How do foreign experts assess the situation in Xinjiang? American Professor J. R. R. Tolkien Dreyer of the University of Miami believes that Uighur dissatisfaction with Beijing's policy of developing western territories is growing. The Uighurs fear that more Han Chinese will move to Xinjiang as a result of railway construction and other infrastructure projects. These concerns, according to the professor, create a favorable environment for the activation of the separatist movement ^.9

There is another point of view. Yitzhak Shikor, an Israeli scholar at the University of Haifa, believes that it is almost impossible to achieve the ultimate goal of the separatists - to recreate "an East Turkestan Republic independent of the PRC." ¹⁰

As for the Russian position, it is based on the general context of Russian-Chinese strategic partnership relations. Moscow consistently supports the territorial integrity of the People's Republic of China, and Beijing, in turn, fully supports Russia on the Chechen problem. The Kremlin also takes into account the interests of the West Siberian region. Moscow believes that the stable socio-political situation in the Xinjiang Autonomous Region and its successful economic development will contribute to enhancing cooperation between Xinjiang and the Western Siberian regions of the Russian Federation.

¹ Statistical Yearbook of China 2004 (Zhongguo tongji nianjian 2004), Beijing, 2004.

^{Syroezhkin K.} 2 Separatism in Xinjiang: Myths and Reality - http://www.ca-c.org/journal/10-1997/st_14_siroegkin.shtml, November 2003

^{Ileuova G.} 3 Trip to the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region - http://www.kisi.kz/Parts/Confs/ll-06-conf.html, June 2001

^{Shichor Yitzhak.} 4 Blow Up: Internal and External Challenges Of Uyghur Separatism and Islamic Radicalism to Chinese Rule in Xinjiang/ Paper Submitted to the Conference "Ethnic Minorities and Great Power Strategies", Honolulu, 12 - 14 October 2004, p. 12.

⁵ Ibid., p. 8.

^{Syroezhkin K.} 6 Separatism in Xinjiang...

⁷ China declares four Muslim organizations "terrorist" - http://www.islamua.net/islamua/news/newscol.shtml7578, January 2004

^{Dreyer June Teufel.} 8 China's Strategic Vulnerability to Minority Separatism / Paper Submitted to the Conference "Ethnic Minorities and Great Power Strategies", Honolulu, 12 - 14 October 2004 p. 3

⁹ Ibid., p. 4.

^{Shichor Yitzhak.} 10 Blow Up: Internal and External Challenges..., p. 18.

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