Yu. M. GALENOVICH

Doctor of Historical Sciences

Since the beginning of this century, the coinciding national interests of Russia and China have encouraged both countries to take steps towards deepening cooperation and mutual understanding.

In 2001, the "Agreement between the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China on Good-neighborliness, Friendship and Cooperation" was concluded, and in 2004 an agreement was signed on the border line near the city of Khabarovsk and on the Argun River. In 2008, the demarcation of the entire length of the border was completed.

The Year of Russia in China was held in 2006, and the Year of China in Russia was held in 2007. 2009 is the Year of the Russian Language in China, and 2010 is the Year of the Chinese Language in Russia.

From September 15 to October 15, 2009, during the celebration of the 60th anniversary of the People's Republic of China and the 60th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the People's Republic of China and our country, China hosts the Sino-Russian Friendship Month. (By the way, for the first time since 1952)

We can assume that the parties are also moving towards holding the Year of Good Neighborliness between Russia and China, the Year of Friendship between Russia and China, and the Year of Cooperation between Russia and China in accordance with the 2001 treaty.

It is obvious that there are political forces in both countries that believe in the urgent need to strengthen our bilateral ties. At the same time, there is some reason to believe that Beijing is probably not without a clash of different approaches on this issue.

In this regard, it seems useful to closely follow the assessments of Chinese scientists of Russia's foreign policy and respond to them.

So, it is impossible not to pay attention to how the PRC currently interprets what is called the "traditional political culture of Russia"there. By "political culture", apparently, we mean the state of minds, the way of thinking that determined and determine the foreign policy, in this case, of Russia.

As a starting point, we can take the statements of the head of the Center for International Strategy Studies of the CPC Central Party School, Professor Jiang Changbin, who specializes in the field of relations between China and our country.

His opinions are contained in an article titled " The History of the return of Heixi-dao Island (Bolshoy Ussuriysky Island near Khabarovsk)", published in the central Beijing foreign policy magazine Shijie Zhishi.

This article was published in connection with the completion of the demarcation of the Russian-Chinese border. (In passing, we note that in the aforementioned article, a reasonable compromise decision of both sides regarding the border line on the islands near the city of Khabarovsk is interpreted as a kind of victory of one side over the other and as the "return" of the lands that the other side allegedly "illegally seized and temporarily appropriated".)

RUSSIAN IMPERIAL THINKING

The article, in particular, referred to the "traditional political culture of Russia".

According to Jiang Changbin, Russia, starting with the Moscow Principality of the 15th century, and then - tsarist Russia, imperial Russia and Soviet Russia, has the same "traditional political culture".

In other words, a number of state structures have changed in Russia as a nation over the course of its history, but the political culture inherent in the nation and determining the state's foreign policy remains unchanged. It was formed by the XVI century and has been operating for more than 5 centuries. This is what some authors in China today call the" traditional political culture " of Russia.

* This refers to the Muscovite, or Russian, state, beginning with Grand Duke Ivan III the Great (1462-1505), who actually laid the foundation of this state and called himself the sovereign of "all Russia" long before the first "official" wedding to the kingdom of Ivan IV in 1547 (approx. ed.).

This political culture, according to the Chinese scholar, consists of two parts.

The first of them represents the foreign policy strategy and tactics of the state. As a matter of fact, we are talking about state and national foreign policy thinking in Russia. At the same time, Jiang Changbin emphatically does not distinguish between the foreign policy ideology of the state and the nation in our country. In other words, what is usually related to the foreign policy of a particular state, this Chinese scholar attributes to Russia as a nation, trying to present it as a "policy for all time".

He describes this political thinking from its very beginning to the present day and beyond as "aggressive, aggressive and expansionist." From Jiang Changbin's point of view, Russia's motto in this sense is the formula: "What is mine is certainly mine; and what is yours (so far) will also be mine (in time)." ¹

In this case, the history of Russia is given as an illustration, which is interpreted as follows. The Moscow Principality was located on an area of only 2.8 million square kilometers. However, as a result of the expansionist policy pursued over 5 centuries, starting from the XVI century, Russia in Soviet times had the most extensive territory in the whole world at 22.4 million square kilometers.² Russia has become an empire that has acquired all these lands through aggression, conquest, wars and expansion.

Thus, imperial expansionist thinking is an integral part of the" traditional political culture " of Russia.

Another part of this "political culture" in the interpretation of the Chinese scholar is the dominant religion in the ideology of Russia, that is, Orthodoxy.

Jiang Changbin points out that after the fall of Byzantium in 1453, Russia has assumed the role of the leader of Orthodoxy. At the same time, the central idea or motto of Orthodoxy in Russia was "deliverance and salvation of all mankind"³. In other words, Russia, guided by Orthodoxy, intends to "save all of humanity", that is, "rid it" of all other beliefs and subordinate it to its "only correct" faith. (By the way, the very term "Orthodoxy" literally translates into Chinese as " correct Eastern teaching.")

Combining the expansionist foreign policy of the state with a religious consciousness that claims to " save all of humanity "(that is, "impose your own way of thinking on all of humanity"), and forms, from the point of view of the Chinese scientist, the "traditional political culture" of Russia.

LENIN ALSO "COMMITTED A CRIME"

At the same time, the role of the October Revolution and Lenin's policy towards China are presented in a new light in China.

In this connection, Mao Zedong is quoted as saying:: "What exactly is the difference between the Soviet Union and us? First, that Russia is imperialism. Secondly, the October Revolution was also added to this, as a result of which very many in Russia became very proud, as they say, they lifted their tail high"⁴. In other words, Mao Zedong interprets the consciousness of people in Russia as a traditional and persisting imperial thinking, burdened with self-conceit, generated and reinforced by the idea of the significance of the October Revolution for all mankind.

The Chinese expert also believes that Lenin criticized Russia's expansionist foreign policy, including in relation to China, only when he was coming to power, that is, before the victory of the revolution. Having come to power, the Russian leader began to build his policy based on the same interests of the state: "The state interests of Soviet Russia became a factor that guided him..." In other words, he actually continued the policy of tsarist Russia.

Jiang Changbin draws attention to the fact that Lenin sent his greetings by telegraph in connection with the liberation of Vladivostok in 1922, and also to the fact that there is still a bronze monument to Lenin in Vladivostok, on which there are his words: "Vladivostok is far away, but this is our city...".

It follows from this that the PRC has now revised its attitude to Lenin's position in relation to China. Earlier, for many years, the CCP contrasted the views of Lenin, who allegedly promised to return to China the lands "seized" from him by Russia, with the positions of subsequent Soviet leaders who, they say, " broke the promise. "-

Nina and " refused to return the land to China."

Now, according to Jiang Changbin, in the PRC, this idea of Lenin's position is considered erroneous, claiming that neither Lenin nor any other Soviet leader ever considered the border agreements with China "unequal" and did not promise to" return " to China "its" lands. For which they are condemned in the PRC.

The PRC also claims that even after October 1917, the USSR, as Deng Xiaoping said in 1989 in an interview with Mikhail Gorbachev, "carried out aggression" against China and caused "the greatest damage to China's interests "(referring to the decisions of the Yalta Conference of 1945)^.5

In short, in the view that exists today in some Chinese circles, Russia - both pre - Soviet, called tsarist and imperial, and Soviet-allegedly pursued an exceptionally aggressive, aggressive, expansionist policy, including in relation to China, as well as to the whole world in the East and West.

Russia - both pre-October and post-October-is condemned for allegedly always building its relations with China as a state and with the Chinese as a nation on an "unequal" basis.

Jiang Changbin believes that the " people of the Soviet Union "" did not particularly respect " either internationalism, international ethics, or international morality. In other words, such concepts as "internationalism", "selflessness", "respect for international law", and even "morality" were used in the Soviet period to deceive the Chinese, seeking in reality only pure benefits for themselves by infringing on China's interests.

These are the arguments of the party ideologist, calculated for a wide circle of Chinese (not to mention party cadres), about the history and essence of Russia's foreign policy before October and after October 1917, as well as about the characteristics allegedly inherent in it as a nation and as a state, in particular, the CPSU and its leaders, as well as the Russian Orthodox Church (Russian Orthodox Church).

All this makes us compare the views of the Beijing ideologue with the views of Russian researchers on the formation of our state's foreign policy and try to understand what are the characteristic features of" traditional political culture", if we proceed from the criteria proposed by Jiang Changbin.

Our scientists have long calculated that Russia in 800-1337 was attacked every 4 years (it is important to emphasize that Russia was attacked, and not it attacked someone), in 1240-1462 there were 200 invasions. In 1368-1893, out of these 525 years, 329 countries were at war. This means that for every 2 years of war, there was only ¹ peace year6.

Of course, throughout the 17th and 19th centuries, the Russians expanded the boundaries of their state.

However, this was preceded by centuries of history, when our country and people were so crushed by foreign military power that it seemed that a general mood could have been formed for centuries in favor of "reviving Russia" or returning the territories torn from it, and punishing foreign invaders for their invasions. By the way, the last invasion of Russia, during which Moscow itself fell under the occupation of foreigners, was the invasion of Napoleon's army in 1812.

And the expansion of the territory of our country did not take place in the name of "reviving the greatness of Russia", restoring its position as the "first or central state" on the entire planet, but for the sake of getting rid of humiliations, retribution to a military enemy or invader. Rather, it was a manifestation of the natural behavior of nations (including China), the process of creating national or multinational states, and the division of borders between neighbors.

CHINA ABSORBED THE CONQUERORS

China has had a different and similar history.

The Celestial Empire expanded its territory at the expense of its neighbors, and fell under the rule of the Mongols, then the Manchus. But she quickly absorbed the conquerors, and neither the Mongol yoke, nor the Manchu yoke, such as the yoke experienced by the Russians, really felt.

Another thing is that for only one century, from the middle of the XIX century to the middle of the XX century.,

China has suffered a lot from foreigners, in particular, and especially from the aggression of Imperial Japan. The territorial integrity of the country was also damaged. The main cause of such disasters is China's infighting and internal weakness.

More than half a century has passed since then, but there is still hatred for foreigners and an emphatic desire to humiliate them, the conviction that foreigners will have to repent and pay for the injustices inflicted on China for a long, endless time.

During the period of the" cultural revolution "in the PRC, when the thoughts and feelings cultivated by Mao Zedong's policy were exposed, in particular, in relation to our country, the Soviet people were threatened:" The debt of blood will have to be paid with blood! Those who oppose China will not end well! The Chinese people are not to be trifled with!" At the same time, large territorial bills were also presented, primarily by Mao Zedong.

Thus, the then political leader of the Chinese nation and a significant part of the population, being largely to blame for their troubles, were in a weakened state for a whole century, and having overcome this state, they themselves went on a militant offensive, at least in ideological terms.

At the same time, it can be noted that the Chinese, like many other peoples, significantly expanded the area of their original residence at the expense of adjacent lands. In modern China, 90% of the population - Han Chinese-originally inhabited only 40% of the current territory of the PRC, and 10% of the population of the PRC from among other nationalities belonged to 60% of the current territory of the country.

The Russians, as a nation, are defensive. For some Chinese, aggressiveness is a deliberately or intentionally inflated state that threatens to remain indefinitely.

What is the political culture of the Chinese?

Sun Yat-sen, speaking about the Chinese, in particular, said that, despite the fact that they are the most numerous people in China itself, and "their culture and enlightenment date back more than 4 thousand years," they have only family and clan solidarity, and "the spirit of the nation is absent. Therefore, although 400 million people are united in one Middle State, in reality they are all a pile of scattered sand." And then: "If we do not continue to pay due attention to the promotion of nationalism, do not unite 400 million people in one solid nation, then China will suffer the collapse of the state and the death of the nation. That is why, in order to prevent this calamity, it is necessary to cultivate nationalism, to direct the spirit of the nation to the salvation of the state. " ⁷

Comparing the Chinese nation to a pile of grains of sand on a large porcelain dish is common in China. A number of political figures were concerned about the disunity of the Chinese, their egoism, which helps them survive in their country, the desire of each of them to isolate themselves from everyone and everything, to close themselves in their shell, to turn out to be a" grain of sand " that supposedly does not concern the problems of the nation as a whole.

It seems to us that this is why Sun Yat-sen proposed as the first of the 3 principles of people's unity put forward by him-san ming zhui - their strong unity as a nation on the world stage-min tzu.

The concern for national unity that permeates China's centuries-old history is linked to the idea of a center around which such unity should take place. The center is something located "in the middle" of China and "looking up" - a kind of" vertical of power " that dominates China and the outside world.

Hence, in the traditional thinking of the Chinese, the idea of autocracy as a means of consolidating the unity of the nation arose and still lives today. (In this case, we are talking only about the foreign policy aspects of traditional thinking in China.)

Further, it seems to us that Mao Zedong conveyed to N. S. Khrushchev in conversations with him at the first personal meeting is an integral part of traditional political thinking.

N. S. Khrushchev recalled how he was alerted by Mao Zedong's displays of great-power chauvinism when he first visited Beijing in 1954. According to the Soviet leader, Mao praised the Chinese nation, convinced of the superiority of the Chinese as a race. Khrushchev and his delegation had to listen to his lengthy lectures. The Chinese leader spoke of Genghis Khan and other conquerors who sought to impose their rule on China, but were instead absorbed by the Chinese themselves. At the same time, he emphasized that "the Chinese people have developed immunity against assimilation by other peoples." Mao Zedong liked to talk about how the Chinese people are the greatest people in the world, who have had the highest culture since time immemorial

It must play a unique role in the history of ^the world.

THE MIDDLE STATE

Thus, according to Mao Zedong, the Chinese are superior in their ability to absorb other peoples.

In their minds, the Chinese state has long been considered central, or created around the center of the Earth. This raises the challenge of demonstrating to all the peoples on the periphery that Chinese culture, including "political culture," is the highest achievement of the human mind, not to mention that it is an ancient culture with a unique capacity for self - preservation.

From all this, China concludes that people on the periphery, and previously they were not embarrassed to be called "barbarians" in China, should recognize the supremacy of "Chinese culture" and accept it as their own. However, it is assumed that if such borrowing does not occur in a kind way, it will have to be imposed by force.

The famous Chinese thinker Liang Qichao (1873-1929) spoke of the subjugation of non-Han Chinese by military force (Yun bing) and their "forced assimilation" (Qiangpo Tonghua). This method of "becoming Han" was used, according to Liang Qichao, twice during the reign of the last Qing Dynasty, during the transition from a system of local hereditary rulers to a government-appointed administration in the places where the Miao and some other ethnic groups live. ⁹

In the People's Republic of China, the October events of 1917 in our country have long ceased to attach the importance that it was given, say, in the first half of the XX century. Back in 1974. Deng Xiaoping, presenting Mao Zedong's thoughts at the UN General Assembly, ranked three revolutions in world history: the French, American, and Chinese revolutions of 1949, without even mentioning Russia.

As for religion, the traditional political culture of China suggests the possibility of" accepting "all world religions" under the wing " of China. But only if they are subordinated to the ideological and political leadership of the Chinese state, which represents the Chinese nation and is under the leadership of the CCP. China does not allow the existence of independent churches, such as the Catholic Church, which recognizes the supremacy of the Vatican, or parishes of the Orthodox Church that are part of the canonical territory of the Russian Orthodox Church (or any other church abroad).

During the" cultural revolution", when the views of Mao Zedong and his followers were exposed to the utmost, in the central organ of the CCP - the People's Daily newspaper - in early 1967.

the slogan was thrown :" We are confident that the day will come when the radiant red banner of Marxism-Leninism, the ideas of Mao Zedong, will fly high over Red Square, the birthplace of the October Revolution. " ¹⁰ The ideas of Mao Zedong are still perceived in China as the basis of the ideology of the ruling party and play the role of a kind of "main religion".

Finally, another element of traditional Chinese political thinking is the kinship of all Han Chinese "by blood", about which Jiang Zemin, when he was the first person in the CCP and in the PRC, said the following:: "The people who live on both sides of the Strait are all Chinese; the blood of our compatriots living on both sides of the Strait is thicker than water."¹¹. As a matter of fact, the idea that "Chinese blood" will overcome all "obstacles"also follows from this.

So, national conceit, national superiority, the belief in the right to assimilate and" cultivate "the peripheral "barbarians", in the kinship by blood that unites all Chinese-these are some components of traditional political thinking or "traditional political culture" in China.

It seems that both in Russia and in China there are different opinions about their history. When the national history is evaluated by foreigners, dialogue is important. You can agree with what corresponds to the facts, and you can challenge something.

The main thing is not to ignore those arguments that are aimed at dividing peoples, at the confrontation of nations, which go to the detriment of spiritual understanding between nations. It seems that attempts to characterize other peoples in this way, one-sidedly and biased, are often made by those who themselves "sit in a glass house", because the history of mankind is such that everywhere, if you want, you can find the same "weaknesses" or pain points.

The story should not separate. For the benefit of both our peoples and states, it is not the search for differences, but the search for coincidences of national interests, the deepening of spiritual mutual understanding and the building of long-term relations based on equality that serves.

¹ Shijie zhishi, 2008, No. 21, pp. 47-48.

² Ibid., p. 48.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid., pp. 47-48.

⁶ Unknown Mendeleev. Cherished thoughts / / Novy Mir, 1994, N 6, pp. 176-189.

⁷ Sun Zhongshan xuan ji (Selected works of Sun Yat-sen). Beijing, 1957, vol. 2, pp. 593-594.

⁸ Khrushchev Remembers. The Last Testament. Bantam edition, Boston, 1976, p. 322 - 323.

^{Liang Qichao.} 9 Zhongguo lishi shang mingzu zhi yanjiu (Study of the Nation in Chinese History) // Yin Bing shi he ji Zhuan ji. Vol. 11, section 42, p. 15. Cit. by: Moskalev A. A. Nation and nationalism in China. Evolyutsiya kitayskoy mysli v podkhodakh k natsii i nationalizmu [Evolution of Chinese Thought in approaches to Nation and Nationalism]. Moscow, 2005, pp. 253-254.

¹⁰ People's Daily, 27.01.1967.

¹¹ Jiang Zemin on Socialism with Chinese characteristics, vol. II-III, Moscow, 2004, p. 442.

Permanent link to this publication: