V. GELBRAS

Doctor of Economics

In a quarter-century of implementing the "reform and opening up" policy, China's economy has changed significantly. Its scale has increased many times, and its structure has changed. Much has been written about the scale of the Chinese economy; it is generally recognized that it has become an important factor in the global economy. Incomparably less attention is paid to its internal changes, especially social changes. Meanwhile, they deserve it.

Finding out the many changes that are taking place in the Chinese economy is associated with the need to overcome considerable difficulties. One of the main reasons is the limited and contradictory nature of information.

In 2006, according to some sources, the national private sector generated 40-50% of GDP, and according to others, even 60-65% ^.1 They indicate an increased role of private entrepreneurship in the country's economy, but such contradictory estimates cause reasonable confusion. Data on the volume of private sector taxes, the number of private enterprises, and the number of their employees differ. It is important that the existence of a national private sector determines the life of more than a third of the country's population. This fact alone shows the importance of the processes associated with the revival of national private entrepreneurship, which was liquidated in the mid-1950s.After 40 years, it began to gradually recover. Now it has become an essential factor in the political, social and economic life of the country, that is, its historical development.

Many analysts have suggested that the success of Chinese reforms is largely due to national private entrepreneurship. This opinion, however, cannot be supported by facts. The main argument of its supporters is extremely simple: the introduction of a household contract in the village contributed to the appearance of more than 300 million rubles. private peasant farms. The rise of agriculture, which occurred after the spread of household contracts, created the material basis for the subsequent rapid development of the economy.

In fact, the situation was more complicated. The change in the political structure of society and the state is associated with the household contract. The party and the state went to the liquidation of" people's communes"," big "and"production brigades". Volost governments were re-established in the country, and the peasants were united under the leadership of rural residents ' committees.

The elimination of" people's communes " from the life of society and the state took several years. Their disappearance, among other things, meant the de facto recognition of the failure of the concept of the party and the state, according to which "people's communes" represented the only reliable way for the country's transition to communism.

The process of transforming the administrative structure and production organization was slow. It ended when the maximum level of agricultural production was achieved thanks to the extension of the household contract. Further development of the village's economy was on the agenda. The party and the Government started to solve them in a completely different economic situation.

And yet the post-reform peasantry could not and did not become a layer of private entrepreneurs. Only individual peasants were engaged in private entrepreneurship. And then many years after the transition to "reform and openness".

There are several reasons for this. The main ones are:

First, the government did not return to the peasantry ownership of the land liquidated in the course of cooperation. It remained the property of the state.

Secondly, contract plots were determined on the basis of equalizing principles (by the number of employees, by the number of eaters, or by the number of employees and eaters combined) in conditions of agricultural overpopulation and acute shortage of arable land. In order to maintain equality in the quality of land, allotments were cut from 7 to 15 small plots, often located in different places of the village's land.

Third, 250 out of 790 million peasants, or more than one-third, were starving. They had to provide for their existence on tiny plots of land. For centuries, the village was dominated by subsistence farming. The transition to contract relations allowed farmers to improve their quality of life.-

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The process of formation of a new political and economic structure of the village, 1979-1985 (thousands)

-----

Sources: Zhongguo tongji nianjian, 1983. - E 147; Zhongguo tongji nianjian, 1984. - E 131; Zhongguo tongji nianjian, 1985. - E 237; Zhongguo jingji nianjian, 1986 (Chinese Economic Yearbook 1986). - E III-13.

It did not contribute to the development of the commodity economy.

Fourth, in exchange for allotment, the peasantry was obliged to perform tasks to sell most of the resulting crop to the state at low prices. Until the beginning of the 2000s, the state withdrew maximum resources from agriculture for accelerated industrialization and urban construction.

In fact, with the introduction of contract relations in China, the labor peasant economy was revived. State ownership of land determines the basic conditions for its existence. The right to" perpetual possession " of contract land did not eliminate the dependence of the peasantry on the authorities in the center and in the localities.

PRIVATE ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN THE PEASANT ENVIRONMENT

It has long been known that a peasant labor farm is fundamentally different from a private enterprise institution. A private entrepreneur strives to maximize profits. The working peasant economy is subject to other motives, it does not have such a goal of activity. A private entrepreneur with a drop in profit can quit his previous business and completely change the scope of his activity. The peasant holds on to his land plot until the last possible moment. He does not abandon it, despite falling incomes, ruinous losses, even starvation. Allotment is the main source of subsistence for the peasantry, the only form of social security and social insurance.

Private entrepreneurship in the peasant environment emerged slowly. Even a decade after the establishment of contract relations in the village, private entrepreneurship practically took only the first tentative steps.² In 2005, according to official statistics, less than 15% of the total employed population worked in private farms in towns and villages.

This information does not correspond to official statements about the creation of more than 40% of GDP in these farms. Is the specific size of the final product created by 15% of the employed population many times higher than the productivity of the remaining 85% of the working population? Perhaps such a large-scale discrepancy in indicators is explained by their calculation for different areas of the economy. This information will be clarified below to the extent that it is possible to understand the nature of individual Chinese statistics at all.

Sociological surveys of peasant farms in the 1980s revealed that the vast majority of peasants did not understand what a market economy was, did not have surplus products, and did not seek to produce on the market. It began to use the income received as a result of the sale of products in the main part not for the expansion of production, but for household improvement, primarily for the repair and construction of its homes. For many years of cultural and revolutionary outrages, the houses have become rather dilapidated. A conviction spread among the peasants: "After the revolution, everything was taken away from us, except for our homes." The peasantry was not confident in the stability and duration of the positive changes generated by the reforms.

Given the situation, the CPC Central Committee and the State Council of the People's Republic of China allowed the village party and state leaders to engage in entrepreneurship. But the city bosses were banned from doing business. The calculation was correct. Thanks to the involvement of the bureaucracy in entrepreneurial activity, a real socio-political force emerged in the countryside, which initiated the destruction of subsistence farming and ensured the rise of market production. The calculation was justified in a certain sense. However, the consequences of this measure have had a diverse impact, both positive and negative, on all aspects of society.

In the village there were officials-entrepreneurs, mostly hiding "under the red hat" of collective farming. Artels, unit farms, and primitive joint-stock structures began to appear, providing work for millions of peasants who could not find employment

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those who were in dire need of increasing their families ' incomes. At the same time, various powerful shadow structures were formed, which, like the state, began to profit from the peasants, but, unlike the state, helped it survive. Bureaucracy, enterprising peasants and shadow structures provided employment for the surplus rural labor force, financially and economically supported the village, and contributed to the development of non-agricultural production in the village.

The involvement of party and state officials in business activities caused the disintegration of government bodies in the center and in the field. It reached such a large scale that the top leadership of the party and the state had to start an all-out struggle to purge the apparatus and suppress the shadow economy. It seems, however, that the achievements in this struggle are causing an even larger scale of the shadow economy, based on the illegal link between government officials and private property.³

Having allowed the existence of private property, the state did not allow state-owned banks and financial organizations to lend to peasant farms and private enterprises until the end of the 10th five - year plan (2001-2005). This mission was carried out by shadow structures in society, the party and the state.

It would be wrong to limit the discussion to the difficult conditions that have held back the formation of national private entrepreneurship for many years.

From the very first years of "reform and opening up", private entrepreneurship has indeed played a prominent role in China's economic recovery. It was brilliantly performed by private entrepreneurs from other countries.

Numerous representatives of the foreign Chinese diaspora were the first to arrive in China. During the 1980s and 1990s, they were the main and largest investors in the Chinese economy. The privileged conditions for the placement of incoming foreign capital and political stability in the country, as well as the successful activity of representatives of foreign Chinese capital in China, aroused the interest of the international business community. Entrepreneurs from the United States, England, France, Germany, and Japan, including representatives of large multinational corporations, have flooded into the Chinese market. The temporary milestone of a sharp increase in foreign direct investment in the Chinese economy was 1992. It was then that the Chinese leadership established close relations with the World Forum of Chinese Entrepreneurs, founded by the wise Lee Kuan Yew, former Prime Minister of Singapore, a prominent figure in the global Chinese business community.

IMPORTANT MILESTONES IN CCP POLICY

It is advisable, first of all, to briefly outline the most important milestones in the CPC and state policies that determined the conditions for the elimination and later gradual formation of national private entrepreneurship.

1953 Directive of the CPC Central Committee on Private Enterprise Policy. Its motto is " use, limit, transform." As a result, private entrepreneurship was liquidated by 1957.

1979 III Plenum of the CPC Central Committee of the eleventh convocation: allow individual (family) entrepreneurship (based on the involvement of 3-5 students and 1-2 auxiliary workers).

1982 Deng Xiaoping: Private enterprises employing 8 or more workers will not harm socialism.

1983 CPC Central Committee Document No. 1 on Private Enterprise policy. Slogan: "do not rush to allow or prohibit, do not strike, do not label."

1987. The CPC Central Committee recognizes that private entrepreneurship is necessary.

1988 The Constitution of the People's Republic of China introduces the provision: "The State allows the existence and development of a private economy within the limits established by law." The 1953 "use, restrict, transform" setting was canceled.

1991. The CPC Central Committee declares that private farming is a useful complement to an economy based on public ownership. The installation is announced: "unite, help, lead, educate."

1997 15th CPC National Congress: Private economy is an important part of the socialist market economy. "Once-

Employment of the population in private structures

Source: Zhongguo tongji nianjian, 2006 (Chinese Statistical Yearbook, 2006) - Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 2006. - Tab. 5 - 4.

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build a multi-layered economy with public ownership as the foundation."

Finally, in the 2000s, the CPC Central Committee concluded that private entrepreneurs develop the "productive forces of socialist society" and contribute to other areas of society. The Constitution of the People's Republic of China introduces a provision: private property is protected by law. The decisions of these years, in fact, created a legal basis for the development of national private entrepreneurship.

In February 2005, the State Council of the People's Republic of China published " Some Considerations on stimulating, supporting and guiding the development of the economy of individual, private and other non-State forms of ownership "(known as "36 non-state points"). In accordance with this document, it is planned to review a whole range of legislative acts. However, after two years, conflicting opinions have emerged in society. Government officials report on the gradual implementation of the Government's decision. However, many representatives of various sectors of society say that it has not yet been accepted for implementation.⁴

In July 2006, the CPC Central Committee convenes the National United Front Conference. It is the first time that a policy is formulated for private entrepreneurs and "representatives of other new social strata". The document adopted at the meeting states::

1. Recognize the importance of working with private entrepreneurs and "representatives of other new social strata".

2. Be guided by the attitude: "fully respect, establish connections, strengthen unity, fervently support, actively lead."

3. Consider private entrepreneurs and "representatives of other new social strata" as a new object of activity of the united front, rally and unite them around the party and the government.

Thanks to these attitudes, private entrepreneurship has opened up broad horizons of growth, cleared of all kinds of obstacles that complicated its activities in previous years.

Political attitudes allow us to highlight one side of reality to a certain extent. The other can be represented by a brief description of the economic conditions of private entrepreneurship.

25 branches of the economy are monopolized by the state - banking and finance, railway transport, post, telegraph, computer science, a number of industries, etc. In 2007, it was decided to gradually allow private capital to enter many sectors, including the defense industry. Individual (family) farms and private entrepreneurs are allowed to engage in foreign economic activity. The State sets all the key parameters for the functioning of banks and the financial system in a directive manner: the issue of funds, the volume of the credit supply, loan interest, and many other indicators. The state is a monopoly land owner and controls the most important material resources.

Despite the decisions of the CPC Central Committee and the State Council of the People's Republic of China, almost until 2005, banks, guided by previous decisions of these bodies, refused to lend to private businesses. The volume of loans it received in 2005 amounted to only 2.3% of loans issued to enterprises in the state and" collective " sectors. According to other official data, in 2005 individual (family) and private farms received short-term loans in the amount of 218.1 billion rubles. RMB*, and "enterprises of municipalities and settlements", which are mostly also private institutions, 790.2 billion yuan. They accounted for 2.5% and 9% of the total amount of short-term loans issued by financial institutions, respectively.

The tax-free minimum of individual monthly income has been increased from 800 to 1,600 yuan. In accordance with the revised Income Tax law adopted in 2007, two progressive tax scales have been introduced. According to one of them, the tax rate varies from 5% to 45% depending on the size of the monthly salary. According to another version, the tax rate varies from 5% to 35% depending on the annual business income.

It is planned to introduce a single tax on corporate income - 25% instead of 33%. So far, small private owners pay income tax (33%), VAT (17%), fishing tax (5.5%) and other taxes and fees. Consequently, if the single tax also becomes the only one, the tax burden will be significantly eased, and more favorable conditions will arise for the further expansion of private entrepreneurship.

It has already made a significant contribution to solving a whole range of economic and social problems in the country. Between 1990 and 2005, according to official reports, national private enterprises managed to employ more than 70% of the new urban workforce, more than 70% of the reduced staff of State-owned enterprises, and more than 80% of migrant farmers.

The introduction of a single tax on corporate income is planned to be implemented in order to equalize the system of taxation of national enterprises and enterprises with foreign capital. In order to avoid a sharp reduction in the inflow of foreign capital to the country, it is proposed to maintain tax incentives for it in a number of basic areas.

After the 15th and then the 16th (2002) Party Congresses, the CPC Central Committee and the State Council of the People's Republic of China are guided by the "two without the slightest hesitation, one is unity" attitude. Its essence: "it is necessary to strengthen and develop the public economy without the slightest hesitation, it is necessary to stimulate, support and direct the development of private economy without the slightest hesitation;"-

* 1 dollar - 8 yuan.

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by making public property the main thing, encouraging the development of private forms of economy, combining them in the process of implementing socialist modernization, and not allowing them to be opposed to each other. " ⁵

THREE COMPONENTS OF NON-STATE ENTREPRENEURSHIP

In China, an attempt has recently been made to understand the modern structure of the economy, reflecting the fundamental changes in its forms of ownership that have developed by the beginning of the XXI century. For this purpose, the concept of mining jingji⁶. Its translation into Russian is difficult due to the ambiguity of the mining content. It can literally mean "national", "public", or "national" economy. However, as will be clear from the following discussion, none of these translation options reflects the real content of the economic relations for which this concept was introduced.

Mining jingji, according to its interpretation, is designed to unite the following three groups of farms::

1. In a broad sense - farms of various forms of ownership outside the framework of state-owned enterprises and enterprises with state participation.

2. Structures of various forms of ownership based on national capital (jteizi mining jingji). The group includes collective, individual, private and other mixed-type farms. With the formation of this group, the concept of "enterprises of volosts and settlements"goes out of circulation. In 2006, the clarification of the content of this economically meaningless category of farms was almost completed. This work covered 95% of "enterprises of volosts and settlements". As a result of clarifying the forms of ownership of 200 thousand rubles. out of 1.68 million enterprises, they were transformed into joint-stock and unit firms, while 1.39 million were transformed into individual (family) and private institutions.⁷ The group does not include firms and enterprises created as a result of direct investment of capital from Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan, as well as the capital of entrepreneurs from other countries.

3. In the narrow sense-individual (geti jingji) and private farms (siren jingji, siing jingji).

It turns out that the use of any of the above versions of the translation of the concept of mining jingji is inevitably associated with the juxtaposition of all existing forms of state ownership in China, emphasizing its exclusive role and special character. Consequently, the adequate meaning of the new concept is private economy.

This means that the modern Chinese economy consists of three major structures: state-owned and state-controlled farms, enterprises founded through foreign direct investment, and finally, the national private economy. If it is necessary to specify the details below, the following names of individual structures are used: enterprises with foreign capital, national non-state farms. They include individual (family) institutions and private enterprises. They are the main object of further consideration.

THREE SOURCES...

Over the years of "reforms and openness", three sources of private national entrepreneurship have emerged:

- Successful family farms that have started to capitalize their income.

- Heads of various levels who are engaged in legitimate and illegitimate privatization of state and public property.

- Specialists who have created enterprises for the introduction of scientific and technical developments into production.

The structure and personal content of these sources have changed significantly over the past years. In the mid-1990s, about 60% of private entrepreneurs were farmers, workers, and employees. By 2005, their share had decreased by 3 times.

The share of party-state officials and IT specialists in the total mass of private entrepreneurs has increased over the years from 34% to 67%. In 2005, 55% of entrepreneurs were formerly responsible employees of state-owned and "collective" enterprises. Among the former party officials, 56% were employees of party and state bodies, and 31% were county-level managers. Now, according to some sources, more than 32%, according to others-almost 34% of all businessmen are members of the CCP.

In the mid-1990s, 47% of entrepreneurs had primary or incomplete secondary education. By 2005, their share had fallen to less than 15%. The share of people with secondary education decreased from 36% to 34%, but university graduates increased from 17% to 46%, researchers (a title awarded for success in teaching and research) - from 0.6% to almost 6%.

The number of private entrepreneurs (investors) increased from 3.95 million. in 2000, up to 11.1 million people in 2005, that is, 2.8 times. Of these, 7.2 million (65%) are urban residents.

The number of private enterprises increased from 1.8 million to 4.3 million, or 2.4 times. Their authorized capital was 7.5 trillion yuan, or more than 37% of GDP. They employ 58.2 million people, including 34.6 million (more than 59%) in urban areas.

In 2005, individual (family) businesses had 24.6 million establishments with 49 million employees. 28 million (57%) of them worked in cities.

If we assume that families in China consist of three people, then private entrepreneurship began to determine the financial condition of almost 110 million people, or 8% of the population. Private business provides employment for about 108 million people and is a source of livelihood for almost 322 million people. In total, more than 30% of Chinese residents depend on the development of a national private business.

AND DRIVING FORCES

When, in the 1980s, the leaders of the party and the state gave the following statement:-

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Despite the resurgence of private enterprise, they hardly fully understood the consequences of this decision. They hardly expected that by the beginning of the new century, private entrepreneurship would have completed the dramatic process of its revival and would play a significant role in all areas of the country's socio-economic life.

After a quarter of a century in China, you can find a lot of arguments about the "criminal original essence", about the" criminal birthmarks " of private capitalism, etc.There is a considerable amount of truth in such characteristics. It is very difficult to develop an unambiguous assessment of private entrepreneurship and the very course of its revival. It was born and developed rapidly due to several powerful impulses.

Considering the socio-economic dynamics of "reforms and openness" allows us to summarize the nature of the impact of various driving forces on private entrepreneurship in the country.

The first and in many respects decisive impulse, as is clear from the above, was the political decisions of the party and the government. Private entrepreneurship is also due to the long-standing wait-and-see party-state policy. For many years, China avoided using the word "privatization", although in fact it was in full swing, both legitimately and criminally. As a result, in a few years, private entrepreneurs have not just completed the initial capital accumulation process, but have developed large fortunes in the country, and powerful private structures have emerged that are not much inferior in their economic power to many of their foreign business counterparts. A large number of large entrepreneurs, who were explicitly or secretly nurtured by party and state efforts, came from the bureaucratic environment.

On July 1, 2001, the CPC Central Committee proposed three criteria for the "new assessment of the private entrepreneur stratum"; in September 2002, at the XVI Party Congress, they were "improved" ⁸.

Their essence consists in the following provisions. The main goal of building a socialist society is to improve the welfare of the people. As China's economic recovery continues, the standard of living increases, and individual and family wealth can continuously increase. In this situation, it is impossible to assess the political image of an individual, simply guided by the criterion of the presence or absence of his property. The main thing is the ideological and political image and its specific actions. We must take into account the sources of wealth formation, its distribution and use, and its contribution to the development of "socialist productive forces and other matters." Entrepreneurs are the builders of socialism, just like workers, peasants, intellectuals, gang members (leading, as a rule, trusted party and state officials), PLA soldiers. Therefore, the layer of private entrepreneurs is an important component of China's social structure. They can apply to join the CCP, participate along with everyone else in the selection of labor leaders, and participate in the open selection of civil servants.

In March 2003, the 2nd Session of the Tenth National People's Congress (NPC) adopted a resolution to supplement the Constitution of the People's Republic of China. It calls private entrepreneurs "builders of the cause of socialism" and an important part of the United Patriotic front⁹. On 25 February 2005, the State Council of the People's Republic of China issued a decree on stimulating, supporting and guiding the development of individual, private and other non-State farms.

At the same time, many problems in the existence and development of private entrepreneurship are associated with unresolved legal and practical issues, with difficulties in their implementation. Thus, according to official reports, 27 out of the 37 planned tasks for the development of non-state enterprises were completed by mid-2007. As of the beginning of 2007, more than 1.3 million legal acts of central and local authorities have been checked for compliance with the decisions of the CPC and the State Council of the People's Republic of China. During the audit, it turned out that more than 5 thousand acts do not comply with the guidelines.

The second powerful impetus for the growth of private entrepreneurship was the fusion of power and property. The rapid pace of development was largely driven by the increased political role of private entrepreneurs. In 2002, more than 2 million private entrepreneurs were surveyed in 31 provinces, autonomous regions and cities of central subordination. It turned out that 17.4% were deputies of the assemblies of people's representatives at various levels, 35.1% were members of political advisory bodies. 29.9% of entrepreneurs are members of the Chinese Communist Party. 25.8% of private enterprises were created as a result of the actual privatization of state-owned or "collective" factories and fabriks10.

According to incomplete data from the National Association of Industrialists and Merchants (UAPT), 23.1 thousand representatives of non-state economic structures are deputies of assemblies at all levels. Of these, 139 are deputies of the National People's Congress, 1,100 are deputies of the provincial People's representative assemblies, 17 of them are members of their standing committees. 6.5 thousand became deputies of the city SNP, 1.2 thousand joined their standing committees. These data indicate that many representatives of private capital have joined the central and local legislative bodies. Consequently, they received a platform for expressing their interests and the opportunity to influence the definition of state policy.

48.4 thousand people are members of the People's Political Consultative Conference of China (CPPCC) and its local branches ¹¹. CPPCC, <url>-

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The United Front Organization of the Communist Party of China (CPC) participates in determining the Party's and state's policies. Meetings of the National CPPCC Conference and its local organizations in the years of" reform and openness " began to be held simultaneously with the congresses of the NPC and local SNPs. They address the same range of issues, and the entire system of CPPCC bodies is called upon to participate in improving the legislative framework of the state and the practical activities of its executive bodies. Therefore, the participation of representatives of private capital in the CPPCC opened up another channel for them to influence the socio-political and economic life of the country. A considerable number of entrepreneurs have joined the management of local government executive bodies ¹². 233 entrepreneurs are members of the Executive Committee of the UAPT. Several people joined the association's management team.

The third powerful impetus for the growth of private entrepreneurship was the intensification of the activities of organized criminal communities, the gigantic scale of their illegal operations with state assets. Criminal groups managed to entangle the country with their secret connections and, taking advantage of the favor, or even the tacit complicity of high-ranking officials, create secret business empires. Their activities have reached such proportions that since the early 2000s, the state has launched a fierce organized struggle against these criminal associations, which cause considerable damage to the power positions of the party and the state and the country's economy. ¹³

The report of the collective of authors of the Academy of Social Sciences, published in 2007, states that the country has developed a "new fusion of power and property" - the mutual use of power and funds by state officials and owners of private enterprises, their mutual support for each other, direct and indirect ownership of the share capital of private enterprises by officials. "The existence of such shortcomings seriously hinders the normal development of private enterprises, causing serious damage to their appearance." ¹⁴

The fourth powerful impulse was the growth of mass entrepreneurship among urban and rural residents, who sought to provide their families with a source of income. The state, especially in the first decades of "reform and openness", paid so little attention to addressing the vital needs of the population that enterprising people took advantage of the opportunities that appeared. Some of them were able to succeed and become widely known as talented businessmen.

National private capital is undergoing a period of organizational development. According to a sample survey of private enterprises in 2004, 74.3% of them did not have management boards, 56.7% did not have shareholders ' meetings, 30.7% did not have audit commissions, 50.5% did not have trade union organizations, and 30.5% did not have CPC organizations.

The fifth impulse was mass unemployment, extremely low incomes of the peasantry and urban poor, and the reduction of staff in state-owned enterprises. The state has stopped providing employment to citizens. The system of lifelong employment has gone down in history. An extensive labor market has emerged in the cities. The gradual abolition of" agricultural " registration in the 2000s allowed millions of peasants to rush to the cities of different regions of the country in search of earnings. The lack of social security and social insurance, the inaction of trade unions, and the backwardness of labor legislation contributed to the emergence of a multi-million-strong army of unemployed people who are ready to accept the most difficult working conditions and extremely low wages.

(The ending follows)

¹ Siying qiyezhu jieceng cengzhangde xin jieduan (A new stage in the formation of a class of private entrepreneurs) / 2006 nian: Zhongguo shehui singshi fengxi yui yuce (2006: analysis and forecast of the social situation in China) - http://china.com.cn/zhuanti/2006-01/19/content_6095866.htm

According to Ms. Ou Xinqian, Deputy Chairman of the State Development and Reform Committee of the People's Republic of China, medium-sized and small enterprises generate approximately 60% of GDP. They account for about 50% of tax revenues to the budget. 95% of them are non-state enterprises - http://www.xinhua-net.com/zhibo/20070607/wz_iframe_2htm

The same data was provided in the report of the Ministry of Finance of the People's Republic of China on the results of 2005. - http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2006-10/05/content_405681.htm

Explanations for the significant differences between this information and that given in the text, as well as its inconsistencies with the words of Ou Xinqian, could not be found in the Chinese press.

² For the initial years of private entrepreneurship, see: Korpusov V. V. Private Entrepreneurship in China, Moscow, Publishing Company "Vostochnaya Literatura" RAS, 1996, 384 p., as well as Bruce Dixon's monograph " Red Capitalists in China. The Party, private entrepreneurs and Prospects for political change" / Translated from English by Moscow, Olymp-Business CJSC, 2005.

³ For more information, see: Xin Yan, Yablokov N. P. Fighting the Mafia in China. Ovchinsky V. S. Mafia of the XXI century: made in China, Moscow, NORMA Publishing House, 2006.

⁴ Fei gong jingji: jai xiwang zhong dengdai (Private Sector: Hopes and Expectations) - http://china.com.cn/news/txt/2007-03/14/content_7959286.htm

⁵ Mining jingji da fazhan kuajin xin shiqi (Private sector development has entered a new stage). - Zhongguo minying jingji fazhan baogao. N 3 (2005 - 2006) - http://www.pishu.cn/pishu/jj/200609/695.html

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ 95% of xiang zhen qiye wancheng chanquan laige (95% of township and township enterprises have completed their ownership review). - Renmin ribao hai waiban. 23.09.2006.

⁸ Siying qiyezhu jieceng...

⁹ Mining jingji da fazhan...

¹⁰ Zhongguo saying qiye diaocha (China Private Enterprise Survey) - http://www.china.com.cn/chinese/zhuanti/282306.htm

¹¹ Sin shiji de Zhongguo sing qiyezhu jieceng: chengzhang zhuangkuang (China's Private Entrepreneur Layer in the New Century: A Growth Environment) - http://china.com.cn/in0-fo/07shxs/txt/2007-01/17/content_7667784.htm

¹² Mining jingji da fazhan...

¹³ For more information, see: Xin Yan, Yablokov N. P. Decree. Op.

¹⁴ Siying qiyezhu jieceng...

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