China Keywords:, naval power, Zhang Wenmu

O. V. MIGUNOVA

(Saint Petersburg)

In the spiritual life of modern China, there is an intense search for a new, different from the orthodox Marxist-Maoist, "ideological" paradigm, free from the extremes of class-polarized consciousness and more adequately reflecting the realities of today without encroaching on the ideological status quo.

Of particular interest is the concept of China's entry into the "era of seas and oceans", which has recently been actively developed by the geopolitical thought of the Middle Kingdom.

Zhang Wenmu, a well-known philosopher and geopolitician at home and abroad, who has earned the reputation of a Chinese social science hawk, according to the popular political and economic monthly Huasheng Shidian, is at the origin of the idea of strengthening China's maritime power¹. In Chinese political science textbooks, a special place is given to the presentation of his views, and courses on his concept of national security are taught in universities.

The main ideas of Zhang Wenmu are formulated in the works of 2001-2009: "Chinese security Strategy in the new century", "Analysis of the security of China's national interests in the context of global geopolitics", "Chinese National Security Strategy in the context of global prospects","On the Maritime Power of China" ².

"THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT" AND "THE LAW OF THE SEA"

Zhang Wenmu characterizes the current Chinese geopolitical situation based on several fundamental facts.

Having overcome self-isolation, China, which is actively integrating into the world economy, is developing rapidly. It has an inalienable right to do so, just like any other country.

The volume and pace of economic growth directly depend, in addition to investment, on raw materials, which are severely scarce in China. But they are located abroad, as well as the main markets for Chinese products. For safe transportation of raw materials and goods, an escort is required. Sea routes are the cheapest and most efficient, so you need a sea escort, i.e. a fleet. And not only commercial, but also military. ("There is no military fleet, and there is no reliable guarantee of resources" ³).

The power of the navy provides naval power. Ensuring the safe transportation of raw materials and goods by sea is a matter of national security (up to 80% of the Chinese economy is somehow connected with the sea). Consequently, the need to protect national economic security at sea objectively takes China beyond its territorial borders-to the seas and oceans.

To support this simple idea, Zhang Wenmu built a rather cumbersome and ornate argumentation system, which is quoted below:

"...people tend to confuse two concepts: "border security" and "secure border". Expanding the borders of "national security" is often confused with expanding territorial borders, " in other words, with the so-called threat. This is absolutely wrong.

In fact, these two concepts are both related and different from each other. Any country with a market economy has not only sovereign internal interests, but also interests that go beyond sovereignty, but within the boundaries of its integration into the world.

The concept of "border security" means the possible degree of control and protection by the State of internal sovereign territories. A national "safe border" means the possible degree of control and protection of interests located outside the sovereign borders. For example, the territorial borders of the United States are limited to the borders of North America, but due to its great political, economic and military power, its national "safe borders" have an almost global reach.

China's territory is roughly the same size as that of the United States. But due to the insufficient power of China's external naval forces compared to the United States, China has a national " safe border "that does not go beyond its" territorial borders", although the broadest range of China's political and economic interests is closely linked to the world community.

When a nation-state participates in the process of globalization, the right to protect its national interests integrated into the world is guaranteed.

their foreign interests and their protection are not considered a "threat"in relation to other countries. ...A country's security depends on other countries, especially how the major powers have specifically defined it ... its national safe borders (i.e. from tacit recognition or non-recognition of the geopolitical claims of a particular country. - O. M.) ... " ⁴

Following the peculiar logic of Zhang Wenmu, the" right to development " is implemented with the help of naval forces, which in turn provide China with access to world resources, sales markets and security of transport corridors. Access to the geopolitical sea expanses turns out to be both a pass to the club of world powers, and a certain guarantor of China's national security, and a kind of "surveying" of zones of influence.

The ultimate goal of the theoretical efforts of Chinese geopolitics, which Zhang Wenmu willingly or unwittingly preaches , is to justify the need for China's maximum access to global raw materials.

The main argument in favor of such a redistribution is the vital need to ensure national security. And since, as the author believes, any state has a legal right to do so, the question boils down to settling differences with those who got to these resources before others and single-handedly seized a monopoly on them.

Zhang Wenmu's reasoning even shows a certain resentment at the historical injustice of a geopolitical nature: having all the rights to the world's resources and at the same time "being very dependent on them, we at the same time do not have any control over international territories that have rich resources"⁵.

HOW TO DIVIDE THE PACIFIC OCEAN

The focus of the strategic confrontation between China and the rest of the world, especially the United States, Zhang Wenmu believes, is now not in ideology and not in the difference of political systems. It has shifted towards the aggravation of geo-civilizational (!) contradictions, the form of which is expressed by geopolitical tensions, which are most clearly manifested in the struggle for power at sea.

And the main person involved in such a struggle is the United States. Analyzing the nature of the "sea confrontation", Zhang Wenmu considers it essential to note the difference between the US sea power, which is a maritime hegemony, and the Chinese sea power, which embodies, in his opinion, the "just law of the sea" and the protection of this right by the naval forces. This right is a "universal State political right" and is linked to the "inalienable right of every State to development"⁶. 100 years ago, under the slogan of "free trade", the Americans fought against the maritime monopoly of Western European powers, but today, under the same slogan, China is fighting against US hegemony.

In Taiwan, the United States intervenes in the affairs of the PRC, thereby violating its sovereignty and providing a strong rear for the forces of island separatism. China will never accept this state of affairs, and such a tough stance follows from the indisputable fact, as Zhang Wenmu believes ,that " Taiwan and the Nanypa (Spratly)Islands* are sovereign territories of China. " ⁷

The issue of Taiwan is a constant source of tension in relations between the PRC and the United States, moreover, a source of "irreconcilable contradictions"⁸ between them.

The US Navy dominates the Pacific Ocean completely. The Americans deprive China of control over the Taiwan Strait, thereby closing its access to both the open sea and the World Ocean, and block the possibility of creating a zone of secure strategic borders.

Because of this, a confrontation with the United States is inevitable. China must put an end to American hegemony at sea. This will give China the opportunity to become a "global power of the first magnitude" and push the boundaries of the national economy.-

* The Nanipa Islands (Spratly) in the South China Sea are disputed by China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines and Brunei.

strategic borders") to the limits required by the PRC, which it can reach without hindrance, relying on the power of the navy. "He who rules the sea rules the world." Hence the conclusion: "The Chinese fleet can no longer remain a "dried duck", it must necessarily carry missiles and be accompanied by a Chinese satellite, moreover, it must help expand our safe borders. The future of China and its fate depend on the modernization of the Navy. " ⁹

"America," he writes, " does not object to the development of China, but thinks that it would be best if China developed within itself... Americans want us to look for food in our own homes, and when we have nothing else to eat, they want us to eat ourselves (our resources). The development of the United States is based on eating the world, and in order to feed themselves, they need the resources of the whole world. But we in China have already reached the limit of resource usage. " ¹⁰ In this remark, you can hear not just condemnation, but also some bewilderment: why are we worse?

Zhang Wenmu's critique of American hegemonic policies resembles an implicit call for China to rationalize its policies in its own way, following the example of the United States.

First, by dramatizing the threat of depletion of its own resources (which is not yet true) and advocating switching to external sources of raw materials, it advocates conserving domestic raw materials as a strategic reserve. Secondly, he argues that a full-scale reorientation to "eat the world", to "the resources of the whole world" can radically improve the Chinese economy. "In fact," the Chinese political scientist argues, " a good model of a country's economic development should be like this: the development of productive forces follows an upward curve, and the consumption of domestic resources follows a downward curve, forming a kind of scissors. The wider the "scissors" between these curves, the healthier the country's economic development. And China's economic development has always been directly proportional to the growth of resource consumption. The need for economic development based on a benign model forces the Chinese economy to rely on global resources. " ¹¹

At the same time, the confrontation between the United States and China is not, according to the scientist, of a systemic, global nature. It seems that as disputes are resolved, Zhang Wenmu predicts, the grounds for further confrontation with the United States will become less and less. Rather, it has the local character of a clash of conflicting interests at this stage: "At present, the Sino-American conflict is a clash of national current interests, not long-term contradictions." ¹²

However, the normalization of Sino-American relations seems to Zhang Wenm possible only and exclusively by resolving controversial issues according to the Chinese scenario. In the long run, this is the reunification of the shores of the beloved Homeland, and in the foreseeable future - the practical pushing of the United States into the central Pacific zone to the 150th degree of east longitude, where the zone of "safe borders" of China should extend and where the zone of "safe borders" of the United States on their side should end. This is the idea of a "fraternal" division, which ignores the interests of third countries in the Pacific Ocean.

In effect, Zhang Wenmu is suggesting that the United States should share its prerogatives and cede to China a substantial part of its monopoly responsibility for maintaining order in the Pacific. "The war in the Pacific and the experience of the Cold War have shown us that only if China and the United States work together can we ensure a stable peace in the Pacific region. From a long-term strategic perspective, China-US relations are an indispensable relationship of strategic partners and friends in the Asia-Pacific region. " ¹³

CHINA - USA: A MARRIAGE OF CONVENIENCE

Zhang Wenmu, on the one hand, acts as an opponent

he accuses the United States of hypocrisy and the practice of double standards, calls for being prepared for the most extreme measures in competition with them for dominance in the Pacific, and on the other hand, sees them as a model of political will, potential allies, and calls for strengthening not only common interests, but also friendship.

This attitude is similar to a marriage without love, but for convenience. "Great-power friends are undefeated opponents" is the title of one section of Zhang Wenmu's book. "Some people think," says the author, " that by submitting to the United States, they become their friends. But very often those who have submitted to the United States, such as Chiang Kai-shek, ... Gorbachev, Yeltsin, etc., end up as victims, while truly undefeated enemies become friends. " ¹⁴

In Zhang Wenmu's terminology, this is called "dialectic". "Those who don't have powerful friends will eventually be discarded by other powerful friends, but an influential opponent can become a friend. This is, in fact, a model of behavior of a hegemon politician. " ¹⁵ As we can see, without deluding himself with the prospects of selfless and selfless ("for ten thousand years") friendship, Zhang Wenmu demonstrates a model of Chinese political pragmatism: a friend is someone who is profitable to have friends at the moment and at the moment. In other words, for now, China needs to neutralize the United States through " friendship."

Many Chinese people only respect strength and seem to expect the same respect from others. Any kind of concessions, unilateral steps taken by one of the parties as a "goodwill gesture" (for example, settling disputed territorial and border issues in favor of China, granting it explicit economic and trade preferences) are perceived by the Chinese side as a sign of weakness with all the consequences that follow from this. Such a position of the other party does not imply any reciprocal benefits and counter-obligations. Moreover, it is not worthy of respect. For one who knows how to govern, says the Tao te Ching, "does not put himself in a low position." ¹⁶

"The strong eats the weak - this is an iron law... international struggle", and serious, and even more so - "friendly" - relations can only be between equals. And while China does not have a sufficiently strong navy comparable in power to the US navy, it is necessary to think not only about partnership and "friendship", but also about more serious things: "Now the US is really in the first place, but China is also on the rise, so we, having made every effort, will not we can not prepare for the worst, first of all, not to improve in military affairs."¹⁷. Potentially, he believes, China is a great power, "we must have strength," and the path to greatness lies through " preparing to fight in major battles."

THE LOGIC OF SURVIVAL IN CHINESE

Thus, the integration of China into the system of international economic and political relations, the expansion of the zone of its economic interests turn out to be a factor in Zhang Wenmu's concept, in fact, a matter of course, justifying and even prescribing the expansion of the "strategic security" zone far beyond the territory of the PRC and its territorial waters. As you might guess, the limits of such a border coincide with the geographical distribution of Chinese goods and Chinese capital. If the above-mentioned "redistribution" of the Pacific Ocean is understood by the scientist primarily from the point of view of the military and strategic interests of the PRC, then economic interests, in his opinion, require the expansion of the "strategic security" zone in other parts of the World Ocean.

Not by international law, but by the very "logic of development", i.e. the process of accelerated modernization, the logic of survival in a costly economy and the most severe tie to foreign markets, China is "doomed", although with certain reservations, to expansionism.

Zhang Wenmu also spoke more clearly about this issue, without referring to the abstract "right to development". In a 2004 interview with Huasheng Shidian magazine, he noted that the bifurcation point* has already been passed, and China has reached the " key point in its development when not going forward means going back." Otherwise, the Chinese political scientist fears, "a crisis may arise within society, which will lead to public unrest of a violent nature." ¹⁸

The conclusion is that there is no alternative, but expansion in all its forms is necessary : conquering sales markets, ensuring safe trade routes, buying up new technologies, energy sources and raw materials abroad (mineral deposits, including gas and oil, forest lands, concessions for geological exploration and development of mineral resources), acquiring multinational corporations and banks Finally, demographic expansion, which in some places is already taking on a tangible scale.

HOW TO TAKE FATE INTO YOUR OWN HANDS?

Paradoxically, galloping economic development is the only guarantee of stability and sustainability for today's China.

Such a situation does not correspond to the Confucian ethic of "saving face" and cannot suit Chinese geostrategists. Zhang Wenmu argues: "survival should not be the essence of China's future destiny"¹⁹. In his opinion, the meaning of the Chinese concept of national security should consist in shaping the configuration of world geopolitics, modeling geopolitical processes in the right way for themselves, and determining the rules of the game themselves. For " globalization is beneficial only if the levers... the authorities will be in your own hands. " ²⁰

To achieve this, Zhang Wenmu believes, China must show character, political wisdom and willpower in defending its own interests, not being afraid to neglect the deceptive formula of military parity offered by the West. "The Chinese have not yet come to understand the importance of strong will, but it is encouraging that we have the experience of the Russian people from Mikhail Gorbachev to Vladimir Putin. The Russian people paid a tragically high price for this common understanding, this "consensus" with the West, losing so many valuable historical opportunities. Yes, Americans especially appreciate Yeltsin for his complaisance, but Yeltsin, on the last day of the twentieth century, voluntarily resigned and asked the people for forgiveness with a sense of guilt."²¹

* * *

In general, Zhang Wenmu is a new type of scholar for China, who is generally alien to the pathos of uncritical reverence for the dogmas of official ideology, but who does not consider it shameful to quote Mao Zedong or Deng Xiaoping out of place. Rather, he is a pragmatist or, better, a realist in assessing the current state of affairs, who tends to distance himself from abstract philosophical problems and from "empty conversations of scientists who have lost touch with reality" ²². Contrary to established Chinese tradition, he sometimes calls a spade a spade.

In his forecasts and recommendations, Zhang Wenmu is more of an analyst with a touch of radicalism. Willingly or unwittingly, some sharpness of his judgments and the directness of his statements, which is not typical of the Chinese mentality, well sets off the balanced, balanced and deliberate general line of the CCP and modern Chinese geopolitics. Which seems to suit the Chinese authorities very well.

* Bifurcation (from Lat. bifurcus - bifurcated) - bifurcation, in recent years it has become fashionable to use this concept in the analysis of international relations, including economic ones, to denote alternative ways of development and the problem of choosing one of them (editor's note).

¹ Zhang Wenmu was born in 1957 in Shaanxi Province. In 1975, after graduating from high school, during the years of the "cultural revolution", like millions of other Chinese, he did not escape" labor re-education " in the countryside. He studied at Xibei Daxue University, Tianjin Pedagogical University and Shandong University. In 1997, he received a Doctor of Law degree. Currently, he works at the Institute of Strategic Studies of the Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics.

^{Zhang Wenmu.} 2 Zhongguo xinshiji an-quan zhanliu (Chinese Security Strategy in the New Century). Shandong renmin chubanshe, 2000.

Zhang Wenmu. Shijie diyuan zhengzhi zhong de Zhongguo guojia anquan lii fenxi (Analysis of the security of China's national interests in the context of global geopolitics). Jinan, Shandong renmin chubanshe, 2004.

Zhang Wenmu. Quanqiu shiezhong de Zhongguo anquan zhanliu (China's National Security Strategy in the context of global perspectives). Shandong renmin chubanshe, 2008.

Zhang Wenmu. Lun Zhongguo haiquan (On the maritime Power of China). Haiyang chubanshe, 2009.

^{Zhang Wenmu.} 3 Shijie diyuan zhengzhi zhong de Zhongguo guojia anquan lii fenxi.., p. 2.

⁴ Ibid., pp. 7-8.

^{Zhang Wenmu.} 5 Shijie diyuan zhengzhi zhong de Zhongguo guojia anquan lii fenxi (Analysis of the security of China's national interests in the context of global geopolitics). 2nd ed., Jinan, Shandong renmin chubanshe, 2004, p. 1.

⁶ Ibid., p. 4.

⁷ Ibid., p. 14.

⁸ Ibid., p. 8.

⁹ Ibid., pp. 10-11.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 9.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ibid., p. 14.

¹³ Ibid., p. 15.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ancient Chinese philosophy. Collected texts in two volumes, Vol. 1. Moscow, Mysl. 1972, p. 135.

^{Zhang Wenmu.} 17 Shijie diyuan zhengzhi zhong, 2nd ed., p. 15.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 22.

²⁰ Ibid., p. 312.

²¹ Ibid., pp. 13-14.

²² Ibid., p. 11.

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