The growth of China's economic potential and its active involvement in the processes of globalization at the turn of the XX-XXI centuries attract more and more attention of researchers. In recent years, numerous works have been published on the problem of the so-called "Chinese factor" in modern international relations and the world economy, the authors of which often hold diametrically opposite views.

From the point of view of some, the official statistics of the country's economic growth are overstated, and the real prospects for China's development look pessimistic, and the country is expected to collapse in the future.

On the contrary, proponents of an" optimistic " view of China's future believe that the Chinese economy will maintain its current high pace, will successfully integrate into the global economy, and the role of the PRC in the global economy will increase.

The debate over China's role in the global economy began in the late 1990s, when the country's growing power was perceived as a threat beyond its borders. This is the basis for the concept (or so-called "theory") of the "Chinese threat", which is reflected in the works of such Western economists as Thomas Rosky, Gordon Chan, Joe Studwell, Geoffrey Garten, and Stephen Rowe1. The positions of these authors differ in many ways, although they all assess the economic power of China and its impact on the development of the world economy.

We will confine ourselves to the more specific question of how this discussion has developed in terms of the impact of China's growing economic power on Japan.

Despite some controversial statistics on China's economic growth, it is obvious that the Chinese economy has been developing at a very high rate in recent years: 8-10% per year. Such rapid growth in China against the background of a prolonged recession and deflationary trends in Japan at the turn of the XX-XXI centuries could not but cause concern on the part of Japanese experts. At the beginning of the XXI century, many of them attributed the so-called "Chinese factor" even to one of the reasons for the failure of the country's economic development. From their point of view, China is not only becoming Japan's main competitor in the Asian region, but also has a negative impact on its economy.

Systematizing the opinions of various experts, we can highlight the following main points, which are emphasized by supporters of the concept of the "Chinese threat" to Japan. First, Japan has lost its former economic weight on a global and regional scale due to the slowdown in export growth and the economic crisis. China has significantly strengthened its position in these years. For example, Japan's share of world exports declined from 11.6% in 1992 to 5.9% in 2005, while the share of Chinese exports increased from 2.6% to 7.5% in the same years.²

Secondly, Japan is facing the problem of an aging population, and, consequently, its working capacity is steadily declining. In this situation, it is not easy for the Japanese labor market to compete with the more than half a billion "army" of cheap labor in the PRC: the wages of workers in the PRC and Japan are correlated as 1 to 38 ³. In addition, many costs, such as the price of land, are significantly lower in China than in Japan. Accordingly, in the context of globalization, Japanese companies will seek to move their production to China, which will lead to an increase in the number of layoffs of Japanese employees and an increase in unemployment.

Third, proponents of the "threat" theory note, the removal of production and technology transfer to China lead to the" washing out " of Japan's industry and increase the competitiveness of cheap Chinese products that have already flooded the Japanese market, thereby exacerbating deflationary trends. For example, economist A. Kojima noted that China plays the role of a global" exporter " of deflation, including to Japan. In his opinion, in recent years there has been a rapid increase in the global supply of goods, primarily due to the expansion of exports of cheap Chinese products. This leads to deflation, which is thus "imported" into Japan.⁴ In addition, Japan's growing foreign trade deficit with China is becoming a significant problem as a result of the constant increase in imports of cheap Chinese goods.⁵

The issue of the Chinese economic threat to Japan is very painful: China is seriously beginning to claim

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for the role of a leader in the Asia-Pacific region( APR), which until now completely belonged to it. This is noted not only by Japanese, but also by Russian researchers. Thus, A.V. Semin believes that "China, as a huge economic body with an increased economic "weight", is increasingly influencing the economic situation and the integration process in the Asia-Pacific region... In the context of the most severe post-war crisis experienced by Japan, the question arises of preserving its regional leadership. " ⁶

As a result, there are new options for the development of Asian countries and Asia as a whole. One of them is a "train with two locomotives" model. At the same time, Japan is given the position of the locomotive at the head of the train pulling it, and China is given the position of the locomotive at the tail of the train pushing it.⁷

In other Asian economic development scenarios, China has an even greater role to play, and it can become a leader in East Asia without Japan's participation.⁸

China's rapid economic growth inevitably entails a number of political consequences. The growth of its power on a global scale has led to criticism in the Japanese media of China's economic assistance programs. It should be noted that in the mid-1980s and throughout most of the 1990s, China was a priority destination for Japanese official development assistance (ODA)⁹. In 2000, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan held a round table on the problems of economic assistance to China at the turn of the twenty-first century, which resulted in decisions on a significant change in approaches to providing economic assistance to the PRC. The Japanese side considered that " China should solve the problems that it can solve on its own." Henceforth, the main focus of ODA to China should be to help that country transition to a market economy.¹⁰ In fact, this meant a reduction in the volume of economic assistance to China, which is exactly what is happening now.

At the same time, there are many researchers who believe that the so-called "Chinese threat" is largely either far-fetched or clearly overestimated. On the contrary, many of them tend to view China not as a threat at all, but as a source of new opportunities for mutually beneficial cooperation.

Thus, Chinese economist Ch. Guan notes that, despite the rapid quantitative growth, the quality of China's economy is significantly inferior to that of Japan. According to such indicators as the share of the primary sector* in GDP, the Engel coefficient** even for urban residents, electricity consumption per capita, average life expectancy, the level of development of the PRC corresponds to the level of Japan in the early 1960s (see table).¹¹. In terms of per capita income, China is currently ranked 134th in the world (at purchasing power parity - 119), and Japan is in seventh place (19) ^.12

Secondly, the Chinese researcher points out that the low cost of labor in China reflects the low level of its productivity13, while for the further development of the country's economy, productivity growth is necessary 14. In our opinion, taking into account the experience of the development of "new industrial countries"***, it can be argued that such growth will also mean an increase in the cost of labor, although, given the imbalances in the regional development of the PRC, this process is likely to occur quite slowly.

Many experts believe that at present we can talk about complementarity rather than competition between the products of the two countries. Today, only about 20% of Japanese goods compete directly with Chinese ¹⁵. The most intense competition is observed in the electrical engineering industry ¹⁶. However, China mainly produces more "simple" products (for example, conventional televisions), while Japan produces high - tech models (high-end ones

Table

Key indicators of economic development in China and Japan

Source. Kwan C. H. Understanding "The Forty-year Gap between the Economies of Japan and China" // China in Transition, 18.10.2002 - http://www.rieti.go.jp/en/china/02101801.html

* The primary sector of the economy includes agriculture and extractive industries.

** Engel coefficient - the share of household spending on food in consumer spending. In general, it determines the standard of living of the population.

*** This category includes countries such as South Korea, Singapore, Argentina, Malaysia, Thailand, Turkey, and others. There are about 15 countries in total.

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wide-screen flat-screen TVs)¹⁷. Thus, Chinese goods are characterized mainly by low added value, while Japanese goods are characterized by high added value. The lack of direct competition between the products of the two countries allows us to speak not so much about competition as about complementarity in their economic relations.

Third, notes Ch. Guan, it is necessary to distinguish between the concepts of "made in China" and " made by China "("Made in China "and"Made by China"). China, in his opinion, is a global manufacturing base, and it is not Chinese "brands" that have the greatest competitiveness (although in recent years they have also begun to assert themselves), but products manufactured in China at the factories of foreign companies. Calculations show that an increase in exports from China of $ 1 million requires the import of intermediate goods and components worth at least $ 500,000. ¹⁸

Regarding the issue of Japan's trade deficit with China, many researchers point out that statistics do not take into account the re-export of Japanese goods to China through Hong Kong, with which Japan has a positive trade balance. If we take into account combined Japanese exports to China and Hong Kong, then, according to 2005 data, the combined trade balance is obtained with a surplus of $ 6 billion for Japan, and not for China (combined exports - $ 116 billion, imports - $ 110 billion).¹⁹. It should also be taken into account that after China's accession to the WTO and the gradual liberalization of its external economic system, the growth rate of imports from Japan began to exceed the growth rate of exports in this direction, and the positive balance of the PRC in trade with Japan began to decline. Thus, according to data for 2005, the positive balance was $ 8.5 billion, ²⁰ down from $ 5.8 billion. less than in 2001, when China joined the WTO.

Thus, it can be argued that the problem of the trade deficit in relations between the two countries is now taking a new turn and is no longer as clear and acute as it was recently. Moreover, the export of goods from China is one of the prerequisites for an increase in imports of Japanese products to this country. This applies to both intermediate and final goods, which are increasingly affordable for Chinese consumers as their wealth grows.²¹

There are also reasonable doubts about the high degree of influence of the import of Chinese products on deflationary trends and the economic situation in Japan. On the one hand, the share of Chinese products in a number of industries has a significant weight in Japanese imports (for example, in 2001, 77.1% of textiles and 37.4% of audio and video equipment were imported from the PRC) ^.22 However, according to calculations by Ya. Okada, less than 2% of Japanese consumer spending in 2002 was related to the purchase of Chinese goods.²³ Other Japanese scholars point out that Japan's imports account for 8% of its GDP, while imports from China account for only 1%^.24 Even these statistics suggest that the deflationary trends in the Japanese economy observed at the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries cannot be explained solely by the import of cheap goods from China.

Opponents of the "Chinese threat" theory point out that although Japanese investment in China is growing and a part of production is being transferred there, their share was only about 2% of all direct Japanese investment in 2000.Therefore, the thesis about the "leaching" of industry from Japan due to the alleged mass transfer of production to China is not supported by statistics ²⁵. However, it should be noted that, according to data for fiscal year 2004, direct investment increased to 12.8%, and if we take into account investments only in manufacturing sectors, the share of China reaches 27.5% of all Japanese investments and almost 62% in Asian countries.²⁶ These data allow us to say that Japanese companies really prefer to transfer their production to China, but, as it seems to us, this trend cannot be unequivocally considered as negative. Japan's economy is currently undergoing a structural adjustment phase, during which short-term negative effects are possible, such as an increase in unemployment due to the transfer of some production capacity abroad, but ultimately this should be followed by an increase in its efficiency and competitiveness.

It is noteworthy that in the scientific and political circles of Japan, China began to be perceived as a threat at a time when the Japanese economy was experiencing a decade-long depression and could not get out of the deflationary spiral. Statements about the "threat" were even made by high-ranking Japanese officials. Thus, in 2002, Deputy Finance Minister H. Kuroda stated that the primary cause of deflation in his country lies in neighboring Asian countries, primarily in China. ²⁷ However, from 2003 to 2004, when the Japanese economy began to show signs of recovery, Tokyo almost stopped considering China as a threat. On the contrary, China has become a source of opportunity and a "savior" of Japanese business, and economic ties with this country have become a driving force for Japan's growth.²⁸ This estimate is still maintained at the present time. The main reason for this change is the rapid growth of Japanese exports to China (which is important against the background of stagnation in European and North American destinations). A recalculation of trade with Hong Kong showed that "Greater China" already absorbs more than 20% of Japanese exports and that it is exports to China that are becoming one of the main factors in the revival of the Japanese economy.

Yet many of the propositions of the "threat theory" are not empty rhetoric. Without allowing their absolutization and elevation to the status of scientific theories, it is impossible

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At the same time, the fact that China's power on a regional and global scale has really increased significantly in the last 10 years should not be taken into account. As a result, there is a tightening of the struggle for political leadership in Asia between Japan and China. It is unlikely that in the near future China will catch up with Japan in such qualitative indicators as, for example, the size of GDP per capita. However, the calculation of GDP at purchasing power parity in absolute terms already allows us to call China, not Japan, the second economic power in the world.

Calculations show that the gap between countries is still narrowing. Thus, the Foreign Trade White Paper prepared by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry of Japan published data showing that in 1980, the ratio of economic development rates between the two countries did not allow China to catch up with Japan in terms of per capita income. By 1990, the dynamics of development had changed in such a way that the PRC could hypothetically catch up with its neighbor by 2096. During the 10 years of recession in Japan, this gap was reduced by ^{56 years, and, according to 2000 data, if the current economic growth rate is maintained, the PRC can catch up with Japan by 204029}

At the same time, it is difficult to assume that China will maintain the same high growth rates that characterized its economic development in the late 1990s and early 2000s, and Japan-as low as during the recession. Therefore, it seems that this forecast for 2040 is very optimistic for China and pessimistic for Japan.

The increasing competition of Japanese products with Chinese ones is an additional incentive for Japanese entrepreneurs who are looking for new areas of application of advanced technologies in order to enter world markets with fundamentally new products. This may change the current trend.

It should also be noted that the two countries are currently actively developing and strengthening bilateral economic ties and are becoming more and more dependent on each other. This process is a manifestation of the general trends of increasing interdependence of economies in the context of globalization. Undoubtedly, the expansion of economic relations between China and Japan will continue, which should create the basis for both healthy competition (without which economic development is impossible) and various mutually beneficial cooperation based on the international division of labor.

^{Rawski T.} 1 What's Happening to China's GDP Statistics -www.pitt.edu/-tgrawski/papers2001/gdp912.pdf; Chang G. G. The Coming Collapse of China. New York: Random House, 2001; Studwell J. The China Dream: the Elusive Quest for the Greatest Untapped Market on Earth. New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2002; Garten J. E. When Everything is Made in China // Business Week, 17.06.2002; Roach St. The China Factor - http://www.mor-ganstanley.com/GEFdata/digests/20021014-mon.html

^{Masuyama S.} 2 Chugoku keizai no tanto, higashiadzia chiki togo no shinten to naigaikike no chugoku senryaku (China's Economic Leadership, Development of Integration in East Asia, and Strategy of Japanese and Foreign companies in China). 2004, N 5, p. 8; Calculated from: International Trade Statistics 2006, WTO - http://www.wto.org

³ Chugoku no yakushin-adziya no osen (Asia's response to China's breakthrough). Edited by T. Watanabe. Tokyo: Toyokeizai Simposha, 2002, p. 246; Hokkaido Shimbun, 06.12.2002.

^{Kompa A.} 4 The Age of Deflation // Look Japan. December 2002, p. 22.

⁵ Odoru nihon no chugokuron (Disturbing Concept of the Chinese Threat) // Toa, 02.2002 - http://www.kazankai.org/publishing/toa/2002_02/compass2/01.html Semin A.V. Foreign policy guidelines of Japan and China (90-ies), Moscow, 2001, p. 42.

^{Semin A.V.} 6 Decree. soch., p. 126.

⁷ Ibid., p. 134.

⁸ Cit. by: Japan about itself and the world, Moscow, 1994, N 7, p. 146.

⁹ Chinese-Japanese Relations in the 21^st Century. Ed.: M. Soderberg. London and New York, 2002, p. 116, 120.

¹⁰ Taichu keizai kereku keikaku (China's Economic Assistance Plan). Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. Official website -http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/oda/kunibetsu/china/sei_1_13_2.html

^{Kwan C. M.} 11 Understanding "The Forty-year Gap between the Economies of Japan and China" // China in Transition, 18.10.2002 - http://www.rieti.go.jp/en/china/02101801.html

¹² World Development Indicators 2005. World Bank Group -http://devdata.worldbank.org/wdi2005/Section1.htm

^{Guan Ch} 13 Chugoku keiron-o norikoeru tameni (Refuting the Theory of the Chinese Threat) / / Japanknowledge, 01.05.2002 - http://www.japanknowledge.com/inose/0000130000000164.html

¹⁴ Более подробно см.: 2005 JETRO White Paper on International Trade and Foreign Direct Investment (Summary), p. 3 - 4 - http://www.jetro.go.jp/en/stats/white_paper/2005.pdf

^{Kwan C. H.} 15 The Complimentary Relationship Between Japan and China - An Update / / China in Transition, 12.09.2003 - http://www.rieti.go.jp/en/china/03091201.html Nittu "kyogo" - wa 20% ika (Competition between Japan and China is below 20%) / / Toa, 05.2002 - http://www.kazankai.org/publishing/toa/2002_05/speciall/08.html

¹⁶ Nittu kankei no keizai bunseki: kudokaron-chugokukeyiron (Analysis of Sino-Japanese Relations: theories of "emasculation" and "Chinese threat"). Edited by M. Ito. Tokyo, 2003, p. 160.

¹⁷ Nittu "kyogo" - wa 20% ika...

^{Kwan C. H.} 18 Overcoming Japan's China Syndrome // Journal of Japanese Trade and Industry. September/October 2002, p. 26 - 27.

¹⁹ Рассчитано по: United Nations Statistics Division - Commodity Trade Statistics Data Base (COMTRADE), 2006 http://unstats.un.org/unsd/comtrade/

²⁰ Ibid. - Calculated taking into account re-exports via Hong Kong.

²¹ Nittu kankei no keizai bunseki.., p. 14.

²² Chugoku no yakushin-adziya no osen (Asia's response to China's breakthrough), pp. 209-211.

^{Okada Ya} 23 Defure-wa chugoku-karano kenkasehinyun-no kek-ka-nanoka (Is deflation a consequence of importing cheap goods from China?) // The Keizai Seminar, 05.2003, p. 12.

²⁴ Nittu kankei no keizai bunseki, p. 5.

^{Guan Ch} 25 Nittu keizai kankei no tadashii mikata (Correct understanding of Sino-Japanese economic relations). Тоа, 05.2002 - http://www.kazankai.org/publishing/toa/2002_05/

²⁶ Calculated by: Ministry of Finance of Japan. Официальный сайт - http://www.mof.go.jp/fdi/h16b_2.htm, http://www.mof.go.jp/fdi/h16b_4.htm, http://www.mof.go.jp/fdi/sankou03.xls

²⁷ The Washington Times, 20.12.2002. Of course, X's opinion. Kuroda, despite his high status, cannot be taken as an official position of the Japanese government. So, just a month later, Japan's Deputy Foreign Minister Yu. Takeuchi stated that he sees China as "a challenge that opens up new opportunities". See: The Japan Economic Review, 15.01.2003, p. 1.

^{Kojima A.} 28 Made in Japan, Again / / The Japan Economic Review, 15.07.2004, p. 5; Itami H., Tanaka K. et al. Kigesenryaku Hakuse III (White Paper on Enterprise Strategy). Tokyo, 2004, p. 11; Hokkaido Shimbun, 05.02.2004.

²⁹ Tsuse hakuse 2002 (Foreign Trade White Paper 2002). Tokyo, 2002, p. 13.

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