A. LARIN

Candidate of Historical Sciences

The "Father of Chinese reform" Deng Xiaoping has this saying:: "If we talk about China, there are not so many opportunities for significant development. However, unlike other countries in the world, it has its own special features. For example, we have several tens of millions of patriotic compatriots abroad, who have already made a great contribution to the country's development. " ¹

The global Chinese diaspora is the owner of huge capital, entrepreneurial experience, and international business ties-exactly what the PRC needs to become one of the most developed countries in the world. According to the International Organization for Migration, the Chinese diaspora is the largest in the world, estimated at 35 million people, which is 18.3% of the total number of all diasporas in the world combined.² The estimated private wealth of 20 million ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia (SE) in the mid-1990s exceeded $ 200 billion. United States dollars. Of the region's 1,000 leading companies, more than half - 517-are owned by ethnic Chinese, who make up about 5% of the region's population. According to some sources, ethnic Chinese own almost 80% of private capital in Indonesia and 40% - 50% in Malaysia.³

Accordingly, the policy of the Chinese government is focused on using this unique reserve with maximum efficiency. It is based on providing foreign Chinese with numerous and diverse special rights and benefits of an industrial and domestic nature, arousing their national-patriotic feelings and showing them a caring and respectful attitude. Chinese President Hu Jintao said in one of his speeches:: "It is extremely important for the cause of the party and the country to gather the forces of China's overseas sons and daughters, encourage, protect and develop their activism. History has proved and will prove again and again that the vast masses of overseas compatriots, as well as their relatives and re - emigrants, are an important force in promoting the modernization of the country, in realizing the full unification of the motherland and the glorious revival of the Chinese nation. " ⁴

The second objective of Beijing's policy is to promote in every possible way the stable and peaceful coexistence of its diasporas with the indigenous population of their host countries.

FROM SILICON VALLEY TO YOUR HOMELAND

To attract investment and technology to the diaspora, China has such powerful trump cards as cheap labor and a potentially limitless market, but it also needs an appropriate legislative framework. The fundamental documents here are the "Decree of the State Council on the Promotion of Foreign Investment "of October 11, 1986 and the" Decree of the State Council on the Promotion of Investment in Huaqiao and Compatriots from Hong Kong and Macao " of August ¹⁹, 1999.5 They are supplemented and specified by other resolutions of the central and local authorities. (A separate document is the "State Council Decree on Encouraging Investment by Taiwanese Compatriots" of July 3, 1988.)

These documents grant huaqiao (expats with Chinese citizenship) and huazhen (expats with Chinese and foreign citizenship), as well as residents of Hong Kong (Hong Kong) and Macao (Macao), the right to make investments in such forms as: establishment of enterprises only with their own capital, or joint, or cooperative; compensatory trade processing of raw materials, organization of assembly production; acquisition of shares and loans of enterprises; purchase of buildings; acquisition of land use rights with subsequent development of land and management on it, etc.

A potential investor can choose projects from among those offered by local governments, or offer them their own projects, or ask for help from Chinese representative offices abroad. Investment forums, exhibitions and sales of various goods held in the country by local organizations are an effective form of choosing the objects of cooperation. Investment companies receive the right to use land, but not to own it. The right to use land cannot be assigned.

An investment company can independently decide whether to purchase machinery and equipment, raw materials, fuel, spare parts, vehicles and office equipment at home or abroad. However, all other things being equal, preference should be given to procurement in the country.

In a number of cases, investment enterprises are exempt from customs duties and consolidated commercial and industrial tax when importing such groups of goods as: machinery and equipment, their parts, etc., which are investments or paid for at the expense of investment funds; machinery, equipment and their parts purchased at the expense of added capital, if their delivery is not completed. can be provided within the country; raw materials, spare parts, parts, packaging materials used for the production of export products; equipment necessary for production management, such as remote surveillance television cameras, electronic computers, communications equipment.

The state encourages Huaqiao, as well as compatriots from Hong Kong and Macao, to enter the international market with their products, but with the consent of the relevant authorities, a certain share of them can be supplied to the domestic market. In the trans-

This work was supported by the Jiang Jingguo Foundation for Scientific Exchange (Taipei).

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first of all, this applies to products that the state is forced to import.

Thus, China has created a variety of channels of communication with potential investors, practices various forms of investment, and encourages the import of technologies and the export of finished products. At the same time, expats with foreign citizenship are actually equated with expats - Chinese citizens in terms of investment. However, in some cases, the latter have an advantage over the former. For example, Article 2 of the State Council's Decree on Encouraging Investment in Huaqiao and Compatriots from Hong Kong and Macao calls for these two categories of Chinese to "develop and manage land." Articles 17 and 19 of the "Regulations" give Huaqiao the right to instruct its relatives or friends in China to act as their representatives and set up businesses on behalf of the investor.

The preferential policy of the Chinese government in relation to the diaspora against the background of its traditional ties with the ethnic homeland has had a significant effect: the lion's share of investment from abroad in China is accounted for by emigrants. For example, investors from Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore gave China more than three-quarters of the total amount of foreign investment in 1996. " ⁶ The total number of joint ventures with foreign Chinese capital already exceeded 100,000 in 1994, accumulating $ 17 billion. USD ⁷

From 1991-1993, the Chinese government set out to promote technologically intensive industries such as automotive, electronics, aerospace, integrated circuits, software, computer systems and peripherals, as well as complex consumer goods. Large Western companies began to enter the country, which caused a reduction in the share of foreign Chinese firms working mainly in labor-intensive sectors of the economy in the total volume of foreign capital in China8. However, in solving the problem of importing technologies, there was also a place for foreign Chinese entrepreneurs who have undoubted achievements in the field of high technologies, especially in developed countries. (For example, at the turn of the century, an estimated quarter of U.S. Silicon Valley firms were headed by immigrants from China and India. These firms created 50,000 jobs, produced and sold $ 17 billion worth of products. $ ⁹)

Guo Dongpo, head of the State Council's Office for Overseas Chinese Affairs, noted that his department actively helps its "wards "" to serve as guides for foreign entrepreneurs who want to create joint ventures in the field of high technologies with Chinese structures or carry out technological upgrades and launch new products by acquiring shares of Chinese companies. The Office invites multinational companies to participate in cooperation and exchange with China and import advanced technologies to China with the assistance of foreign Chinese. " ¹⁰

Indeed, joint ventures of Chinese foreign companies with multinational companies in the context of globalization have proved to be quite successful in attracting modern technologies in such areas as energy, telecommunications equipment, automotive and aerospace industries, for example. The same applies to joint ventures of foreign Chinese companies with state-owned companies. Partners of foreign Chinese companies in China are British Petroleum, companies from France, Italy, etc.

An interesting example is the New Wave Semicondactor Corporation, founded in 1997 by Howard Yang, a Chinese expat. He spent a decade and a half in the United States, earned a Ph. D. in electrical engineering from Oregon State University, worked for a Silicon Valley firm, and returned to China in 1994. After working for two years at one of the leading semiconductor companies, Mr. Yang and two colleagues, also from Silicon Valley, decided to start a private venture capital company. Silicon Valley firms, Taiwan's state-owned Shanghai-based Huahong Microelectronics, and several individual investors invested $ 5.4 million in the new company.

The company's headquarters are located in Silicon Valley, and most of its production facilities, including research and development, marketing, sales, and administrative divisions, are located in Shanghai. Taiwan's leading chip manufacturer, Taiwan Semikondactor Manufacturing, is the official founder of the company. Thus, by the hands of foreign Chinese, a TNC was created on Chinese soil, using the economic resources of the three economies.¹¹

When developing the market for new technologies in China, foreign Chinese entrepreneurs do not lose their positions in their traditional labor-intensive industries. Since it is mainly labor-intensive products that are exported, Huaqiao firms meet the Chinese government's desire to develop export production to a greater extent than Western ones. They export about a third of their products , which is more than the export share of goods produced by Western companies. ¹² It is interesting that they export not only finished products: as a result of the development of integration links between Hong Kong and the surrounding areas of the "mainland", where labor-intensive links of production chains have moved, Huaqiao firms engaged in these links export an intermediate product to Hong Kong. It undergoes further processing there, after which the finished products are exported and partly to the domestic market of China ¹³.

CADRES DECIDE EVERYTHING

Another important area of work of the Chinese leadership abroad is attracting qualified scientific and technical personnel to the country, including highly qualified personnel. This direction often merges with the one described above - attracting investment and technology. Both are served, in particular, by the extensive privilege systems developed by various ministries and departments, as well as local authorities in Beijing, Shanghai and a number of provinces for foreign Chinese who create enterprises with modern technologies in China. As a rule, such privilege systems include:

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- high (35% or more) shares of participation in profits generated by technology transfer in the form of patents, inventions, etc.;

- simplified procedures for registering enterprises and obtaining Chinese documents confirming foreign diplomas;

- advantages in setting up a family: young children are assigned to the best of the nearest schools, enjoy benefits when passing exams for admission to higher-level schools and colleges;

- comfortable housing, reduced rent for three years for office space;

- partial refund of value added tax ¹⁴.

In recent years, so-called entrepreneurial or "start-up" parks ("chuangye yuanqu", literally, "parks for starting a business") have become popular in China, created specifically as bases where Chinese people with foreign education could start their business. As an example, consider one of the parks for foreign Chinese, located in Suzhou. The goal of the park is "to create a favorable environment for the use of research results and the development of small and medium-sized enterprises with modern technologies by providing all the necessary conditions for their work" ¹⁵. The park's clients are "companies with advanced technology and research institutes run by students and scientists who study or work abroad or have returned from abroad." The park offers its clients a range of benefits: business tax refund for the first three years; real estate tax exemption for the first two years after the company makes a profit; a small amount of minimum registered capital ($10 thousand for firms providing technological advice and services, and $ 60 thousand for enterprises-advantages in obtaining various kinds of grants and subsidies, in certifying new products; assistance in obtaining financing and reimbursement of taxes paid; advice on political and technical issues.

Along with entrepreneurship, another important area of attracting professional personnel is science and education. "China is a land of happiness for science and technology workers, where they can show their talents and satisfy their ambitions," says Guo Dongpo, director of the Office for Work with Expats. ¹⁶ According to statistics, currently in China, specialists who have returned from abroad occupy a predominant position in the upper and middle echelons of scientific and teaching circles. They make up 81% of academicians of the Chinese Academy of Sciences (including Academician Zhong Nanipan, who recently made an outstanding contribution to the fight against SARS), and 54% of academicians of the Chinese Academy of Engineering. 78% of directors of Chinese educational institutions, 63% of undergraduates (shoshisheng) and scientific supervisors (daoshi), 72% of managers of basic educational and research centers and leading laboratories at the state and provincial level have acquired knowledge abroad17.

Thanks to the success of its economic development, China has been able to spend significant funds on the return of scientists from abroad, in particular, in the form of large grants. So, some time ago, the government allocated $ 1 billion to 9 leading universities in the country. RMB, at least 20% of which was intended for recruiting scientists from among foreign Chinese.

The introduction of professional personnel from among foreign Chinese to the modernization of the country does not require, however, their mandatory return to the land of their ancestors. Similarly, the Government encourages those who are willing to "serve the motherland abroad" and thus show themselves as patriots by cooperating with the Chinese side in the economic or research and teaching fields.

In the economy, these are the same investments, technology transfer, and development of Chinese and foreign markets. In the 1990s, Chinese visitors to the United States began to create companies focused on the production of goods and services, mainly for the Chinese market. These companies were based in the United States and usually located their headquarters and research units in Silicon Valley, while all other services and core personnel were located in China. Such, for example, is UTStarcom, a telecommunications company created by a native of China. Its headquarters in Silicon Valley employs 30 employees, and in China-about 1 thousand people. The creation of such industries is regarded by experts as a qualitatively new type of cooperation between China and developed countries: it takes the form of a "transnational technological community", which means a new international division of labor and allows China to successfully fit into the processes of globalization.

In the field of research and teaching, cooperation between "overseas" Chinese and the "mainland" includes giving lectures by invitation, scientific consultations, participating in joint research and educational projects, for which the Chinese government often allocates substantial grants, and working in public organizations that have close ties with China. The Chinese government also spares no expense in this type of activity. For example, in 2005, the Chinese State Foundation for Natural Sciences offered large grants (1 million yuan annually for four years). specifically for financing large-scale research projects that must be carried out jointly by highly qualified specialists - foreign citizens of Chinese origin (huazhen) and their colleagues from the PRC.

It is noteworthy that Beijing's policy is not just to attract entrepreneurs and qualified specialists; it is also to provide protection to all re-emigrants who have returned to their homeland for permanent residence ("guiqiao"), as well as relatives of emigrants and re-emigrants ("Qiaojuan"). China's leaders invariably put these two categories of citizens on a par with emigrants-Huaqiao as a single object of emigration policy.

In the " Law of the People's Republic of China on the Protection of Human Rights

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re-emigrants - "guiqiao" and relatives- "Qiaojuan" ¹⁸ (published on September 7, 1990, corrected on October 31, 2000) it is noted that returned Huaqiao and relatives of Huaqiao ("guiqiao" and "Qiaojuan") they are full citizens of the country, and "no organizations or persons should treat them with disdain", and the state "in accordance with their characteristics and the real situation shows due care for them". The State undertakes to provide accommodation for those who have returned to their permanent place of residence in Huaqiao; to assist the agricultural and forestry enterprises and other enterprises at their disposal with personnel, equipment, finances; to protect the economic and housing rights of re-emigrants and relatives, etc. " People's governments of various degrees should take care of re-emigrants and relatives in their affairs, guide and serve them".

The government's attention to re-emigrants and their relatives has a clear humanistic meaning, as well as a political one: it is designed to strengthen the psychological connection of emigrants with their homeland, to give them confidence that the state is not indifferent to their difficulties.

BEIJING'S"DIASPORA PERIMETER" POLICY

The nature of the relationship between two national organisms - the diaspora and its environment-depends on many conditions. In some cases, these relationships develop more or less harmoniously; in others, they are accompanied by hostility, friction, and even conflict. The history of Chinese diasporas in the countries of Southeast Asia, the United States, and Latin America provides many examples of the second kind. For a long time, the Chinese have been discriminated against, bullied, and xenophobic in these countries, and have sometimes risen up to defend their rights. In the Southeast Asian countries that are adjacent to China and have hosted most of the multi-million-strong Chinese emigration, a deeply unfriendly attitude towards newcomers from a huge country persisted for a particularly long time-until the 80s of the XX century.

Currently, the relations of foreign Chinese with the population of their countries of residence look immeasurably more prosperous. It seems that the decisive factor in this change was a radical turn in the PRC's foreign policy strategy and, consequently, in its approach to the Chinese diaspora. For three decades after World War II, the Chinese government has been an ideological antagonist of the Western world, with a tendency to use members of its diaspora for all sorts of shady activities against the Governments of their host countries. This was particularly pronounced in Southeast Asia, where China's diplomatic relations with the countries of the sub-region were unstable. However, from the turn of the 70s-80s. Beijing has revised its anti-Western line, brought its position closer to that of the Southeast Asian countries, and established broad economic and, above all, investment cooperation with the Diaspora. For their part, the Governments of the newly independent Southeast Asian States were initially suspicious of the Chinese minority. Creating new national and cultural identities, they attempted to assimilate the Chinese, demanded that they break ties with their ethnic homeland, restricted or banned the activities of Chinese national societies, but in the 1980s, having become convinced of the loyalty of the Chinese part of the population, they changed their previous negative attitude towards it to a more tolerant one.

Nevertheless, there is still some tension between the indigenous nationalities of the sub-region States and, on the other hand, Chinese immigrants. This tension can hardly be considered a residual, historical relic - it is constantly reproduced under the influence of both traditional and new circumstances. The local political and intellectual elite is distrustful and concerned about the closeness of the Chinese community, the developed ties of ethnic Chinese with foreign countries, and their investment in the Chinese economy, which is now regarded as the assertion of a "new assertive Chinese regional identity." A significant role is played by the fact that the Chinese are strong competitors in business, who have managed to take leading positions in important areas of national economies and accumulate huge wealth. Chinese experts themselves rate the business qualities of their ethnic counterparts very highly, noting their "willingness to work hard, the ability to adapt to new conditions, proven business acumen, and the ability to quickly use new opportunities" ¹⁹. These qualities are constantly featured in publications on this topic.

The competitive power of Chinese entrepreneurs increases even more due to their organization - the presence of developed informal personal connections (which, generally speaking, include not only people of Chinese nationality). These connections allow you to transfer confidential business information and even, without cumbersome formalities, based on trust alone, quickly conclude large transactions. The Chinese community is also distinguished by its dislike of publicity. An aphoristic expression of this trait can be considered the words of a large businessman from Southeast Asia, of Chinese origin: "The best way not to lose your face is to keep the lower part of it closed."

The entrepreneurial talent of ethnic Chinese, their involvement in international businesses beyond the control of the authorities, the close ties between members of Chinese communities and between communities of different countries, their closeness and, as a result of all this, the huge wealth concentrated in the hands of businessmen of Chinese origin-all this causes a natural aggressive reaction from less successful rivals from the indigenous population. "Over time," write Chinese expatriate publicists, " the economic success of a number of entrepreneurs has become the object of intense envy. Moreover, Chinese communities as a whole were often scapegoated, their members portrayed as immoral, selfish people who would do anything for profit. Descendants of ethnic Chinese were forced to overcome the glu-

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Boko harnesses the hostility that has taken root in the societies that have adopted them, while upholding their dignity and right to respect. " ²⁰

At the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries, when the PRC became one of the most powerful and rapidly developing countries in the world and the idea of forming a "Greater China" emerged, a new motive appeared for distrust of Chinese diasporas in Southeast Asia. Not only is the diaspora helping China build up its strength with its investments, whether willingly or unwittingly. There have been concerns that new financial ties, combined with playing on ethnic ties, will allow China to draw the diaspora into its sphere of economic and political influence and use it as a tool to achieve its goals. "We are not just concerned," said a senior Philippine official, " we are in awe. In a decade or so, China will become a major player in Asia, and we see overseas Chinese as an integral part of the overall package."²¹

LORDS OF THE PACIFIC RIM

Alongside and in connection with these reflections, there are also concerns of a different kind: can the economic potential of the Chinese diaspora in the Southeast Asian countries be transformed into a political force? If so, can this process eventually lead to the establishment of diaspora control over a particular state? Is it by chance that today the most prominent figures from the upper layer of the Chinese diaspora are awarded such nicknames as" Lords of the Ring "(meaning the Pacific Ring),"New Asian Emperors"?²² Events of a slightly different nature, such as the "case of Li Wenhe," a Chinese-American accused in 1999 in the United States of stealing military-technical secrets, provide additional food for speculation that the Chinese abroad are acting on instructions from Beijing.

How well-founded are the concerns about turning the diaspora into a peddler of the "Chinese threat"?

It seems to us that at the moment they are completely refuted by a number of serious arguments.

First, the economic power of the Chinese in the Southeast Asian countries does not prevent them from remaining an alien national minority, not quite a full-fledged part of society. The wealth of the upper stratum of diasporas does not facilitate the integration of emigrants into local societies, does not give them immunity from discrimination, and even does not prevent them from becoming scapegoats if the authorities need to divert the public's attention from the facts of their corruption and incompetence. Nor do Chinese diasporas become an instrument of the struggle for equality, or in general, political struggle, since Chinese emigrants avoid such a struggle, not wanting to upset the balance established in their relations with the local population. In the figurative words of one Chinese scholar, the economic power of the Chinese diaspora remains "the wealth of the eunuch."

Secondly, local societies are extremely reluctant to accept representatives of Chinese diasporas (with rare exceptions) as participants in power structures, and the activities of ethnic Chinese people are usually limited to the business sphere.

Third, the idea that the Chinese diaspora in a particular country is united into a single organism turns out to be a myth. It would be more correct to speak about the existence of numerous groups in the diaspora with more or less close internal cohesion, competing with each other. There are numerous stories about rich Chinese tycoons who are unable to agree among themselves on a joint solution to political or business problems. Moreover, there is no need to talk about the political activity of the "new Asian emperors" at the international level: there are no solidarity speeches for national equality on their part.

"The activities of ethnic Chinese people take place in the business world, and here differences in interests separate them to a greater extent than their belonging to the Chinese nation unites," notes the authoritative Australian scholar David Goodman and concludes: ... apart from the basis, often extremely vague, in the form of ancestral community, there is little that unites the Chinese of the region, and the concept of community ethnic Chinese in East and South-East Asia crumble on closer inspection. " ²³

Finally, having devoted themselves exclusively to commerce, the Chinese emigration, including its upper stratum, is obviously far from setting the grand goal of promoting the rise of the ethnic homeland, although it is willingly proud of its success. In general, Chinese emigrants "go into politics only for reasons of profit, and not for ideological reasons related to their Chinese origin." ²⁴ Moreover, since Chinese immigrants and their descendants are constantly afraid of being accused of pro-Beijing sentiments and actions, they are forced to behave in relations with the United States. ethnic homeland with constant caution, emphasizing: what they do is pure business, which has nothing to do with the idea of "Greater China". In order to avoid giving rise to suspicion, they often "do everything possible to demonstrate respect, first of all, for the wishes of local governments"²⁵. Nevertheless, the distrust of the Chinese diaspora, which stands behind the powerful country of their ancestors, does not go away from the psychology of the indigenous population.

Thus, the Chinese diaspora, being a major economic player, emphatically distances itself from politics, only timidly touching on the issue of equality, and even more so avoids anything that could give it a reason to reproach it with pro-Chinese sympathies. In such circumstances, it is impossible to turn the diaspora into a conduit for Beijing's interests.

However, this state of affairs is quite satisfactory for Beijing, which is primarily interested in maintaining political stability in the surrounding area, continuing the economic activity of diasporas and harmonizing their relations with local authorities. Therefore, his policy, so to speak, "along the perimeter of diasporas" is conservative and protective in nature. In its ideological propaganda-

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The author's position completely lacks the slightest hints on the political nature of the relations between the mainland and the diaspora today or in the future, on the potential of the diaspora as a political force, etc. In this sense, it can be said that Beijing's position on relations with the diaspora is completely depoliticized.

By drawing foreign Chinese capital into its economy on a massive scale, raising trade and investment cooperation with Taiwan to an unprecedented level, and returning Hong Kong, which has merged into a single economic whole with the surrounding regions of Guangdong Province, Beijing pointedly ignores the talk of "Greater China", which is associated in international public opinion with the involvement of the diaspora in Chinese politics. Thanks to this, the hype around the idea of "Greater China", which had first appeared in the first half of the 90s, then disappeared by itself.

The statement of Chinese scientists themselves is significant: "Due to the sensitivity of a number of international issues, mainland China does not consider it appropriate to give its own estimates of the volume of the economy of foreign Chinese. Hong Kong, Taiwan and Macao are also slow to provide clarity. In countries where Chinese emigrants are a national minority, such assessments can easily lead to an aggravation of interethnic contradictions and harm Chinese emigrants. " ²⁶

In order to avoid confusion and various kinds of conflicts, China drew a clear line in its legislation back in the 50s between Chinese citizens and citizens of other states, clearly defining its duty to protect the interests of its own citizens and at the same time expressing its readiness to respect the interests of citizens of other states. The current "Law on Citizenship of the People's Republic of China" of September 10, 1980, based on both the principle of blood and the principle of soil, contains the following provisions::

"Article 3.The People's Republic of China does not recognize the dual citizenship of its citizens.

Article 4. A person who has both parents or one parent who is a Chinese citizen and was born in China has Chinese citizenship.

Article 5. If both parents or one parent are Chinese citizens, then a person born outside of China has Chinese citizenship. However, if only one of the parents who permanently resides outside of China is a Chinese citizen, then the newborn has foreign citizenship and does not have Chinese citizenship.

Article 6. If parents who do not have citizenship or with unclear citizenship permanently reside in China, then their child born in China has Chinese citizenship."

Other articles of the Law confirm Article 1: a person who has received Chinese citizenship is deprived of foreign citizenship, and a person who has received foreign citizenship is deprived of Chinese citizenship.

This also applies to huaqiao. The Chinese Government approves and supports the voluntary acceptance of citizenship of the host country by Huaqiao emigrants, while expressing a number of requirements and wishes to them. The materials of the Chinese consular service emphasize:: "A person who voluntarily accepts the citizenship of another country is a foreign citizen, he must enjoy all the rights and fulfill all the duties of a citizen of this country. However, by losing his Chinese citizenship, Huaqiao also " retains a kinship link with the Chinese people."

If Huaqiao remains a Chinese citizen, the Chinese government obliges him to " observe the laws and customs of the country of residence, live in friendship with the local population, and contribute to the development of the economy of the country of residence."

As for people of Chinese origin with foreign citizenship ("wai ji huazhen"), their rights and interests are protected by the laws of their respective countries. In China, they can act as foreign entrepreneurs and in this capacity enjoy the protection of the relevant laws of the People's Republic of China. At the same time, the guidelines for consular work state:: "Since many foreigners of Chinese origin have relatives in the country, we consider them as our own people, protect and develop their kinship, close ties with our country." On the territory of China, in the business sphere, foreigners of Chinese origin are actually subject to many of the most important rights granted to emigrant citizens (huaqiao).

The main thing that China has a stabilizing effect on the relations of Chinese diasporas with the local population is the following. The Chinese Government is making the most serious efforts to establish in international public opinion the image of a peace-loving and responsible power that strictly adheres to the rules of civilized behavior, and this is achieved both by means of foreign policy propaganda and by real behavior, as exemplified, for example, by the settlement of relations with the ASEAN countries.

The Chinese government's cautious, low-key "diaspora perimeter" policy does not mean passivity when conflicts arise between Chinese migrants and local authorities. Unfortunately, similar conflicts have already occurred several times in Russia. For example, in May 2004, at a Moscow market, police arrested a large shipment of Chinese goods imported into Russia through the "gray customs clearance"channels. In May 2005, there was a clash between Chinese workers and Russian police officers in Irkutsk. In the same year, 2005, an investigative case was initiated on the smuggling of a huge batch of shoes from China. In such cases, Chinese representatives invariably defend the interests of their fellow citizens, but at the same time show restraint and flexibility, strive to localize the conflict and demonstrate their readiness to resolve it gradually, through careful study and discussion of the issue, without compromising the development of bilateral relations.

It is interesting to see what Chinese scholars themselves say about Beijing's "diaspora" policy. From their point of view, the policy towards foreign citizens of Chinese origin should not be passive, however, it should be prudent and appropriate.-

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rect, so as not to accidentally expose them to a blow.

Further, Chinese scientists politely but firmly reject the hypotheses that appear in Western literature regarding the future, even in the distant future, "threat" resulting from the increase in the economic weight of the Chinese diaspora. According to Chinese scholars, such an interpretation of figures indicating the financial strength of the diaspora and the presence of a large percentage of ethnic Chinese in the list of Asian super-rich is a one-sided, distorted image of the diaspora, "which can only provoke anti-Chinese sentiments among Asian ethnic groups, especially in the young Southeast Asian countries." ²⁷

Chinese experts have their own point of view on the growing scale and pace of the emigration process from China. At the turn of the last and present centuries, China became the main source of international migration flows. Over the last two decades of the twentieth century, the Chinese diaspora has grown by 2.4% annually. ²⁸ Statistics suggest that China may take a dominant position in the global migration system and, ultimately, change the nature of host societies.

However, Chinese scientists criticize this version of the" Chinese threat " and assess emigration from China in a completely different way. At present, they believe, "the mass of Chinese migrants that has spread all over the world has already become a force that has an important impact on the world economy, science, technology and culture every day and attracts the close attention of all mankind." ²⁹ Chinese emigration is a special phenomenon: its participants, unlike Western colonizers, conquerors and racists, who throughout their history have been engaged exclusively in peaceful labor, without violating local laws. Therefore, the Chinese diaspora in its classical forms can "serve as a fruitful model for the future migration wave maturing in human society" ³⁰.

As for the future, "in an age of rapid economic globalization, with China's openness to the outside world, it will be difficult to avoid the migration of some other part of the population abroad." ³¹ One should not forget, however, that the number of Europeans living outside Europe is 50% of its "internal" population. The same is true for the population of many countries in Africa. Meanwhile, the Chinese diaspora still accounts for less than 3% of China's population, "which shows that the potential strength of the Chinese population's movement to the international sphere is very great." ³²

Thus, Chinese scientists emphasize that Chinese emigration is a natural phenomenon, regardless of its absolute size, which has an indisputable right to exist and plays a constructive role in the life of the international community. The Chinese diaspora should be fully present in the political arena of their host countries and seek equal status with the indigenous population, and the Chinese Government should provide appropriate forms of support to the diaspora.

¹ Deng Xiaoping lun qiaou / Gouyuan qiaou bangongshi, Zhong gong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi bian. Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe (Deng Xiaoping on working with emigrants / Ed.: Office of the State Council for Working with Emigrants, Office for Studying Documents of the CPC Central Committee. Publishing house of Central Committee documents). Beijing, 2000, p. 12, 13.

² World Migration 2005: Costs and Benefits of International Migration - http//www.iom.int/jahia/page255.html

^{Rajeswary Ampalavanar-Brown.} 3 Overseas Chinese Investments in China - Patterns of Growth Diversification and Finance // The China Quarterly. September 1998, N 155, p. 594.

⁴ People's Daily, 01.03.2005.

⁵ Gouyuan guan yu guli huaqiao he Hong Kong, Macao tongbao tou zi di guiding (State Council Decree on Investment Promotion for Huaqiao and Compatriots from Hong Kong and Macao) http://www.chinaqw.com.cn/node2/node2796/node2883/node3179/userobject6ai 156107.html

^{Gautam Sen.} 6 Post-reform China and the International Economy / Gautam Sen. International Relations, London School of Economics. First Hress - www.theglobalsite.ac.uk 2001, p. 4.

⁷ Working in China. China Daily. 08.04.2002.

^{Rajeswary Ampalavanar-Brown.} 8 Overseas Chinese Investments in China.., p. 612.

^{Dominique Guellec.} 9 Introduction - http://www.scidevnet/dossiers

¹⁰ A Promising Undertaking - http://www/chinahouston.org/news/2000825214035.html

^{Anna Lee Saxenian.} 11 Brain Sirculation and Capitalist Dynamics: The Silicon Valley - Hsinchu - Shanghai Triangle. CSES Working Paper Series. Paper N 8 / The Center for Economy and Society. Cornell University, Department of Sociology - http://www.economyandsociety.org/publications/wp8.pdf

^{Rajeswary Ampalavanar-Brown.} 12 Overseas Chinese Investments in China.., p. 613.

^{Gautam Sen.} 13 Post-reform China and the international economy.., p. 9.

¹⁴ A promising undertaking....

^{Anna Lee Saxenian.} 15 Transnational Communities and the Evolution of Global Production Networks: The Cases of Taiwan, China and India // East-West Center Working Papers. Economics Series. N 37. December 2001 p. 26.

¹⁶ A promising undertaking...

¹⁷ "Hai Gui": zhongguo baoyu di caifu (Returning specialists are a precious treasure of China) - http://www/cctv/com/abroad/20050228/102266/shtml

¹⁸ Zhong Hua Renmin Gunghego guiqiao qiaojuan quanyi baohu fa (Law of the People's Republic of China on Protection of the Rights of Huaqiao Returnees and Huaqiao Relatives) - http://www.chi-naqw.com.cn/node2/node2796/node2883/node3179/userobject6ai3723.html

¹⁹ Overseas-Chinese Enterpreneurship. WHF. E-magazine for the Globe Chinese Comminity. January 2004, N 3 - http://www.huaren.org

²⁰ About Us - http://www.huaren.org

²¹ Enter the Dragon: Building the Chinese Powerhouse, 6/26/94 -www.academic.brooklyn.cuny.edu/core9/phalsall/chinpress.html

^{George T. Haley, Chin Tiong Tan, Usha C. V. Haley.} 22 New Asian Emperors. Butterworth Heinemann, 1998.

²³ Survival. Winter 1997 - 1998, p. 141.

^{Phar Kim Bemg.} 24 Overseas Chinese: How Powerful are They? Asia Times online, 10.12/2002 - http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/DL10Ad04.html

²⁵ Ibidem.

^{Dan Chun.} 26 Lue lun hai wai huazhen jingji / / Hai wai huazhen yanju lun ji / He Shiyuan zhubian (Dan Chun. Kratko ob ekonomiki zarubezhnykh kitaytsev [Briefly on the economy of foreign Chinese]. He Shiyuan). Beijing, 2002, p. 194.

^{Dan Chun.} 27 Lue lun hai wai huazhen jingji.., p. 197.

^{Peter S. Li.} 28 Chinese Overseas as a Minority in Majority Settings. Proceedings II: the International Chinese Overseas Conference. 2001. Taipei, p. 19 - 40.

^{He Shiyuan.} 29 Hai wai huazhen yu guoji yimin yanju // Hai wai huazhen yanju lun ji ji (He Shiyuan. Izuchenie zarubezhnykh kitaytsev i mezhdunarodnoi migratsii [Studying foreign Chinese and international migration]. He Shiyuan). Beijing, 2002, p. 7.

³⁰ Ibid., p. 6.

^{Qiu Liben.} 31 Guoji renkou qianyi yu huaqiao huazhen yanjiu // Hai wai huazhen yanju lun ji ji (International migration of the population and the study of foreign Chinese / / Collection of works on the study of foreign Chinese). Beijing, 2002, p. 51.

³² Ibid., p. 53.

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