D. MOSYAKOV

Doctor of Historical Sciences

Political developments in South-East Asia (SE) in recent years are making major changes in the geopolitical landscape of both this region and the so-called Greater East Asia region, which usually includes China, Japan, and South Korea in addition to the Southeast Asian countries. Today, the struggle between the two most influential Asian superpowers-Japan and China - is increasingly active around Southeast Asia and the main landmarks and directions of its development.

The reason for the beginning of the confrontation was an unexpected event - a statement made by Beijing in 2003, according to which China announced its departure from the Singapore Agreements of 2000, when all the countries of Greater East Asia agreed to build a free trade zone together ^.1 In fact, violating the Singapore agreements, the Chinese leadership began to promote its own concept of creating a free trade zone( FTA), where neither Japan nor South Korea had a place.

WHAT ARE THE REASONS FOR CHANGING PRIORITIES?

Apparently, the change in priorities of the Chinese leadership was associated with both subjective and quite objective circumstances, among which the following should be particularly noted::

- the obvious irritation that the leadership in Beijing was provoked by the steps taken by the new Japanese government headed by Prime Minister Koizumi. The point is not only that the Japanese Prime Minister visited the Yasu-kuni Shrine, where Japanese military leaders responsible for unleashing the war in China and the Pacific are buried, ² but that with Koizumi's appearance in the forefront , the Chinese leadership hopes for deepening contradictions in relations between Japan and the United States and for a more independent foreign policy course from the United States The plans were unfulfilled;

- The undoubted success of economic and social development and the associated growing ambition of the Chinese leadership, which, in the wake of the economic recovery, came to the conclusion that China, independently and without consulting Japan and the Republic of Korea, can create the most attractive conditions for cooperation with the ASEAN countries separately from them.

Today, it is becoming increasingly clear that the decision to build a free trade zone in Southeast Asia independently and even in competition with Japan was based on a well-thought-out plan of action, in which political accents were and are even more important than economic ones. The fact is that from an economic point of view, the creation of a free trade zone is more in the interests of the Southeast Asian countries than of China. First, it opens up a huge Chinese market for the products of these countries (the annual growth of ASEAN exports to China exceeds 30%, and in 2003 it exceeded 50%, the trade surplus in 2002 was $ 6 billion, and in the first 9 months of 2003 - almost $ 10 billion).³. Secondly, within the framework of the" go abroad policy", that is, the situation when the Chinese authorities guarantee their private investors a return on their capital invested in the Southeast Asian countries, in the event of any force majeure circumstances, the ASEAN states have a real opportunity to achieve the flow of part of foreign direct investment to themselves, coming directly to China.

After all, if before the crisis of the late 1990s, up to 60% of all direct investment directed to Asia came to the Southeast Asian countries, then after the crisis, the same 60% of investment began to flow to the PRC (and together with Hong Kong, China's share reached 80%). At the same time, the share of ASEAN countries has declined sharply and now stands at just over 14% ^.4 It is obvious that such a sharp change in the direction of the main flow of investment had the most negative impact on the process of the ASEAN countries ' exit from the 1997-1998 financial and economic crisis. The growth of production and GDP in 1999-2000 in these countries is very different from that in other countries.-

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The economic growth rate lagged from pre-crisis indicators and a new powerful impulse was needed to restore stable development. Such an impulse for them was additional investment from China, which, according to the Japanese newspaper Yomiuri, has increased annually by 20% in recent years, and in some ASEAN countries - by 40% ^.5

IS POLITICS "MORE IMPORTANT" THAN THE ECONOMY?

Based on the above, we can definitely say that there is an obvious and direct economic interest on the part of the ASEAN countries in creating a free trade zone with China. At the same time, there is no special economic interest on the part of the PRC comparable to that experienced by the Southeast Asian countries. Moreover, according to most experts who study this problem, by opening its borders to goods from ASEAN countries and allowing part of direct investment to go to Southeast Asia, China is economically at a loss. All this shows that by insisting on the establishment of a China-plus-ASEAN FTA with the ASEAN countries as soon as possible and taking the most active steps in this direction, the authorities in Beijing are pursuing not so much economic as political goals.

Indeed, if you carefully analyze Chinese policy in the region, you can find very significant political interests, the implementation of which depends, first of all, on the pace and success of creating an FTA, that is, a situation where the ASEAN countries will find themselves in a zone of dominant dependence on the Chinese market, Chinese investment and capital.

In principle, the desire to secure a dominant position in Southeast Asia has long been one of China's top foreign policy priorities, regardless of the merits of the individual leaders who are at the helm of the country. Under Mao Zedong, this goal was attempted by forcibly overthrowing the existing political regimes in Southeast Asia, based on underground communist parties and guerrilla armies. The result of this policy was to increase the distrust of local elites in the communist leadership in Beijing and almost completely end the political and economic ties of these countries with China.

The restoration of China's relations with the Southeast Asian countries, which began in the 1980s, was associated not so much with reconciliation, search for compromise and trust with the ruling regimes of these countries, but with a sharp intensification of Chinese expansion to the South-to the South China Sea islands - Paracel and Spratly. At that time, the Chinese leadership pursued a policy of vigorous penetration into the Southeast Asian region, and the main role in this process was played not by economic, but by military-political methods. The struggle over the Paracel Islands and the Spratly Islands with Vietnam, which ended in a real naval battle and the death of a Vietnamese warship ⁱⁿ 1988,6 unexpected landings of Chinese troops on unoccupied islands in the Spratly Archipelago, ⁷ bellicose statements regarding the ownership of all the islands of the South China Sea by China, 8 and, finally, the seizure of Mischief reefs in 1995,9 what brought Sino-Philippine relations to the brink of military conflict were all very obvious manifestations of a certain political course.

The pros and cons of this course for Beijing were obvious. On the one hand, the real promotion and seizure of territories that could be used as a springboard for new promotion and military-political pressure, and to ensure their economic interests in the event of the discovery of large oil reserves on the Spratly Islands shelf. But on the other hand, this course presupposed tense and strained relations with most of the ASEAN countries, which were actively rearming in the face of Chinese threats, trying to strengthen relations with the United States and in one way or another hinder Chinese expansion.

TRUST INSTEAD OF CONFRONTATION

Apparently, at some point in China, they realized the limitations and low effectiveness of military-political relations.

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They have also significantly changed the essence and manners of their behavior with the countries of South-East Asia. China has moved to implement a different plan of action, which is not intended to capture weakly protected areas of the Southeast Asian region through military actions, but to put the Southeast Asian countries in a position where China does not even need to resort to military-police measures to achieve its goals. Therefore, instead of confrontation and opposition to the ruling regimes in Southeast Asia, China has turned in the direction of seeking greater trust, establishing a wide variety of ties and interdependencies with them.

Initially, the emphasis was placed on the rapid development of the economy and trade. Thus, while in 1994 the trade turnover between China and the ASEAN countries did not exceed $ 15 billion, in 2003 it exceeded $ 50 billion. ¹⁰ Following this, a course was taken to create an atmosphere of partnership, good neighborliness and mutual trust.

The first outlines of such a policy emerged in 1997, when the Joint Cooperation Committee11 was established , which quickly became one of the important channels for maintaining ties between China and ASEAN, coordinating their interaction in various areas. Following this, Beijing unveiled five main areas of participation in Southeast Asian affairs ^.12 These areas are as follows:

- cooperation in the field of agriculture;

- creation and implementation of modern high technologies;

- efficient use of labor resources, including creating a framework for bringing business conditions closer together in the ASEAN countries and in China;

- expansion of mutual investments;

- China's participation in the implementation of hydropower and reclamation projects in the Mekong River basin.

Naturally, all these areas of economic cooperation with China could not fail to interest the ASEAN countries, because they were talking about approaches to solving the most important and significant problems for them. Among the Chinese proposals for cooperation, the item concerning the joint development of the Mekong basin was particularly prominent. This is potentially a very dangerous point for the unity of ASEAN, because here China did not act as a partner of ASEAN as a whole, but rather as a partner of individual countries of the bloc - Laos, Thailand, Cambodia and, to a lesser extent, Vietnam.

"CRISIS-PROOF" CHINA-AN EXAMPLE TO FOLLOW

The events related to the 1997-1998 financial and economic crisis can be considered a turning point in relations between ASEAN and China. China has managed to show itself extremely positively in the eyes of the ruling elites of the ASEAN countries: it has not devalued the yuan and has provided quite significant assistance to countries particularly affected by the crisis, thereby significantly improving its image in their eyes.

The subsequent positive response of the ASEAN member States to China's new policy of rapprochement and cooperation was quite understandable and related to several important factors:

- the already mentioned difficult economic situation in which the ASEAN countries found themselves, when they lost the lion's share of foreign direct investment, which after the crisis was reoriented to China, which sharply weakened their position;

- there is an obvious crisis in the attitude of the regional ruling elites to the policies of Western countries, and, above all, the United States. The trust of these elites in the West was severely damaged during the crisis, as their self-esteem was wounded by the undisguised Western dictate, which was carried out by the IMF. In this regard, there has been a noticeable change in the psychological atmosphere in the region. Anti-Westernism and pan-Asian nationalism began to manifest almost everywhere in the ruling circles of the ASEAN countries, which became an additional factor that contributed to the development of cooperation with Beijing;

- China's rapidly growing economic potential allowed it to be considered as a new "motor" of the Asian economy and regional development. Therefore, the policy that the ASEAN countries could afford to pursue with regard to an economically weak China in the 1970s and 1980s, they could no longer pursue with regard to a strong China in the 2000s.

ASEAN + 1 FORMULA GETS SUPPORT

Thus, the proposal for the formation of a single economic zone under the "ASEAN + 1" formula, where China was the only unit, fell on well-prepared ground. At the same time, having achieved the signing of the document on the establishment of a free trade zone, Beijing immediately began to implement a pre-prepared program, the purpose of which was to fill the Brunei Agreements ¹³ with real content as quickly as possible, and to draw the ASEAN countries, especially their financial and administrative elite, even deeper into cooperation with China.

Since 2001, numerous committees for cooperation between China and ASEAN countries in specific areas have been organized ^.14 The exchange of mutual visits of officials of different ranks, sending students to study, and holding numerous symposia of both small and medium-sized businesses and managers in certain industries has increased several times ^.15 For example, in 2003 alone, several conferences were held in China with the participation of representatives of agribusiness in ASEAN countries, specialists in various fields of the economy, and representatives of small and medium-sized businesses ^.16 In 2003, China prepared the first truly revolutionary economic agreement-the gradual elimination of tariffs on mutual exports ^and importations17, which indicates significant progress towards the formation of a single free trade zone.

At the same time, other developments indicate that the yet-to-be-born China-ASEAN free trade area is rapidly outgrowing its proper economic framework. Recently, China has made a number of important foreign policy gestures-signed up to-

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The Treaty on confidence-building measures in the South China Sea and conflict prevention there18 has almost completely suspended its expansion in the Spratly Archipelago. An equally significant political act was Beijing's official accession to the Bali Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (1976) ^.19

In response, the ASEAN countries, in turn, took an important step towards Beijing, officially confirming during the last summit in Bali that they had agreed to establish a strategic partnership with Beijing ²⁰ . All this undoubtedly indicates that the degree of political rapprochement between China and the ASEAN countries became significantly higher in 2003.

Particularly interesting in this regard is the analysis of some of the results of the visit of the Chinese delegation headed by the new Premier Wen Jiabao to the Bali Summit of ASEAN Heads of State, held in October 2003. Wen Jiabao demonstrated a new Chinese dynamism to the ASEAN heads of State. According to media reports, he stayed at this resort for only 44 hours and during this time took part in 20 events, where he voiced 29 various initiatives and proposals, signed a number of documents. The new Chinese PREMIER unveiled Beijing's new regional doctrine, which he formulated as follows: : "Achieve good relations with your neighbors, maintain peace with your neighbors, and co-flourish with your neighbors." ²¹

In principle, there is nothing new in the doctrine proclaimed by the Chinese premier. All these provisions, in one way or another, were voiced earlier in the speeches of Chinese leaders. But in Wen Jiabao's words, they were not just a wish, but a goal of Chinese efforts in the region. Formulated in this way, they seem to determine China's increasing involvement in the affairs of its neighbors and, above all, the Southeast Asian countries. After all, in fact, if we look at this doctrine, we can talk about the fact that in order to maintain calm among its neighbors, China could interfere in their internal affairs. Myanmar, where" for the sake of peace " the Chinese actually took on financial support for the military regime, providing it with a loan of $ 200 million and along the way deploying their warships on the Arakan coast, near the Indian border, can be considered as the first example of the practical implementation of Beijing's new foreign policy doctrine. ²²

Today, it is becoming increasingly clear that neither Japan nor the United States can stop Chinese expansion in Southeast Asia. Japan is too pragmatic, self-serving from the point of view of Southeast Asian countries and is not ready, like China, to act "at a loss". The Japanese are delaying the creation of a free trade zone, an alternative to the Chinese one, and instead offer Comprehensive Economic Partenship - a comprehensive economic partnership that can only develop into a free trade zone in ^the long term23 . In addition, the popularity of the Japanese in the public opinion of the Southeast Asian countries is an order of magnitude lower than that of the Chinese. In Thailand, for example, 76% of the population called China their best friend, while only 8% called Japan their best friend. By the way, the United States was named best friend only slightly more than Thai respondents - only 9%²⁴ .

Apparently, neither Japan nor the United States are expected to make any breakthrough, and China is increasingly seen as the main engine that will lead Asian economies to new heights of development. The only question is whether all these hopes will remain illusory and whether the ASEAN countries, having reached the desired heights, will be able to remain truly independent, or whether they will find themselves under the broad shadow of their new patron and strict "big brother".

¹ See: Southeast Asia in 2000, Moscow, 2001, p. 6.

² "Japan Times", 16.01.2002.

³ China: Figures and Sites, Moscow, 2003, pp. 20-21.

⁴ Forging Closer ASEAN-China Econmic Relations (Partners in 21st Century) unpan 1. un. См. также: mason, gmu. Utarasint. pdg ASEAN-China relationship: p. 14 - 16.

⁵ "Yomiuri", 16.11.03.

⁶ Asian Security 1994 - 1995. Compiled by Research Institute for Peace and Security. L-W, 1996.

⁷ Ibid., pp. 27-28.

⁸ ITAR-TASS, 17.08.1995. Statement by Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qi-chen.

⁹ ITAR-TASS, 17.07.1995.

¹⁰ China: Figures and Sites, pp. 20-21. See also: "China and ASEAN Partnership of Good Neighborlines and Mutual Trust", Peking 2000 (www. fmprs.gov.cn).

¹¹ Asiatimes.ru. Development of China's relations with ASEAN. 16.02.2004.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ See: Southeast Asia in 2000, p. 6.

¹⁴ Asiatimes.ru. 16.02.2004.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ People's Daily Online. 19.08.2003.

¹⁷ Xinhua.net.com. 26.02.2003.

¹⁸ "China Daily", 10.10.2003. See also: Strana.ru news 195676.html.

¹⁹ Xinhua.net.com 11.10.03. A French newspaper noted a new rise in relations between China and ASEAN.

²⁰ ITAR-TASS, 08.10.2003.

²¹ Xinhua.net.com. 11.10.03. French newspaper...

²² See: Southeast Asia in 2000, p. 201.

²³ Framework for Comprehensive Economic Partership Between Japan and Association of South East Asian Nations, www.moja.go.jp(region)asia-pacifasean(pmv 03 10)framework.html.

²⁴ "Yomiuri", 16.11.03.

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