(On the results of the 17th CPC National Congress)

J. BERGER

Doctor of Historical Sciences

The national Congress of the ruling party, which has been held in recent decades with a clear regularity: once every five years, in the fall, invariably attracts a lot of attention both at home and abroad. This is not due to the fact that the congresses are expected (or feared) to make sharp turns in the course that the country is following. This course is set for many decades, and it is unlikely to change unless some unthinkable cataclysms occur. However, a periodic correction of the exchange rate is possible and necessary. This happens, as a rule, not at congresses, but at plenums of the CPC Central Committee between congresses.

It is not for nothing that the Chinese proverb says that small issues are solved at large gatherings, and big issues are solved at small meetings. Nevertheless, it is the authority of the Congress as the highest party organ that sanctifies and constitutes these decisions. The 17th Congress of the Communist Party of China, held in October 2007, authorized a number of significant amendments to the party's ideological and political guidelines, as well as to the socio-economic course. The renewal of the personal composition of the party leadership carried out at the congress is also of considerable importance.

It is important to emphasize that course corrections, as well as changes in the leadership core, are made in such a way that innovations do not destroy continuity, so that political stability is not disrupted. Stability and sustainability of power are considered as the most important component of long-term and successful development.

MARX'S FACE IS INCREASINGLY REMINISCENT OF CONFUCIUS

Even in the pre-reform era, the CCP's ideological platform was hardly monolithic. With the transition to reforms, its heterogeneity has increased even more. Nevertheless, the conglomerate's components are held together by a common core - the idea of China's rebirth as a great global power, which is the essence of Sinicized Marxism. The rest is modifications to the means and methods of achieving the main goal.

Each of the leaders who came to power after Mao Zedong sought to formulate, often not so much theoretically as aphoristically, their own approach to the problems that faced the country at the next stage of its development. For Deng Xiaoping, this was the establishment of a market economy while maintaining the CCP's absolute power. For Jiang Zemin, it is an expansion of the social base of the ruling party due to the changed structure of society. For Hu Jintao, it means changing the model of economic growth and easing social contradictions.

Accordingly, from the two-term formula: "Marxism-Leninism, the ideas of Mao Zedong", they first moved to the three - term formula, adding "Deng Xiaoping theory", and then to the four-term formula, where "important ideas of triple representation"are added. The official documents of the CCP do not yet directly indicate the authorship of the "three representative offices", but, as is known, they are associated with the name of the penultimate leader.

The 17th CPC National Congress approved Hu Jintao's ideological innovation in the form of a "scientific development concept". This concept originally appeared in the materials of the 3rd Plenum of the CPC Central Committee of the 16th convocation (October 2003). Two factors played a special role in the development of the new concept. The first of them was of an extraordinary nature. This is the SARS epidemic that emerged in the spring of 2003. The epidemic showed the weakness of the Chinese health care system and a number of other parts of the social security system. Another circumstance is concerns about the long-term "Chinese miracle", or rather, its driving forces. The model based on the cheapness of labor and natural resources, on the leading role of exports and investment, having provided unprecedented high rates of economic growth for more than two decades, has increasingly begun to reveal its negative properties. The social sphere was increasingly lagging behind, contradictions in society were growing, and the natural environment was being destroyed.

The new development approach assumes that the "five unified planning plans" (uge tongchou) will be implemented: economic and social development of cities and villages, regions, harmonious development of people and nature, internal development and external openness.

The "scientific concept of development" thus has an anti-crisis focus. It is designed to reduce China's vulnerability to current and future threats, risks and dangers, and strengthen the weakest links in the economic, social and other structures of society.

In purely logical terms, there may be confusion. Don't other components of the CCP's current ideological framework contain development ideas? Why was it necessary to put forward a special concept? The fact is that the current approach to development, as it is easy to see, is radically different from the classical Marxist or Maoist approach, although this difference, of course, is not openly recorded anywhere. Today, for obvious reasons, there is no question of a struggle of opposites, much less of a struggle of classes. The party has gone from being a militant revolutionary organization that blows up the old society to a ruling one that is interested in consolidating the existing order. Therefore, all the ideological pathos is aimed at raising the ideals of harmonization-both inside the country and in the outside world. In this regard, we can say that the process of Sinicization of Marxism has reached a new stage. Its original features are becoming less and less distinguishable. Just as the image of Christ took on Chinese ethnic features on the Taiping banners, today the image of Marx is becoming more and more like that of Confucius.

A special section is devoted to the" Scientific concept of development " in the report at the congress. Its main provisions are expanded and supplemented in other parts as well. They serve as a kind of tuning fork for determining the course in the spheres of economy, political system, culture, social construction, defense, national unity, foreign policy, and party building.

BOTH GOOD AND FAST

The economy remains at the center of efforts to "fully build a middle-class society" by 2020.The list of "new requirements for combat missions" opens with the call to "maximize both good and rapid economic development". This slogan is an important semantic inversion. Previously, "fast" preceded "good". Rearrangement of attributes should show that the quality of growth, if not given priority over the pace, is at least given no less importance.

Another innovation is that by 2020, compared to 2000, it is now required to quadruple not just the total GDP, but also GDP per capita. Purely quantitatively, the new problem statement does not change much. To ensure the implementation of the initial target, the average annual GDP growth over the remaining 13 years was sufficient by 5%, and now it is about 6%. Both figures are significantly lower than today's 10-11%. Another thing is that at the same time the goal is to change the quality of growth, and this task is much more complex.

By highlighting the qualitative aspects of economic growth, the CPC thus shifts its focus from simply increasing the investment of factors of production such as labor and capital to making more efficient use of them. This requires further complex institutional reforms. It is also important to change the orientation points in a psychological way. If China is confidently moving to the leading positions in the world in terms of total GDP, then in terms of GDP per capita, it has not yet entered the top hundred countries. A preferred reference to this criterion can sober up those who tend to exaggerate China's success without noticing the challenges it faces.

Specifically outlining the priorities of the course to create a highly efficient, high-quality economy, Hu Jintao puts innovation, the creation of an innovative type of state, in the first place. Innovation is seen as the main lever for increasing the aggregate national power.

In recent years, China has made considerable progress in developing the production of high-tech goods, which indicates the undoubted achievements of the Chinese industry. At the same time, unlike Japan and the United States, where dependence on imported technologies does not exceed 10%, China depends on them for more than half. As the world's second largest producer of information electronics products, China relies almost entirely on imports of key technologies. Until recently, China's share of R & D spending in GDP was twice that of the United States, and three times that of Japan and the Republic of Korea. In comparison with developed countries, support for basic science is insufficient.

All this shows that China has a long and difficult way to go to achieve this goal, find considerable resources, restructure scientific and technological policies,and significantly improve training. It is also clear that development will be even more important for China than before

international scientific and technical cooperation.

The most important priority of the economic strategy is the transformation of the economic growth model. The primary role in solving this problem is given to expanding domestic, first of all, consumer demand for goods and services produced in the country. The internal market should be at least as important for the country as the external one, which, in turn, requires major changes in the social sphere.

From the early 1990s to 2006, the share of domestic final consumption in GDP decreased from 62.0% to 51%, while the share of capital formation increased from 35% to 43% ^.1 The share of household consumption in GDP fell to 38.2%. In this respect, China differs significantly from other countries. According to the World Bank, since the 1990s, the average share of consumption in the world has mostly remained at the level of 77-79%.

The emphasis on a high rate of accumulation and investment, as well as the export orientation of the economy, were to some extent unavoidable for China, as well as for a number of other developing countries, at the stage of economic growth when domestic consumer demand, which was beginning to form, was insufficient to ensure the required dynamics. But long-term and sustainable socio-economic development in the long term can only be ensured by a progressive increase in domestic consumption and optimization of its structure.

Changing the model of economic growth also means abandoning the traditional method of industrialization with an emphasis on heavy industry, high costs of raw materials and energy, with the inevitable destruction of the natural environment. It is necessary to create a new economy, mainly of a post-industrial type, characterized by a high share of information technologies and services. In other words, it implies a deep restructuring of the economic structure. Such perestroika is associated not only with the transition from an extensive to an intensive development path, but in a broad sense also with the gradual elimination of the mobilization economy and the increasing inclusion of elements and mechanisms of a market economy.

Coordinated urban and rural development occupies an important place among the priorities of economic policy. The implementation of plans to build a middle-class society largely depends on the solution of rural problems.

The new generation of Chinese leaders who came to power after the previous CCP congress has done a lot to ease the situation of the peasants. A number of taxes have been abolished. For the first time, the city began to provide material support to the village, thereby reversing the trend of pumping resources in the opposite direction that had existed for many decades. Investment in rural infrastructure has increased. The State assumed the costs of compulsory education of peasant children. In rural areas, systems are being created to provide a minimum subsistence level and cooperative medical care.

Nevertheless, the gap between urban and rural areas, primarily in the level of income of the population, has not yet narrowed. In 2006, the average disposable income per urban resident was 11,759 yuan (about $ 1,530), and the net income per rural resident was 3,587 yuan (about $ 480).². Therefore, along with increasing support for agriculture, measures are proposed to increase non-agrarian employment of rural residents.

Palliative measures can somewhat improve the existence of the Chinese village, reduce the gap between the city and the countryside. But they are not able to put an end to the low productivity of small-peasant agriculture, which results from overpopulation and lack of land. A radical solution to these problems can only bring large-scale urbanization and industrialization of the village, as well as a radical restructuring of land relations. But this will take more than a decade and will require huge resources. This path has been taken by previous leaders of economic growth in Asia, but it is particularly difficult for China because of the gigantic size of its rural population.

HALF THE COUNTRY UNDER THE CANOPY OF ACID RAIN

The requirement of economical use of energy and other resources and environmental protection is the key and basis for long-term and sustainable development.

The current model of economic growth is increasingly exacerbating the problem of providing the economy and the population with such important resources as land, mineral raw materials, fresh water, and energy carriers. China's dependence on imports of major mineral raw materials increased from 5% in 1990 to more than 50% by early 2006. At the same time, raw materials and energy are used wastefully. In 2006, China's share of global GDP at the exchange rate was estimated at 5.5%, while its share in global energy consumption reached 15%, ferrous metals - 30%, cement - 54%, and fresh water-15%^.3 Per unit of energy and raw material consumption, the cost of goods produced in China is 4-6 times less than in developed countries. For the 11th five-year plan (2006-2010), the goal is to reduce specific energy consumption by 20%, but in 2006, the first year of the five - year plan, it not only did not decrease, but, on the contrary, increased even more ⁴.

In comparable production volumes, Chinese industry pollutes the environment many times more than in developed countries. Total emissions of sulfur dioxide reach almost 20 million tons, which puts China in the first place in the world in this indicator.⁵ During the years of the 10th five-year plan (2001-2005), sulfur dioxide emissions into the atmosphere, contrary to the planned targets, not only did not decrease, but, on the contrary, increased by 27%. In 2005, acid rain fell in 357 of the 696 cities observed. Atmospheric pollution-

this leads to the spread of respiratory diseases. Inland, coastal and ground waters are heavily polluted.

The report to the 17th CPC National Congress puts forward the idea of creating an "ecological culture" along with material and spiritual culture. Favorable ecology is one of the basic characteristics of comprehensive construction of a middle-income society by 2020.

After the congress ended, the State Council adopted a number of regulatory documents defining specific parameters of an extensive program to save energy and reduce harmful emissions into the environment and establishing a system of responsibility for their implementation. Heads of local governments and State-owned enterprises who do not comply with the prescribed standards will continue to be immediately removed from office. Perhaps these negative incentives will outweigh for officials the self-interest provided by reckless economic growth.

Balanced regional development is an essential component of China's economic strategy and policy in the new century. In recent years, the rate of increasing differences in the level of development of the eastern, western and central regions has slightly decreased, but in absolute terms, these differences have continued to increase. In other words, the task of inter-regional economic and socio-economic alignment is still being implemented slowly. In 2006, GDP per capita in Eastern China (including the northeast region) reached 25,663 yuan, in the Far West-16,660 yuan, and in the central regions-only 11,113 yuan. The differences between the most prosperous and the most backward administrative units are even greater. In Shanghai, the figure is 57,310 yuan, while in Guizhou it is only 5,750 yuan.⁶

The main factor determining the difference in the pace of regional development is still the amount of investment received. The size of net exports and the scale of consumption also play a role.

The Chinese leadership is ready to make further efforts to reduce regional development gaps. And on this path there are already the first successes. For example, in 2006, the largest increase in investment in fixed assets - by 49% (compared to the Chinese average of 24%) was recorded in the north-eastern province of Jilin. Investment growth was also higher than the national average in a number of provinces in northwest, southwest, and central China7.

The idea of joint development of all sectors of the economy, while maintaining the priority of the public sector, essentially continues and develops the line outlined by the previous 16th CPC Congress, and in a certain sense, the line of the 15th CPC Congress, which elevated the private sector to the rank of "an important component of the Chinese socialist market economy". The report of current General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee Hu Jintao at the 17th Congress, as well as the report of former General Secretary Jiang Zemin at the 16th Congress, calls for the development of the public sector along with non-state sectors.

THE PUBLIC SECTOR IS BEING REFORMED

Specific measures designed to ensure equal competition and mutual stimulation of various sectors of the economy are named. This includes, first of all, further reforming state-owned enterprises, transforming them into companies or joint-stock companies, improving the management of state property, and reforming state monopolies.

The reform of state-owned enterprises is expected to be completed by 2015-2020. During this period, the pluralization of ownership will continue, as a result of which enterprises will co-exist: with purely state capital, with absolute or relative predominance of it, as well as with state participation without holding a controlling stake. The goal is to create approximately 30 large state-owned corporations that are competitive in global markets.

The state curtails or dramatically reduces its presence in those industries where it is least competitive. Only those enterprises that are essential for the national security and life support of the country remain purely state-owned.

The development of non-state sectors makes it possible to solve a number of complex socio-economic problems of the country. Among them are the expansion of employment, a gradual shift away from the predominant promotion of economic growth through public investment, and easing the ever-increasing burden on the state budget and state-owned banks. The development of the private sector in China also serves as a counterbalance to the country's excessive dependence on foreign capital, which in an extreme situation can be fraught with serious risks.

The materials of the congress highlighted in-depth reform of the financial system, which is one of the problematic areas of the Chinese economy. Here we are talking about improving budget relations - both in the center and in the regions, about paying for the use of resources and the mechanism of compensation for the destruction of the natural environment, about further reform of banks, stock and insurance markets. Changes in the currency policy aimed at moving towards the free conversion of the yuan are envisaged. It is planned to further strengthen state control and state macro-regulation of the economy through the use of financial and monetary policy levers.

One of the most important problems in this area is the fact that a significant part of revenues and expenditures are outside the budget. These include, for example, fees and penalties levied by various legal entities.-

government agencies, administrative, judicial and law enforcement agencies, deductions from the profits of state-owned enterprises. Some of these revenues become a source of commercialization, corruption, and the swelling of the official apparatus, and are used to exert pressure on decision-making bodies.

On the eve of lifting restrictions on the activities of foreign banks in China, in accordance with its obligations to the WTO, the Chinese government took measures to strengthen the competitiveness of state-owned commercial banks. State gold and foreign exchange reserves were injected, strategic investors from abroad were attracted, and the share of non-repayable debts was reduced. However, the banking system is still far from meeting the needs of economic development. The mechanism of formation of " bad " debts still exists. The country's largest banks serve mainly state-owned enterprises, which often means that the non-state sector has to use the services of illegal credit institutions. Monetary support for the village is weak. Overcoming all these shortcomings is on the agenda of the banking and financial system reform.

The tax policy, which is currently based on the collection of value-added tax from enterprises, needs to be improved. A gradual reduction in the share of this tax will create a more balanced tax system.

Over the past two years, the Chinese stock market has made a huge quantitative and qualitative leap in its growth. It is very close to the level of developed countries. But at the same time, the fragility of stock markets, their exposure to external threats and risks, the risk of "bubbles" and collapses associated with fluctuations in domestic and global conditions are also increasing. All of this requires an extremely careful and balanced approach to combining reform and openness.

THE YUAN IS STRENGTHENING

Last but not least, the economic agenda of the 17th CPC National Congress is to further open up the Chinese economy to the outside world.

In recent years, China's role in global markets has increased many times. Its share in global imports and exports of goods increased from 3.6% in 2000 to 7.7% by 2006. In terms of foreign trade, China (excluding Hong Kong and Macao) ranked third in the world, after the United States and Germany.

Foreign trade makes a very big contribution to the dynamics of economic growth and serves as its important driving force. A long-term positive balance in foreign trade has provided the country with the first place in the world in terms of gold and foreign exchange reserves. At the same time, China's foreign trade also has a number of shortcomings, which the current economic course is aimed at eliminating.

Unlike other world trade leaders, China mainly supplies and consumes goods and, to a much lesser extent, services. In 2005, services accounted for only 10% of China's exports. In the world trade in services, China is ranked 8th. At the same time, if the world's leading positions in the service sector belong to such technology-intensive and knowledge-intensive industries as finance, insurance, consulting, postal and telegraph communications, then 55% of Chinese service exports are accounted for by transport and tourism. In the 11th five-year plan, it is planned to change the structure of foreign trade in favor of trade in services. It is planned that the average annual growth rate of trade in services will be twice the growth rate of all foreign trade.⁸

Since the 1990s, China has been pursuing a policy of increasing the scientific and technical component of its exports. In 2006, the total value of new and high-tech export products amounted to $ 281.5 billion, or 29% of the total export value. However, these products are still dominated by individual components and parts. In addition, 90% of new and high-tech products in China are produced by enterprises with foreign capital. The trade development program for the 11th five-year plan aims to significantly increase the export of products with domestic trademarks that are world-famous. It is planned to increase the share of national capital enterprises in exports from 20% in 2006 to 35% in 2010.

China's high foreign trade surplus is a source of economic and political friction with a number of its most important counterparties, primarily the United States. In 2006, the US trade deficit with China (including Hong Kong) was estimated at $ 232.5 billion. United States dollars. A campaign was launched in the Western press to discredit the quality of Chinese exports, with particular emphasis on the fact that they pose a threat to human health. Anti-dumping and anti-subsidy investigations have intensified.

To reduce the pressure on China, the Chinese government is taking steps to reduce its foreign trade surplus. Since July 2005, a significant increase in the exchange rate of the Chinese national currency has begun. Since 2006, the reimbursement of export duties on certain goods has been reduced, primarily those that caused the greatest friction with the West, and those whose production consumed a lot of energy and polluted the environment.

China's economic development at the present stage allows, and to a certain extent requires, a progressive increase in capital exports. By the end of 2006, the total amount of accumulated Chinese direct investment abroad reached $ 90.6 billion. ⁹ Up to 90% of China's non-financial investment abroad goes to countries and regions in Asia and Latin America. Capital is invested primarily in mining, as well as in the financial sector and the provision of business services.

Increased investment in <url>-

the exodus and outflow of foreign currency investments from the country help to balance the trade surplus, ensure the balance of payments and moderate expectations of a major revaluation of the yuan. So far, however, China accounts for just over 0.5% of global foreign investment. Beijing is not satisfied with this situation. That is why he recently created a state investment corporation with the transfer of $ 200 billion from the state's gold and foreign exchange reserves. It is planned to create Chinese multinational corporations.

SCHOOLS FOR PEASANT CHILDREN

The report of the CPC Central Committee to the 17th Congress differs structurally from the reports of previous congresses, in particular in that it includes for the first time a section specifically devoted to social policy.

On the one hand, the policy of primarily innovative economic development and the desire to reduce social injustice in society require ensuring equal opportunities in access to education and improving its quality. To implement the necessary and urgent changes in the field of education, considerable material resources and a certain adjustment of the state's educational policy are needed.

The Program of Reform and Development of Education in China adopted in 1993 by the CPC Central Committee and the State Council of the People's Republic of China stipulated that budget expenditures on education in China should reach 4% of GDP by 2000. This goal, however, was not achieved. The implementation of this task was attributed to 2005. But even in 2005, the share of budget expenditures on education in GDP was only 2.82%.

China ranks 108th in the world in terms of school-age enrollment. Such coverage is particularly low in some of the north-western and south-western provinces, where in some cases it does not reach the level of 1953. Rural residents, especially in economically backward areas, are significantly less likely to receive a high-quality education than urban residents, especially in developed eastern provinces. A significant part of the cost of children's education is borne by the families of students, which often turns out to be an unbearable burden for them and leads to dropout rates.

Since 2005, the State has gradually begun to exempt rural families experiencing financial difficulties from paying for compulsory education and provide subsidies for children to live in dormitories attached to schools. By 2010, the Government aims to achieve full implementation of free compulsory education in rural areas throughout the country.

The surplus of labor, especially in rural areas, on the one hand, and the displacement of live labor as a result of technological progress, on the other, serve as a constant source of tension in providing jobs to the working-age population. The report of the CPC Central Committee to the 17th Congress suggests solving employment issues, first of all, through the development of independent entrepreneurship. The Government will have to step up its efforts in this area, using and improving market mechanisms and expanding the system of professional training of employees.

An important area where considerable effort is required to address or mitigate social inequities is income distribution.

Per capita national income in China is growing rapidly. For 2002-2006. it increased from $ 1,100 to $ 2010, or almost twice as much. During this period, wages of workers and employees increased by an average of 12% per year, i.e. faster than GDP grew. At the same time, property and social differentiation in China has taken on a scale rarely seen in the world. The Gini coefficient, which shows the degree of stratification of society, has reached 0.46, which exceeds the rational limit and even the security limit.

The number of dollar millionaires in China increased from 124,000 to 310,000 between 2001 and 2006, putting China in fifth place in the world in this indicator, after such economically developed countries as the United States, Japan, England and Germany. This upper class, which makes up less than 0.01% of the total number of families in China, owns 41.4% of the country's property. This is almost a third more than the global average. A fifth of the country's total wealth is in the hands of an even smaller group of families. Financial resources from these families exceed $ 5 million. The number of such families increased from 14,000 to 48,000 between 2001 and 2006.10 At the same time, at the end of 2006, 21 million people in the Chinese countryside were living in absolute poverty and another 35 million were barely making ends meet. And in cities, 20 million people had incomes below the subsistence level. There is a very large difference in income between residents of cities and villages, different regions of the country, and between employees of different branches of the national economy.

In recent years, the Government has taken measures to reduce the income and wealth gap between certain social groups. To this end, the tax burden was reduced and subsidies for the rural population were increased, pension provision in cities was increased, and re-employment of employees dismissed from state-owned enterprises was stimulated. Since January 1, 2006, the tax-free salary level has been raised to 1,600 yuan (about $ 200), and since July, the regulation of salaries of employees and pension provision for employees of enterprises has begun. However, there is still a long way to go before a noticeable reduction in social inequality.

In the report of the CPC Central Committee to the 17th CPC Congress, the previous position that economic efficiency is given priority in the primary distribution of income, and social justice is taken into account mainly in the redistribution of income through fiscal and other policies was changed.-

ci of the state. For the first time, the policy document suggested that "the relationship between efficiency and equity should also be properly regulated in primary distribution", and that "even more attention should be paid to equity"in reallocation. This suggests that the current leadership is more determined than before to somehow limit the tendency to widen the gap between rich and poor. The report also suggests that the share of remuneration for work should be increased in the primary distribution of income.

They stressed the need to create a social security system as soon as possible, which would cover both urban and rural populations and include pensions, basic medical care, and guarantees of a living wage for the population. Currently, in all these areas, the population is experiencing a serious shortage.

A POOR MAN CAN'T AFFORD TREATMENT

Healthcare is in a particularly difficult situation. Medical statistics show that the main positive changes in the health status of the population were achieved in the pre-reform period. During the years of market-based economic reforms, no significant changes for the better have taken place. Thus, a sharp decline in child mortality occurred immediately after the founding of the PRC, and in the 1980s and 1990s, this indicator changed little.

According to opinion polls, the population in China puts the high cost of medical services in the first place among all social problems. These services account for an average of 11.8% of the household budget, second only to food expenses. For 25% of poor peasant families, the necessary medical expenses would exceed their annual income.

The share of government spending on health care in GDP was only 0.95% in 2003, compared to 3.1% in the middle-developed countries that China aspires to join. Since the beginning of the reformist course in 1978 and up to 2002, the share of the State and employers in the structure of total health care expenditures has steadily decreased, while the share of individuals has increased. As a result, in 2003, the State accounted for only 17% of expenditures, enterprises and social institutions accounted for 27%, and the remaining 56% of health care expenditures were borne by citizens themselves.¹¹ Per capita expenditures for outpatient and inpatient treatment grew significantly faster than income. In this respect, mainland China is significantly inferior to Taiwan.

Social inequality in access to health services has increased. According to a study conducted by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 80% of government spending on medicine goes to serving the social group, which is based on $ 8.5 million. government officials and party functionaries.

For the urban population in China, there is a health insurance system. However, employees of private and foreign enterprises, as well as unemployed and rural residents who come to work in the city are excluded from this system. In recent years, the village has been experimentally working to create a system of medical services on a cooperative basis. However, the system suffers from a serious lack of funds and is unable to provide serious support to the population.

80% of public health spending goes to the city, while only 20% goes to the countryside. Complete or partial loss of working capacity due to the lack of timely and high-quality medical care is often the cause of the plight of a peasant family. According to the State Council Development Research Center, the average cost of treating a serious illness is 7,000 yuan, which is more than three times the average annual net income of a peasant. ¹²

The country's ability to develop the social sphere is ultimately determined by objective material conditions, primarily by the amount of GDP per capita. However, the subjective aspirations of leaders, their willingness to pay the necessary attention and adequate resources to this area also play a significant role. The materials of the 17th CPC National Congress give reason to hope for positive progress in this direction.

POLITICAL REFORMS ARE NOT A PRIORITY

The materials of the 17th CPC National Congress do not give critics of the Chinese political system any hope for radical changes in this area, at least in the foreseeable future. The report at this congress even muted the emphasis on the importance of political reforms, which was traditionally heard in the reports of former General Secretary Jiang Zemin at the previous three congresses. And at the 13th Congress, Secretary General Zhao Ziyang's report was one of the central topics. However, Zhao Ziyang fell out of favor.

There is also no talk in Hu Jintao's report about separating the functions of the ruling party and the government, or about preventing excessive concentration of power, which Deng Xiaoping once referred to as the most important tasks.

At the same time, Hu Jintao refers to the concept of democracy in different connotations at least 60 times in his report. In his previous article (Asia and Africa Today, 2007, No. 8), the author of these lines wrote in sufficient detail about the discussions around the projects of democratic transformation both within the ruling party itself and outside it. Today, we can say that the 17th CPC National Congress adopted the most minimalist of them.

Internal party democracy has been chosen as the primary area of change. One of the measures to strengthen it is considered to be an experimental transformation

party congress at the county level to a permanent body for the term of office of its delegates. Local party committees undertake to make important decisions, including appointing responsible employees, by voting. The Politburo of the CPC Central Committee is required to report periodically to the plenums of the CPC Central Committee, and the bureau of local party committees - to the plenums of the latter. Candidates to the governing bodies of grassroots party organizations can be offered both from above and from below, including non-partisan candidates. At the 17th Party Congress, the Central Committee elections were secret and partly alternative (there were 8.3% more nominees), but the distribution of votes was not reported.

As far as non-party democracy is concerned, the promise to gradually bring the norms of electing delegates to the People's Representative assemblies by city and village residents in line with their number is noteworthy. Now four times as many deputies are elected from the townspeople as from the villagers. This rule was introduced back in the 1950s to ensure the leadership role of the working class. It also emphasizes the importance of developing democracy at the basic level. However, the expected spread of direct elections of grassroots authorities from villages to towns and parishes did not occur.

One of the most remarkable results of the 17th Congress is that it demonstrated the effectiveness of the mechanism for changing and updating the leadership, the foundations of which were laid by Deng Xiaoping. This mechanism provides not only permanent renewal and rejuvenation of the ruling elite, but also its qualitative improvement. Of course, in the ruling party of China, as in any political party, there are groups that have their own specific interests and seek to promote their representatives to leading positions in the party and state in order to realize them. However, such competition does not develop into a direct confrontation that can "turn the boat around". Certain rules are observed, which makes the gradual transfer of power from the older generation of leaders to the younger one an institution that is essential for the long-term crisis-free functioning of the political regime. It is well known that not all countries with economies in transition and transitional structures of power managed to create such an institution, which caused them considerable problems.

THE GERONTOCRACY BARRIER

The essence of the rules is quite simple. First, senior management positions cannot be held by people over the age of 70. This prevents the formation of a gerontocracy, which turned out to be a disaster both for pre-reform China and for a number of other socialist countries, including the Soviet Union. At the 17th Congress, three elderly members of the Standing Committee of the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee, the top level of the party leadership, voluntarily resigned. Second, top managers are elected for no longer than two five-year terms. Third, successors are included in the current leadership of the party no later than five years before the expiration of its term of office. Thus, future leaders are known in advance and have the opportunity to properly express themselves. Moreover, if the final election at the congress is more or less formal, then the preliminary selection of candidates is a long-term, thorough, multi-stage process that takes into account their personal and business qualities, experience, reputation and, of course, connections. And it necessarily presupposes a consensus developed in the course of numerous agreements, mutual concessions and bargaining by all the most influential forces and persons in the party.

So what is the fifth generation of Chinese leaders, who will have to fully take over the reins of government by 2022 in just five years after the 18th CPC Congress?

First of all, these are mature people, in their early fifties, who have considerable life experience and have already proven themselves to be successful in fairly high positions. Their early youth came during the chaotic years of the Cultural Revolution. Many took part in these events in one way or another, but then they were exiled to the countryside and thus tasted all the hardships of peasant labor. After the chaos ended, with the normalization of life in the country, the vast majority managed to enter universities and get a decent education. Moreover, some have acquired academic degrees, mainly in the social sciences. This distinguishes them from the fourth generation of managers, where techies predominate, and those who studied earlier, at a less favorable time for mastering the profession.

Some of the figures who have just joined the ranks of the top echelon of the Chinese leadership, like the current General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee, Hu Jintao, came from among the leading functionaries of the Komsomol. This eventually led to their promotion to the CCP, although not without some complications at the beginning. The fact is that they began to climb the career ladder in the harsh years that followed the tragic events in Tiananmen Square in the summer of 1989. At that time, the conservatives in the Central Committee of the CPC, who controlled the political situation, were suspicious of people from the Komsomol, who were not without reason suspected of sympathizing with the rioting students. But a few years later, when the reformist trends were strengthened at the top, everything went well for them. Prior to the congress, former Komsomol leaders held about a third of the top leadership positions at the provincial level (party secretaries and governors) and about a quarter of ministerial posts in the State Council of the People's Republic of China. They formed the talent pool and backbone of Hu Jintao's team.

Other neophytes belong to the so-called "party of princes". This category in China includes the descendants of top-level leaders of the party and state. They

they didn't always grow in greenhouses. Many people suffered a lot of hardships during the years of the "cultural revolution". But then, using the prestige and connections of their fathers, they gained considerable status and wealth of their own, succeeding both in business and in a political career.

Rivalry and interaction between Komsomol members and "princes"does not exhaust the complex alignment of internal party forces of influence. Senior managers who are retiring due to their age retain considerable political weight. Their interests are vigorously defended by elites associated with state monopolies in the economy, the generals, and regional authorities.

WHO IS THE SUCCESSOR?

The nine-member Standing Committee of the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee was joined by four new members at the 17th CPC Congress. It has not yet been determined which of them will replace the General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee when Hu Jintao leaves the post at the next congress in five years.

At the time, Deng Xiaoping appointed Jiang Zemin as his successor, and Hu Jintao as Jiang Zemin's successor, determining with all the weight of his authority the indisputability of such a change of main figures for many years to come. Today, Deng Xiaoping is no longer there, and none of the most influential figures: neither the former head of the CPC Central Committee, Jiang Zemin, nor its current head, Hu Jintao, have sufficient authority to independently decide such crucial issues. So we have to negotiate.

Today, it is believed that Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang have the greatest chances. The first one belongs to the group of "princes". His father, the head of the propaganda department of the CPC Central Committee, was one of the first victims of the "cultural revolution"together with his family.

15-year-old Xi Jinping was sent to a remote mountain village in the north-west of the country in January 1969 to be re-educated by hard physical labor in the People's commune. He stayed there until 1975, but managed to become secretary of the local party cell. After completing the Cultural Revolution, he graduated from the prestigious Tsinghua University in Beijing with a bachelor's degree in chemical engineering and a Master's degree in law, and continued his party career. As vice mayor of the city of Xiamen, which is separated only by a narrow strait from Taiwan, Xi Jinping greatly promoted trade between the island and the mainland. In recent years, Xi Jinping has headed party committees in a number of affluent eastern provinces. In Fujian, he made every effort to attract foreign investors, and in Zhejiang, he worked closely with the national private capital.

Li Keqiang also experienced the hardships of peasant labor in one of the poorest villages in his early youth at the end of the cultural Revolution. In 1978, after passing a huge competition, he managed to enter the law Faculty of Peking University. Some of his fellow practitioners later occupied important positions in the Chinese legal system, while others became dissidents. After completing his studies, Li Keqiang combined a successful political career in the Komsomol with scientific work in the field of economics. For one of his publications, he was awarded a prestigious prize, and in 1994 he received an academic degree. Later, like Xi Jinping, he served as the first secretary of provincial party committees, but in areas that are much less prosperous, and partly depressed, where social problems, first of all, employment problems are much more acute. For the past three years, he has been the head of Liaoning Province, where the unemployment rate is incomparably higher than the national average. Today, the Chinese press praises Li Keqiang primarily for his concern for ordinary people, for his attention to their needs and troubles, for his accessibility and simplicity in communicating with the people. During Li Keqiang's short term in office, Liaoning Province has become one of the leaders in the country's economic growth.

It is believed that Hu initially intended Li Keqiang, a fellow Komsomol member and fellow Communist Party member, to be appointed General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee, but then, under pressure from Jiang Zemin, he was forced to concede in favor of Xi Jinping.

Perhaps it was Xi's long-standing ties to the elite of the country's most advanced eastern regions that drew him to the attention of Jiang Zemin, who himself hails from Shanghai, China's richest city. However, it is unlikely that there is

reasons to consider Xi Jinping a creature of Jiang Zemin. Initially, he is said to have placed a bet on a different person - Chen Liangyu. Just over a year ago, he was the head of the Shanghai City Committee of the CPC and a member of the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee. However, in September 2006, through the joint efforts of Hu Jintao and the second person in the party, Zeng Qinghong, he was accused of corruption, removed from all posts and arrested.

Therefore, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao had to agree on Xi Jinping as a neutral figure, arranging different groups in one way or another. Even the name "Jinping" given to him at birth - "well-disposed to balance" - speaks about the balance of his nature, the rejection of extremes. It is thanks to this, as well as good connections, personal and business qualities, that Xi Jinping managed to make a huge career leap. At the 15th CPC National Congress, he was just a candidate member of the CPC Central Committee, at the 16th he was a member of the CPC Central Committee, and at the 17th he immediately became a member of the narrow leading core of the party-the Standing Committee of the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee.

TOWARDS A HARMONIOUS WORLD

Before the congress, the party leadership was under intense pressure from a number of former party and state functionaries, who sought a radical revision of the current course. Critics on the left have attacked market reforms as the root of all evils: the growing gap between rich and poor, corruption, and the abandonment of socialist ideals. Critics on the right demanded that political institutions be brought into line with the changed socio-economic framework.

The voices on the left were especially loud. In July 2007, a series of letters to Hu Jintao and the CPC Central Committee were signed by former party and State officials. In one of them, which appeared on the Internet on the website "Banner of Mao Zedong" ("Mao Zedong Qizhi") and signed by such personalities as Ma Bin, former adviser to the Development Research Center at the State Council of the People's Republic of China, former Minister of Chemical Industry Qin Zhonghua, former head of the State Statistical Office Li Chengrui, former Ambassador to the Soviet Union Yang Shouzhen, it was said that the troubles caused by the reforms cause complaints and anger in society, and if immediate measures are not taken to correct the situation, people like Yeltsin will appear, and the party and state will collapse. Other letters signed by well-known people also demanded that the 17th Congress of the Communist Party take measures to prevent the collapse of the CPSU and the Soviet Union.

The voices on the right were less resonant and less peremptory, although they also belonged to very prominent figures, such as Hu Qili (a former member of the Politburo Standing Committee of the CPC Central Committee), Wang Guangying (who held important posts in the highest legislative body of the PRC), Chen Jinhua (a former member of the CPC Central Committee and a minister).

The 17th Congress of the Communist Party of China took into account the concerns about the real problems in Chinese society and outlined, as mentioned above, some concrete approaches to solving them. At the same time, he strongly rejected calls for curtailing China's economic reforms and opening up to the outside world. Hu Jintao's report and other documents of the congress once again declare that the Chinese Communist Party remains committed to building socialism with Chinese characteristics and development. Social harmony is recognized as an essential attribute of socialism and development. Hence the desire to smooth out as much as possible the contradictions and conflicts within the ruling party, in society, as well as in the international arena.

Thus, the main outcome of the 17th Congress of the Communist Party of China is to correct the course, first of all, in social and economic policy in order to prevent further aggravation of accumulated problems and contradictions and thereby optimize the conditions for long-term sustainable development of the country. However, it would be wrong to assume that such an adjustment has only an internal dimension. Its significance goes far beyond the country's borders, primarily because of the influence that China already has on the fate of the world today.

Today, China is the most important producer of consumer and other goods for the global market. Tomorrow is one of the centers of innovation, a global provider of high-tech services and a global investor. The day after tomorrow, with the conversion of the yuan into a convertible and reserve currency, it will become one of the most important financial centers. And then the new Chinese model of development that is being formed now, if successful, may become attractive to other countries. And then the paradigm of universal harmony proposed by China to the world can turn into a considerable "soft power", ready to compete with the model of development of society and economy that the West embodies.

¹ United Nations Statistics Division. National Accounts - http://unstats.un.org/unsd/snaama/resultsCountry.asp?Country=156&SLevel=99&Yea

^{Zhou Tianyong.} 2 Jiuding zeyang cai nan xiao cheng xiang shouzhu chaju. [How to really reduce the income gap between urban and rural areas]. Zhongguo jingji shibao. 22.10.2007.

³ Xinhua News Agency. 18.10.2007.

^{Chi Jianguo.} 4 Fazhan xiangdai xunhuan jingji zou kechixu kuaisu cengzhang dy "Zhongguo daolu". [Develop a modern waste-free economy, follow the "Chinese path" of rapid long-term growth]. Qianxian. 25.10.2007.

⁵ Zhongguo jingji zhoukan. 30.07.2007.

^{Liu Yun, Lee Hsien.} 6 2006 nanny / 2007 nanny wogo quyu jingji fazhan taishi fenxi. [Analysis of the situation in the development of the regional economy of China in 2006-2007]. Zhongguo jingji shibao. 22.10.2007.

⁷ Ibid.

^{Ma Xin.} 8 Zhongguo wai mao ji xu yu cu zhuan jing. [China's foreign trade urgently needs to go from extensive to intensive]. People's Daily haiwai ban. 29.08.2007.

⁹ Zhongguo jingji shibao. 18.09.2007.

¹⁰ Xinhua News Agency. 30.10.2007.

¹¹ Zhongguo jingji shibao. 11.03.2007.

¹² Dongfang wang. 20.02.2006.

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