WHY IS A COUNTRY WITH EXCELLENT CONDITIONS FOR CONDUCTING HIGHLY PRODUCTIVE AGRICULTURE CONSTANTLY WAITING FOR FAMINE

A. O. FILONIK

Candidate of Economic Sciences

Sudan is one of the largest countries in Africa and the entire Arab world. Its natural resources, especially agricultural ones, are literally endless, and it could become the breadbasket of the entire Arab East. But poor governance, coupled with a run-down agriculture and weak industry, vast expanses and a small population, has prevented it from getting back on its feet and taking the right steps towards its future for decades. Although measures to save the economy have been implemented since the 1990s, and changes in economic legislation have been introduced in recent years, they have not yet been able to move the flywheel of progress and start a new countdown for this reserve of backwardness and poverty.

Perhaps the savior of Sudan will be oil. It has already raised the per capita income, and in the future, perhaps, it will be able to do more. But the country remains a peasant country, only indirectly involved in the economic processes that have engulfed a more dynamic world. There are many reasons for what is happening in this country, and not the least of them lies in the specifics of its agar structure.

"CREEPING IN" INTO THE FUTURE

In the Arab table of ranks, Sudan was lost in the last ranks for many years. Reports about him, if they appeared in the Arab media, occupied the most modest places and were served in a telegraphic style. Reports on major regional events did not pay much attention to it, and analysts did not find time to follow the state of its economy. Sudan was in a state of chronic anemia and oblivion, from which only the events in Darfur and the discovery of oil fields had brought it out.

According to the UN classification, the country is classified as a least developed country and is experiencing chronic difficulties due to structural imbalances in the economic system, political and social instability, and other factors. This place may remain for a long time, since even the growth of oil production revenues is unlikely to bring it out of stagnation in the near future - so great is the backwardness and stagnation.

The Sudanese economy is predominantly agricultural. In the final five years of the last century, the share of agriculture in exports reached almost 90%, providing the largest amount of foreign exchange earnings. At the same time, the agricultural sector is the most important source of raw materials for the local manufacturing industry, a supplier of food and labor to the labor market.

With the beginning of the operation of oil fields, the situation began to change. The share of agriculture in gross domestic product (GDP) decreased from 46% in 2002 to 39% in 2006, the share of industry increased from 23% to 28%, and the service sector increased from 31% to 32%. However, it should be taken into account that the sectoral structure of GDP here is subject to significant fluctuations. In particular, in 2005 the share of agricultural production decreased to 26%, industry-increased to 33%, and services - to 40%. Such swings can strongly distort the structural picture of overall growth; at the same time, they indicate significant unevenness of development and instability of trends.

Absolute GDP growth figures at current prices show an increase of one and a half times over the period from 2002 to 2006. The average annual growth rate increased from 6.5% to 9.3% due to the transition to commercial oil production and increased investment. For the same reason, the share of the agricultural sector in exports fell to 6% by 2006.

Oil revenues and the injection of some of them into the economy since the turn of the century have revived business activity. The number of transactions between 2004 and 2006 alone increased from 25,000 to 206,000, the capital market capacity increased approximately 6-fold, and the value of outstanding shares increased from $ 4 billion. up to $ 7.6 billion, and the number of companies traded on the stock exchange increased from 46 to ⁵²¹. This is not very much, but the response of the business community was quite clear to begin with. Moreover, the nature of the local bourgeoisie is such that most of its activities are concentrated in the cities, most of them are confined to trade and speculation, and production is considered as a secondary occupation. It still has to go through a major evolution before it can be considered cities as engines of economic development. The economic situation is developing in such a way that urban centers do not stand out too clearly from the agricultural space and also have a mostly agricultural character. Therefore, in general, rural activity remains genetically similar for a significant part of the Sudanese bourgeoisie, and it is this circumstance that allows maintaining the functioning of the village. Although only a relatively small amount of capital is invested in rural production and agricultural machinery, and a considerable resource is used for veda-

In rural areas, there are no restrictions on usurious transactions, speculations, or other parasitic activities.

In order to truly develop the agricultural sector, it is necessary, at least, to accumulate oil money in this direction. At the same time, it is also necessary to translate them into production projects, materialize them in new enterprises and industries. But the state has too many concerns outside the economic circle. They are linked to the ever-present threat of war between the north and the south, with insurgent movements, with the repulse of hostile forces on the borders, and no one knows how to use the oil revenues more wisely to return the country to a peaceful life. In the meantime, Sudan is far from having a better future, with the expectation of which it is developing processes that began in the past decades.

IF WE HAVE IT , WE DON'T APPRECIATE IT...

Sudan's entry into the era of agrarian capitalism can be dated back to 1925, when the British administration established a large-scale cotton-growing farm of the colonial type in Gezir. The leading role in it was assigned to groups of local producers-tenants, who laid the foundation for Sudanese "farming". This was the average rural bourgeoisie, which acted according to the strict instructions laid down in the project. Several other enterprises of this type sprang up in a short time, and the process of centralized implementation of capitalist principles in the Sudanese countryside stopped there. But it gave rise to a side phenomenon - small private pumping farms that adopted the experience of large neighbors and served as channels for further penetration of capitalism into the agricultural body of Sudan.

Mechanized farms on rainfed land became another vehicle for capitalist development. The inclusion of these clay spaces in the turnover was activated even before independence and expanded the scope of intensive production. Since then, Sudan's agriculture has been developing in a kind of four-pronged pattern, in which agriculture has been divided into paired segments - irrigated-rainfed and modern-traditional. This division continues even now. All segments complement each other, but this does not mean that the space formed by them develops harmoniously.

Large-scale agricultural enclaves formed in the 1920s-1940s were a significant milestone in the capitalist transformation of the countryside. They replaced the previous forms of production in part of the territory between the White and Blue Nile, but they were isolated and were not sufficiently popular in the agricultural space of Sudan during the republican period. This was due to the general degradation of the agrarian economy after the country gained independence in 1956 due to the shift of the center of gravity in power to political struggle, a sharp deterioration in the controllability of economic processes, fragmented reproduction mechanisms and, as a result, a noticeable degradation of "pilot" farms.

Nevertheless, the model of an agrarian system based on large pockets of intensive agriculture under State administration was the most acceptable for Sudan, if only because of its potential effectiveness. The other pole of this system, represented by vast underdeveloped zones, served as a kind of reserve of the land fund and a "reserve" of traditional forms of farming.

In the post-colonial period, the authorities followed the well-trodden path of creating large tenant farms on land masses, the distribution of which and, to a certain extent, management remained in the hands of the state. The expectation was that commercial capital would adopt such a scheme and take advantage of the opportunity to invest its savings in agriculture, not just in Khartoum or abroad.² Therefore, the authorities began organizing large irrigation projects in the interfluve of the White and Blue Nile, creating a State Agricultural Corporation for this purpose.

At the same time, a network of small private pump farms developed, which were more flexible and relatively quick to respond to changes in demand. In particular, already in the 1980s, in addition to cotton and millet, they began to grow wheat, onions, and rice, diversifying production and thus insuring against the invasion of pests and market fluctuations.³ Today, a large part of rural enterprises that can formally be considered "market" are represented by family-type farms. But for the most part, they have not reached the necessary maturity for the reason that their "capitalist attributes" are more or less leveled by elements inherent in traditional management.

Another state structure, the Mechanized Agriculture Corporation, was engaged in promoting large-scale commercial projects in the rainfed farming zone. During the period from the 1970s to the early 1990s, significant areas were developed in Gedarif, Kordofan, and Blue Nile Province, but they were quickly depleted as a result of predatory exploitation. After that, a new round of expansion in the direction of the south began. There, mechanized farms were wedged into Southern Kordofan, northern Upper Nile Province, southern Blue Nile Province, and to a lesser extent, Southern Darfur and Bahr el-Ghazal Governors4.

Mechanized farms consisted of plots with an area of 25-40 hectares, which were purchased by urban entrepreneurs. For rainfed agriculture, this is a small size, but as a result of their appearance, the production sphere expanded, which involved capital created in trade, usury, and speculative operations.-

walkie-talkies and other similar activities.

These processes were not carried out within the framework of a clear national development strategy, but rather were an inertial movement along a well-established path, which was characterized by changing tenants, disrupting crop rotation, and ignoring the interests of the ecosphere. Competent leadership, accelerated investment growth, systematic development of land resources, and other measures that harmonize development and make it more sustainable were not present at all.

In such circumstances, the idea of developing and implementing large-scale projects by the State that could ensure the growth of Sudanese agriculture was undermined by established practice. By the mid-1980s, half of the rainfed land, at least in Kordofan, was concentrated in the hands of private license holders.⁵ This process continues to this day. However, mechanized farms are still experiencing a serious organizational decline and, in their current capacity, are increasingly leaning towards extensive farming methods, i.e., they are moving closer to the declining small farms.

Similar phenomena are observed in the irrigated area. Gezira's management was decentralized, and in its place there were 16 divisions that are not controlled by the authorities,but are actually transferred to the local farmers. This also applies to other large irrigated farms that fall within the State's area of responsibility. Its abandonment of its functions led to a deterioration in financing, stagnation of economic activity, dilapidation of the production infrastructure, and activation of usurious capital that parasitizes the labor of commodity producers. Such changes have worsened the opportunities for economic growth and caused the conversion of farms that have started growing garden and vegetable crops that are not typical for these agroclimatic conditions.⁶

Thus, the British heritage with its clear organization and distribution of functions was not appreciated. The form was taken over from it, and the content was lost so much that the capitalization of the village at the turn of the century degenerated into a sluggish fading action, and it will take a long effort to raise the efficiency of the Sudanese model of village development after decades of its collapse.

MODERNIZATION OR NORMALIZATION - WHICH IS MORE IMPORTANT?

Bogged down in the political struggle and bringing it later to the state of undeclared internal war, the Sudanese authorities by the 80s of the last century lost control over the development of the economy, including agriculture. Work on its development was abandoned, which led to serious disruptions in the activities of farms in Hashm al-Girb, Rahad, Gedarif and other key locations. Moreover, areas of instability have expanded as non-Muslims have moved from the Nuba Mountains and South Sudan to Gezira, for example, or as commercial farming has moved to areas where the poor non-Arab minority in the southern part of the country has settled. As a result, property inequality was aggravated by the ethno-confessional factor due to serious socio-cultural differences and a large number of migrants.

The results of such an offensive on the village began to affect almost immediately. The worst of them was the widespread famine in 1984-1985. No progress was made in the agricultural sector, which means that no progress was made in the fight against poverty and backwardness. The food supply of the population has not improved and the prerequisites for economic growth have not been created. And now Sudan cannot do without humanitarian and food aid, increasingly falling under the control of foreign capital. Since the early 1980s, American aid, which implies accountability to an external donor, ⁷ and therefore damages the country's independence, has become absolutely necessary for it.

For a number of years, Sudanese agriculture has been developing under a kind of patronage of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB). In particular, efforts to

The expansion of private economic activity is half funded through the WB channels ⁸. These supranational structures, on which economic recovery and agricultural development depend to a significant extent, encourage Sudan to move towards privatization, accelerated liberalization of production relations in the agrosphere and more complete development of agricultural resources.

Currently, the first three - year (2008-2011) stage of the agricultural sector modernization program is being implemented, estimated at $1.5 billion. The total package of measures designed to intensify and streamline reproduction processes in the agricultural sector is estimated at $5 billion.⁹ Naturally, with such expenses, the Sudan found itself facing a severe need to meet the requirements of financial donors who carry the idea of social reconstruction of the village on the basis of the development of a modern market system in its liberal version. At the same time, the modernization of Sudan's agriculture must be carried out in an unstable political environment, in conditions of internal conflicts and sporadic military operations. The effectiveness of what is planned in such circumstances remains questionable. After all, before resuscitating the agricultural sector and its food segment, it is necessary, at a minimum, to restore weakened systems of political regulation and broken humanitarian ties.

Nevertheless, the persistence of Western "advisers" makes us think that their task is not only to overcome the economic devastation. Apparently, the past experience of the spread of agrarian capitalism in Sudan suggests to the Western expert community how to structurally involve this state in the sphere of modern market relations and establish consistent development of its resource riches by international corporations.

Western countries, especially the United States, actively position Sudan as an important priority in their foreign policy calculations in the Arab-African direction and see its future closely linked to their influence. However, it is not yet clear what the social consequences of China's activities in the oil and agricultural sectors of Sudan, which the Chinese side also considers as the most important subject of its national interests in Africa, will be. It is also possible that we should not forget about the interests of Russia, although for the time being it may well be satisfied with a share in Sudanese oil production, without widely claiming other areas.

But the transformation of Sudan into a full-fledged partner is absolutely impossible without peace on its land and the revival of the rural economy. The strategic goal of this industry is to provide the population with food, contribute to the normalization of the situation in the country, protect it from hunger and prevent people from leaving for anarchy and criminal niches in search of means of survival.

Solving this problem is not easy. Moreover, agrarian capitalism in its local version does not fit well with the industrial type of rural production in the" reference " countries. The food segment of the agricultural sector of Sudan remains largely archaic, with a weak tendency to self-development, and at the same time resistant to decay. This is partly due to the minimal needs of the population, its commitment to standard nutrition, unpretentious taste habits, and the unpretentiousness of the national cuisine itself.

Table

Источник: Rural Development the White N'ile Province. Tokyo. 2006, p. 75.

OBE-MENTOR OR ASSISTANT?

Gaps in the national food supply are a chronic problem in Sudan. It stems from many causes, but mainly from the underdevelopment of agrarian capitalism, stagnant transitional forms with large inclusions of subsistence farming. The food sector of the Sudanese village is characterized by agricultural disorder, chronic "under-production" of food and other similar anomalies.

In the current context, it is quite difficult to determine the role of market and traditional ways in the food balance. However, it can be assumed that extensive production remains essential for filling the consumer market, if only because it covers vast areas, the size of which compensates for low yields, reduced agricultural productivity and other disadvantages of poorly profiled and primitive managed agriculture.

In relation to the total area, including agricultural land, the population of Sudan is small. Even with a small shift in the level of development of the productive forces in agriculture, this circumstance alone would be sufficient to ensure a normal food supply at the expense of our own resources. However, the complexity of the situation is that the productive capacity of the Sudanese village is so far behind,

that it is even difficult to find a counterpart in other parts of the Arab world. In addition, it is constantly "squeezed" because of the fighting, the expulsion of small owners from the land, the destruction of already pathetic objects of village infrastructure.

However, it would be wrong to assume that over the past decades, Sudanese agriculture has developed exclusively in a downward direction. There are no complete statistics, but some evidence confirms an increase in the collection of crops that are of particular importance to the population, and guaranteed demand in local markets. To a lesser extent, this applies to wheat, which is popular only in urban areas. Millet and sorghum-the main products in the daily diet of rural residents-are out of competition, although in fact their production did not grow, which is confirmed by the table data. In other words, the positive shift was offset by a drop in yield. However, this upward-downward trend has been observed only since 1991, when attempts were made to restore the economic space and adjust the village development plans. The two decades before that were completely lost to her.

In the final period of the last century, the ruling regime primarily sought to activate agriculture as a major area of employment, export production, and most importantly-as a strategic industry necessary to maintain the viability of the regime. After all, even one threat of famine can very quickly provoke the incitement of ethnic conflicts, the emergence of hotbeds of military tension, and cause an aggravation of intertribal struggle for pasture and other lands. At the same time, the criminal situation may sharply worsen and serious disruptions may occur in the work of already unreliable mechanisms of political regulation.

Under the current circumstances, the ruling regime is limited in its influence on the state of affairs on the agrarian front and cannot widely carry out consistent reforms in the countryside, which cover individual levers and enclaves. Therefore, it is understandable that the authorities are trying to find a way to overcome bottlenecks in cooperation with the World Trade Organization (WTO) and other supranational and international structures such as the IMF and WB mentioned above, as well as specialized organizations of the UN, G8 and G20 - the G20, the EU, the USA and other partners.

Sudan has an intention to join the WTO and is negotiating the terms of membership in this organization. As a demonstration of the seriousness of his plans, he is reforming the legal framework for foreign trade, bringing it closer to international standards. To date, as Western experts note, some liberalization of agricultural markets and loosening of control over prices and export duties have led to a reduction in trade barriers. Proponents of this process expect that it can be activated already within the WTO after Sudan joins its ranks.¹⁰

However, following an externally prescribed course does not guarantee that Sudan will be able to improve the situation in the agricultural sector in general and in the food sector in particular. The steps already taken do not allow us to state unequivocally that we have managed to achieve positive changes in the situation on the agricultural market. Even Western observers who assess the impact of global trade liberalization on developing and least developed countries note that the highest prices will be for mass-produced crops and, to a much lesser extent, for tropical agricultural products. In other words, it is known that trade in exotic crops, which make up a significant part of the exports of agricultural African countries, will be discriminated against in world food markets. This picture contradicts claims that these countries will benefit from liberalizing their economic policies after joining the WTO.¹¹

There are obstacles that limit Sudan's ability to meet WTO requirements. The country lacks effective mechanisms that can ensure the implementation of the recommendations of world trade leaders, especially if we take into account the presence of a huge natural segment in its agricultural sector. In this regard, it is generally unclear whether it is possible in principle to implement the WTO requirements in the context of Sudan ¹².

Most likely, it will develop its agricultural complex and food sector in a natural way, i.e. with minimal chances of a frontal transition to intensive economic growth. And this, quite likely, will lead to new threats to food "well-being", which will only move the country away from the moment of its transformation into an all-Arab breadbasket. It turns out that an alliance with the WTO is not a lifesaver that can instantly transfer Sudan to the realm of millet abundance.

what to do?

Sudan has vast land resources, and water reserves are also sufficient to support a productive agriculture based on a much larger population. But it turns out that even with the wasteful use of the arable wedge, it is still not enough to meet the minimum needs of the current population for food. Food imports are also too small to defuse the market situation, and this fact is chronically reflected in the domestic political situation in the country. Entire districts have been threatened with famine or malnutrition for decades, which constantly provokes a struggle for sources of food supply.

This makes Sudan highly dependent on the world's major producers of cereals and other crops,

the demand for which is constantly high in this country. This one-sided dependence forces the state leadership to regularly apply for food aid to international organizations and foreign countries. This limits Sudan's sovereignty to a certain extent and makes it vulnerable to the dictates of global food suppliers. Subordinating it and other similar countries to the universal idea of liberalizing agricultural and food markets can create a situation in which the process of destroying old regulatory systems outstrips the creation of new ones, and then the country will face new stresses. Moreover, the mechanical planting of "ideal" (in the Western sense) this can create social conflicts instead of freeing the village from pre-market remnants and overcoming economic outsiderism in the global aspect.

In principle, Sudan still has little reason to expect that it will be able to stimulate growth in the agricultural sector so much that it will be able to fully cover food needs while relying solely on its own resources. The regime will not be able to mobilize the deep potential of the village without " dispersal "and transform it into a plentiful" table " for its population. This is unlikely to happen before the Sudanese leadership realizes the need to show the political will and embark on thoughtful and socially oriented transformations that meet the national interests, and not follow the recommendations of theorists who test the effectiveness of the proposed schemes in others ' borders. Blindly following them means looking for workarounds that will only complicate the situation and extend the current turmoil for years to come. The expectation that agriculture mobilizes internal mechanisms for self-development is unproductive and exacerbates the contradictions between the city and the countryside and within the countryside itself by increasing competition for food resources. In these circumstances, the conflict potential of this factor can naturally increase, which, merging with others, will not allow the country to move to a peaceful life.

What to do in an environment where constant tension not only prevents you from forgetting old disputes, but also creates a breeding ground for new conflicts? Against this background, the confrontation may begin in other areas. It is not so fantastic to imagine, for example, a major conflict with neighboring states over water, and it is very likely if the demarcation between the North and South ends with the division of the country. The situation in general is not so impossible...

The food problem in Sudan is complex and ambiguous. Therefore, in order to maintain at least a semblance of stability, the policy of waiting becomes more preferable than active activity in the mode of even limited perestroika. The country is extremely afraid of provoking changes that may lead to the collapse of the usual way of life, which guarantees relative survival for everyone, even with the increasing degradation of living conditions and habitat.

The ruling regime is hesitating to take decisive action, probably waiting for some stronger motivations, and so far expects that oil will help to refrain from what it sees as reckless steps for as long as possible. Meanwhile, the position does not straighten out, as if hovering in a dead center. It seems that the country has reached the bottom, and very soon it will be too late for its leadership to think about how to prevent the impending paralysis, because it will have to think about eliminating its devastating consequences, for which even impressive revenues from oil production will not be enough.

Sudan has come very close to the point where inactivity can become unacceptable.

¹ Central Bank of Sudan. Sudan Economy in Figures. K., 2007.

² Food and Power in Sudan: Critique of Humanitarism, L., 1997, p. 154.

³ Rural Development in the White Nile Province. Tokyo, 1986, p. 111.

⁴ Food and Power.., p. 154.

⁵ Ibid., p. 155.

^{Smirnova G. I.} 6 Nekotorye itogi ekonomicheskoi liberalizatsii v Sudane [Some results of economic liberalization in Sudan]. 2002, N 15, pp. 170-171.

⁷ Food and Power.., p. 4.

⁸ Ibid., p. 154.

⁹ http://www//iimes//2008/22 - 10 - 08/ htm 1/27/2009

^{Elfadil Abdel Karim, Abler D.} 10 Implication of a Doha Agreement on Agricultural Markets in Sudan. Working Paper N 08 - 01. Shambat 2008.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 3.

¹² Ibid., p. 4.

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