Keywords: China, global crisis, yuan revaluation

The United States has long sought to revalue the yuan, believing that the undervalued exchange rate of the Chinese national currency has turned into a protectionist measure to actually subsidize Chinese exports. The European Union is concerned about the undervalued yuan. Both India and Brazil, China's BRIC partners (Brazil, Russia, India, and China), have recently been calling for an end to the artificial peg of the yuan to the dollar¹.

However, Beijing has counterarguments against the appreciation of the yuan, which are shared by some Western and international experts.

2^{During the China-US Economic and Strategic Dialogue held in Beijing in May 2010, US Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner noted that bringing the renminbi closer to market value is "an important part of broader reform", while emphasizing that the Chinese government should make its own decisions on this issue}.

As most experts assumed, Beijing actually went for a small increase in the yuan exchange rate.

On the eve of the G20 summit in Toronto, the People's (central) Bank of China announced on June 19, 2010, the establishment of a more flexible exchange rate of the yuan against the dollar. The dollar - yuan exchange rate was set at around 6.8 yuan, compared to 6.827 yuan, meaning the Chinese currency appreciated by 0.43%^.3

This was Beijing's first monetary policy revision since July 2008, when the PBOC pegged the yuan more tightly to the dollar.

The ambiguous nature of the problem of yuan revaluation is discussed in the article by Doctor of Economics L. I. Kondrashova.

L. I. KONDRASHOVA

Doctor of Economics

Setting the exchange rate of a national currency affects the interests of millions and millions of people in different countries. Financiers, on the other hand, strive to preserve the aura of "mystery" and closeness to the uninitiated in this matter. But they themselves, first of all, because of the divergent interests of economic agents and the unpredictability of the consequences of decisions made, are often unable to understand the complex currency intricacies.

What should be the exchange rate in order to maximally stimulate national producers and meet domestic demand, while at the same time not provoking dissatisfaction on the part of other participants in the global market?

This is the essence of a rational exchange rate policy, the impact of which on the national economy, according to a number of Russian economists, has not yet been sufficiently studied.

CURRENCY CHAINS

The classification of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) contains 10 main types of monetary policy, which differ in the degree of rigidity or flexibility of the exchange rate: rigid fixation, i.e. "freezing" (no national currency and currency management); flexible fixation (normal flexible fixation, actual stabilization; transitional forms of fixation, including horizontal corridor, sliding binding, etc. sliding anchor); swimming (controlled swimming and free swimming); other course management modes⁴.

According to this classification, China is among the 21 countries with de facto currency stabilization, in which the exchange rate is not free-floating, but is controlled by monetary authorities who do not officially announce its target level. Active government intervention in China is aimed at creating a "controlled fluctuation" regime, which involves regulating the exchange rate of the currency used in a relatively narrow corridor.

Under the de facto stabilization regime, the Government can change the exchange rate in one direction or another at a time under the influence of various external circumstances and taking into account the set goals of economic policy, raising or lowering the national currency against the dollar.

The policy of a "weak" domestic currency reduces the costs of domestic producers in currency terms and increases the cost of imported products.-

what has a positive effect is an increase in the income of exporters and gold and foreign exchange reserves, an increase in foreign investment, curbing imports and increasing the competitiveness of their own products. All this contributes to the acceleration of economic growth.

At the stage of the industrial "take-off", many countries sought to maintain an undervalued real exchange rate, using the gold and foreign exchange reserves of central banks as the most important management tool. The policy of undervaluing the exchange rate and accumulating foreign exchange reserves was implemented in Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong and Taiwan, when these East Asian "tigers" were catching up with developed countries.

The exchange rate was maintained at the level of 20-40% of the real value calculated on the basis of purchasing power parity. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the ratio of foreign exchange reserves to gross domestic product (GDP) in almost all East Asian countries exceeds 20%, compared to the global average of 6-7% and ^1.5% in the United States5. The negative results of such a policy are an increase in the cost of investment imports, a decrease in the final demand of the population, which affects the quality of economic growth.

On the contrary, a" strong " currency (in relation to the dollar), making imported goods cheaper, allows you to curb inflation, reduce the cost of intermediate consumption and final products going to the domestic market. Negative consequences in this case are a decrease in the competitiveness of locally produced goods in foreign markets, an increase in imports and pressure on domestic producers due to the attractiveness and cheapness of imported goods, a decrease in the positive balance of foreign trade, and capital outflow.

Growth usually slows down, but its quality improves. Currency revaluation can be particularly dangerous during the downward phase of the economic cycle and during the crisis, which is currently the case.

"CULPRITS": JAPAN YESTERDAY...

Periodic economic crises occur due to the emergence of huge imbalances in the global economy.

They are caused by disruptions in the commodity markets (overproduction) and in the currency and financial markets (credit and cash flow disruptions). All currency crises are caused by the same factors, including: increased inflation and uneven development across countries; increased competition for markets and the use of more aggressive means of this struggle; the development of speculative processes in the global financial market, and the complexity of state regulation in this area.

The main reason for the crisis that began in 2007, many experts believe, is excessive consumption in the United States, which persistently forces other countries to finance their external debt, using the special position of the dollar as a reserve currency. The crisis has shown that the existing global financial system does not sufficiently correspond to the economic and political realities of the current stage of development and is predisposed to speculative explosions.

Meanwhile, there is a growing desire in US financial circles to blame the growing payment and budget deficits on China, which uses the weak yuan and the low cost of its labor force to reduce the cost of exports, which allegedly leads to the loss of tens of thousands of American jobs.

Attempts to find the culprits of their troubles abroad have been made in the United States before.

During the crisis of 1971, Washington considered that the situation could be corrected by revaluating (raising the exchange rates) of foreign currencies against the dollar, which should relatively lower the price level in the United States, increase exports and limit the import of foreign goods.⁶

But then the main "villain" that flooded the American market with its goods was Japan*.

At that time, China's currency sector was still in its infancy.

In 1974, a daily quotation of the yuan against the US dollar and other currencies was introduced based on a currency basket that reflected the structure of the country's external settlements.

With the beginning of the market reform in the PRC in 1978, a dualism of the plan and the market was established, which was evident in both price and currency policies.

Since April 1980, the Bank of China has started issuing currency certificates in yuan, intended for payments in special stores, hotels, clubs, tourist organizations and for payment of various types of services provided to foreigners living in China. All non-residents (employees of foreign embassies, foreign students, Chinese migrants who came to their homeland, residents of Hong Kong and Macao) who had a permanent residence permit.

* In 1971 in the United States after the economic downturn of 1969-1970. long-term depression set in. But still, the main reason for the actual devaluation of the dollar and the collapse of one of the main pillars of the Bretton Woods system (the so-called gold standard), i.e., the dollar's peg to gold and the fixed exchange rate of all major currencies against the dollar, was the complete and final collapse of this relic, which completely did not correspond to the with the resurgence of other Western economies, which Japan has joined. ed.).

These artificial currency units could be exchanged at the official exchange rate for currency certificates and, if necessary, exchanged back for hard currency at the official exchange rate, which made these artificial monetary units a variant of the convertible yuan. Currency certificates also attracted Chinese citizens who traveled abroad or wanted to buy high-quality imported goods in currency stores. This provoked a wave of speculation on the black market of currency certificates, for which a kind of "yuan premium"was paid.

One of the most important measures to create a foreign exchange market was the establishment of currency exchange centers and points, first in Shenzhen (on the border with Hong Kong), and then in Shanghai. In 1993, the foreign exchange market included more than 100 currency distribution and exchange centers operating in all regions of the country.

Eventually, the currency certificates were revoked, and speculation with them was put to an end. At the same time, the existence of two exchange rates - planned and market-was eliminated. The difference between them reached 50%, but the planned exchange rate was applied only to one-fifth of the total volume of foreign trade.⁷

In 1994, with the introduction of the currency regulation system, multiple exchange rates were merged into a single regulated floating exchange rate. As a result of the gradual devaluation of the yuan, its exchange rate against the dollar fell from 1.5 yuan in 1980 to 8.6 yuan in 1994. But in the following year, 1995, a fixed exchange rate of 8.28 yuan was established, which meant an increase in the official exchange rate by 4%.

The depreciation of the Chinese currency in the 1990s played an important role in ensuring a positive balance of payments balance and in the inflow of foreign investment. However, the tight binding of its own monetary unit to the dollar led to a certain loss of monetary policy levers. By adopting a fixed renminbi regime, China has lost the ability to regulate the minimum interest rate.

Although the RMB was converted for current transactions in 1996, the Chinese foreign exchange market has not been able to correctly reflect the ratio of foreign exchange supply and demand due to the persistence of strict administration, such as the forced sale of foreign exchange earnings, strict capital controls, and repeated Central Bank interventions to maintain monetary stability.

The country's moderately tight monetary policy, favorable foreign trade balance, and increased foreign exchange reserves all served as a strong shock absorber that avoided the negative impact of the global financial crisis of 1997-1998 and saved the country from the danger of devaluation of the yuan in contrast to many other Asian currencies.

In subsequent years, the yuan remained pegged to the dollar and was fixed at the same level. The prolonged peg of the yuan to the dollar has increasingly increased the gap between the official exchange rate and the purchasing power of the Chinese currency.

Already in the 1970s, there were significant differences in the value of the yuan at the official exchange rate and in the purchasing power of the yuan in relation to the service sector.

This is evidenced by the data of the well-known estimate of China's GDP based on the purchasing power of currencies, which was obtained during a research project led by the luminary of comparative economic research, the American Irving Kravis. According to Kravis ' calculations for 1975, in the service sector, 1 yuan was equal to $20. But in the area of commodity supply, the yuan was much "weaker". In the retail trade of consumer goods, 1 yuan could be equated to $1.37. Thus, the dollar equivalent of the yuan, taking into account services, in 1975 was equal to 4.35 in Chinese "weights" (consumption structure), 1.04 in American ones, and 2.13 in the geometric mean. This turned out to be very close to the official exchange rate for 1975 - 1.98 yuan per $ 1 ⁸.

At the beginning of this decade, the American Institute of World Politics conducted research on the state of the Chinese economy, which provides calculations of the equilibrium exchange rate of the yuan by comparing the country's trade and payment balances, showing that the Chinese currency is undervalued by 35-40%⁹. In more recent studies, the fork of estimates is slightly wider -25-45% ¹⁰.

Modern calculations of China's GDP by the purchasing power of the yuan by the World Bank (WB) give a higher indicator than published by official statistical authorities, which also confirms the fact that the yuan's exchange rate is undervalued.

However, in China itself, the fact of undervaluing the yuan is not generally recognized, and the calculations themselves, due to their labor intensity and the use of various methods that are by no means infallible, are still largely speculative in nature. This partly explains the low popularity of open exchange rate publications in China.

...TODAY-CHINA

Until recently, there was another reason for the reluctance to address the issue of the exchange rate - caution when revising the GDP indicator in the course of comparative analysis.

For a long time, China preferred to be considered a "large" country with an insufficiently high level of economic development, and estimates of GDP at the official undervalued exchange rate suited it. Now he has openly proclaimed the course of creating a "powerful" state as the main goal of the second stage of the reform. Increasing China's position in the rating of economic potentials-

It is becoming increasingly clear that Lov is somehow "pouring water into the mill" of foreign accusations of his "currency selfishness".

Since 2002, the American business community, concerned about China's growing encroachment on the American market, began to "persuade" Chinese leaders to switch to a more realistic yuan exchange rate.

In 2004, the U.S. Senate, under pressure from union bosses who attributed rising unemployment to an influx of cheap Chinese goods, proposed a "Free Trade with China" bill, which raised the issue of negotiations with China over the revaluation of the yuan and the introduction of a floating exchange rate. "By lowering the value of the yuan by 15 to 40%, China is subsidizing American imports of Chinese goods and increasing the direct costs of American exporters to China," said Senator Charles Schumer of New York.

Responding to American criticism of the "weak yuan," Premier Wen Jiabao, in an interview with reporters on March 14, 2005, recalled that currency regulation in China has already been included in the program of the monetary system since 1994.: "We have set out to develop a mechanism for flexible regulation of the national currency exchange rate, which would meet the requirements of the market. A draft of reforms has been developed. China is a responsible country that takes the yuan revaluation into account not only its own interests, but also its possible impact on neighboring countries and the whole world."

However, under some external pressure, on July 21, 2005, China lifted the 11-year-old tight peg of the yuan to the dollar and introduced a "limited floating" exchange rate of the national currency, revaluing the yuan by 2.1%. Over the next 3 years, as a result of creeping inflation, the yuan's exchange rate increased from 8.28 to 6.83 yuan per $1, which is equivalent to a total revaluation of 21.2%. Such a "gentle" currency operation, supplemented by a number of government measures, did not significantly affect China's high economic growth rates, although to some extent it saved the country from even greater "overheating" of the economy.

A new round of pressure on China to change its official exchange rate began in 2006 and peaked in the subsequent crisis years, when the Chinese currency was again locked at 6.83 yuan per $1 in mid-2008.

Washington attributes China's successful overcoming of the global financial and economic crisis and its transformation into the world's largest exporter of goods to an undervaluation of the Chinese currency.

US Treasury Secretary Geithner bluntly stated that "China is manipulating the exchange rate of its currency", in other words, he accused China of artificially lowering the exchange rate in order to provide advantages to its exporters.

Although many American experts considered this statement too harsh, the threat of sanctions under US law for currency manipulation loomed. On February 3, 2010, US President Barack Obama announced that Washington intends to toughen its approach to trade relations with China, to force China to be more accommodating in the issue of the yuan exchange rate.¹¹

There is no consensus on the "pros" and "cons" of revaluation of the yuan in American expert circles. It is obvious that companies exporting goods to China will benefit primarily from the growth of the yuan exchange rate. These are manufacturers of luxury goods, high-tech goods, and suppliers of raw materials, including oil companies. American retailers of clothing and footwear, textiles, and household electrical appliances will lose out.

Proponents of revaluing the Chinese yuan are trying to argue that China's concessions can benefit itself, since the undervalued yuan restrains the growth of domestic consumption, which contradicts the goal of increasing domestic demand. Other arguments are also used : a favorable impact on the level of domestic prices, benefits from cheaper energy resources, and a reduction in China's excessive dependence on exports.¹² It is significant that individual managers of large Chinese companies whose activities are related to imports have begun to advocate for an increase in the price of the yuan.

These arguments in favor of the prospects for strengthening the yuan in the United States are not shared by everyone, some American scientists believe that revaluation will only harm the Chinese economy, reducing growth rates, increasing unemployment, and" bad debts " of enterprises to banks.

Some scholars compare the current campaign of pressure on China with the similar campaign of the 1980s against Japan, which, after revaluation, has not been able to get out of a state of stagnation for more than 10 years. Similarly, Justin Lin Yifu, a well-known Chinese economist who is currently chief economist of the World Bank, strongly rejects the need to revalue the yuan. In his opinion, such an act with negative consequences for China is also undesirable for other countries, since it can complicate the global economy's recovery from the crisis.

You should also pay attention to such an "external stand-in" of the Chinese yuan and the intermediary currency of China's foreign economic activity, such as the Hong Kong dollar. Currently, about half of China's foreign trade turnover and currency payments pass through Hong Kong (Hong Kong). Being in the same team with the yuan, in the event of a revaluation, the Hong Kong dollar will inevitably pull it up, which means that Hong Kong, which is already expensive for living and business, will become even more expensive and less attractive for financial transactions.

It also calls into question the very conclusion that a" weak " yuan harms the interests of American consumers.

Nobel laureate Paul Krugman, who as an economist is inclined to increase the value of the Chinese currency, at the same time recognizes that

* The United States remains the largest exporter of goods and services. ed.).

revaluation of the Chinese currency is by no means an option for the United States itself, since the rise in the price of Chinese goods would restrain consumer demand in the country. A slowdown in China's economic growth would also weigh on U.S. exports. According to Krugman, the most serious problem in the world today is not so much the desired revaluation of the Chinese currency, but the real devaluation of the US dollar. The devaluation of the US dollar weakens the desire of other countries to purchase US Treasury bonds, which harms the recovery of the US economy. "For the US, a strong dollar is important, not a strong yuan," Krugman said.¹³

China is not a country that easily succumbs to external pressure.

Its leaders defend the policy of maintaining the officially established parity of the yuan to the dollar. Such statements were made by Chinese leaders in 2008, 2009, and early 2010, including Vice-Chairman of the government's Development and Reform Commission Zhang Xiaoqiang and Premier Wen Jiabao. In March 2010, Wen Jiabao, who disagreed with the fact that the yuan was undervalued, said that Beijing "opposes accusations and even forceful pressure to revalue the yuan, which will not bring good to reform." According to him, the PRC "will continue to improve the exchange rate formation mechanism and maintain its basic stability at a reasonable and balanced level."¹⁴

This decision of the Chinese authorities is dictated not by their intractability, but by fears of a decline in the competitiveness of Chinese goods on the world market and a further drop in exports, which was provoked by the crisis.

Revaluation would have cost several tens of billions of yuan of the trade surplus, although it would have contained inflation. Rising interest rates, which would likely follow a revaluation, and yuan losses in dollar portfolios are likely to increase the threat of bank failures. Until the banking system is restored, China cannot go for the liberalization of the foreign exchange market and a free floating exchange rate.

In June 2010, the People's Bank of China confirmed its intention to continue its exchange rate policy reform and increase the "flexibility" of the renminbi exchange rate, taking into account a basket of currencies, but without going beyond the established range of fluctuations of the renminbi (0.5% per day). According to experts, these statements by the Chinese financial authorities are intended to prevent sanctions related to the possible declaration of China as a currency manipulator. But they cannot be seen as the first serious step in a significant revaluation of the Chinese currency.

WHAT INSTEAD OF A DOLLAR?

The global crisis, which revealed serious flaws in the entire architecture of global finance, called into question the reputation of the dollar as a universal monetary equivalent.

In March 2009, a UN panel of experts headed by Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz concluded that the dollar had exhausted itself as the world's reserve currency because it was" volatile " (too unstable) and carried with it high inflationary risks.¹⁵

The creation of a new reserve currency, in his opinion, could be initiated by China, since it has the largest international reserves.

Until now, the most reliable candidate for the role of an alternative to the dollar was considered the euro. However, the slow recovery of the eurozone countries from the economic downturn, Greece's teetering on the brink of default, and a sharp increase in public debt relative to GDP, especially in Portugal, Spain and Italy, led to a serious weakening of the euro.

Some experts in the euro zone countries began to consider the candidacy of the Chinese yuan for the role of a new reserve currency and joined the Americans in trying to persuade the Beijing authorities to change the policy of depreciation of the yuan.

According to financial experts, the rejection of the dollar in favor of another currency is theoretically quite feasible, but practically difficult to implement. It requires not only the consent of the United States, but also a high degree of confidence in the issuing state of the new reserve currency, in the quality of its banking system.

To begin with, the currency must be freely convertible for all categories of current and capital transactions. So far, the Chinese yuan cannot claim to be the new world reserve currency, and the Chinese authorities are not eager to take on such a complex mission. China has not yet created financial institutions and instruments that can be responsible for the full range of tasks related to global finance. In addition, the yuan is not a fully convertible currency, and some experts advise against rushing to fully convertibility of the yuan, the lack of which has brought certain dividends to the country.

We should not forget that, despite the high growth rates of China's GDP, the Chinese economy is almost 3 times smaller than the American one.

The initiator of the introduction of the new reserve currency is a well-known American entrepreneur and instigator of all sorts of financial innovations (and speculation) George Soros proposed, like Stiglitz, that the SDR (Special Drawing Rights*), the non - cash accounting units of the IMF, created back in 1969 for inter - state monetary transactions, should be used as a new reserve currency.

The IMF's idea of a new world currency based on quasi-money was supported by Russia, which made a similar proposal at the London summit " big

* SDR - special drawing rights (SDR) (editor's note).

twenties" in 2009 China has shown solidarity with Russia. According to the head of the People's Bank of China, Zhou Xiaochuan, the creation of an international reserve currency "will eliminate the shortcomings of the existing system, where national currencies play a leading role." ¹⁶

At a time when the issue of reform of international financial institutions, including the IMF and the World Bank, is so acute, proposals for a transition to a multi-currency system are multiplying.

According to Robert Mundell, winner of the 1999 Nobel Prize in Economics, the world is currently driven by a trend towards "larger currency areas."

Back in 2006, the idea of introducing a joint currency of the countries of East and South Asia - "aku" (Asian currency unit - ACU)was put forward¹⁷. In Latin America, the problem of creating a new single currency, the bolivar, is being discussed. In North America, some experts attribute the further strengthening of NAFTA (North American Free Trade Area) to the future appearance of Amero.

Adopted in April 2010 in Brasilia at the BRIC Summit (Brazil, Russia, India, China) The Joint Statement stressed that " ... the world needs today a new and more stable financial architecture that will make the global economy less susceptible to future crises and more resilient to them, and there is an urgent need for a more stable, predictable and diversified international system." In the interests of strengthening international economic stability, finance ministers and central bank governors were instructed to " study the issue of regional currency arrangements and discuss the terms of cooperation between our countries in this area. In order to facilitate trade and investment, we will explore opportunities for currency cooperation, including an agreement on the use of national currencies in trade between our countries. " ¹⁸

But it takes time to coordinate local currency laws and accumulate currency reserves in the Central Banks of the BRIC countries.

Similar plans to abandon the dollar and gradually switch to the use of the Russian ruble in mutual settlements are being developed in the CIS countries. Russian Finance Minister Alexander Kudrin did not rule out that the experience of Belarus and China, which already trade with each other using national money through the so-called currency swaps scheme, can be used ¹⁹.

As such, Chinese leaders do not deny the need for greater liberalization of the currency regime in China and serious reform of the banking system in order to gradually achieve convertibility of the yuan in the context of the balance of investment payments.

The Chinese currency is beginning to function more and more as an Asian reserve currency, and it is possible that the yuan, or "renminbi" ("people's money"), may well become the fourth reserve hard currency in the future (after the US dollar, euro and yen).

On October 24, 2009, an agreement was signed to establish a free trade area within ASEAN. There is reason to believe that the Chinese yuan can become the single currency of ASEAN in mutual settlements. In many countries bordering the PRC, especially in those where their own currency is weak, the yuan is actually the second settlement currency, which is sometimes preferred to the detriment of the national one.

Mutual settlements in yuan are practiced in China's trade with Russia. In our Far East, the yuan is used, and in western Chinese regions, the ruble is recognized. The transition to mutual settlements in national currencies was discussed during the 7th meeting of the leaders of the two countries in June 2009.

Talk of creating a new reserve system is causing a sharply negative reaction in the United States. President Barack Obama bluntly stated that "there is no need for a (single) global reserve currency... the dollar is exceptionally strong because investors see the United States as the world's strongest economy and most stable political system. " ²⁰ At the same time, the White House does not object to expanding the use of the SDR as a reserve currency. While continuing to argue that the exchange rate of the Chinese "people's currency" is undervalued and insisting on its revaluation, the Obama administration is in no hurry to take tough measures and continues to wait for voluntary concessions from China.

The outbreak of a currency and trade war between the two economic giants is clearly unprofitable for China. Demonstrating a firm stance on the exchange rate of its national currency and at the same time realizing that it cannot afford to completely ignore the concerns of its main importer of goods, Beijing continues to look for a "middle ground" between the "weak" and "strong" yuan.

If the US goes to strengthen the dollar, then against the background of the ongoing "weak yuan", this can only worsen the US trade balance with China. Under these circumstances, China will be forced to continue buying up dollar-denominated assets, remaining a kind of sponsor of the American economy. The Chinese have invested so much in American securities that now they cannot back down for fear of devaluing their investments. The strengthening of the yuan promises certain benefits to other foreign trade partners of China, in addition to the United States, especially since many of them do not mind using the yuan in bilateral trade.

Given the growing economic and financial power of the PRC and its authority, the appreciation of the Chinese currency is clearly unavoidable for Beijing.

But so far, it is constrained not only by economic, but also by purely political considerations.

Yielding to massive external pressure would mean a "loss of face" for the Chinese leadership.Moreover, Chinese observers consider it "unfair" to ask other countries to revalue their currency by such a powerful power as the United States, while in recent years the dollar has devalued quite significantly. As Wen Jiabao stated, " I can't understand that at the same time as they devalue their own currencies, they impose appreciation on other currencies. In my opinion, this is protectionism. " ²¹

Still, there is no doubt that China will be able to find "harmony" between its national interests and external challenges. It is the same as in the model of China's integration into world trade and production, and into the global financial system. This model can be called managed, and it is characterized by a combination of a high degree of openness and rather strict national control.²²

¹ New York Times, 17.05.2010.

² New York Times, 25.05.2010.

³ Prime-TASS, 22.06.2010.

⁴ For more information, see: Smirnov S. Exchange rate regime and economic stability // Voprosy ekonomiki, 2010, No. 1.

^{Polterovich V. M.} 5 Elementy teorii reformov [Elements of the theory of reforms]. Moscow, 2007, pp. 181-182.

^{Anikin A.V.} 6 Currency crisis in the West, Moscow, 1975, p. 11.

⁷ Ibid., p. 327.

⁸ Journal of Comparative Economics. 1981, vol. 5, N 1, p. 73.

⁹ The Renminbi Exchange Rate and the Global Monetary System // Institute for International Economics - http://www.iie.com

¹⁰ Prime-TASS, 17.03.2010.

¹¹ http://txt.newsru.com/world/05feb2010/usa_kit.html

^{Hafizov Lenar} 12, Prime Mark. Bet on strengthening the yuan / / Prime-TASS, 17.03.2010

¹³ http://russian.sme.gov.cn/news/zhaoshang/20091123/0440 45.html

¹⁴ Official website of the Government of the People's Republic of China. Chinese Government's Official Portal. China faces most complicated year, keeping yuan stable. 14.03.2010-http://english.gov.cn/2010-03/14/content_1555437.htm

¹⁵ The Guardian, 27.03.2009.

¹⁶ Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 27.03.2010.

^Parrenas 17, Julius Ceasar. Challenges and Prospects for an Asian Currency Unit - http://www.rieti.go.jp/jp/events/06120801/pdf/2-2_parrenas_presentation.pdf

¹⁸ Official website of the President of Russia. Joint statement of the Heads of State and Government of the countries participating in the Second BRIC Summit (Brazil, Russia, India, China). 15.04.2010 г. - http://news.kremlin.ru/ref_notes/524

¹⁹ Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 02.04.2010.

²⁰ Reuters, 24.03.2009.

²¹ Official website of the Government of the People's Republic of China. China faces most complicated year...

^{Dmitry Kuzmin.} 22 Model of China's integration into the world economy and countercyclical policy // Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn, 2010, No. 1.