Anastasia Belkova

Church-State Relations in the Theory of Religious Economy

Anastasia Belkova - Postgraduate Student of the Institute of Mongolian, Buddhist and Tibetan Studies of the Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of Science, Ulan-Ude (Russia), afan-project@mail.ru

This paper is an attempt to consider state and church relations using the theory of religious economy. This paper presents the review of researches using economic approach to the study of religion, which touchs upon the problem of the influence of state on religious sphere. The author uses economic models and comes to the following conclusions. First, economic reasons of intervention of the state into religious market are linked with positive social effect from activity of religious organizations. Second, the state in such a situation seeks to promote religious organizations, however, the issue of loyalty comes to the fore. The state regulates religious market and subsidizes only loyal religious organizations in order to control the expenditure of public funds. Religious organizations of traditional faiths often become loyal because of the wide experience of interaction with the government.

Keywords: church and state, religious market, religious economy.

The theoretical model that uses the economic approach as a basis for analyzing religion is one of the main methodological paradigms of modern sociology of religion. Within its framework, religious organizations are considered as competing firms offering religious goods to consumers. This definition

The research was carried out with the financial support of the RGNF within the framework of the RGNF research project (Religious situation in Inner Asia: problems of post-Soviet transformations), project N 13 - 33 - 01260.

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religious economics is what we will stick to in this paper. The main representatives of this direction are William Bainbridge, Roger Finke, Lawrence Iannaccone and Rodney Stark 1.

In Russia, works on religious economics are mostly theoretical reviews. S. A. Opalev2 examines the place of rational choice theory among modern theoretical approaches to the study of religion, as well as the impact of religious pluralism and state regulation of religions on religiosity. E. D. Rutkevich 3 analyzes the" new paradigm " of S. Warner4 and his followers, The author uses various names: "the theory of rational choice of religion", "the theory of religious mobilization", "the theory of market religious niche", "the theory of religious economy", "the theory of religious supply", "the model of religion of rational choice". R. O. Safronov5 gives a brief overview of the problem. a retrospective review of the formation and development of the theory of rational choice in the sociology of religion. E. A. Stepanova 6, considering the differences between the religious situation in the United States and in Western Europe, also refers to the theory of rational choice. A.V. Filkina 7 in his review of the main interpretations of religious phenomena in the sociology of religion touches on the " economy of-

1. См. работы: Bainbridge, W. S. and Stark, R. (1987) A Theory of Religion. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press; Finke, R. and Stark, R. (1992) The Churching of America: Winners and Losers in Our Religious Economy. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press; Iannaccone, L. R. (1997) "Rational Choice: Framework for the Scientific Study of Religion", in Rational Choice Theory and Religion: Summary and Assessment, pp. 25 - 44. New York: Routledge.

Opalev S. A. 2. Criticism of the theory of secularization in the theory of rational choice//Religious studies. 2010. N3 / 4. pp. 170-189; Opalev S. A. Issledovaniya religioznogo pluralizma v sovremennoi zapadnoy sotsiologii religii [Studies of religious pluralism in the modern Western Sociology of Religion]. 2011. N2. pp. 106-115.

Rutkevich E. D. 3. "New paradigm" in the sociology of religion: Pro and Contra//Bulletin of IS RAS, 2012, N6, pp. 208-233.

4. Warner, S. (1993) "Work in Progress towards a New Paradigm for the Sociological Study of Religion in the United States", American Journal of Sociology 98 (5): 1044 - 1093.

Safronov R. O. 5.Sovremennye sotsiologicheskie teorii religii v SSHA i Evrope [Modern sociological theories of religion in the USA and Europe]. 2009-N1 / 2. pp. 24-44.

Stepanova E. A. 6. Religion in the USA and Western Europe: exception or rule?// Scientific Yearbook of IFiP UO RAS, 2012, vol. 12. pp. 110-122.

Filkina A.V. 7. Methodology of studying modern religious phenomena: problem statement//Bulletin of TSPU. 2006. N2. p. 111-115.

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scientific " concepts of religion, focusing in detail on the theory of religious capital by L. Giannaccone 8.

Traditionally, when studying the influence of the state on the religious situation, the economic approach is expressed in the analysis of religious competition, religious choice, and the dynamics of religiosity. At the same time, this approach may be of interest in analyzing the relationship between religious organizations and the state. What are the rational grounds for government interference in church activities? Why does the state support only some religious associations? In this article, we will try to answer these questions using economic models. In addition, we will try to consider the main conclusions of the theory of religious economics concerning relations between the state and the church. The research is based on the analysis of scientific works performed within the framework of the economic approach to the study of religion.

Religious economics theorists on the role of the State

K. Hilton, Yu. Rodionova and F. Deng, in his review of the application of economic theory to the analysis of church-state relations, begins with Adam Smith.:

Smith viewed religions as if they were firms selling a product to customers. New religious firms are entering the market to meet consumer demand. Creating a monopoly through state licensing or the establishment of a state religion will reduce the efforts of the seller of religion to satisfy consumer tastes. Churches that have long been supported by the State distance themselves from the concerns of their members.10
8. См. подробнее: Iannaccone, L. R. (1990) "Religious Practice: a Human Capita] Approach", Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 29: 297 - 314; Iannaccone, L. R. (1994) "Why Strict Churches Are Strong", American Journal of Sociology 99: 1180 - 1211.

9. Hylton, K. N., Rodionova, Y. and Deng, F. (2008) "Church and State: an Economic Analysis", Boston University of Law Working Paper 24 (8): 1 - 48 [http://www.bu.edu/law/faculty/scholarship/workingpapers/2008.html, accessed on 15.08.2013].

10. Ibid., pp. 4 - 5. Here and further translation by the author.

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Indeed, A. Smith in his work"Research on the nature and causes of wealth" 11, analyzing government spending, discusses the impact of state participation on competition between various religious organizations:

But if politics had never been called to the aid of religion, if the victorious party had never supported the teachings of one sect to the detriment of those of another, it would probably have treated all existing sects equally and impartially, and left each individual to choose his own priest and religion according to his conviction. In this case, no doubt, there would be a large number of religious sects... Every preacher, no doubt, would feel compelled to make extraordinary efforts and employ all sorts of subterfuges in order to retain and increase the available number of his followers. But since all the other preachers would feel compelled to do the same, no preacher or sect of preachers could be very successful. The interested and active zeal of religious preachers can be dangerous and can have unpleasant consequences only where only one sect is allowed in society, or where society as a whole is divided into two or three large sects, and the preachers of each of them act in concert and subject to established discipline and hierarchy.. The preachers of every sect, seeing themselves surrounded on all sides by more adversaries than friends, would be compelled to teach that candor and moderation which is so rarely found among the preachers of great sects, whose doctrines, supported by the civil power, are revered by almost all the inhabitants of vast kingdoms and empires.12
According to A. Smith, state interference in competition between religions negatively affects the quality of religious products. The lack of state regulation, on the contrary, encourages an increase in the competitiveness of religious goods and activates the behavior of the church in the religious market.

11. Smith, A. C. (1776) The Wealth of Nation. L.: W Strahan and T. Cadell.

Smit A. 12. Issledovanie o prirode i prichinakh bogatstva narodov [Research on the nature and causes of peoples ' wealth], Moscow: Eksmo, 2007, pp. 731-732.

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The classics of the modern theory of religious economics, L. Giannaccone and R. Stark, also touched upon the problem of relations between the state and the church. For example, Yiannaccone considered this issue within the framework of his concept of religious capital.13 In his opinion, the interference of the State, which forces one to support an official religion, hinders the free investment of religious capital. This negatively affects the quality of the religious product offered by the traditional church:

A state-sponsored religious monopoly provides only the appearance of piety - behind this lies an inefficient clergy and an apathetic population... Pluralistic competition will stimulate religious markets in the same way that it does in secular markets, forcing suppliers to offer a wide range of alternative denominations that are well adapted to the specific needs of consumers, which is more effective.14
However, Yiannaccone is more interested in the inner workings of religious markets. It focuses on a comparative analysis of "churches" and "sects" in the context of the so-called stowaway problem. 15 And despite the fact that Yiannaccone builds his classification based on the correspondence of religious norms with generally accepted culture, it is possible to draw parallels between his "churches" and traditional, state-supported religions (he himself refers to Smith's expression established churches - state churches).16. Yiannaccone and Stark write: "The ability of a single religious firm to monopolize the religious economy depends on the extent to which the state uses coercion to regulate it

13. According to L. Yiannaccone, religious capital is a person's knowledge about the doctrine and rituals of any religion. The accumulation of religious capital restricts religious choice due to its non-convertibility, since when a person passes to another denomination, religious capital must be accumulated anew.

14. Iannaccone, L. R. Rational Choice: Framework for the Scientific Study of Religion, p. 40.

15. The problem of the "stowaway" ("hare" - free rider) in L. Giannaccone is similar to the corresponding economic problem-a situation where people can benefit from the common good without paying any costs for its receipt, which makes the production of such goods unprofitable for a private firm.

16. Iannoccone, L. R. (1992) "Sacrifice and Stigma: Reducing Free-Riding in Cults, Communes, and Other Collectives", Journal of Political Economy 100 (2): 283.

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religions"17. R. Finke notes that the state policy on religion ranges from subsidies to complete suppression.18
In the joint work "Deregulation of Religion: the economy of Church and state" 19 l. Giannaccone, R. Finke, and R. Stark argue that non-interference by the State in religion promotes pluralism, which in turn creates competition between religious organizations. As a result, religious firms will be better able to meet consumer demand, which will have a positive impact on the overall viability of religion. "As in other markets, government regulation can profoundly affect producers' incentives, consumer choice, and overall equilibrium. The simple abolition of state regulation is at the heart of many religious trends and developments, and this is our main idea."20 Finke and Stark continue this idea by arguing that the higher the competition between religious organizations, the more religious the population is.21 Some practical studies support this view22.

However, other scholars disagree with it. S. Bruce, back in 1995, when analyzing the religious situation in the UK, came to the conclusion that state regulation or support of religion in reality does not suppress pluralism.23
17. Stark, R. and Iannaccone, L. R. (1994) "A Supply-Side Reinterpretation of the 'Secularization' of Europe", Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 33 (3): 232.

18. См. работы: Finke, R. (1997) "The Consequences of Religious Competition: Supply-Side Explanations for Religious Change", in Rational Choice Theory and Religion: Summary and Assessment, pp. 45 - 64. New York: Routledge; Finke, R. (1997) The Illusion of Shifting Demand: Supply-Side Interpretations of American Religious History, pp. 108 - 124. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

19. Iannaccone, L. R., Finke, R. and Stark, R. (1997) "Deregulating Religion: The Economics of Church and State", Economic Inquiry 35 (2): 350 - 364.

20. Iannaccone, L. R., Finke, R. and Stark, R. (1997) "Deregulating Religion: The Economics of Church and State", Economic Inquiry 35 (2): 351.

21. See, for example, U.S. Religious Market Research: Stark, R. and Finke, R. (2000) Acts of Faith: Explaining the Human Side of Religion. Berkeley: University of California Press; Finke, R. and Stark, R. The Churching of America: Winners and Losers in Our Religious Economy.

22. См., например: Olds, K. (1994) "Privatizing the Church - Disestablishment in Connecticut and Massachusetts", Journal of Political Economy 102 (2): 277 - 297.

23. Bruce, S. (1995) "The Truth about Religion in Britain", Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 34 (4): 426 - 427; Bruce, S. (1992) "Pluralism and Religious Vitality", in Steve Bruce (ed.) Religion and Modernization: Sociologists and Historians Debate the Secularization Thesis, pp. 170 - 194. Oxford: Clarendon.

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R. Phillips, using the theory of neosecularization24, argues that it is impossible to establish an unambiguous causal relationship between the cessation of state interference in the religious sphere and the growth of pluralism:

The relationship between pluralism and non-interference by the State is not defined once and for all in historical evidence. It is too easy to reverse this sequence of events and assume that growing religious pluralism-spurred in part by immigration and geographical mobility - is curtailing support for religious institutions that are ultimately doomed to perish.25
Similar objections are raised by D. V. Olson, who, when speaking about state support, means an oligopoly:

Governments consider it appropriate to support traditional religions and regulate others. Where there is an oligopoly of several strong religions, it may be in the government's interest to protect them from other religions, as happened in the Netherlands. But it is also possible that in the context of pluralism, the state will stop regulating the religious market26.

F. J. Lechner calls into question the need to discuss the relationship between government regulation and religious competition, pointing out that the growth of the number of believers is not necessarily determined by religious competition:

In practice, the growth of the church largely does not depend on the transfer of believers from one church to another. Successful religious brands, such as conservative churches in the United States, tend to,

24. Neo-secularization theory is an updated concept of secularization, which is based on the assumption that secularization is not a decline in religion, but a declining amount of religious power at both the individual, organizational, and societal levels of analysis. Its main theorists are David Yaman, Jose Casanova, William Phillips, and John Sommerville.

25. Phillips, R. (2004) "Can Rising Rates of Church Participation Be a Consequence of Secularization?", Sociology of Religion 65: 148.

26. Olson, D.V.A. (2002) "Competing Notions of Religious Competition and Conflict in Theories of Religious Economies", in Market, Sacred Canopies: Essays on Religious Markets and Religious Pluralism, p. 155. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.

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they grow by effectively socializing their members, rather than by attracting new customers through competition.27
M. Chávez and F. S. Gorski also deny the connection between the level of religiosity and the presence of religious competition.28 According to them, there are two different types of religious competition. In the European type ," membership in a religious organization"... citizenship... Religion is often involved in cultural, political, and social conflicts between states, classes, and national and ethnic groups," and religious alliances become markers of non-religious interests. In the American type, religious organizations depend on voluntary donations, which means that these organizations compete for people's time and resources with other both religious and non-religious voluntary associations. Therefore, it is hardly necessary to talk about the general patterns of such correlations, since there are too many exceptions.29 Back in 1992, M. Chavez, in a joint work with D. Kahn, analyzing the possibilities of an economic approach to the analysis of state regulation of religious markets, argued that state regulation makes religious firms ineffective and negatively affects the mobilization of religious consumers. However, he drew attention to an exception to this rule: in Protestant and Catholic countries, with state support for religion, there is an increase in the level of religious participation. At the same time, he recognized that for an adequate sociological explanation, it is not enough to use only indicators of religious pluralism - it is necessary to take into account non-economic variables.30 Ubainbridge, in turn, said that signs of monopoly can arise even in the absence of government intervention.:

27. Lechner, F.J. (2006) "Rational Choice and Religious Economies", in Sage Handbook of the Sociology of Religion, p. 16 [http://sociology.emory.edu/faculty/flechner/Rational%20Choice%20and%20Religious%20Econ omies.pdf, accessed on 15.08.2013].

28. Chaves, M. and Gorski, PS. (2001) "Religious Pluralism and Religious Participation", Annual Review of Sociology, p. 261.

Rutkevich E. D. 29. "New paradigm" in the sociology of religion: Pro and Contra. p. 218.

30. Chaves, M. and Cann, D. E. (1992) "Regulation, Pluralism, and Religious Market Structure", Rationality and Society. 4 (3): 272 - 290.

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If a society has a dominant religious tradition divided into similar denominations and sects, then the doctrines and practices of non-stressed and stressed groups will differ only in degree, but not in essence... Competing Protestant groups do not completely contradict each other, but only in limited areas... Protestant societies therefore enjoy the advantages of a religious monopoly, despite the presence of religious diversity.31
The approach of K. D. Miller, which focuses on specific aspects of state regulation of religion, considered from the point of view of religious economics, is interesting:

The state's regulation of the church affects the possibility of entry, the nature of competition, and the cost structure of competitors. In extreme cases, there is a control over the entrance, which includes a legal ban on the formation of new religious groups. More lenient methods of curbing the entry of new players into the market include state support for certain religious organizations, registration requirements, a ban on explicit proselytizing, blocking access to the media space, and a discriminatory tax regime for non-traditional sects and cults... Churches are more likely than sects and cults to successfully promote their interests through political influence.32
K. Hilton, Yu. Rodionova and F. Deng in the above-mentioned work, considering the problem of state regulation of religion, proceed from the fact that religion contributes to reducing the scale of such behavior that violates social norms. State intervention weakens the motivation of churches to engage in this kind of useful activity, since by supporting a particular religion, the state creates a "lazy monopoly". "Lazy monopoly" is a term coined by A. Hirschman [33] in 1970, it describes a situation where a monopolist organization prefers to lose money on its own resources.-

31. Bainbridge, W. S. (1995) "Social Influence and Religious Pluralism", Advances in Group Processes 12: 7.

32. Miller, K. D. (2002) "Competitive Strategies of Religious Organizations", Strategic Management Journal 23 (5): 447, 448.

33. Hirschman, A. (1970) Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organization and States. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

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this reduces the pressure on the organization, as passive customers remain 34.

It is easy to see why religious institutions would prefer to gain a certain degree of power through government. A religious institution can benefit from the state's right to levy taxes and regulate competitors, as well as direct subsidies in its own direction. A religion can use the regulatory function of the state and block entry for new faiths, and possibly subject them to a complete ban. The state may require citizens to support the state church (or churches) through taxes. Taxation and competition regulations that restrict religious growth are costly to society. Such policies reduce the scope of the religious market, reducing public welfare as much as the taxation of the market in any other case. In addition, such policies create interest groups, in particular tax recipients, and privileged religious organizations that have incentives to lobby to maintain their status.35
K. Hilton, Yu. Rodionova and F. Deng believe that in exchange for government subsidies, religious organizations provide support to specific political actors. At the same time, the latter prefer a particular church for reasons of economy (based on whose support will cost less). Thus, K. Hilton, Yu. Rodionova and F. Deng, studying the specific consequences of the practice of public spending on religious organizations, come to the conclusion that this situation contributes to the spread of corruption, which is manifested in the adoption of laws that establish the special status of selected religions, and bribes to government officials who enforce religious prohibitions.

Summarizing the above, we note that in the tradition of the economic approach, the issue of relations between the state and the church is mostly considered within the framework of the analysis of religious con --

34. See for more details: Sklyar T. M. The problem of "lazy monopoly" in Russian healthcare. Scientific reports N3 (R) - 2997-St. Petersburg: Research Institute of Management of St. Petersburg State University, 2007. p. 11.

35. Hylton, K. N., Rodionova, Y. and Deng, F. (2008) Church and state: an economic analysis, p. 6 - 7.

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smoking rates. The general provisions of the theory in this regard are as follows.

First, the less regulated a religious economy is, the more pluralistic it becomes. Multiplicity occurs in an unregulated market, because one firm cannot simultaneously be both in the sphere of the sacred and in the sphere of the mundane, be both rigid and condescending, ascetic and liberated. As a result, there are various niches in this market that correspond to each of these aspects of religious activity.

Second, as soon as a religious firm becomes a monopoly, it tries to extend its influence to other public institutions.

Third, if there is a transition from a regulated religious economy to an unregulated one, then many religious firms are formed, none of which is able to support the process of sacralization (for a number of reasons, this is also impossible for a coalition of firms). In such a situation, there will be an increase in personal religiosity-precisely because of the increase in the number of religious firms. While religious monopolies can provide society with religious symbolism, they cannot increase the scale of personal religiosity.

Fourth, the less regulated the religious economy is and the more competitive it is, the higher the level of religiosity will be observed in society.

Fifth, even when competition is limited, religious firms can provide a high level of religiosity if these firms are the main intermediaries in any social conflict. In such cases, religious identity is inseparable from group identification.36
Thus, when analyzing relations between the state and the church from the point of view of religious economics, the main attention is paid to the consequences of state interference in the religious sphere, rather than to the causes and mechanisms of state regulation. So far, one of the most cited works on this topic is Adam Smith's eighteenth-century study, which is referenced by most modern theorists of religious economics. Individual works, however, contribute to the opi-

Safronov R. O. 36. Sovremennye sotsiologicheskie teorii religii v SSHA i Evrope [Modern sociological theories of religion in the USA and Europe], pp. 40-41.

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research and analysis of the mechanisms of interaction between the church and the state, such as, for example, the research of the aforementioned K. D. Miller. In our opinion, the use of the theory of rational choice allows us to consider the relations between the state and the church from a new point of view, using ready-made economic models. Next, we will try to investigate the causes and mechanisms of state regulation of religion using an economic approach.

Reasons for state support for religion: Calculating loyalty and social effects

The first question that arises when analyzing relations between the state and the church is: why do the authorities support religious organizations? It would seem that the absence of state intervention will allow monopolistic competition to develop, when many firms-churches produce a differentiated product. The company is interested in a variety of products and in their improvement, which is what this market model provides. In this case, the buyer has a wide range of choices, and manufacturers, accordingly, are able to more fully meet the needs of consumers. This is written, in particular, by L. Giannaccone, R. Finke and R. Stark. However, the religious product is specific. The church offers beliefs, ideals, rituals, social connections,"compensators" 37, but often not only the seller (religious organization) and the buyer (believer) benefit from the transaction, but also a third party, for example, society as a whole. This effect is due to the church's involvement in solving social problems.

First, most religions (which are offered by firms-churches) contain ideals and norms that have a beneficial effect on society. For example, the commandment "thou shalt not kill" reduces the likelihood of believers committing crimes, and, accordingly, society benefits from increased security, from reducing the cost of preventing crimes and ensuring the rule of law.

Secondly, the activities of a religious organization are not limited to individual exchanges with consumers of its services. Often, the church sets broader goals of making a positive impact on society as a whole, which must be consistent with its doctrine. Then churches organize charity events-

37. For more information, see Stark, R. and Bainbridge, WS. 4 Theory of Religion.

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They also have fun eating out, giving shelter to the homeless, fighting alcoholism, and so on. At the same time, the beneficiary of such actions does not have to be a believer and belong to the organizing church, that is, formally, within the framework of the economy of religion, he is not a consumer and does not buy goods.

A. E. Clark and O. Lelkes write:

The fact that we also find 38 side effects is consistent with the following statements:

- the activities of religious institutions are not exclusive to their members, and those who are outside also benefit;

- there is a "moral" component of religiosity that gives a positive signal to everyone else (this refers to A. Smith's statement that religion increases the value of reputational capital by providing information about the moral character of a person.);

- religiosity as such is positively correlated with socially oriented behavior 40.

Rodney Stark, based on his research on religion in the United States, also argues that religion not only reduces crime, but also promotes socially oriented behavior, such as helping people in difficult situations, donating, and so on. Stark points out that, contrary to popular belief, religious people are not only involved in charity work within their own churches, and that they are even more involved in external social activities than non-believers. 41
Thus, the production and consumption of religious goods provides benefits not only to direct consumers, but also to third parties. In economic science in this case-

38. Side effects are defined here as the benefits that third parties receive from the relationship between a particular consumer of a religious product and a religious organization.

39. См.: Anderson, G. M. (1998) "Mr. Smith and the Preachers: the Economics of Religion in the Wealth of Nations", Journal of Political Economy 96: 1066 - 1088.

40. Clark, A. E., Lelkes, O. (2009) Let Us Pray: Religious Interactions in Life Satisfaction, Working Paper, p. 13. [http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/docs/00/56/61/20/PDF/w p200901.pdf, accessed on 15.08.2013].

41. Interview with R. Stark on the portal "Research on Religion" dated May 5, 2013. [http://www.researchonreligion.org/christianity/rodney-stark-on-how-religion-benefits-everyone - including-atheists, accessed from 27.07.2013].

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42.all the benefits associated with the production and consumption of certain goods and services, including those that are a side effect and result from the consumption of certain goods and services. do not require compensation (referred to as "overflow benefits"). In this case, the volume of output that provides overflow benefits is less than the optimal value (that is, it corresponds to the interests of society and the state), since the producer, without receiving returns from the production of additional benefits, is not motivated to increase supply in the market. In other words, the market system itself does not provide the benefits that are side effects of economic activities (for example, in the field of education or health).

The church is just such a firm that benefits not only the direct consumer of a religious product, but also society as a whole, since religious regulations prevent believers from antisocial behavior (murder, theft, etc.). However, the church spends certain resources to ensure both the production of a religious product and the social effects associated with it. its activities.

To increase the social significance of these effects, the state assumes the function of replenishing the resources spent. The most convenient and easy method from an organizational point of view is to subsidize producers, in our case religious organizations. Subsidies allow religious organizations to increase the amount of resources they spend on socially useful activities. At the same time, the resulting effect exceeds the costs of increasing conflict in the religious market associated with the selectivity of state support. It should be borne in mind that "subsidizing" is understood not only as financial injections into the religious sector.-

42. "Spillover benefits" in the context of religious research are mentioned in the work of Joseph Daniels and Mark von der Ruhr in their construction of the economic growth model "megachurch": Daniels, J. P. and von der Ruhr, M. (2010) Subsidizing Religious Participation through Groups: A Model of the 'Megachurch' Strategy for Growth, ASREC Web Archive, pp. 1-20. [http://www.thearda. com/asrec/archive/papers/von%20der%20Ruhr%20and%20Daniels%20-%20Subsidizing%20Re ligious%20Participation%20through%20Groups. pdf, accessed on 15.08.2013].

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top from the state, but also administrative and legislative support, social ties established between representatives of the church and government bodies, and so on.

Thus, the economic approach makes it possible to explain the reasons for state interference in the activities of religious organizations. However, this raises other questions: why are only certain faiths supported and why is preference given to specific religions?

We can offer such an answer to these questions.

The state relies on certain ideas about efficiency. Since its resources are limited, it wants to control the expenditure of resources transferred to religious organizations. As a result, the loyalty factor comes to the fore. The greater the readiness of a religious organization for external control and the stronger its ties with the state, the more likely it is that the subsidies provided to it will be spent for purposes consistent with State policy. Here, too, the minimization of effort factor works: it is more rational to build relationships with as few religious organizations as possible. This is how state-supported denominations appear.

In official discourse, traditional religions are considered State-supported. This choice is legitimized by cultural and historical factors: the special role and significance of traditional confessions is justified by their rootedness in culture, in everyday life, as well as by the fact of their long-term existence in this territory. However, from an economic point of view, all this does not matter, since only loyalty and manageability are important.

Why do states support traditional religious organizations in the world practice? After all, the concept of tradition is not so flexible that it can be used in different situations? Let's try to consider the relationship between tradition and loyalty with the help of economic theory.

The creation of a managed religious organization is a long and complex process. It is necessary that the state authorities and the religious organization acquire the experience of interaction that would allow them to expect a clear and adequate response from the partner. An established relationship between the State and the faith is of paramount importance, as it reduces the risks associated with abusive behavior.-

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current of one of the parties. Usually, the state has been making efforts for a long time to build such relations with the church. And the longer this period, the more" traditional " the religion becomes. Thus, in the Soviet period, despite the official policy of "secularization from above", some confessions were allowed to carry out their activities, but under constant state control and within very strict rules. Religious organizations formed under such conditions are now referred to as traditional ones.

Stable relations between the state and traditional religious organizations are important for both partners and provide appropriate preferences on the part of the state. New religious movements that do not have the advantages of traditional confessions are risky partners for the state, since they are too independent and are not ready to comply with the norms dictated by the state. They are forced to aggressively reclaim their market niche, and therefore their strategies are aimed at recruiting new members, minimizing side effects, making the most of their available resources, and meeting the needs of their customers as fully as possible in order to retain them in their religious community. Mature religious organizations, on the other hand, can afford the side effects of their activities, since they have already taken a place in the religious market. In addition, they already include building relations with the state in their tasks. Thus, the adaptability of a religious organization to the external environment, including the norms dictated by the state, increases its chances of receiving state aid.

We are saying that it is possible for the state to classify religions according to the principle of tradition and non-tradition and provide support only to selected religious organizations. At the same time, pointing out the economic reasons for state interference in the religious sphere and the selectivity of state support, it should be emphasized that these are not the only reasons. In this case, we are talking only about the fact that the theory of religious economics allows us to look at the relations between the state and the church from a new point of view and supplement the totality of reasons for state intervention in the religious sphere with economic factors.

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Some conclusions

The application of the economic approach to the analysis of religion is controversial today. Some empirical studies refute the postulates of the theory of religious economy43, while others, on the contrary, confirm them. The concept we are considering is still being formed, facing problems of explaining religious phenomena, and therefore theoretical research focuses on the question of the feasibility of its application. But, on the other hand, the use of economic models provides ample opportunities for studying specific religious situations and relations, including the interaction of the state and the church.

In the framework of the paradigm under consideration, state interference in the religious sphere is generally assessed negatively, and the absence of such interference, or deregulation of religion, is assessed as something that promotes religious pluralism, which, in turn, increases religious competition. Competition forces churches-firms to improve the quality of their religious products, which leads to more complete satisfaction of consumer requests; as a result, the level of religiosity in society increases.

Despite the fact that some authors question this thesis, the main controversy is around the consequences of state intervention in the religious sphere. At the same time, the economic model makes it possible to analyze the causes of this intervention and its mechanisms.

In our opinion, state regulation of the religious market is determined by the social function of religion and the side effects of religious organizations ' activities: religion promotes socially oriented behavior, religious organizations are engaged in charitable activities, that is, the effect produced by the activities of religious organizations is felt not only by the believer (as a consumer of a religious product), but also by society as a whole. In this situation, the state is forced to compensate for the high costs of religious organizations. At the same time, the sub-regional authorities-

43. См., например: Chaves, M. and Gorski, P. S. (2001) Religious Pluralism and Religious Participation; Bruce, S. (1993) "Religion and Rational Choice: Critique of Economic Explanations of Religious behavior", Sociology of Religion 54 (2): 193 - 205.

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only some religious organizations advertise. The reasons for this are related to the need to control the expenditure of public funds, which is the easiest thing to do when working with a managed organization that has a long experience of interacting with public authorities. That is why the state, when regulating the religious market, classifies confessions into traditional (i.e., state-supported) and non-traditional ones.

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