Recently, Soviet Oriental literature has paid much attention to the problem of China's relations with neighboring countries and peoples in ancient and medieval times .1 The works of Soviet authors make a significant contribution to the coverage of the theory and practice of foreign relations between the Chinese government and foreigners. Meanwhile, this general problem has another important, but still poorly understood aspect: Chinese policy in relation to various tribes and peoples who, during the long period of existence of the Chinese Empire, fell under its direct authority, that is, from the point of view of the imperial government, turned into "foreign subjects".

As you know, the cradle of Chinese civilization was the basin of the middle and lower reaches of the Yellow River. From here, Chinese statehood and culture gradually spread out in different directions over the centuries, mainly to the south. The borders of the empire and the area of predominance of Chinese culture underwent many changes over time. In this regard, non-Chinese tribes and peoples who inhabited vast areas of Central and Eastern Asia could be under the rule of imperial China. Some of them retained their national features to one degree or another, while others gradually assimilated. The expansion of the empire was accompanied by a process of internal colonization by the Chinese of territories previously occupied by non-Chinese populations. Under these circumstances, the Chinese authorities inevitably had to deal with the problem of managing non-national, unpopulated or insufficiently populated territories.

1 Without setting out to give a complete list of works on this topic, we note for example such studies as:" China and its neighbors in ancient Times and the Middle Ages". Moscow, 1970; V. A. Aleksandrov. Russia on the Far Eastern Borders, Moscow, 1969; A. A. Bokshchanin. China and the countries of the Southern Seas in the XIV-XVI centuries. Moscow, 1968; I. S. Ermachenko. Politics of the Manchu Qing Dynasty in Southern and Northern Mongolia in the XVII century. Moscow, 1974; I. Ya. Zlatkin. History of the Dzungarian Khanate (1635-1758). Moscow, 1964; G. V. Melikhov. Manchus in the North-East (XVII century). Moscow, 1974; V. S. Taskin. Materials on the history of Xiongnu, vol. I. Moscow, 1968; vol. 2. Moscow, 1973; L. I. Duman. Traditions in China's foreign policy. "The role of traditions in the history and culture of China", Moscow, 1972; Yu. L. Krol. About the concept of "China-barbarians". "China: Society and the State", Moscow, 1973, as well as reports and reports by L. I. Duman, V. S. Kuznetsov, G. P. Suprunenko, M. Sushailo and N. Madeyuev, K. Sh. Hafizova, I. I. Hwang published in the proceedings of the annual symposium: "Scientific Conference" Society and the State in China "(Moscow 1970; Moscow 1971; Moscow 1972; Moscow 1973; Moscow 1974, Moscow 1975).

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Han Chinese areas. In other words, it was necessary to develop certain principles of national policy.

The formation of such a policy was closely linked to the problem of China's relations with the outside world noted above. It is quite natural that in many cases, especially at the early stage of the development of Chinese statehood, it is very difficult to trace clear lines between the approach to "external" and "internal" foreigners. A leveling influence in this regard was exerted by the dogma widely spread in the ideology of ancient and medieval China, according to which all non - Chinese peoples were considered as wild, uncultured and unbridled barbarians and at the same time as potential subjects of the only full-fledged ruler on earth-the Chinese monarch. Nevertheless, the process of allocating national policy to a special sphere of internal affairs has always been dictated by practical needs.

This process as a whole is still poorly understood. In Soviet literature, it received partial coverage only in relation to the latest turn that leads to the history of modern times, that is, the period of the Qing Dynasty's rule in the country, or rather, the XVII - beginning of the XIX century2 . However, it was the Manchu dynasty that had gained a foothold in China after a long period of resistance from the Chinese people. Therefore, the national policy of the imperial court in this period (and most of all in the late XVII - early XVIII centuries) was characterized by a number of special features. As for the earlier period, to some extent the gap in research is filled by R. F. Its's monograph on the South China region covering the third century BC - XVI century AD3 . But the main focus of the work is on the ethnic history of the peoples who lived here, and not on the policy of the Chinese government on the national outskirts of the country.

Therefore, in this article, far from claiming a comprehensive coverage of the above issue, we will try to consider the most characteristic features of the imperial court's policy towards its non-Chinese subjects at the beginning of the XV century. This period, which is generally limited to the first quarter of this century, was not chosen by chance. Until that time, significant areas of the current territory of Southern and Southwestern China did not actually belong to it, although they were formally included in the administrative system of the empire in the VII-XIV centuries .4 It was only at the beginning of the 15th century that Chinese rule was finally established and a largely new political situation was emerging .5 From this point on, the imperial government is faced with the problem of "developing" these areas. In addition, at the end of the XIV - beginning of the XV century. there is a certain stabilization of the Chinese borders in the north and north-west of the empire. After a long reign of foreign invaders (XII - mid-XIV c.), the northern regions of the country are again intensively developed by the Chinese authorities. And here, again, there is a need to regulate relations with the remaining non-ethnic population.

In documents of the early 15th century (imperial edicts and court instructions to generals and local authorities), some statements have been preserved that give an idea of the basic principles that the Chinese government intended to follow in its relations with China.-

2 L. I. Duman. Agrarian policy of the Qing (Manchu) government in Xinjiang at the end of the XVIII century. Moscow-L. 1936; I. S. Ermachenko. Edict. op.; V. S. Kuznetsov. Economic policy of the Qing government in Xinjiang, Moscow, 1973; G. V. Melikhov. Decree: Op.

3 R. F. Its. Ethnic history of the South of East Asia, L. 1972.

4 Ibid., p. 268.

5 Ibid., pp. 244, 259.

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countries with non-Chinese populations 6 . In the most general form, these principles were reflected, for example, in the instructions of Emperor Zhu Di (1402-1424) of March 12, 1403, regarding the actions of the Chinese administration in Yunnan. Its text, in particular, read: "The way to keep foreigners 7 in subjection is that they know about their subordination 8 to the imperial court and do not lose the ability to remain within the framework of subjects"9 . This "ability" was supported by the fact that military governors of the Chinese court in remote provinces were given powers and orders to "keep foreigners in fear and submission" 10 .

However, along with this, one can trace the desire of the government not to abuse purely military methods of keeping the non-Chinese population in subjection. In this respect, the following instruction of the court dated May 4, 1409 is very characteristic: "Since ancient times, we were led to kill foreign enemies. However, making sure to kill them is not the way to pacify distant lands. Although they are stubborn and cruel and hardly turn to civilization, however, their nature is not bestial and they can be tamed... " 11 . This approach was not motivated by humanitarian or philanthropic considerations. It is simply that by this time the Chinese government has learned from experience that methods of undisguised suppression do not always bring the expected results and that it is very difficult to cope with the liberation aspirations of the foreign population only with their help. A direct confirmation of this can be found in the instructions of the court dated October 11, 1402 to General Han Guang, who was sent to Guangdong and Guangxi to "pacify" the region. It read: "Foreigners... easily raise riots. It's hard to see past them. The more they are killed, the harder it is to control them. " 12
The "soft" approach did not mean a complete rejection of the use of harsh and harsh measures against the non-Chinese population. The same instruction of 1402 says: "When you arrive at the place, you must subdue them (foreigners - L. B.). Lean on those of them who perform their duty virtuously, but those who are not devoted solely to duty - kill" 13 . Military force and methods of direct suppression were widely practiced in Chinese national politics in the early 15th century. Consequently, the intention was to combine such measures with more flexible means of" taming " the non-Chinese population. But also like this

6 The main source for writing this article is Ming Tai-tsung shi lu ("Chronicle of the reign of Taizong of the Ming Dynasty"), compiled in 1430 and covering events from 1399 to 1424. This source, as well as similar chronicles of the reigns of other Ming emperors (1368-1644), is one of the most complete and valuable tools for studying the political history of China in the XIV-XVII centuries. Sections on "local government" ("tu si"), i.e. non-Chinese peoples in the south - west of the country, from the Ming Shi dynastic history compiled in 1678-1739 were also used.

7 Collectively, Chinese sources do not divide non-Chinese peoples into "foreigners" and "foreign subjects", referring to them by the terms "and" (as in this case), as well as "Man", "Manyi" and others. Therefore, if the national identity is not specifically indicated in the text, then these collective terms can be translated both as "foreigners" and as" foreign subjects", depending on whether we are talking about peoples who lived within the empire or outside it.

8 Chinese sources most often use the terms "gui hua", " gui xiang "(as in this case), "gui fu", "lai gui" and others to denote the subordination of a non-national population, which can most accurately be translated as "turn to civilization", but which carry a specific meaning "submit" or " submit."

9 "Ming Tai-tsung shi lu". Siangan. 1964-1966, tsz. 17, p. 311.

10 Ibid., ch. 15, p. 277; ch. 103, p. 1340.

11 Ibid., zz. 90, pp. 1189-1190.

12 Ibid., ch. 12-II, p. 216.

13 Ibid.

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the approach itself deserves attention. The centuries-old Chinese attitude toward all foreigners, whether "internal" or "external", as barbarians, and the juxtaposition of their nature with that of the beast, has led some Chinese politicians to believe that there can be no other relationship with these people than hostility and suppression by force. For example, in November 1406, Zhu Di told courtiers: "Foreigners earn their livelihood by robbing and killing. Do they suspect the existence of etiquette and duty? Therefore, the sages believed that these people should not be controlled. " 14 However, the emperor did not fully agree with the mentioned opinion of the "sages". The whole point of the statement was that it is possible and necessary to manage the non-Chinese population, but again using flexible tactics.

The implementation of such principles depended on the specific situation in certain areas of the empire. The national policy of the Chinese government at the beginning of the XV century can be divided into two main areas: on the northern and north-western borders, where a certain number of Jurchens (Proto-Manchus), Koreans, Mongols (Dadan), western Mongols-Oirats (waze), Uyghurs lived within the empire, and in the south-western provinces, where a certain number of Jurchens (Proto-Manchus), Koreans, Mongols (Dadan), western Mongols-Oirats (waze), and Uyghurs large areas were inhabited by Zhuang, Miao, Yizu, Yao, Li and other peoples.

The differences in the Chinese government's approach to these two areas were primarily due to military and strategic goals. The main military forces of the empire, both defensive and offensive, were concentrated on the north - western borders. The southwestern provinces played a much smaller role in this regard. For example, Gu Cheng, the military governor of the court in Guizhou, wrote in his report to the emperor on the situation on the outskirts of the country in October 1403:: "I believe that when foreign robbers start rioting from time to time in Yunnan and Liangguan, which lie on distant borders, it is like the poison from bee stings and you should not pay attention to it... Only the new generations of northern foreigners, whose nomads are strong and warlike, harbor treacherous intentions and are waiting for the right moment to attack our borders. When making state plans for long-range targeting, one should be deeply concerned about northern foreigners... " 15 . Although there is a deliberate disregard for the liberation struggle of the peoples of Southwestern China (the postulate of security in the areas entrusted to Gu Zheng was supposed to strengthen his reputation at court), the prevailing mindset of Chinese politicians was reflected in the report quite clearly. Second, by this time, the borders of the Ming Empire in the north covered only a part of Southern Manchuria, and in the northwest they went south of the Mongolian steppes. Therefore, a significant number of Jurchens, Mongols, and other peoples did not yet live under the control of the Chinese authorities, and the national question was not yet sufficiently separated from foreign policy problems. On the contrary, in the south - west of the country, non-Chinese peoples made up a significant part of the population. In the XV century, the process of internal colonization continued here, and the national question was very acute.

The north-western region (or the direction of national policy) was characterized by subordination of the main goals to military-strategic calculations. The Chinese authorities readily accepted Mongols, Jurchens, Uyghurs, and other ethnic groups who wanted to settle in the empire. This was dictated by a twofold desire-

14 Ibid., ch. 60, p. 875.

15 Ibid., zz. 23, p. 422.

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niem: on the one hand, to weaken the neighboring tribes, and on the other-to get new soldiers for the border service, because all those who "came and joined" were enlisted in the troops. In this way, the Chinese government tried to exploit the feudal fragmentation of the Mongol, Jurchen and other tribes and create a certain buffer zone on the borders of the empire .16 The presence of non-national military contingents on the north-western borders (especially Mongolian cavalry detachments) is repeatedly recorded in the Ming Tai-tsung shi lu. In particular, the imperial decree of October 31, 1403 speaks of the large number of Mongol soldiers serving the empire .17
Usually, the Mongol, Jurchen, Uyghur, and other feudal lords and tribal leaders who found themselves within the reach of the Chinese local authorities or voluntarily chose to settle in the empire had to make a special presentation to the court. To do this, either they themselves or their subordinates went to the capital, or the local Chinese authorities reported to the center about their desire. Messengers were "graciously" received at court. Then there was an order to assign these feudal lords and leaders Chinese titles. This, in turn, was accompanied by a handover (or transfer)of appropriate Chinese ceremonial clothing and regalia, and sometimes even gifts. Those who received the titles were "appointed" by the emperor as commanders of detachments consisting of their relatives and subordinates. The number of people dependent on the "coming and joining" feudal lords and leaders could, according to sources, range from a dozen to several thousand people. They received the right to live in the specified territory. The military units formed in this way from the non-national population were integrated into the local Chinese military administrative units - wei 18 .

The described titling procedure did not deprive representatives of the non-national nobility of the right to be full-fledged masters among their subordinates "brought" by them. The Chinese government preferred not to encroach on the peculiar internal autonomy of clan, tribal and other associations of the non-Chinese population that fell on the territory of the empire. The dependence of foreign "heads" was given a personal character characteristic of the feudal period: the emperor acted as a suzerain who accepted them into service. In this light, it is important to emphasize that Mongol, Jurchen, and other commanders who served in the Chinese military, unlike Chinese officers and military officials, were allowed to offer "tribute" to the Emperor and receive gifts in return from the court.

In all this structure, there is a direct similarity with the practice of relations with foreign tribes and peoples in the northwest adopted in China at the time under review. The Chinese government did everything possible to encourage and provoke the arrival of envoys from there with gifts called tribute to the emperor. In response, the court sent its gifts and appointed those on whose behalf the messengers came, commanders of local and foreign Wei. At the same time, the Chinese are not very interested in-

16 G. V. Melikhov. Policy of the Ming Empire towards the Jurchens (1402-1413). "China and its neighbors in Ancient and Medieval times", p. 258.

17 "Ming Tai-tsung shi lu", zh. 24, p. 442.

18 Wei-a Chinese military unit, legally consisting of 5,600 soldiers and commanders. Vei's were located on a specific territory and were named after their location. The Wei Command enjoyed certain administrative powers here. Therefore, Wei was not only a military unit, but also partly a military administrative unit. This fact is also confirmed by the fact that the personnel of the vei almost never corresponded to the specified legal figure, deviating much from it in one direction or another (see: N. P. Svistunova. Organization of the border Guard service in northern China during the Ming Era. "China and its neighbors in ancient Times and the Middle Ages", pp. 218, 222, 226, 228).

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lo is both the location of these wei and the actual status of the designated "head" in the local social hierarchy. The latter were automatically ranked by the Chinese side as vassals of the emperor and received the ranks and regalia assigned to the chief of Wei. Naturally, such foreign vei were practically not subordinated to the imperial authorities to any extent .19 This was also realized in China itself. Not without reason, in order not to confuse the marked units with the real, Chinese wei, these foreign formations were called "Jimi Wei", that is, " wei connecting (the forces of foreigners)"20 . This tactic of external relations pursued certain goals. First, it reflected the principles of "divide and conquer" in accordance with the mentioned theory of "binding of foreigners"(jimi). Secondly, it contained elements of appeasing the foreign nobility, " attracting them to China with a kind attitude." Finally, and thirdly, the system of foreign possessions nominally subject to the Emperor could (and did) justify aggressive actions in foreign lands on occasion.

The obvious similarity in the treatment of the Chinese court with its "internal and external vassals" takes on a deep meaning in this light. The separation of individual groups from their fellow tribesmen and the use of "newcomers" in the Chinese troops served to strengthen internecine strife among neighboring peoples; the "merciful" attitude of the court to "joined" (ranks and regalia, gifts, non - interference in the prerogatives of the local elite) - to encourage the transition under the power of the empire, "attracting hearts" to China; the apparent unification of the Russian Empire and the in treating "internal "subjects as if they were "external" - facilitating the real subordination of the latter.

However, along with this, despite all the external similarities in relations with "foreign subjects" and foreigners in the northwest, some differences can be traced here. Despite maintaining a certain degree of internal autonomy among non-national subjects within the empire, the ideal of Chinese politicians was to achieve complete "unity" with them, that is, to eventually assimilate them. One of the instructions sent from the capital to the commander-in-chief of the troops in Gansu, Song Sheng, stated: "Unity with those who have come and joined is a special concern of the imperial court. The lack of unity leads to shame and grief, as well as to the failure of those who have surrendered and joined our limits to follow the path of submission."21 . Such unity was understood, of course, as the gradual introduction of foreign subjects to Chinese norms and customs, because the adoption of foreign customs and lifestyles by the Chinese has long been equated with immoral acts.

The specific steps taken by the Chinese authorities for this purpose were not yet systematic at the time described, but they can nevertheless be detected. In October 1403, the emperor gave an order to "grant" Chinese surnames to Mongol soldiers who served in the Chinese troops .22 Subsequently, the assignment of Chinese surnames to non-national subjects was made both for certain merits and without a special reason .23 This measure was undoubtedly aimed at greater "unity" with non-Chinese people. In the same vein, the spread of-

19 For more information, see: G. V. Melikhov. Policy of the Ming Empire towards the Jurchens (1402-1413), pp. 251-274.

20 The policy of "binding the forces of foreigners" was developed in China in ancient times. It consisted, on the one hand, in inciting strife and hostility among foreign tribes and peoples, and on the other, in cajoling foreign nobility: gifts, dynastic marriages, sworn obligations, and so on.

21 "Ming Tai-tsung shi lu", tsz. 43, p. 681.

22 Ibid., zz. 23, pp. 427-428.

23 Ibid., ch. 44, p. 692; ch. 107, p. 1380-1381.

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applying to them the order of succession by the sons of junior and middle officers of the posts and ranks of their fathers 24 . This procedure was adopted at the time described in the Chinese army. Noteworthy is the reference in the source to attempts to put soldiers of non-Chinese origin on the ground, that is, to extend to them the order of maintenance of troops maintained at that time in China .25
In 1407, the sources record the only case in the period described of the creation of a civil administrative unit in the north-west of the country from a non-national population-Zhangguansy ("office of a senior official"). It was established in Yantong in Shanxi Province. It includes 47 fortified settlements with a population of 1,100 households. The local commander of one of the aforementioned fortified settlements was appointed head of the department - a "senior official". It is very important to emphasize that the courts that came under the administration had to bear taxes and duties in favor of the Chinese Wei Wukai 26 . Such "senior official offices" were cultivated by the Chinese government in the southwest of the empire. They were not typical of the north-western direction of national policy at the time under review. Therefore, this fact is of interest, as it indicates a certain commonality of the final goals of this policy in both regions. In the light of the achievement of "unity" with the non-ethnic population, it is also interesting to attract contingents of Mongolian cavalry to the campaigns of Chinese troops in Mongolia .27 Demonstrating their favor for "those who came and joined," the imperial court instructed local authorities to pay close attention to the needs of the non-Chinese population. In this regard, the latter could be issued livestock, food aid and loans from the treasury .28
At the same time, the Chinese authorities did not stop feeling distrust of the non-national population in the north-west of the country. Fears and suspicions were reflected in many documents sent from the capital to the local military authorities at the beginning of the 15th century. One of the decrees to the Gansu command, for example, read:: "Local Mongolian government troops (i.e., those serving China - A. B.) are all incited by people's speeches to cause trouble. I fear that they will desert or rebel. " 29 Another similar decree warned: "The military men of the local Mongols in Gansu have rebellious intentions at heart." 30 These fears were justified, because despite the attempts of the Chinese government to "attract the hearts" of non-national subjects to China, the real situation in which "those who came and joined" found themselves encouraged them to rise up in the liberation struggle. As a precautionary measure against the unrest of non-national detachments, the Chinese government resorted to relocating them to other places that were not inhabited by them, and to placing Chinese military formations near them for greater control and intimidation .31 But such actions only increased the discontent of the non-Chinese population. For example, the reason for the uprising in April 1410 mon-

24 Ibid., ch. 77, p. 1041.

25 Ibid., zz. 130, p. 1610. In China, in the late 14th and 15th centuries, a system of military settlements (Tuntian) was widespread, involving soldiers in cultivating the land and providing them with agricultural equipment so that they could "plow and fight".

26 "Ming Tai-tsung shi lu", tsz. 66, p. 933.

27 Ibid., zz. 107, p. 1380 - 81, 1386 - 87, 1391.

28 Ibid., zz. 43, p. 681; zz. 44, p. 695; zz. 129, p. 1598-1599.

29 Ibid., ch. 119, pp. 1504-1505.

30 Ibid., zz. 130, p. 1610.

31 Ibid.

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The intention of the authorities to relocate them to other parts of the country was evident from the fact that the Gol detachments serving in Liangzhou and Yongchang Wei in Shaanxi .32
The liberation movement of the non-Chinese population in the north-west of the country is most clearly traced in 1410-1413. It can be assumed that the reason for this, in addition to harassment by local Chinese authorities, was the beginning in 1409-1410 of a series of large campaigns of Chinese troops in Mongolia and the associated awakening of national feelings among the Mongols located within the empire. In any case, the noted uprising in Shaanxi, which was suppressed until the end of the year, was followed by new protests. In August 1411, the Mongol movement to Ningxia was recorded, which lasted until March of the following year33 . In March 1412, a mutiny began under Kotochi in Gansu, which lasted until the summer of that year34 . Along with it, in April 1412, another hotbed of non-Chinese revolt was recorded in Gansu35 . In August of the same year, a new Mongol uprising broke out in Ningxia, and in September, foreign troops rebelled a second time in Wei Liangzhou and Yongchang. 36 The suppression of various hotbeds of this last of these movements cost the Chinese considerable effort and lasted until the summer of 1413 .37 In June 1410 and May 1412, there were revolts of the Muslim (Uyghur) population in the Wei Suzhou area of Gansu38 .

It is characteristic that all the described movements were suppressed by force of arms without any attempts to enter into negotiations with the rebels. Such attempts were invariably made in the case of uprisings of the Chinese population. Even when the non-Chinese population in the south-west of the country disobeyed, the imperial government did not always and immediately resort to military force. In the north-west, by contrast, the court's instructions stated that at the slightest resistance, the recalcitrant should be immediately subdued with the help of troops. It was even prescribed to " kill on the spot "all non-Chinese who in one way or another assist the rebels. 39 Thus, the liberation movement of non-Chinese peoples on the northwestern borders of the empire was suppressed more severely than the rebellions of the Chinese population inside the country and even than in other national areas.

In the south-western regions of the empire inhabited by various non-Chinese peoples, the Minsk government did not pursue military-strategic goals, but solved the problem of expanding and strengthening its administrative system of government. This required considerable effort and the application of somewhat different methods of national policy than in the north-west. As already noted, by the beginning of the 15th century, significant areas of Southern and Southwestern China remained completely out of the control of the Chinese authorities. First of all, this applies to the mountainous regions of modern Chinese provinces - Guizhou and western Hunan. Attempts by previous Chinese rulers from the Song and Yuan (Mongol) dynasties to establish their rule here were unsuccessful. A similar attempt by Zhu Yuan-zhang, the founder of the Ming Dynasty, at the end of the 14th century, was also unsuccessful .40 In addition, a lot of "wild", as defined by Chinese sources, but in fact not under-

32 Ibid., zz. 102, p. 1324.

33 Ibid., ch. 117, p. 1492; ch. 124, p. 1559.

34 Ibid., ch. 125, p. 1567; ch. 128, p. 1593.

35 Ibid., cp. 126, p. 1575.

36 Ibid., ch. 130, p. 1612; ch. 131, p. 1619.

37 Ibid., zz. 131, p. 1621; zz. 134, p. 1635; zz. 135, p. 1650-1651; zz.135, p. 1657-1658; zz. 140, p. 1682.

38 Ibid., ch. 104, pp. 1352-1354; ch. 127, pp. 1534.

39 Ibid., ch. 119, pp. 1504-1505; ch. 103, pp. 1342-1343.

40 R. F. Its. Decree, op., pp. 268, 276,

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The areas assigned to the Chinese authorities remained in the provinces of Sichuan, Yunnan,Guangxi, and Hainan.

Intending to actively develop these areas, the Chinese government at the beginning of the XV century resorted to the tactic of combining military intervention and threats with" attracting the hearts " of the non-ethnic population by peaceful means. At the same time, instructions from the capital prescribed to give preference to the latter. For example, in October 1403, the court recommended to the military governor in Yunnan, Mu Sheng: "If possible, take as a model the attraction of the hearts of foreigners to civilization, and not necessarily send troops"41 . The reasons for the commitment to such a flexible policy, as already noted, lay in the understanding of the imperfection of methods of exclusively military suppression in order to consolidate one's dominance in the developed areas. In addition, the actions of troops in hard-to-reach and remote places from the center of the empire were often ineffective, as previous experience showed. "At first they (non - national subjects-A. B.) all turn to civilization, and then they become robbers again; it is difficult for the government troops to eradicate them," 42 wrote in late 1403. one of the military officials in his report to the court on the situation in Guangxi. In addition, the emperor recommended that Mu Sheng adhere to peaceful tactics only when possible, without hampering his authority to move to direct suppression if necessary.

What exactly was the "attraction" of the non - Chinese population of the south-western suburbs "to civilization"? Local Chinese authorities, both civil and military, forced previously independent settlements and other non-national associations to recognize their citizenship to the emperor by force, threats, or by mutual agreement. Usually, a manifesto was sent to the discovered "wild foreigners" on behalf of the Chinese administration, which offered to accept such citizenship and contained veiled threats in case of insubordination. Then, if necessary, troops were deployed, and with "consent", a mechanism already familiar from the north-western region was activated: either a representative of those who submitted was sent to the capital, or a report was sent by the local Chinese authorities about their desire to "come and join". In response, the highest approval was given, and the" local heads " received Chinese ranks, titles, and regalia. At the same time, in the south-western region, the latter option is much more often traced - namely, the report of the Chinese authorities on the accession of new non-national subjects, and not the trips of their envoys to the court. The number of subordinates could range from several tens to several tens of thousands of people. A similar pattern is observed at the beginning of the 15th century in relation to the most diverse peoples in various provinces of the south-west of the country .43
In many cases, simultaneously with the direction of "attracting" manifestos, troops were drawn together to suppress possible resistance .44 In turn, the use of the army did not exclude further attempts to "attract foreigners" with manifestos. In this case, in exchange for submission, a promise was made to suspend military operations and withdraw troops .45 In other words, with all the noted preference for peaceful "pacification" of the non-Chinese population, the latter was practically carried out from a position of strength and organically combined

41 "Ming Tai-tsung shi lu", zh. 23, p. 425.

42 Ibid., cp. 25, p. 460.

43 Ibid., zz. 43, p. 688; zz. 44, p. 701; zz. 52, p. 777; zz. 55, p. 816-818; zz. 73, p. 1015-1016; zz. 101, p. 1318; zz. 122, p. 1540; zz. 139, p. 1676, zz. 141, p. 1692.

44 Ibid., ch. 141, p. 1693.

45 Ibid., ch. 51, p. 767.

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with direct pressure methods. The central Government encouraged the efforts of local authorities to "attract" the non-ethnic population "to civilization", as evidenced by orders to practice sending out "attracting" manifestos46 . For success in acquiring new subjects, Chinese officials and military personnel received awards and incentives.

As for the administrative structure of the "affiliates" in the south - west region, it was not uniform. In some cases, they could simply be integrated into Chinese counties, almost equalizing their responsibilities with the local Chinese population47 . But more often, non-national subjects received a kind of autonomy. At first, the imperial government was prepared to be content with a general, even if formal, expression of submission on their part. This is clearly reflected in the words of the emperor, uttered at the end of 1406: "The way to manage foreigners is this: as soon as they obey, you can leave them alone." 48 To a certain extent, this approach was dictated by the actual situation in the specified region. Chinese colonization of the southern and southwestern provinces of the country, although it had been going on for many centuries, was still not so deep and broad as to serve as a sufficient basis for the rapid and widespread introduction of purely Chinese orders. Even at the beginning of the sixteenth century, Chinese colonization was not yet sufficient .49 Therefore, when developing these provinces administratively, the Chinese needed a certain alliance with the social elite of local tribes and peoples. This was reflected in the preservation of some of its prerogatives, which was what the aforementioned autonomy was reduced to.

Taking into account this situation, the caution that the central government strongly advised local Chinese authorities to observe in dealing with "newcomers and joiners"becomes more understandable. For example, one of the emperor's instructions on this matter read:: "Since foreigners turn to culture, we should effectively support them in this regard. At the slightest encroachment on their interests, they will cease to be sincere towards the imperial court. An order should be sent immediately... protect them. It is also prudent to give orders to local authorities that it is their duty to follow the path of cordiality and peaceful relations with them to the end."50 The American researcher C. O. Hacker calls this tactic "delaying-polite" 51 .

The mentioned autonomy found a concrete expression in the application of the well-known system of " tu si "("local administrations"). Its essence is very accurately reflected in Chinese sources, where it says: "From the time of the Hunu (late 14th century-A. B.), their own former officials were used to manage those southwestern foreigners who came under their control. "52" Only the following needs to be clarified: officials here mean the tribal and feudal elite of non-Chinese peoples, who, as noted above, received ranks and regalia from the imperial court. Given the nature of this system, researchers come to the fair conclusion that it preserved social relations among non-Chinese peoples 53 .

46 Ibid., ch. 41, p. 673.

47 Ibid., ch. 55, pp. 816-817; ch. 122, p. 1540.

48 Ibid., ch. 60, p. 875.

49 W. Eberhard. Social Mobility in Traditional China. Leiden. 1962, p. 20.

50 "Ming Tai-tsung shi lu", zh. 38, pp. 647-648.

51 Ch. O. Hucker. The Traditional Chinese State in Ming Times. Tucson. 1961, p. 21.

52 "Ming shi", - "Ershiu shi", Vol. 9. Shanghai, 1935, tsz. 310, p. 7867 (4).

53 R. F. Its. Op. ed., pp. 277; Ch. O. Hucker. Op. tit., pp. 21-22.

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According to Chinese sources, the method of leaving local leaders and princes at the head of the subjugated non-national population, provided that they submit to the imperial power, can be traced back to the end of the II-beginning of the I century BC .54 However, it was during the period under review, or rather, at the end of the XIV-beginning of the XV century, that the "tu sy" system acquired the features of a special and developed direction of domestic policy. A whole gradation of "local administrations" is being created. The lowest unit was the already mentioned "senior official's office" ("zhangguansy"). The "local administrator" who headed it received the full sixth official Chinese rank 55 . The next, higher level was the " pacification departments "(anfuses), headed by people who received the fifth auxiliary official rank. Even higher up were the" offices of complete pacification " (xuanfus), which were supposed to be headed by officials of the fourth auxiliary rank. At the top of this pyramid were the "offices of complete calm" (Xuanweis), led by officials of the third auxiliary rank. In addition, the "Ming Shi" refers to another category of such departments - "departments of attraction and retribution" (zhaotaos)56 . Their practical application on the material of sources of the beginning of the XV century is not traced and the rank of the officials who headed them is not called. But judging by the fact that if the "Ming shi" follows the marked gradation, these departments are not placed above the "pacification department", but below the "complete pacification department", they should have been headed by an official of the full fifth rank.

Despite the apparent harmony of the system outlined, its application in practice was not so definite. The formation of one or another of the listed administrative divisions did not have clear criteria and was dictated by specific circumstances. There was also no uniform order of subordination of the above-mentioned units. As can be clearly seen from sources, the "senior official's offices" could, for example, be subordinate either to the military command of the province, 57 or to the "complete calm departments", 58 or to a military garrison stationed nearby .59 At the same time, the type of subordination could change depending on the orders of the Chinese authorities .60 The very existence of such "directorates" was not stable. The government administration could arbitrarily change the status of individual units, for example, transform the "offices of complete calm" into "offices of a senior official" and so on .61 In addition, the Chinese authorities were free to abolish such autonomous entities altogether, subordinating the non-national population to the control of the ordinary Chinese administration .62 Autonomous "administrations" also disappeared of their own free will: the population sometimes simply fled .63 Finally, the formation of the above-mentioned units in the territories of settlement of non-Chinese peoples was combined with the establishment of the usual forms of imperial administrative division-counties, districts, regions, and so on. Moreover, they could be headed not only by China-

54 "Ming shi", tsz. 310, p. 7867 (4).

55 In the traditional Chinese table of ranks, there were 9 gradations (starting with the first as the highest rank). But each rank had two levels-"full" (higher) and "auxiliary" (that is, incomplete). Thus, the pyramid of ranks was practically an eighteen-step pyramid.

56 "Ming shi", tsz. 310, p. 7867 (4).

57 "Ming Tai-tsung shi lu", ch. 44, p. 689; ch. 60, p. 874; ch. 75, p. 1033.

58 Ibid., ch. 44, p. 689; ch. 67, p. 938.

59 Ibid., zz. 63, p. 907.

60 Ibid., zz. 78, p. 1053.

61 Ibid., ch. 52, pp. 792-793.

62 Ibid., ch. 145, p. 1717; ch. 147, p. 1729.

63 Ibid., zz. 64, p. 912; zz. 66, p. 932; zz. 175, p. 1920-1921.

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local officials, but also "local" officials who are invested with the appropriate position 64 .

It is very interesting to ask how far the independence of the "local" administration was extended, or, conversely, how limited, within the framework of the outlined system of autonomy. As already noted, the Chinese retained certain prerogatives of the social elite of the non-Chinese population. Hence, it is possible that in some cases they may have been satisfied by the purely formal recognition of the Emperor's supreme authority by local leaders. Receiving Chinese ranks and regalia in these circumstances did not limit their power over their fellow tribesmen in any way. Recognition of this situation is contained in Chinese official sources. For example, non-Chinese peoples in Sichuan are recorded as: "It is reported that they themselves have their own tyrants and, although they accept titles and titles from the imperial court, but in fact they themselves are the rulers of those lands." 65 The fact that one of these "officials" arrested and robbed an imperial envoy passing through its territory also speaks in favor of a certain freedom of the hands of the "local administration" .66
Emphasizing the special position of "local officials", the imperial court practiced maintaining "tributary relations" with them, that is, "allowed" them to send "tribute from local goods" to the capital and sent gifts in return. The extension of this order adopted in the foreign policy relations of the empire to non-national subjects also indicates that they were placed in a special position from others, continuing to be considered to some extent "foreigners". As in the case of foreign countries, certain groups of non-Chinese officials were subject to certain norms of giving back for the "tribute" they delivered .67 They also set deadlines for sending "tributes", which often coincided with the frequency required by the Chinese from foreigners - once every 3 years .68 At the beginning of the 15th century, the court hosted lavish receptions of" embassies "from" local officials " consisting of several dozen or even hundreds of people .69 At the same time, not wanting the "tribute" to serve as a burden for non-national leaders, Zhu Di argued that "one should not be too demanding in the embassy business"70 . Such an emphatic approach of non-Chinese subjects to foreigners undoubtedly contributed to the consolidation of special rights of the local social elite.

At the same time, in many specific cases, the expression of submission of the non-ethnic population to the Chinese court could be accompanied by quite tangible restrictions on the power of former leaders. In this regard, such a step as the order of November 5, 1404 to appoint Chinese "assistants" who would be "experienced in the affairs" of the administration to all "foreign heads" in Yunnan is very symptomatic .71 Officially, this was motivated by the lack of knowledge of the Chinese language and office management standards in such chapters. But the significance of this step does not change: in this way, local tribal associations were included in the orbit of the Chinese administrative apparatus. It is quite possible to assume that something like this could have been practiced not only within Yunnan alone. The Chinese themselves were not inclined to regard the autonomous administrative units they established as empty

64 Ibid., ch. 30, p. 551; ch. 31, p. 560; ch. 52, p. 777; ch.76, p. 1039.

65 "Ming shi", tsz. 311, p. 7870 (1).

66 "Ming Tai-tsung shi lu", ts. 114, p. 1454.

67 Ibid., ch. 19, pp. 346-347.

68 Ibid., vol. 54, p. 806; vol. 177, pp. 1933-1934.

69 Ibid., ch. 87, pp. 1156, 1158; ch. 16, pp. 296, 297.

70 Ibid., ch. 86, p. 1137.

71 Ibid., ch. 35, p. 610.

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a formality that did not change anything in the life of the non-ethnic population. The mentioned administrative system was considered in itself as a factor that restrained and restricted the non-Chinese peoples of the empire. In "Ming Shi", for example, it is written on this occasion: "Established... the various military and civilian ranks of the heads of departments of complete calm and such departments themselves to bind the forces (jimi) of foreigners " 72 . Where circumstances permitted, the Chinese administration did not miss the opportunity to strengthen its control in autonomous units.

It is also characteristic of the Chinese government's attitude to the de facto independence of "local tyrants", which is noted, in particular, in the above quote about the situation in Sichuan. Stating this independence, the source continues: "Therefore, until the end of the Ming Dynasty, it was often necessary to bother with punitive campaigns against them." 73 In other words, the imperial authorities were by no means content with such a situation and sought to actively combat manifestations of real insubordination under the guise of recognizing submission. In this aspect of the limited rights of the non-Chinese administration within the framework of autonomy, such facts as the precedent of the unpunished beating to death of a "local official" with sticks by a Chinese officer or the transformation of foreign subjects into their slaves by other military personnel are also indicative .74
Finally, the issue of taxation of "incoming and joined"persons is of considerable importance in solving the problem raised. It has already been mentioned above that they provide a "tribute" to the court. In addition to the prestigious moment, this order could also carry certain economic functions 75 . It is possible that in some cases the Chinese government was limited only to local goods supplied "as a tribute". But along with this, since 1403, sources contain information about the inclusion of the non-Chinese population in tax lists-registers, which can then be traced to the example of many peoples of the southwestern provinces of China .76 At the same time, data on arrears in basic and additional taxes from the non-Chinese population of this region are beginning to be recorded .77 In Guizhou, after the subordination of this territory in 1414, special tax administrations, "shuikes", began to be created .78 Thus, the "tribute" did not always and everywhere replace the heavy yoke of Chinese taxation, which was borne by the" joining " peoples. However, in order to adapt the tax system to specific local conditions, the Chinese authorities here practiced withdrawing the main tax not only on cereals, as was customary in China proper, but also on other local products: gold, silver, cinnabar, tea, horses, sea products, and so on .79 But that didn't change the point. With all possible adaptability, the taxation of national suburbs in favor of the Chinese treasury was a significant limitation of their autonomy and had a significant impact on the situation of non-Chinese peoples and tribes in the southwestern provinces of the country.

_ 72 "Ming shi", tsz. 316, p. 7888 (4).

73 Ibid., zz. 311, p. 7870 (1).

74 "Ming Tai-tsung shi lu", ts. 47, p. 720; ts. 87, p. 1158.

75 For example, the Puan "dan" established in 1403 for the purpose of complete pacification was supposed to consist of 3,000 dan (about 310 tons) of grain ("Ming Tai-tsung shi lu", ch. 16, p. 298).

76 Ibid., tsk. 20, p. 364; tsk. 55, p. 816-817; tsk. 81, p. 1089; tsk. 149, p. 1743; tsk. 150, p. 1745; tsk. 161, p. 1825; tsk. 182, p. 1963.

77 Ibid., ch. 17, p. 311.

78 Ibid., ch. 154, p. 1776.

79 Ibid., ch. 17, p. 311; ch. 56, p. 829; ch. 116, p. 1479; ch. 125, p.1568; ch. 155, p. 1788.

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Based on the above, it is hardly possible to agree with the opinion that the Chinese system of managing the non-national population completely left the existing order of life without outside interference. As it appears from the sources, at the beginning of the XV century, the described autonomy in some cases could have a real meaning, and in others it could be very limited. This difference depended on specific circumstances: the balance of forces, geographical location (inaccessibility of the area), local traditions, traditions of the liberation movement, strategic calculations of the Chinese, and so on. In particular, much could depend on the nature of the subordination of autonomous administrative units. If they were placed at the disposal of similar, but higher in the Chinese hierarchy, autonomous entities or directly subordinate to the emperor, then autonomy could be preserved to a greater extent. If they fell under the control of the military command of the province or the nearest military garrison, the conditions for independent actions were significantly narrowed. Even though the imperial government was forced to leave a certain amount of freedom to the local social elite, it did not cease to strive to ensure that its power in the marginal national regions of the country was quite real. The task of" taming foreigners " was not removed, although the Chinese government was forced to resort to various tactics to achieve this goal.

A clear indication that the imperial government did not want to limit itself to the described system of autonomy and sought to further Sinicize the national regions is the formation in 1413-1414 of the new Chinese province of Guizhou in the territory long inhabited by the Miao people. This step can be considered the culmination: in national politics at the time described. Many of its characteristic features and methods are reflected here. The attempt to conquer Guizhou in the late 14th century was, as noted, unsuccessful. Moreover, at the turn of the next century, those areas of Guizhou that were previously considered part of the empire were freed from Chinese rule. But in the spring of 1403, the government of Zhu Di again subordinates them, establishing here 14 departments of a senior official .81 In the future, the internecine struggle of the Miao tribes was used for armed intervention and seizure of their entire country. In 1413, a Chinese army of 50 thousand invaded here .82 Already on March 3 of this year, Guizhou received the "auxiliary" status of a province of the empire, and a year later, in March 1414, this status was finally approved .83 Here, the usual provincial authorities for China were created - general administrative, military and judicial, and a new territorial zoning was carried out. In the latter case, a combination of traditional Chinese administrative divisions and the above-mentioned autonomous entities was observed.

Initially, Guizhou was divided into 8 regions (fu) and 4 districts (Zhou), retaining 75 senior official departments under their subordination. It is characteristic that all these units were subordinated to the Imperial tax department, that is, they were attached to the Chinese tax system. In addition to these "civil" territorial divisions, 18 military wei were organized in the new province, subordinate to the central military department. It also managed 7 more senior official departments in Guizhou, which were paramilitary in nature (that is, their population was assigned to the military class). In the future, official institutions and posts, as well as administrative

80 Ch. O. Hucker. Op. cit., pp. 21 - 22.

81 "Ming Tai-tsung shi lu", ch. 16, p. 298.

82 "Ming shi", tsz. 316, p. 7888 (4).

83 "Ming Tai-tsung shi lu", ts. 137, p. 1661; ts. 149, p. 1735.

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The division in Guizhou has changed repeatedly. In general, the government tried to adhere to the order that in each region there were 6 districts and 4 departments of a senior official. But, according to the source, these units "were divided, then united and reformed in different ways." 84 "Local officials"could also be involved in managing local affairs at a level lower than the regional level .85 This was facilitated by the fact that by the time described, the Miao already had a fairly well-defined social elite, which acquired certain administrative functions .86 "Local officials" retained the "right" to send "tribute" to the emperor. But control over their appointments to the post and the succession of their functions was transferred to the hands of the metropolitan Department of ranks. The supreme command over all "local troops", that is, detachments consisting of Miao warriors, was entrusted to the central Military department .87
Thus, in the system of organizing the administration and zoning of the newly formed province, some features of autonomy were used, which were left to the local non-Chinese social elite. But they were closely intertwined with the ordinary Chinese order and were carried out while maintaining the highest control in the hands of the Chinese administration. From this we can conclude that this autonomy played a supporting role and was used by the imperial authorities as a tool for consolidating their rule. The conquest of Guizhou and the organization of the province here were carried out through direct military pressure. This once again shows that the Chinese government at the beginning of the 15th century, despite all the caution it recommended in its approach to the non-national population and the desire to "attract hearts with a kind attitude", by no means limited itself to such methods and resorted to brute force whenever possible.

The formation of the province of Guizhou and the consequent further consolidation of Chinese rule in the southwest of the empire completes the centuries-old struggle of the Chinese authorities for a firm grip on the territories inhabited by the local non-Chinese population. 88 But this does not mean that the foreign rule was not met with resistance. The entire first quarter of the 15th century, both before and after 1413 - 1414, was filled with the heroic liberation struggle of the indigenous inhabitants of the southwestern provinces of the empire against the establishment of Chinese rule. As early as January 1403, the government of Zhu Di was forced to admit that "the various foreigners of the southwest are difficult to subdue and easily raise rebellions." 89 This, of course, was not news to the Chinese. A decree sent to the military authorities in Sichuan in May 1409 stated: "This situation of foreigners rebelling has been going on for a long time."90
The period under review was no exception in this regard. The Chinese chroniclers 'commentaries on one of the emperor's decrees on national policy give the following general description of the moment described:" At that time, foreigners rebelled and disobeyed, sometimes becoming enraged. " 91 Official Chinese ideology attributed this rage to the natural bad qualities of all " barbarians." "There is treason in the hearts of foreigners," wrote a Guangxi military man in a report already quoted to the court

84 "Ming shi", tsz. 316, p. 7888 (4).

85 Ibid.

86 R. F. Its. Op. ed., p. 271.

87 "Ming shi", tsz. 316, p. 7888 (4).

88 R. F. Its. Op. ed., pp. 244, 277.

89 "Ming Tai-tsung shi lu", ch. 15, p. 277.

90 Ibid., zz. 90, p. 1191.

91 Ibid., p. 1190.

92 Ibid., cp. 25, p. 460.

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at the end of 1403. In fact, such "treason" had very real reasons. In this regard, we should recall the above words of the same military man from Guangxi that non-Chinese subjects first join "civilization", and then rebel again. There is a deep meaning here: initially, expressing nominal submission to the distant imperial court, the non-Chinese population did not yet directly face the oppression of the Chinese authorities. Later, having experienced this oppression, it rose up to fight. There is, of course, another possible explanation: while the Chinese troops acted or threatened the "joined" ones, the latter obeyed, but after the troops left and the pressure eased, they again sought to gain independence.

Zhu Di's Government had to deal with the liberation movement of non-Chinese people in the southwestern provinces from the very first months of its existence. In September 1402, a movement began among the non-national population in Guangxi. The rebels "resisted and killed Chinese officials and soldiers." Both diplomatic and military means were used for suppression. In December 1403, after exterminating about 1,200 people of the local population, the Chinese captured position 93 . In May 1405, a report was received from Guangxi about the suppression of a new uprising, and just a few days later-about the beginning of the next one . A similar picture was observed here two years later: in February 1407, a report came about the pacification of "foreign robbers", and in March a new movement began. 95 It grew rapidly, as at that time a significant part of the Chinese troops from Guangxi were transferred to Vietnam. As a result, the imperial authorities had to urgently pull together troops from Huguang, Yunnan, and Gui Zhou, and even withdraw some soldiers from Vietnam .96 The uprising was suppressed by November 1407. The liberation movement of the Yao and Miao peoples in Guangxi broke out again in October 1412. Its immediate cause was the growth of tax oppression. The Chinese authorities managed to deal with it around the end of the same year97 . Rebellions of non-national subjects in Guangxi also occurred in 1415 and 1423,98 Armed demonstrations by the non-Chinese population of Yunnan were recorded in 1405 and 1423,99 The establishment of Chinese rule in Guizhou was accompanied by outbreaks of Miao resistance in 1404, twice in 1408, and again in 1410,100 . The proclamation of Guizhou as a province in 1413 - 1414 was also marked by armed struggle. In December 1415, a new uprising began here .101 In 1413-1414, there was a Miao liberation movement in Sichuan. To suppress it, troops from Huguang and Guizhou were transferred there .102 In mid-1415, a Rong rebellion broke out in Sichuan . Unrest among the non-Chinese population in Huguang occurred in 1405, 1410, twice in 1414, and again in 1420 .104
All these movements can be considered as a natural reaction to the strengthening of Chinese oppression in the national regions of the Southeast Asia.-

93 Ibid., ch. 11, p. 191; ch. 15, p. 274-275; ch. 25, p. 457.

94 Ibid., zz. 41, pp. 671-672, 672-673.

95 Ibid., ch. 62, p. 896; ch. 64, p. 910.

96 Ibid., ch. 70, p. 982; ch. 72, pp. 1011-1012.

97 Ibid., ch. 132, p. 1624; ch. 135, p. 1645.

98 Ibid., ch. 162, p. 1837; ch. 256, p. 2370; ch. 263, p. 2403.

99 Ibid., zz. 49, pp. 737-738; zz. 254, pp. 2362.

100 Ibid., ch. 80, p. 1075; ch. 84, p. 1120; ch. 151, p. 1760.

101 Ibid., zz. 170, p. 1899.

102 Ibid., ch. 138, p. 1671; ch. 142, p. 1699, 1707; ch. 144, p. 1710; ch. 147, p. 1727.

103 Ibid., zz. 166, pp. 1859-1860.

104 Ibid., zz. 38, p. 647; zz. 105, p. 1360-1361; zz. 155, p. 1789; zz. 157, p. 1800; zz. 225, p. 2212,

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the fall of the empire. But in general, the Zhu Di government managed to cope with the resistance of the subordinate peoples. The point here is not only in the preponderance of forces and the superiority of the Chinese army, but also in the well-known interest of the social elite of non-Chinese peoples in an alliance with the Chinese feudal lords. Such an alliance helped the local nobility to consolidate their dominant position and join the new, characteristic of the Chinese, methods of exploiting the bulk of the population. The consolidation of Chinese influence was also facilitated by the tribal and national disunity of the peoples inhabiting the southwestern provinces. Sources indicate that the Chinese skillfully used such discord to their advantage.

When there were internecine conflicts among its foreign subjects, the Zhu Di government preferred to refrain from direct intervention. Despite the warring parties ' requests for help, the imperial court was limited to manifestos with arguments about the goodness of peace. Officially, this tactic was explained by the court as follows: "Attacks of southern foreigners on each other have been happening for a long time. Capturing one or two of them and punishing them will not be enough to transform their rude morals... And if you rush to punish them, it will only prevent the hearts of people from faraway lands from turning to China. " 105 The main thing that the local Chinese authorities were instructed to pay attention to in such conflicts was the obedience of all the warring parties to the imperial administration. For example, Mu Sheng's request for position during the Yunnan civil strife in 1403 was answered by the court: "Both attackers and victims are already paying taxes to the imperial treasury, which indicates that there is no evil in their hearts." 106 The only thing that scared the government was the possibility of small disputes escalating into sharp conflicts that threatened to overthrow the Chinese government. Therefore, local troops were instructed to be on constant alert in case of internecine clashes of the non-ethnic population .107
These are the main directions and methods of national policy of the Imperial government of China in the first quarter of the XV century. They were quite heterogeneous. Depending on the circumstances, a number of means could vary: from nominally proclaiming the supremacy of the emperor, granting a kind of autonomy and cultural penetration, to direct force and military suppression. But all these methods pursued one common goal - the full consolidation of Chinese power and influence on the national outskirts of the empire.

105 Ibid., ch. 30, p. 545.

106 Ibid., ch. 23, pp. 424-425.

107 Ibid., ch. 44, pp. 699-700.

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