The Great October Socialist Revolution proclaimed proletarian internationalism as one of the main principles of the socialist state's foreign policy, which includes providing assistance to oppressed peoples in their struggle for national liberation and independent development. The first countries that Soviet Russia applied this principle to in practice were its neighbors to the East, including China. The very fact of the appearance of a friendly socialist power on its northern borders significantly changed China's international position and made it easier for it to fight against the foreign bases that hindered its development, the unequal treaties and the privileges of foreign capital associated with them.

In an address to the Chinese people of July 25, 1919. The Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR pointed out that "if the Chinese people want to become free, like the Russian people, and avoid the fate that the allies at Versailles have prepared for them... let them understand that their only ally and brother in the struggle for freedom is the Russian worker and peasant and his Red Army." 1 The appeal reminded that immediately after October 1917, "the workers' and peasants ' government... declared all secret treaties concluded with Japan, China, and the former allies" destroyed, and invited the Chinese government to enter into negotiations for the annulment of all such treaties concerning China concluded from 1896 to 1916. This appeal, which was one of the most important international legal acts of the Soviet state, contained a complete rejection of the unequal treaties imposed on China at the end of the XIX century, as well as special privileges and rights, including the right of extraterritoriality and concessions, with the return to China of the Russian part of the "boxer" indemnity levied from China after the Yihetuan uprising of 1899-1901 recognition of China's right to customs autonomy 2 . This document was the first in China's history act of direct assistance to a foreign Power in its struggle for political independence and national sovereignty.

China's sovereign rights were formalized in the Agreement on General Principles for the Settlement of Issues between the USSR and the Republic of China of May 31, 1924.3 Not limited to the international legal recognition of China's sovereignty, the government and people of the USSR actively opposed all actions of the imperialists that consolidated the former dependence of the Chinese people. The Soviet Union's support for the liberation struggle of the Chinese people during the revolution of 1925-1927 was extremely broad and truly nationwide. In response to the shooting of a workers ' demonstration in Shanghai by the British police on May 30, 1925, a mass movement under the slogan "Hands off China!" swept across the Soviet country. The RCP(b) and the Soviet Government took effective measures to assist the Chinese people in their revolutionary struggle along all lines: political, military and economic. To China were

1 Soviet-Chinese Relations, 1917-1957. Collected papers, Moscow, 1959, p. 45.

2 Ibid., pp. 43-44.

3 Modern History of China, 1917-1927. Moscow, 1983, pp. 146-158.

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V. K. Blucher, M. M. Borodin, A. S. Bubnov, G. N. Voitinsky, and many others were sent to help the Chinese revolutionary forces strengthen their Communist Party, develop strategies and tactics for revolutionary actions, and unite all the progressive forces of China on the basis of revolutionary - democratic slogans. 4 .

Thanks to the political, military and economic assistance of the USSR, the revolutionary base created by Sun Yat-sen in Guangdong Province was strengthened and became the national center of the revolution. A revolutionary government and a national revolutionary army were established there, and Soviet military advisers V. K. Blucher, P. A. Pavlov, A. I. Cherepanov and others took an active part in training its command personnel, planning and directing operations. Advisers were also sent to the national armies of Fung Yuxiang and other progressive militaries in northern China who supported the revolutionary government of Sun Yat-sen. A total of 135 advisers were sent to China from the USSR in 1924-1927.5 The revolutionary armies of China were supplied from the USSR with a large number of weapons, ammunition, as well as aircraft, oil products worth tens of millions of rubles. A significant number of sea vessels and a lot of motor vehicles were used for their delivery. Weapons and instructors were also sent to the workers of Shanghai and other cities who were raising uprisings in the rear of the reactionary militarists. In assisting the Chinese Revolution, the Soviet Government also drew on the experience of the armed struggle of the Soviet people against imperialist intervention and internal counter-revolution. Lenin wrote about the revolutionary war being waged by the oppressed people: "If this war can really awaken millions of working and exploited people, this revolutionary war is fraught with such possibilities that the liberation of the peoples of the East is now quite feasible." 6
The Soviet Union provided great assistance to the Chinese revolutionary forces both through the training of political, military, trade union and Komsomol cadres in its educational institutions and in practical work, who mastered the basics of Marxist-Leninist theory in the USSR, acquired knowledge and then used it in their homeland. This aid enabled the revolutionary forces to launch the Northern Campaign , a major offensive by the People's Revolutionary Army against the reactionary-militarist provinces of Central and Eastern China. This campaign was crowned with success and marked the beginning of the real liberation of China from the power of the oppressors .7 Chiang Kai-shek's counter-revolutionary coup of 1927, which was prepared by the right-wing elements of the Kuomintang with the support of the imperialists and meant a temporary defeat of the revolution, did not interrupt the revolutionary process. Progressive forces under the leadership of the CCP continued to struggle and established several Soviet-era districts in the south and north of the country. There were profound social transformations that took place, and the Soviet experience was once again used, although the Soviet Government could not provide direct assistance to the Chinese revolutionary forces due to the fact that the reactionary Kuomintang Government expelled our advisers and severed diplomatic relations with the USSR.

Since 1931, the Chinese people have been in grave danger. The Japanese imperialists seized Manchuria, parts of Northern China, and Inner Mongolia, and in 1932 carried out a robbery attack on Shanghai. In the conditions when the imperialist powers promoted Japan's aggression by sabotaging the League of Nations ' collective countermeasures, and supplied the aggressor with strategic raw materials and weapons, the only significant international factor capable of delaying and stopping the encroachments of the Japanese military could only be close cooperation between the Soviet Union and China in all spheres. The militaristic elite of Japan therefore tried to isolate China from the USSR by organizing along their border

4 On Chinese soil. Memoirs of Soviet volunteers, 1925-1945. Moscow, 1974.

5 Military aid to the USSR in the liberation struggle of the Chinese people, Moscow, 1975, pp. 18-28.

6 Lenin V. I. PSS. Vol. 39, p. 321.

7 See for more details: Yuryev M. F. Revolyutsiya 1925-1927 gg. v Kitaye [Revolution of 1925-1927 in China], Moscow, 1968.

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a chain of dependent puppet modes. After seizing Manchuria and most of Inner Mongolia, Japan sought to move further west to cut off the routes from the USSR to China that went through the provinces of Xinjiang and Gansu .8
To implement plans to create a puppet state here, Japan tried to take advantage of the difficult political and economic situation in this area and acute interethnic contradictions. The exploitation of the local population by Chinese militarists, as well as the breakdown of trade and economic relations with the USSR, led to discontent among the population of Xinjiang, the emergence of unrest among the Uyghur, Kazakh, Dungan and Mongolian populations, which then turned into an armed uprising that swept the eastern part of Xinjiang, led by the Khamian Uyghurs Yulbars and Khoja Niyaz. The rebels demanded the elimination of the alien administration in Hami and the transfer of power to representatives of local nationalities .9 The crisis of reactionary power in Xinjiang was exploited by the Japanese imperialists in the east and the British in the south, who sought to separate Xinjiang from China, divide it and turn it into an anti - Soviet springboard. The Japanese chose Ma Zhuning, a Dungan militant from Gansu, as the direct executors of the plans to seize power in Xinjiang, and the British chose a motley group of Muslim nationalists, including Basmian leaders who had fled from Soviet Central Asia - Janibek, Yusup - Kurbashi, Osman, Uyghur nationalists Shamansur and Sabitdamull. In the west and south of Xinjiang, puppet Khotan and East Turkestan "republics" appeared with centers in Khotan and Kashgar. The Japanese provoked Ma Zhongying's troops to enter Xinjiang, ostensibly to help the Buddhist rebels.

The Kuomintang provincial authorities were besieged in Urumqi. Only the northern regions of Xinjiang remained under their control. Relying on them, as well as on the units of the Manchu armies of Su Wingwen and Ma Zhangshan that arrived here, the Manchu military leader Sheng Shicai seized power in April 193310 . He pretended to be a Democrat and announced a radical change in domestic policy. The principles proclaimed by him included: equal rights of the peoples of Xinjiang, the fight against imperialism, friendship with the USSR, economic development, cultural construction, and the fight against bribery. 11 In addition, he emphasized the fight against the aggression of Japanese imperialism, and on the basis of cooperation and friendship with the USSR. The acute situation in the province forced Sheng Shicai to attract local figures to participate in the administration as district governors and county chiefs, and to grant representatives of the top indigenous nationalities the right to participate in the advisory body under the provincial government. The promotion of this program allowed Sheng Shicai to conclude an agreement with Khoja Niyaz on the cessation of hostilities and joint action against Ma Jung, who was then defeated.

To restore the national economy, the authorities of Xinjiang in 1934-1935 used the stabilization of the political situation, which made it possible to establish good-neighborly relations with the USSR, with its help to develop the province's economy and gradually turn it into a rear base of resistance to Japanese aggression. The volume of Soviet-Xinjiang trade more than doubled by 1936. This reduced the prices of goods and raised the prices of local raw materials to the level of world market prices, which led to an increase in the standard of living of direct producers, although a significant part of the income was appropriated by feudal lords and merchants.

The creation of an extensive network of branches by Soviet trade organizations in the hinterlands of Xinjiang also led to a decrease in the population's income due to the proximity of goods to consumers. The USSR twice provided the Xinjiang government society "Tuchangunsy" with a loan totaling bo-

8 Norins M. R. Gateway to Asia - Sinkjang. N. Y. 1944, pp. 15 - 16.

9 Hedin S. The Flight of "Big Horse". The Trail of War in Central Asia. N. Y. 1936.

10 Modern History of China, 1917-1970, Moscow, 1972, p. 143.

11 Norins M. R. Op. cit., pp. 42, 47.

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more than 30 million rubles. for the construction of power plants, roads, enterprises, purchase of motor vehicles, breeding cattle and seeds 12 . To provide direct assistance to the Xinjiang provincial government, Soviet specialists were sent there: agronomists, animal technicians, veterinarians, economists, engineers, and local branches of specialized organizations Exportstroy, Avtomotoexport, and Lektechsyrye were formed. This assistance has enabled the provincial Government to implement a number of economic and cultural development plans. The plan for 1935-1937 provided for the development of agriculture. In 1936, four integrated agricultural substations were established in Xinjiang. In 1938, Xinjiang had 12 agricultural stations, 6 animal stations, and 4 veterinary stations with a large number of departments. All of them were equipped with agricultural equipment and breeding material imported from the USSR 13 .

Qualified advisers from the USSR at agricultural stations taught dehkans the use of agricultural machinery, the introduction of high-grade cotton, oilseed and grain seeds into production. Animal stations carried out breeding work and brought out new breeds of cattle,including Xinjiang merino. The plan for 1939-1942 provided for the further development of the rural economy, but it paid special attention to irrigation construction and industry. As a result , agriculture continued to recover14, and industry also developed. Relying on Soviet loans and technical assistance, more than 30 enterprises equipped with mechanical engines were built in Xinjiang after 1935: large auto repair shops, power plants, food and light industry plants, etc. Approximately 4 million yuan was invested in the construction of model agricultural stations, veterinary hospitals and schools. The provincial government has invested 750,000 yuan in gold mining and 300,000 yuan in coal mining. Chemical plants, machine-building workshops, mills, tobacco and cannery factories, and leather tanneries were built in Urumqi, Ili and other cities .15
Favorable trade conditions with the USSR, the provision of large loans to China, the efficient work of Soviet specialists, and the allocation of significant funds by the provincial government to the economy from customs revenues from trade with the USSR made it possible to restore the local economy. By 1939, the acreage and livestock reached pre-war levels, four new large irrigation systems were created, a herd of breeding cattle of 10 thousand cows, 15 thousand horses and 38 thousand sheep. A significant increase in output was achieved at industrial enterprises created at the expense of the same loans. Among them were municipal power plants in Urumqi, Kulja and Chuguchak, small power plants in other cities, auto repair plants, a cotton gin plant in Turfan, a steam mill in Kulja, oil mills, rice cleaning, soap making, alcohol-making, brewing, confectionery and other enterprises with new equipment. The introduction of road transport has led to the development of a road network, the construction of bridges, and the development of mountain passes 16 .

As for the central Chinese government, the restoration of diplomatic relations between the USSR and China at the end of 1932, interrupted by the conflict on the CER in 1929,17 created conditions for further development of trade and economic ties , and assistance to China in rearming its army in order to resist Japanese aggression. In 1934 and later, the Soviet Union was visited by a Chinese military mission led by Yang Jie, which was received at a high level. She had the task of getting acquainted with the military production in the USSR, agreeing on the supply and

12 Sladkovsky M. I. Ocherki ekonomicheskikh otnosheniy SSSR s Kitayem [Essays on economic relations between the USSR and China]. Moscow, 1957, p. 103.

13 Or Xinjiang Daily, 21. V. 1938.

14 Norins M. R. Op. cit., p. 103.

15 China at War, April 1940, N 3.

16 For the political side of the case, see: Kapitsa M. S. Sovetsko-kitayskie otnosheniya [Soviet-Chinese Relations], Moscow, 1958.

17 See about him: Yanguzov Z. Sh. Special Red Banner Far Eastern Army on guard of peace and security of the USSR (1929-1938). Blagoveshchensk. 1970.

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credit for Soviet weapons and their delivery by Soviet motor transport and aircraft through Xinjiang, sending military advisers and pilots to China to train Chinese personnel in the use of Soviet weapons 18 . The political aspect of strengthening Soviet-Chinese relations was determined by the Non-Aggression Pact of August 21, 1937. It has provided great moral support to the Chinese people and has been repeatedly extended.

When Japan went to war against China in 1937, after seizing East and South China and forcing France and Britain to close the roads leading to China from Indochina and Burma, China was almost isolated. The route through Xinjiang was then the only artery connecting China by land with the outside world. Under these circumstances, the policy of the USSR played a huge role in protecting China's independence. In the north-west, the railways of the USSR and China were separated by a distance of 3 thousand kilometers. The presence of mountains, deserts, swamps, and sparse settlements served as an obstacle to the organization of communications. The latter were carried out mainly by camel caravans along pack trails. In order to provide full-fledged assistance to China, it was necessary to build a road in a short time. Soon, the USSR provided China with a number of its specialists, road vehicles, and motor vehicles. An extensive highway construction program was implemented through Xinjiang and Gansu. High-mountain pass structures were built on this highway, dozens of bridges were built, a roadbed was built in a number of places, and a network of gas stations was created.

A. I. Cherepanov, who was then the main Soviet military adviser in China, writes: "The heroic work of Soviet road builders laid a highway through Xinjiang. Until now, it seems that the historical literature does not describe this true feat of the builders of the "road of life", as well as its "exploiters" - drivers, service personnel. " 19 In extremely difficult conditions, often at an altitude of 1.5 - 2 thousand meters, Soviet road builders and Chinese workers selfless work by November 1937 ensured the commissioning of the highway length of 2925 km from the station Sary Ozek on Turksib to Lanzhou. If earlier cargo was on the way for months, now the delivery time was reduced to 20 days, and delivery was carried out without hindrance. About 4 thousand Soviet road workers worked on the highway 20 . As noted by another Soviet military adviser in China, A. Ya. Kalyagin, " The Xinjiang tract was served by about 5.2 thousand ZIS-5 trucks. For the delivery of urgent cargo, an airline was organized, served by TB-3 transport aircraft. In general, tens of thousands of Soviet people were employed in sending cargo - packing, loading, and transportation - and they worked regardless of time and weather conditions. Such assistance could only be provided by a socialist country. " 21
The main difficulty was the supply of fuel to convoys. The tank with fuel completely consumed it by the end of the flight for its own movement. Therefore, fuel had to be thrown onto the highway by camel caravans. In this regard, it became necessary to find fuel on the spot, exploring oil fields, organizing its production and distillation for gasoline. Back in 1935-1936, a Soviet geological expedition was sent to Xinjiang, which discovered an oil field near the city of Shiho (Usu). An agreement was signed with the provincial government to build an oil refinery in Tushangzi with a capacity of 50 thousand tons of distilled oil per year at the expense of a Soviet loan and equipment. In 1940, it entered service 22 . In 1937, the Alma-Ata - Khami Air Line began operating to deliver military cargo by air23 . Then it was continued to Chongqing.

18 Soviet-Chinese relations, p. 158.

19 Cherepanov A. I. Zapiski voennogo sovetov v Kitae [Notes of a military adviser in China]. Moscow, 1976, p. 603.

20 Dubinsky A.M. Soviet-Chinese Relations, 1937-1945, Moscow, 1980, pp. 76-78.

21 On the Chinese land, Moscow, 1977, p. 174.

22 Sladkovsky M. I. Istoriya tortovo-ekonomicheskikh otnosheniy SSSR s Kitayem, 1917-1974 gg. [History of cake and economic relations between the USSR and China, 1917-1974].

23 Norins M. R. Op. cit., p. 119.

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With the beginning of the Sino-Japanese war, the USSR agreed to provide China with a loan of $ 500 million and immediately began to deliver weapons, first by sea from Odessa to Southern China (60 thousand tons of weapons were delivered by 1938) .24 The delivery of weapons to China by land was carried out from 1937, even before the conclusion of three new loan agreements totaling $ 250 million in 1938-1939 .25 Soviet vehicles and aircraft delivered 26 military equipment via Xinjiang : about 1 thousand fighters and bombers, 1,140 guns, up to 100 tanks, a large number of machine guns, rifles, and ammunition.

The USSR, at the request of the Chinese government, built an aircraft assembly plant in Urumqi in 1939-1940, designed to assemble up to 450 aircraft from parts delivered from the USSR, and organized an aviation school in Kulja to train up to 4 crew members for each aircraft delivered from the USSR .27 Aircraft were also assembled from parts delivered by car in Hami and Lanzhou 28 . Then the Chinese government asked the USSR to send Soviet military specialists to China to be used as advisers in various branches of the armed forces and instructors for training Chinese pilots and aircraft technicians. As early as the beginning of 1939, there were 3,665 such Soviet specialists in China, including many people who later became famous in the Great Patriotic War (including P. F. Batitsky, P. S. Rybalko, and V. I. Chuikov).

Equipping the Chinese army with modern types of Soviet aircraft required their skilled use. The Chinese pilots couldn't do it right away. This task was carried out by Soviet volunteers. Over the years, groups of Soviet volunteers were sent to China to directly participate in the battles. Their total number was 700 people. 200 Soviet pilots gave their lives defending Chinese cities and making effective raids on concentrations of Japanese troops and equipment .30 As the Chinese historian Peng Ming emphasized, " Soviet pilots showed heroism, perseverance and a spirit of self-sacrifice in battle... While American capitalists supplied Japan with gasoline and scrap iron,.. Soviet heroes in the air spaces of our homeland shed their precious blood for the sake of the interests of the Chinese people. Let the Chinese people never forget this. " 31 In Wuhan, an obelisk over the grave of these volunteers reads: "The memory of Soviet pilots will live forever in the heart of the Chinese people. May this noble spirit of proletarian internationalism, which is inherent in the working class, always develop and strengthen the fraternal and unbreakable friendship of the Chinese and Soviet peoples. " 32
The work of Soviet military advisers took place in the difficult conditions of the united political front of the CCP and the Kuomintang, which was sought to undermine not only reactionary figures in China, but also left-sectarian elements in the CCP. Therefore, one of the primary tasks was to strengthen the united front. V. I. Chuikov recalled: "My task was not only to help the Chinese command in the management of troops... My task as military attache and chief military adviser was to contain Chiang Kai-shek's belligerent tendencies against the Communist armies and guerrilla areas that were controlled by the Chinese Communists; in other words, to keep Chiang Kai-shek out of internecine warfare, so that he would mobilize all the forces of the nation to repel the aggressor... The chief military Adviser was assigned the task of coordinating the actions of the Chinese Red Army and Chiang Kai-shek's troops against the Japanese invaders, despite the differences between them.

24 Dubinsky A.M. Uk. soch., p. 79.

25 Sladkovsky M. I. Istoriya [History] , pp. 128-133.

26 On Chinese soil, p. 175.

27 Sladkovsky M. I. Istoriya [History], pp. 138-140.

28 Chudodeev Yu. V. Podvig v nebe Kitay [Feat in the sky of China], Moscow, 1980, p. 9.

29 Istoriya vtoroi mirovoi voyny 1939-1945 [History of the Second World War 1939-1945], vol. 2, Moscow, 1974, p. 73.

30 Borodin B. A. Help of the USSR to the Chinese people in the Anti-Japanese War (1937-1941). Moscow, 1965, p. 169.

31 Pyn Min. A brief history of friendship between the peoples of China and the USSR, Moscow, 1957, p. 102.

32 History of the Second World War, vol. 2, p. 74.

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them " 33 . It was also necessary to take care of the transfer of part of the weapons from the USSR to the 8th People's Revolutionary Army (NRA), led by the CPC. Prior to the creation of the united front, the Soviet Union directly provided military assistance to the Chinese Red Army through the territory of the MNR to the Special Area of the provinces of Shaanxi - Gansu - Ningxia, controlled by the EPK, with which air and radio communication was maintained. This delivery of weapons, ammunition, and food to China involved 140 motor vehicles .34
After the United Front agreement was concluded in 1937, Chiang Kai-shek's government took over the supply of weapons and maintenance to the 8th NRA at the expense of Soviet military aid delivered through Xinjiang. In those years, a group of Chinese Communists worked in the provincial government of Xinjiang, which was transferred to the territory of Xinjiang during the relocation of a part of the Chinese Red Army. The USSR's assistance to China made it possible to strengthen the military potential of its aviation, artillery, and tanks .35 Local specialists were trained for these types of troops. In 1938, 200 Chinese pilots graduated from Soviet aviation schools, and in 1939 the number of such specialists reached almost 10 thousand, of which 1045 pilots were 36 . Soviet military equipment, operated by both Soviet volunteers and Chinese military personnel, played an important role in delivering sensitive blows to the Japanese aggressors during the defense of Nanjing and Wuhan, in the battle of Taierzhuang, and in repelling Japanese attempts to launch an offensive on the western provinces. Planes from the USSR, led by Soviet and Chinese pilots, raided the island. Taiwan, where Japanese military bases were bombed. "The Chinese government informs the Soviet Government," it was reported from Chungking, " that after it has sent advisers, great progress is being made in China's armed resistance to aggression. Moreover, all the advisers who came to the rescue show great zeal in their work. " 37
Soviet aid to China was not limited to sending specialists and supplying equipment and equipment. No less important was the fact that the Armed Forces of the USSR, which reached 40 divisions on the border of Manchuria, distracted the almost one million Kwantung Army, which consisted of the most trained and equipped with modern equipment of Japanese formations .38 Moving it to the Chinese front would greatly strengthen the Japanese strike power. And the sharp rebuff given by the Armed Forces of the USSR to the attempts of the Japanese army to invade our territory near Lake Baikal. Khasan and to the territory of Mongolia near the Khalkhin-Gol river, forced the Japanese command to urgently transfer troops and equipment from other parts of China there. Only by the end of the operation on Khalkhin Gol in August 1939, the Japanese doubled the number of their troops there by transferring them from China. The Soviet authorities in the Far East provided assistance to the Chinese units and partisans fighting against the Japanese in Manchuria, providing them with shelter on our territory and the opportunity to return to their homeland to fight against the invaders .39
The activities of military advisers and volunteers, which enjoyed the approval and love of Chinese workers, were often met with resistance by Chinese militarists: "In vain did the Soviet military advisers develop and propose plans for the defeat of this or that group. Chiang Kai-shek and his closest aides approved of these plans, but they were too busy fighting the CCP and its armed forces to implement them." 40 In 1940, the provision of military assistance to China began to be hampered by the fact that the Kuomintang government refused to support the command of the 8th NRA under the pretext that its troops, having undertaken active operations and created liberated areas, had begun to implement democratic transformations in them. The USSR, in connection with this refusal, restricted military supplies to the Kuomintang-

33 Chuikov V. I. Mission in China, Moscow, 1981, pp. 54-55.

34 Military aid to the USSR in the liberation struggle of the Chinese people, pp. 43-44.

35 Kalyagin A. Ya. Po znakomimym dorogam [On unfamiliar roads], Moscow, 1969, p. 49 sl.

36 Ibid., pp. 63, 78.

37 Cit. by: Cherepanov A. I. Uk. soch., p. 607.

38 The Red Banner of the Far East, Moscow, 1971.

39 Pegov N. M. Dalekoe-blizkoe [Distant-close], Moscow, 1982, p. 89 sl., et al.

40 Chuikov V. I. Uk. soch., p. 113.

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Nevsky authorities. Only after assurances from Chiang Kai-shek's Government that it was ready to improve relations with the CFC were deliveries resumed .41 In early 1941, after the attack of the Kuomintang troops on the People's Revolutionary units of the 4th Army, which threatened to break the united Front and civil war, the Soviet Government took steps through our embassy to prevent such an outcome and again suspended military supplies to the Changkaishists .42
After the beginning of Nazi Germany's aggression against the USSR and the Japanese-American war in the Pacific, Chiang Kai-shek's government took a course to curtail ties with the USSR and began to openly focus on the United States and Britain in order to get their help in the upcoming civil war against the CCP. The situation in Xinjiang also worsened, " where Governor Sheng Shicai abruptly changed the course of domestic policy, began to defeat democratic organizations, arrested communists who worked in provincial institutions, and launched a real campaign against Soviet trade and economic organizations and enterprises, including those that transported military cargo to China. Since all attempts to settle relations were futile, the Government of the USSR was forced to curtail its previous assistance in 1942.

A new vivid and significant manifestation of Soviet internationalism was the assistance to China in the event of the USSR's entry into the war with Japan. It was crucial not only for defeating Japan, but also for repelling the subsequent American intervention in China and defeating Kuomintang reaction in the civil war it unleashed.

The entry of the USSR into the war in the Far East radically changed the situation in the interests of all participants in the democratic coalition, including the Chinese, Korean and other peoples of the region enslaved by the invaders .43 The CCP leadership warmly welcomed the Soviet Union's entry into the war and sought to fully coordinate its efforts with the Red Army .44 The Kuomintang government and the United States took a different position. Fearing that the Soviet Union's entry into the war would lead to the victory of the democratic forces in China, after the surrender of Japan, they forbade its troops to surrender to the NRA units and even used them for military operations against the NRA. The Kuomintang government delayed concluding a treaty with the USSR. Only on August 14, 1945, when the Red Army entered Manchuria and the defeat of the Japanese forces became obvious, did it agree to sign the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance .45
The victory of the Soviet troops over the Kwantung Army led to a radical change in the situation in China. As a result, Manchuria was preserved for China - the most economically developed region; the CCP was able to create a powerful revolutionary base there for the formation of a modern army, the implementation of fundamental socio-economic and political transformations that laid the foundation for a decisive victory in the civil war unleashed by the Kuomintang; the Red Army, during the liberation of Manchuria, provided the NRA with modern weapons, Soviet specialists provided the democratic authorities of Manchuria with advanced experience in economic management and management, and helped create conditions for the formation of progressive social relations .46
The presence of Soviet troops in Manchuria and the presence of a Soviet military base on the Liaodong Peninsula prevented widespread US military intervention in the Chinese civil war on the side of the Kuomintang .47 By joining the howl-

41 Military aid to the USSR, p. 80.

42 Sladkovsky M. I. Istoriya [History] , pp. 140-144.

43 See for more details: Achkasov V. I., Yuryev M. F. The role of the USSR in the national liberation war of the Chinese people and the defeat of imperialist Japan. - Voprosy istorii, 1983, N 9.

44 Soviet-Chinese relations, pp. 194-195.

45 Documents of Foreign Policy of the USSR, vol. 7, Moscow, 1963.

46 Liberation mission of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Second World War, Moscow, 1974.

47 For more information, see: Astafyev G. V. US intervention in China and its defeat (1945-1949). Moscow, 1958.

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Well, against Japan, the USSR not only took care of its own interests and the fulfillment of allied obligations, but also fulfilled its international class duty to the Chinese workers, revolutionaries of China, Korea, and Indochina, carried out a liberation mission, playing a decisive role in the liberation war of the Chinese people. 48
The Soviet State and people provided intensive fraternal assistance to the Chinese people in their struggle for national liberation and social progress. This was especially evident in 1924-1927, 1937-1942, and again in 1945 during the People's Liberation War and socialist construction in China. As K. U. Chernenko, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, points out, "the normalization of relations with the People's Republic of China could, of course, contribute to the enhancement of the role of socialism in international life. We are consistent supporters of such normalization. " 49 Our country consistently supports the improvement of these relations. Progress in Soviet-Chinese relations would help strengthen the forces of peace on Earth.

48 Borisov O. B. The Soviet Union and the Manchurian Revolutionary Base (1945-1949). Moscow, 1977, p. 202.

49 Chernenko K. U. Narod i partiya ediny [The people and the Party are United], Moscow, 1984, p. 24.

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