CHINA REFLECTS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORIES

O. A. ARIN

Doctor of Historical Sciences

Key words: China, theory of international relations, integrated state power, soft power

After the self-destruction of the USSR and the breakdown of the bipolar system of international relations in the West, the efforts of theoretical scientists to form new approaches to the study of world relations intensified. Old school concepts are being revised and new ones are being created. Since the early 1990s, China has been actively involved in the process of forming theories of international relations.

Over the past two decades, its experts have been unable to escape the influence of Western theories of international relations, and as a result, traditional Chinese views on the world and on China's place and role in world politics have undergone certain changes.

"GREAT HARMONY" UNDER THE SHADOW OF THE MIDDLE KINGDOM

Recently, Western scholars have begun to ask themselves the question: why are there no theories of international relations in the East, especially in East Asia?

The question is posed purely in the Western style, since it implies theory precisely in the form of Western paradigms, i.e., those terms, concepts and categories to which the West itself is accustomed. At the same time, it is overlooked that in fact, Western science began to create theories of international relations only after the Second World War, and even then not immediately, if we recall a similar question posed in 1966 by Martin Byte (1913-1972), one of the pillars of the British theory of international relations, in relation to the West itself: "Why is there no theory of international relations?"¹.

It seems that both Bayt and those who ask this question in relation to non-Western countries do not distinguish between two concepts - science and theory: science discovers the laws and regularities of nature and society, it is objective and universal, has no citizenship or nationality, and theory as a form of scientific generalization of basic ideas in a particular field. other areas of knowledge may be national, ideological, or even erroneous. In this sense, it can be argued that there is no real science of international relations either in the West or in the East, and there are a great many theories both here and there.

China is no exception. In this country, both in ancient times and after 1949, there were many theories with Chinese characteristics of the vision of the world, which are not similar to Western versions.

The Chinese worldview is based on traditional philosophy, which since the beginning of the 20th century has been diluted by various Western trends, including its Marxist direction in the Soviet version.

According to Qin Yaqing of the Chinese University of Foreign Policy (Beijing), in the Chinese context, the concept of "theory "has two meanings: one is a" guide to action", the other is the sum of knowledge and ideas that explain the world in the spirit of the theories of* Kenneth Waltz and Hedley Bull ². The first type includes practical theories such as Mao Zedong's" three worlds theory "or Deng Xiaoping's"strategic theories." The famous military theory (even the whole doctrine)can also be attributed to them without much stretch Sun Tzu (544-496 BC), embodied in the ^Art of War3, which is still a reference book for modern Chinese and Western militaries. The second type includes theories with a philosophical approach to seeing the world.

For a long time, Chinese political thought, indeed, did not burden itself with specific theories of international relations. There were historical reasons for this.

Kenneth Walz (b. 1924) is an American political scientist, one of the founders of neorealism, or structural realism, in the theory of international relations. The authors of this theory argue that the interaction between sovereign states is explained by the anarchic structure of international relations, which restricts and forces their choice.

Hedley Bull (1932-1985) was an Australian and British academic, founder of the English School of International Relations Theory. Author of the book " Anarchist Community: a study of the structure of world politics "(1977), in which, unlike Waltz, he notes that, despite the anarchic nature of international relations, sovereign states form not only a system of states, but also a community of states. ed.).

They consisted in the fact that the Chinese lexicon could not even contain the word "international". It is replaced by the word goji, which consists of two hieroglyphs, the first of which-go - means "country, state", and the second - ji - "border, border, edge". After all, in the traditional view of the Chinese, China existed in the world as a center, from which all sorts of tributary peoples, ruled by the Chinese emperor, dispersed in circles. The very name of the country - Zhongguo-means "Central, or Middle, state". That is, the structure of such an international system was simple: in the center is China, and on the periphery - subordinate states that paid tribute to the center. This system seems to have been established as early as the Zhou Dynasty (1046-771 BC), but it was most developed after the unification of the country in the Qin Dynasty (221-207 BC) and was maintained by other dynasties until the beginning of the XIX century. In Chinese thinking, this meant interaction not between the center and some independent external state entities, but rather relations within one system with a clear hierarchical subordination. Therefore, there could be no question of any sovereignty or territorial integrity of the subjects. Such an approach in principle excluded the very idea of internationality, respectively, and any theories of international relations, even of a practical nature.

Such a Chinese worldview is denoted by the term Tianxia, meaning " space under the sky." Chinese scientist Qian Mu calls this approach introverted, "when everything around me is inside me." For Chinese thinking, this means that something may be far away from the subject in time and space, but it will never be in opposition to the subject or something that needs to be conquered. If we are talking about space, then the center-periphery system resembles circles of water running away from the center. This holistic approach differs from the Western ambivalent view of opposites that must inevitably come into conflict.

The second idea of Tianxia is that of Datpung, a great harmony that is not only possible, but also inevitable, since seemingly opposite elements always complement each other. This complementarity is well explained by the yin-yang philosophy. The concept of Tianxia seems to cover the whole world and aims to harmonize the world. It seems to represent a space where man and nature meet, material and ideal, physical and spiritual.

According to many Chinese theorists, the modern ideas about the harmonization of the world, introduced into the Chinese foreign policy doctrine in 2006 in the form of the principle of "respect for the national interests of other countries"**, stem from the idea of Datpun⁴.

The third idea of Tanya is order. In Confucian philosophy, as is well known, the idea of order in society is central. Although at first glance the tax-tributary system is based on the idea of unequal relations, in the Confucian sense, these relations are defined as merciful inequality by analogy with the relationship between father and son. This is how the family was built in China, and this is how relations were built inside Tianxia. It is clear that to consolidate such a system, certain principles and rules were required, which turned it into a standard of living. As you know, they are based on five types of relationships: between father and son, emperor and ministers, older brother and younger brother, husband and wife, friend and friend. Four principles served as the social glue: proper behavior, justice, honesty, and a sense of shame. Rule based on these rules was called Lizhi, meaning rule based on a code of ethics and / or morals.

Western authors interpret Tianxia philosophy in different ways. In the interpretations of some, such as the Australian Sinologist Rosita Delios, this philosophy, like the entire set of Chinese philosophical trends - Taoism, Confucianism, Buddhism, Moism (improving society through knowledge), is "harmonization on Earth"⁵. In the interpretation of others, in her own words, this is the "philosophy of pre-scientific mysticism"⁶. Third party accounts-

* Yin-yang (darkness-light) - in ancient Chinese philosophy, the polar forces (female and male, dark and light, passive and active principles) that make up its driving foundations and harmony (editor's note).

* * For more information, see: Beijing's version of "soft power". Mishina S. I. " Speak softly..."; Rusakov EM. "... holding a big club in your hands " / / Asia and Africa today. 2011, No. 3 (editor's note).

It is believed that the Tianxia concept is a Chinese-centric view of the world, according to which there is a single civilization at the center of the world, the Middle Kingdom, which is surrounded by barbarians. They don't even deserve a name. The role and significance of the latter depend on the degree of assimilation of Chinese culture. Naturally, relations with them could not be built on the basis of European ideas as between sovereign states: it could only be about the relationship of the master and subordinates.⁷

Thus, for a long historical period, China did not need to create independent theories of international relations because of the lack of need for them. They were not formed in the period from the middle of the XIX century, when China fell into the" arms " of the West, until the formation of the PRC in 1949.

GENERAL THEORIES AND PRINCIPLES OF CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY

Theories of international relations, expressed in official state doctrines concerning foreign policy, began to appear after the formation of the PRC in 1949.

These theories were and still are the most important component, the central core of the process of forming and implementing foreign policy. They are designed to convince the country's population of the validity of certain steps of Chinese policy in the international arena. According to the standards of Chinese definitions, a theory (lilong) is "a system of concepts and principles, or systematized rational knowledge; a scientific theory is established on the basis of public practice, proved and verified by public practice, and correctly reflects the essence and laws of objective reality. The value of a scientific theory is determined by its ability to control human behavior. " ⁸

It seems that, in contrast to Chinese practice, Americans think that the reality is created by the United States itself. Various American foreign policy concepts and doctrines (political realism, neoconservatism, neoliberalism, constructivism, etc.) are rather a set of goals that Washington seeks in the international arena in accordance with the national interests of the United States. Their authors do not care to what extent these interests are acceptable to other subjects of international politics. Moreover, they are not interested in how adequate they are to the objective course of human development.

In China, the theory has historically been treated with deep respect. If it seemed convincing and reflected the practice of the majority of Chinese, then implementing a policy based on the theory became an easy task, from the point of view of its support within the country. Moreover, the Chinese are not confused by the frequent change of theories. On the contrary, a "perpetual" theory would be more wary: since life, the world situation, and China itself are constantly changing, it means that the theory, reflecting these changes, must also change, otherwise it turns into a dogma.

Chinese documents often use the term linghuo xing (flexibility), which seems to accumulate and reflect phenomena that require constant change. At the same time, there are some permanent values that cannot be changed, or at least they are not subject to change. These are some kind of fundamental principles concerning vital national interests. Such uncompromising values are designated by the term yuanze xing (principles), which covers the national interests, sovereignty and socialist path of development of the PRC. Among the national interests, the principle of reunification with Taiwan is clearly fixed, which is not subject to compromise or even discussion. The fundamental ones include zhongxue weitpi (Chinese values), which should not be compromised when interacting with the West. At the same time, the xixue weiyun principle (Western values) implies the use of these values for technical and practical purposes.⁹

Although these principles were embodied in practical theories and doctrines of China's foreign policy, they also affected the perception of Western theories that began to penetrate the PRC in the early 1990s.

MASTERING WESTERN THOUGHT

In the initial period of the PRC's formation, its foreign policy theories were heavily framed by Marxist and socialist terminology. But later, especially since the end of the twentieth century, elements of traditional Chinese philosophy, on the one hand, and the achievements of Western thought, on the other, began to be more actively introduced into them.

The already mentioned Qin Yaqing, a theorist and researcher of the formation of theories of international relations in China, believes,

* Political realism, or realism, combines various theories and concepts of international relations based on the supremacy of force (power), primarily military and economic. Neoconservatism sees world politics as the arena of an eternal struggle between " good and evil "(hence the struggle of Reagan with the " evil empire "and George W. Bush with the" axis of evil"), while the main and almost the only" force for good " is the United States. In practice, neoconservatives of foreign policy advocate an aggressive ideology of US world domination (namely, "domination", not "leadership", which is claimed by more realistic American politicians). Liberalism emphasizes the multiplicity of factors that determine the state's foreign policy (economic, cultural, etc.), and the possibilities of peaceful cooperation. Neoliberals believe that nation-states achieve economic, strategic and other benefits in the "absolute" dimension, and not in relation to other states, which creates prerequisites for mutually beneficial cooperation, especially within the framework of international associations and organizations. Supportersconstructivists argue that international relations are determined by the interaction of various social actors, i.e., they are more or less subject to them (ed. by E. Rusakov).

Table 1

Number of publications of articles of the main theoretical schools (%)

that the period after 1949 can be divided into three stages.

The first stage began in 1953, when the Faculty of Diplomatic Studies at the People's University of China was first established in Beijing, and two years later it was reorganized into the Institute of Foreign Policy. This stage lasted until 1964. The functions of this organization were mainly limited to the training of diplomatic personnel. During the second stage (1964-1979), three faculties of international relations were established at the three main universities of the country - Beijing, People's University and Fudan University. The first one studied liberation movements in the "third world", the second - communist movements in the world, and the third-international relations in the Western world. The main task was to interpret world politics in the spirit of the classics-Karl Marx, Lenin and Mao Zedong. Theories of applied purposes (theories for actions) were also formed, such as various versions of the "three worlds" theories.

The third stage lasts from 1979 to the present day10. It was at this time that the advanced development of Western thought began in China. The quantitative growth of such development is shown in the table, which shows the number of publications of the main Chinese theoretical schools of international relations, such as Marxism, realism, liberalism, constructivism and the Chinese paradigm based on Chinese philosophical thought. The calculation was carried out by the author on the basis of an analysis of five major journals specializing in international topics: World Economics and Politics, European Studies, Foreign Affairs Review, International Review and Contemporary International Relations¹¹.

These figures eloquently indicate a sharp drop in the publications of the Marxist school during this period and the stagnant state of the traditional Chinese school. At the same time, if the high percentage of publications of the school of political realism and liberalism can be explained by the fact that it was the works of the authors of these areas that were translated in China in the first place, then the popularity of constructivism, it turns out, was due to the fact that, according to Professor Qin, this school essentially coincides with the interpretation of syn (change). In addition, another key word in constructivism is self-perception (identity), which for the new China has also become important because of the definition of itself as a rising power. The interaction of identity and behavior was widely discussed in China within the framework of constructivism, which made this school popular among Chinese scientists.

Explaining the decline in interest in the Marxist school, the author points out that it failed to develop a paradigm that explains the uniqueness of China, the specific nature of Chinese socialism and the nature of its behavior on the world stage.

Despite the increased spread of Western schools, especially American ones, Chinese scientists realize that they cannot explain the phenomena characteristic of the behavior of China and other East Asian countries in terms of their own theories. This applies, for example, to the deepening of integration ties despite the lack of trust between many countries in the region. In addition, they understand that it is not possible to blindly follow Western theories of international relations, but rather to develop their own, based on the Chinese practice and prospects of their country. According to Qin Yaqing, the "rest of the world" expects this from China, as relations with it are expanding and compacting every year.

The author comes to the conclusion that, despite the awareness of such a need, a well-structured Chinese theory of international relations has not yet been created in China.

POWER OR STRENGTH?

Official Chinese foreign policy doctrines were most influenced by theories based on the ideas of the Neorealist power approach (the theory of integrated state power) and the concept of "soft power" by Joseph Nye.

The theory of the complex power of the state in Chinese is called dzunkhe goli. Americans translate it as "comprehensive National Power". It should be noted that the Chinese character li means exactly "strength", since they convey" power " with other characters - kenen or Qiangguan. As a result, in such translations, the difference between power and strength disappears, the content of which is very different ¹².

The concept of junhe goli was developed in the late 1990s in the depths of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, the Military Academy of the People's Liberation Army of China (PLA) and China-

Table 2

Integrated power of the Top 10 countries (2006)

Источник: Reports on International Politics and Security (January 2006) // Yellow Book of International Politics - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Com-prehensive_National_Power

Russian Institute of Modern International Relations. More precisely, the ideas of American scientists were not so much developed as processed. Many Western political scientists have been engaged in measuring power in international relations. A detailed article about such calculations was written by Jeffrey Hart13.

The indicators used by the Chinese, in fact, do not differ in any way from the American versions, except for their number. So, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences counted 8 aspects and 64 indicators.

What do Chinese researchers understand by the integrated power of the state?

Shanghai scholar Qiu Mingzhen defines it as follows: "National power is a kind of combined force, as well as an integrated and integrated system of forces. It includes economic, political, military, and diplomatic powers a particular nation and also the accumulation, potential, effectiveness (vigour) and level of cultural development. ... Culture is not only a permanent essential part of the state's complex power, but also an important indicator of it. " ¹⁴

At the initial stage of the formation of the concept of integrated power, Chinese authors, listing its "hard" components (economy, territory, population, military power, etc.), paid great attention to its "soft" components in the Marxist sense. Thus, Qiu Mingzhen, emphasizing that China is a socialist state, sees integrated power as a reflection of the correspondence of the socialist superstructure to the socialist economic basis and socialist productive forces. "Therefore," he writes, " in order to strengthen China's integrated power, we must consolidate and develop the economic system at the initial stage of socialism, vigorously developing the socialist productive forces, building the material and institutional civilization of socialism, as well as developing the superstructure and socialist ideology adapted to the socialist basis. And on this basis, build a spiritual civilization, making comprehensive progress. These are the basic conditions for strengthening the integrated power of socialist China and the historical task of socialist cultural work in China. In general, China's socialist culture includes both material and spiritual cultures. " ¹⁵

With this approach, the "Chinese specificity" is manifested in the socialist nature of the concept of integrated power. Culture becomes almost the core of all power, and all its other components, including material ones, depend on the degree of development of culture. Qiu Mingzhen writes: "The Chinese socialist spiritual culture includes ideology, morality, education, science, technology, literature, art, health and physical culture. At the same time, science and technology, especially their most developed forms, are the "primary productive forces"¹⁶.

Over time, Chinese scientists stopped emphasizing the socialist nature of complex power, apparently realizing that the superstructure factors in this power cannot be calculated, and concentrated on its "hard" components. However, even here everything turned out to be not so simple.

In 2007, two Chinese authors from Tsinghua University - Hu Angang and Meng Honggua-presented the results of an analysis of the integrated power of the state using a formula developed by Huang Shofeng of the PLA Military Academy:

P = KxHxS,

where P denotes "strength" in a given year, K is the coordination system, which includes such factors as the ability of the national leadership to coordinate and unite, H is material support, which includes all physical factors, S is intellectual support, which includes a set of imperatives (moral principles) of thinking, intellectual and other factors ¹⁷.

Material support includes: economic resources, human capital, natural resources, financial resources, resources in the field of knowledge and technology, resources in management (financial expenses

central administration), military resources, and international expenditures (such as export and import volumes, royalties, and license fees). The result is eight parameters consisting of more fractional indicators.

Although the article by these authors was written in 2007, generalizing data are given only for 1998. Be that as it may, the calculation of power using this method, as a result, for five states built the following hierarchy (see Table 2): the United States, Japan, Russia, China and India. However, according to one of the main indicators - GDP, which is part of the integrated power of the state, Russia in those years was in 11th place, behind the rest of these states.

Even more questions are raised in the table. 2 from the Yellow Book on World Economy and International Development of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.

From this table, it is clear that the combined power of the state, for example, such countries as Canada and South Korea, exceeded the similar power of India, and Great Britain-all countries except the United States. This is clearly at odds with reality, and not only because it is difficult to calculate the importance (specific weight)in complex power not only intangible factors, but also material resources: population, territory, and even the size of the economy. These indicators only state quantitative parameters, at best hinting at the potential of their use within the framework of the integrated power of the state. For example, Canada has a population of about 35 million people and India has more than 1.2 billion people, but despite this, Canada's GNP exceeds India's, which means that Canada has significantly more output per capita than India.

In other words, power is simply a quantitative calculation of a country's material resources, its material base, to use the Marxist term, which should be coupled with the superstructure of the state. It is the state that determines how to turn this power, this potential, into a force for achieving certain goals. But this problem is not discussed at the theoretical level by Chinese scientists.

"SOFT POWER" IN CHINESE

At the end of December 2012, the founding meeting of the Chinese Public Diplomacy Association was held in China. Its creation is a new step of the Chinese leadership in implementing the concept of "soft power". Chairman of the NPC International Affairs Committee Li Zhaoxing, who served as the head of the Chinese Foreign Ministry in 2003-2007, was elected Chairman of the association.

Chinese political scientists see "soft power" as an important component of the state's complex power, international influence, and prestige.

The concept of "soft power" entered the lexicon of Chinese political scientists shortly after its author, the American scientist J. R. R. Tolkien. Nai coined the term with Wang Huning's 1993 article in the Fudan University journal titled "Culture as National Strength: Soft Power" ¹⁸.

Culture was put in the foreground as the main component of "soft power", on the basis of which China's foreign policy should be based.

In 2009, a book called "Soft Power" was published.: the new China Strategy in international politics " ¹⁹, the authors of which are almost exclusively Chinese, both Chinese citizens and those living abroad.

The collection's editor, Singapore-based scholar Li Mingqiang, identifies two approaches to the theory of "soft power". One is expressed by Johua Kurlanczyk: China's " soft power "is" transforming the whole world." Another is the famous American international expert Fareed Zakari: "China used soft power only in the sense that it allows its power to be used gently. He does this deliberately, showing that he is not an international "bully"."²⁰ Li believes that" soft power "within the framework of American liberal democracy attracts many" first world "elites, and in the presentation of the Chinese model of" political authoritarianism plus economic liberalism " - third world countries.²¹

The Chinese version of "soft power", according to Chinese scientists, includes multilateralism (active participation in international organizations), economic diplomacy, and neighborhood policy.

Thus, Chen Qianfeng writes that the Chinese cultural doctrine of the "Middle Way", which is the basis of the teachings of Confucianism , is the Chinese "soft power": "In the context of international relations... Confucianism insists on treating other nations on the basis of gentleness and morality, and believes that kindness is the antidote to rudeness. " ²²

Other Chinese scholars believe that "soft power" is more rooted in political power than in culture, and in modern conditions is embodied in the current state institutions, norms and reliability (of the political system). They put forward the idea that the current Chinese development model itself is a "source of national soft power."

Meng Honghua (China) identifies five elements of soft power: culture, values, development model, international institutions, and the international image of the country. The challenge is how to promote, say, China's cultural image on the international stage. However, Chinese scholars are concerned that in reality China is not so much bringing its own culture to the world as America has secured cultural hegemony in the world, including the growing influence of American "soft power" in China itself.

According to Zhao Suisheng, a Chinese-born American expert, "China's economic and military strength is as disparate as China's soft power, particularly in terms of political values and moral appeal." ²³

* * *

It seems that the Western concepts that Chinese scholars have been developing so intensively since the early 1990s have contributed little to the development of theories of international relations in China.

On the one hand, this is due to the fact that even in the West, theories of international relations are at a stage that has not yet taken shape as a holistic science. On the other hand, such concepts are incompatible not only with the Chinese culture of political thinking, but also with the general model of the country's development. This model is often called the "Beijing consensus" by international political scientists, as opposed to the" Washington consensus", which in a simplified form means the fundamental difference between the socialist and capitalist development options. The fundamental differences in these "consensuses" are the main reason for the rejection of Western theories in Chinese society.

Nevertheless, the Chinese do not avoid using some aspects of various Western theories in their practical meaning. Thus, the theory of the integrated power of the state has become an incentive for analyzing the comparison of the material power of the PRC with other countries, which, although in an approximate form, still allows us to more objectively assess the dynamics of the growth of the country's economic potential. Nye's theory of "soft power" is also useful. It encouraged the Chinese to pay more attention to the superstructure elements in foreign policy, one of which was the promotion of national culture. Confucius institutes have been established in various countries to promote knowledge about China, its culture, literature, and so on.

However, if we talk about the international image of the PRC, so far its products, which have flooded the whole world, strengthen it to a much greater extent than the wisdom of Confucius. But everything takes time. It is possible that after some time on the table of Western political and military leaders, in addition to Sun Tzu's book "The Art of War", there will also be a volume of the sayings of Confucius.

Time will show.

^{Wight Martin.} 1 Why is there no International Theory? // Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics. London, Allen & Unwin, 1966, p. 17 - 34.

^{Qin Yaqing.} 2 Why is there no Chinese international relations theory? // Non-Western International Theory. Perspectives on and beyond Asia. London, New York, 2010, p. 27.

^{Sun Tsu.} 3 The Art of War. Boston, London, 1988.

^{Dellios Rosita.} 4 International relations theory and Chinese philosophy (2011) // Humanities Social Sciences papers. Paper 570, p. 74 - http://epublications.bond.edu.au/hss_pubs/570

⁵ Ibid., p. 81.

⁶ Ibid., p. 65.

^{Jacque Martin.} 7 When China Rules the World. New York, 2009, p. 240 - 244.

⁸ Ci hai (Shanghai: Shanghai Dictionary Publishing House, 1979, 2766). Cite: Wangjisi. International Relations. Theory and the Study of Chinese Foreign Policy: A Chinese Perspective // Chinese foreign policy: theory and practice. Oxford, New York, 1994, p. 482.

^{Zhao Quansheng.} 9 Chinese Foreign Policy Toward Northeast Asia and Sino-Korean Relations: Domestic and International Dimensions // Prepared for the International Symposium on "East Asia Transformed: New Patterns in the 1990s". November 14 - 17, 1991, Pusan, Korea.

^{Qin Yaqing.} 10 Op. cit., p. 28.

^{Qin Yaqing.} 11 Development of International Relations Theory in China // International Studies. 2009, N1, 2, p. 193.

¹² For more information, see: Arin Oleg. Twenty-first Century: the World without Russia, Moscow, 2001.

^{Hart Jeffrey.} 13 Three Approaches to the Measurement of Power in International Relations // International Organizations. Spring 1976, N 2.

^{Qiu Mingzhen.} 14 On Development of Culture and Comprehensive National Power // SASS Papers (Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences). 2000, N 8, p. 314.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 318 - 319.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 319.

^{Hu Angang, Men Honggua.} 17 The Rise of modern China. Comprehensive national power and the Great Strategy / / Almanac "Vostok", September 2007, N 2 - http://www.situation.ru/app/j_art_1195.htm

^WangHuning. 18 Culture as National Power: Soft Power //Journal of Fudan University, 1993, N 3.

¹⁹ Soft Power: China's Emerging Strategy in International Politics. Li Mingjiang, ed. NY., Lexington Books, 2009.

²⁰ Ibid., p. 2.

²¹ Ibid., p. 6.

²² Ibid., p. 12.

²³ Ibid.

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