V. KUZNETSOV, Doctor of Historical Sciences

The proclamation of the People's Republic of China as part of the country's population in 1949 was met with mixed reactions. The CCP's reputation as a God-fearing ruling party has made believers wary, if not hostile, of the new government. The spread of the CCP's control was often accompanied by persecution of believers, the closure of monasteries, and the conversion of monks to the lay category. In some cases, the CCP's promises to give people material goods that they did not have before did not produce the expected effect: for devout believers, concern for the soul prevailed over thoughts of the carnal. In 1950, a demonstration of rejection of the new government represented by the CCP resulted in fasting and celebrating the Muslim New Year in Northwestern China. Leaflets plastered on walls and telegraph poles read: "Our leader is Muhammad, our law is the Koran. Islam is above all else. " ¹ The desire to maintain adherence to religious beliefs, in particular among the non-Han population, was to some extent a reaction to the ignoring of their Han cadres.

ACCORDING TO THE CHINESE CONSTITUTION...

By law, the new state defined its attitude to religion in the constitution adopted in 1954. Its article 89 read: "Citizens of the People's Republic of China have freedom of religion." ² In principle, this provision did not differ from the same provision in the Constitution of the Guo-Mingtang Republic of China, which entered into force on December 25, 1947. Its article 13 proclaimed: "Citizens enjoy freedom of religion" ³ .

The parameters of this freedom under the Constitution of the People's Republic of China were not unlimited, but were determined by the state, which was guided by its own interests. The criteria from which it proceeded were based on the thesis: what is counterrevolutionary is forbidden, and what is not counterrevolutionary is permitted. This attitude was expressed in Liu Shaoqi's report on the draft constitution of the People's Republic of China, which he delivered to the participants of the National People's Congress. "The draft constitution," Liu Shaoqi said, " stipulates that our state will continue to truly guarantee citizens the right to freedom of religion. But ensuring freedom of religion and ensuring freedom of counter-revolutionary activity are two different things that should never be confused. Our constitution and all our laws will also never create even the most insignificant comforts for those who are engaged in counter-revolutionary activities while wearing a religious toga."

This postulate about the limitations of religious freedom, voiced by one of the leaders of the CCP, bore the imprint of traditional Chinese political culture, the main principle of which is based on the primacy of state interests over personal ones.

In accordance with the Constitution of the People's Republic of China, the State has the right and ability to control the international contacts of religious citizens. "Religious organization and religious affairs," declares article 36 of the Constitution, " are free from foreign control." By securing freedom for religious organizations "from foreign control", the Constitution of the People's Republic of China actually asserts the possibility for state institutions to monitor the contacts of their faithful compatriots with foreign church circles under the pretext of protecting Chinese religious organizations from undesirable, from the point of view of the interests of the state, interaction with foreign organizations.

Freedom of religion was recognized by the Constitution of the People's Republic of China as a feature of the individual's mentality. But the exercise of this freedom and the specific manifestations of religious activity in public life were subject to State control. For this purpose, under the State Council (Government) The People's Republic of China established the Office of Religious Affairs, which was announced on November 10, 1954. It was the main state institution of the People's Republic of China, which was called upon to deal directly with the religious problem in its entirety. Its functions included:

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- regularly investigate and study religious organizations and the activities of their personnel;

- monitor all types of religious activities;

- lead Catholics and Protestants, and gather Buddhists, Taoists, and Muslims for regular meetings to teach patriotism;

- consistently implement the religious policy of the central government;

- continuously promote the state's policy regarding the current situation among religious leaders and all believers in order to raise their political consciousness;

- make religious leaders closer to the government;

- strike at politically incorrigible reactionaries in religious organizations and cooperate with public security officials to calm hidden counter-revolutionaries in all faiths;

- receive foreign religious guests.

WHAT IS THE "SAM-THREE MOVEMENT"?

From the very first days of the PRC's existence, its authorities initiated the creation of church organizations as a means of influencing the masses of believers.

In April 1951, at a meeting of government officials and Protestant clergy in Beijing, the sam-tri Movement (self-government, independent preaching of the faith, and self-sufficiency) was officially established.

In July 1952, a preparatory meeting was held in Beijing to establish the Society of Muslims of China (later the Chinese Islamic Association). Representatives of the CPC participated in the preparatory meetings. Almost a year later, in May 1953, the Chinese Islamic Association was established. All eight of its officials were CCP members or prominent figures in various United Front organizations established by the CCP. Burhan Shahidi, Chairman of the Xinjiang Provincial Government (a member of the CPC Xinjiang Bureau since January 1950), became Chairman, and Ma Yuhuai, a party official in Beijing, became general secretary.

In June 1953, the Chinese Buddhist Association was established. Zhao Puzhu was elected its General Secretary (after 1949 he held various posts in the Government of the People's Republic of China), and Shirab Zhaltso was elected its vice-president. The latter actively cooperated with the government. His official biography stated: "The Tibetan Buddhist elder, the Venerable Shirab Jal-tso, has been the Vice-chairman of the Qinghai Provincial Government since December 1949. Devoted to the unity of the motherland, he traveled throughout Qinghai Province, preaching the government's policy on religious issues and national minorities; continuously supported the 17-point agreement for the peaceful liberation of Tibet; strongly condemned the idea of Tibetan independence as erroneous, advocated the unity of China; he was respected for his patriotism and revered as a patriotic elder."

In 1956, the Chinese Taoist Association was established. The head of the Religious Affairs Department, He Chengxiang, attended the inaugural meeting and assured the participants of the government's support.

In 1956, the government initiated the establishment of the National Patriotic Association of Chinese Catholics. In July 1956, a group of Catholics established a preparatory committee in Beijing under the patronage of He Chengxiang, Head of the Religious Affairs Department of the State Council of the People's Republic of China. Participants of this event were taught to "lead the Catholic Church well" by Premier Zhou Enlai of the State Council. In July 1957, the National Association of Catholic Patriots was organized under the leadership of He Chengxiang.

Thus, by the second half of the 1950s, national confessional organizations were established in China on the initiative of the Government. Their common tasks included: to love and protect the motherland, to help the government implement religious policies. These were the points of the oath of allegiance of the leadership of the main faiths to the state.

The creation of national confessional organizations took place in the context of the struggle of punitive bodies with disloyal hierarchs and believers. As the Minister of Public Security Luo Ruiqing stated at the 2nd session of the National People's Congress (July 1955), in May-April 1954, almost 200 shelters were uncovered in Hebei Province, which were used by secret organizations under the auspices of the Catholic Church. According to him, "counter-revolutionary elements are still operating under the guise of religion."

Linking the practice of worship to a particular confessional organization associated with the government, which serves as evidence of "normal" religious activity, is a characteristic feature of the relationship between the state and the church in the PRC. Such a system, which restricts a person's right to freely practice the precepts of their professed faith, did not exist under the predecessor of the PRC, the Kuomintang Republic ^of China4 .

In the context of Chinese reality, when the CCP is the true ruler of China, the legislative and executive powers are not carried out in accordance with the articles of the constitution and legal acts.

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acts, but according to the directives of the CCP and the personal instructions of its leadership. The freedom of religion declared by the Constitution has not become a universal reality in everyday life.

Under the shadow of the Constitution that proclaimed freedom of religion, intense atheist propaganda was conducted in the Tibetan areas in the 1950s, which was essentially directed against the interests of the Lamaist Church and all Tibetan Lamaists. Dissatisfaction with the actions of the authorities resulted in an all-Tibetan uprising under the slogan of protecting the faith. It culminated in the 1959 Lhasa mutiny. It resulted in the flight of the Dalai Lama, the Lamaist first hierarch, from Tibet. In 1959, the International Commission of Jurists classified the actions of the Chinese authorities in Tibet as an attempt to destroy Buddhism there ^.5

But if in this case the persecution of believers took place in one region and concerned only one religion, then the subsequent "cultural revolution" covered the whole of China, and all religions were targeted.

RED GUARDS AGAINST RELIGION

The" cultural Revolution " initiated in 1965 by the country's top party and political leadership affected literally all aspects of society, including religion. The constitutionally proclaimed freedom of religion turned out to be an anachronism, since the destruction of the "four old" pillars (old culture, old customs, old habits, old thinking) determined the program of actions of the newly minted Red Guards. This scenario was not the product of a spontaneous impulse or spontaneous extremism of unruly youth: it was based on the directives of the highest party and state leadership of the PRC, given to performers and popularized in the official press.

In August 1969, the first official statement on religion and church affairs issued since the beginning of the Cultural Revolution by Hongqi, the scientific and theoretical organ of the CPC Central Committee, stated: "We must fight religion-it is the ABC of all materialism and hence Marxism... Scientific communism and religion are antagonistic. The struggle for the realization of the ideals of communism throughout the world and the "building of the kingdom of Christ on earth" are as incompatible as fire and water. " ⁶

The campaign of God-fighting fell on the church as such as a whole, and all faiths were violently attacked. The "red guards" vandalized and desecrated churches and monasteries, destroyed statues of gods and canonical books, subjected worshippers to violence and abuse, and suppressed any manifestation of religiosity on the part of the laity. In Tibet, during the" cultural revolution", the local population was forbidden to celebrate traditional festivals, such as the harvest festival, because there were religious attributes. Muslims were banned from making pilgrimages to holy places, and Buddhists were banned from making pilgrimages to their shrines. The state leadership stopped the activities of all religious organizations and the publication of their publications.

But in 1978, the 3rd plenum of the CPC Central Committee of the 11th convocation not only ordered a stand-down, but also condemned the actions of the "cultural revolution". Personally, the perpetrators of the riots that marked 1966-1976 were Lin Biao and the gang of four. They brought suffering to the faithful, the propaganda materials of the new party and state leadership of the highest level said.

A "PARTY APPROACH" TO RELIGION

The new party leadership, which took over the reins of government, sought to increase the importance of the law in the eyes of the people and the responsibility of officials for their compliance. In July 1979, the "Criminal Code of the People's Republic of China"came into force. Regarding religion, in particular, it said:: "Civil servants who unlawfully deprive citizens of their freedom of religion and violate the customs and morals of national minorities under aggravating circumstances are punished by imprisonment for a term of up to two years or correctional labor."

The 1982 Constitution once again proclaimed the right to believe in God.

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Article 36 states: "Citizens of the People's Republic of China have freedom of religion." The Constitution further declares: "No State bodies, public organizations or individuals may compel citizens to profess or not to profess a religion, nor may they discriminate against citizens for professing or not professing a religion." And more: "The state protects the normal exercise of religious activities. No one can use religion to disrupt public order, harm the health of citizens, or harm the State education system."

The concept of "state", of course, is primarily based on the top party leadership. The Constitution itself lays down the conditions for the manifestation of the party-administrative bureaucracy of voluntarism. The very concept of "normal religious activity" already defines the conditionality of religious freedom. In practice, what may be beyond the limits of normal religious activity is decided not by the basic law of the state, but by an official of one rank or another, according to the circumstances of the political order or simply the conditions of the moment. How, for example, the medical practice of lamas or Quranic classes at a mosque correlates with the interests of citizens ' health or the state education system - all this is not defined by law. Therefore, the last word remains with the executive branch.

Article 36 of the Constitution leaves many questions. For example, it is not clear where the boundary lies between "normal religious activity", which is protected by the State under article 36 (sec. 3) and "superstitious" practices, which are punishable under paragraph 165 of the "Criminal Code". The criteria that distinguish them are set not by law, but by the practical activities of the party's administrative bodies.

Religions, from the point of view of the state, are five main faiths: Buddhism, Taoism, Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism, which have their own well-known canons, their own beliefs, rituals and institutions, a long history and are influential in many countries. The" normal religious activity " of these different churches is protected by the Constitution. Only those religious practices that violate public order, harm the physical health of citizens or the State system of education and upbringing are punishable. At the same time, the religious activities of the underground Catholic Church are being suppressed, and its dioceses refuse official registration and are not included in the national Catholic organization allowed by the state.

Hebei Province is one of the strongholds of the underground Catholic Church. Here it was customary to make an annual pilgrimage to the place where, as Catholics say, the Virgin Mary descended from heaven to protect Christians during the Ihetuan rebellion (1898-1901). The latter opposed any foreign presence in the country, fought against missionaries and destroyed fellow Christians. In 1995, the holy place was visited by 10 thousand people. But since 1996, the authorities in Hebei Province have banned the pilgrimage.

"Feudal superstition" refers to anything related to ancestral worship, hand-reading, divination, etc. Such" superstitions " are not protected by the constitution, and in certain cases they are punishable because, in accordance with the official atheist position of the CCP, they deceive the people. Thus, all religious associations that do not belong to the five officially recognized religions are considered "secret reactionary societies and ritual sects" and are not protected by the state. This is especially true of the traditional ancestral cult.

"The organization of religious sects using feudal superstitions" is considered extremely unacceptable. If such sects are established "for counter-revolutionary purposes", this is punishable by up to five years ' imprisonment, police supervision or deprivation of political rights in accordance with paragraph 99 of the Criminal Code. Although the "Criminal Code" only mentions "ritual sects", in practice they are not separated from"secret societies".

DOCUMENT No. 19

Everyday practice has put the issue of the need to adopt a special "Law on Religion"on the agenda with all the urgency. This initiative was launched in March 1998 by members of the National Committee of the People's Political Consultative Conference of China. Its necessity was motivated by the lack of a special law on religion in China, which would define the rights and obligations of believers and authorities. According to the initiators of the legislative initiative, the" Law on Religion " should clearly state the provisions defining the framework of legitimate religious activity, as well as the differences between religion and superstition. It is significant that the legislative initiative in this case came from below, and not from above from the top leadership of the CPC.

Legislative acts adopted in the PRC in the late 70s and early 80s defined the general principles of the status of religion in the state. In turn, the CPC Central Committee issued the so-called document No. 19 to the party and state functionaries for direct guidance to action. Its introductory part explains the general principles of the approach to the religious problem in the country. Their essence is as follows:

1. Religion will become obsolete only after the long development of socialism and communism.

2. There are many believers in China. Some religions are practiced by entire national minorities. Religion has a certain mass character and in many places is simultaneously connected with the national issue. However, in the past, religion has been harshly oppressed, and as a result, "State security" and "national unity" have already been seriously damaged.

3. Due to the fact that in the past, religious figures and all believers were considered as "objects of dictatorship", and the customs and habits of the national-

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On the contrary, the policy of violent attacks and enforced prohibitions was pursued, which led to the fact that religious activity in an environment of secrecy and confusion gained some development, and also led to the fact that anti-communist elements were able to take advantage of this kind of conditions to launch counter-revolutionary activities.

4. Due to the fact that the main task of the current stage is to unite the people for the implementation of the "four modernizations", in the past, when politics focused on ideological differences between believers and non-believers, on attacks on the masses of believers, as a result of "increased alienation between believers and non-believers","religious zeal has increased and sharpened, " and " the cause of socialism has been seriously damaged."

Accordingly, the following practical guidelines of religious policy were brought to the attention:

1. "ordinary" (normal) faiths and religious activities are guaranteed. However, religious interference in State administration, justice and education is not permitted in any way, children under the age of 18 are not allowed to study religion, leave their families and go to study religious canons in churches and monasteries, and it is forbidden to use religion to oppose the leadership of the party and the socialist system, to destroy the unity of the state and national cohesion.

2. It is necessary to fight for the unity of the clergy, it is necessary to pay serious attention to various religious figures, but "it is necessary to persevere and resolutely carry out educational work among them in the spirit of patriotism and law enforcement, the defense of socialism, the defense of the unity of the fatherland and national unity." At the same time, it is necessary to ensure that all religious educational institutions systematically train a young group of professional priests who would dearly love the fatherland, defend the party and government leadership, firmly adhere to the attitude of following the path of socialism, possess scientific knowledge about religion, and can also be in contact with the mass of believers. (In other words, we are talking about the need, roughly speaking, to ideologically remake the previously existing professional clergy and at the same time create a group of new professional clergy who are obedient in the loyal implementation of the CCP's policy on religion.)

3. As for "wrongly initiated cases" in the sphere of religion against religious figures, it is necessary to reveal judicial errors; as for those who still persist in adhering to the anti-communist platform, oppose the constitution, and oppose socialism, strict measures should be taken.

Although it is emphasized that Marxism is opposed to any religious teachings, however, in political activities, CCP members can and should form a "united front "by uniting with"patriotic believers".

4. Famous Buddhist and Taoist monasteries and churches that were famous in China and beyond, or that are of great cultural value, need to be restored. However, in addition to the amounts allocated for these purposes, you can not use other funds. Repairs to temples in the village should stop.

It is established that all places of religious activity must be managed by officials from the Department of Religious Affairs; no religious organization or believer is allowed to distribute, preach or propagate religious teachings outside the place of religious activity.

5. Eight leading religious institutions-associations have been established. Their main tasks are to promote the implementation of religious policies, raise "patriotic" and "socialist" consciousness, and carry out" completely ordinary " religious activities. It should strengthen the control of the eight leading religious organizations over various religious activities and in relation to the ideological transformation of believers.

6. CCP members are strictly prohibited from practicing religion or participating in religious activities; those who hold their own for a long time and do not change must be forced to leave the party. However, in areas where national minorities live, due to the fact that religious and national issues are linked, in order to avoid separation from the masses, party members who are isolated and participate in religious activities can be treated differently, and measures can be taken using different methods. If it turns out that among the believers there are party members who oppose the "four basic principles" and the main policy, destroy the "state unity" and the unity of nationalities, then it is necessary to strike at them without regret.

7. The actions of religious hierarchs who use their religion to engage in anti-communist activities should be strictly suppressed; if they continue to engage in anti-communist activities after serving their sentence and being released, then such priests should be punished taking into account aggravating circumstances. At the same time, "turn the teaching materials inside out" to teach the masses of believers.

Document No. 19 also emphasizes the following points: religious work is an important organizational part of the party's activities to create a united front and conduct mass work; "strengthening the party leadership is the main guarantee for resolving the religious issue."

Freedom to practice a religion or not is interpreted in two ways by the authors of document No. 19: "At the same time that the emphasis is placed on the fact that people are guaranteed freedom of religion, it is also necessary to emphasize that people are guaranteed the freedom not to profess any religion. These are two sides of the same question."

As the document highlights, the substance of religion policy should be considered in a dynamic way. At the present stage, the main goal is to vigorously help unite the multinational people of the country in the joint construction of a modern strong socialist state, and ultimately- " with the indispensable condition of guaranteeing freedom of religious worship, in the course of the gradual development of the economy, culture and scientific and technical activities, in the course of the gradual development of socialist material and spiritual culture, the reasons and epistemological reasons that make it possible for religion to exist, and moving further, religion will be destroyed. And the destruction of religion is precisely the most important policy in the field of religion in the PRC."

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MOVING AWAY FROM MILITANT ATHEISM

The legislative and executive authorities are taking practical steps to neutralize the harmful effects of the cultural revolution on religion.

National confessional organizations resumed their activities and by 1980 became part of the CPC United Front Department. Some religious figures who were previously accused of anti-state activities were rehabilitated. The State allocates funds for the reconstruction and repair of famous places of worship.

Retreating before the persistence of religious thinking or religious feelings, the state leadership of the PRC was forced to co-exist with atheism, the CCP's ideological paradigm, and religion. The state apparatus of the PRC, however, does not stop fighting it. But he resorts to other means than before - from a wider acquaintance of the intelligentsia with religious dogmas and practices to frontal attacks with references to the authorities of K. Marx and V. Lenin. So, in 1979, as reported by the Xinhua news Agency, lectures on Buddhism, Islam, Christianity, Taoism and Lamaism began at the Faculty of Philosophy of Peking University. The study of religions, from the point of view of dialectical materialism, is important, because religion, the message said, still has a certain influence in the world, and therefore such a study will contribute to the promotion of atheism.

In the 80s, militant atheism, which had previously been elevated to the rank of state policy, clearly moderated its ardor. The statements of Karl Marx "religion is an opium for the people" and V. I. Lenin "religion is a poisonous opium for the people" are the cornerstones of the Marxist view of religion. Regarding the above considerations, a member of the CCP's central leadership said at the Second Working Conference on Tibet in 1987, "We should no longer speak publicly about it in Tibet like that." Then one of the leaders of the party committee of the Tibet Autonomous Region issued instructions not to use the expression "religion is opium for the people" anymore. But such judgments do not mean that the CCP's atheist functionaries have come to terms with the increase in religious displays that are a direct consequence of the CCP's declining credibility, particularly in non-Han areas.

To counter the ideological threat, the Xinjiang Academy of Sciences has released an atheism textbook aimed at young people in Xinjiang. Highlighting the negative role of religion in Xinjiang's history, the book predicts "a long struggle to destroy religion." ⁷

The appearance of such publications is not a result of the zeal of the local authorities, but a reflection of the general political course of the state leadership. In "Document No. 162" of the State Council of the People's Republic of China (September 1989), at meetings on the problems of Tibet (October 1989), on the further stabilization of the situation in the border national areas (March 1990), at the meeting of the chairmen of the committees on ethnic affairs (February 1990), it was clearly stated that in the border areas special attention is paid to strengthening the propaganda of Marxist-Leninist atheism.

Life has forced the state leadership of the PRC to publicly recognize the positive role of religion in the public life of the country. Religion in China promotes economic development and social stability. As the People's Daily reported on January 20, 1993, Li Ruihuan, a member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee, said at a meeting with leading religious figures in China. Religious organizations, he noted, have been cooperating with the CCP and government agencies at various levels for several years and have made a tangible contribution to strengthening social stability.

As you know, the construction of socialism in the PRC is characterized by the so-called Chinese specifics. It can be said that the relations between the state and the church in the PRC are also unique. In particular, they differ in the methods of government influence on the religious sphere. Among them - the involvement of the state in the training of clergy, the approval of hierarchs in the appropriate rank.

A notice on further improvement of religious work issued by the CPC Central Committee and the State Council of the People's Republic of China in 1991 regarding religious educational institutions stated: "It is necessary to provide support and assistance to patriotic, religious organizations so that they manage religious educational institutions well, systematically and in an organized manner train a group of clergy who love the state, accept the leadership of the party, they firmly follow the socialist path and defend the integrity of the state and national unity. " ⁸

INSTALL A BATCH: "WHAT IS POP - WHAT IS THE PARISH"

The traditional political culture of China is based on the foundations of Confucian ethics, which is based on the primacy of state interests over the individual. This paradigm also defines the relationship between the state and religion in the PRC. The latter is not a personal matter of fellow citizens, but a national problem. "Like pop , like parish" - this maxim applies to the Chinese reality of today, why?-

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It also takes full care of the pastors ' moods and their political orientation. Educating hierarchs and CCP policy-makers among the masses of believers - this is the interest of the state leadership in training clergymen through the system of religious educational institutions.

The State Council of the People's Republic of China subsidizes the Chinese Islamic Canonical Academy. The Government allocates a fixed amount of funds for the Catholic theological school and the Taoist Theological Academy. To a certain extent, when the state finances the system of spiritual education, it does not act out of philanthropic motives, but is guided by purely pragmatic goals.

It considers the religious organization as one of the structural components of Chinese society and, on this basis, considers it its right to appoint religious hierarchs. In this respect, the example of the Lamaist religious organization is very significant.

In 1981, the XVI Gyalwa Karmapa, the head of the Kagyudpa Lamaist sect, died. According to the instructions of the latter, the monks of the Chubu monastery identified the boy into whom the soul of the deceased had transmigrated, and he was recognized by the adherents of the sect as the XVII Gyalva Karmapa. But for the authorities, he became such only after the Administration of Religious Affairs of the State Council of the People's Republic of China specifically approved him in this rank on June 25, 1992. When receiving the young man in Beijing, state leaders explicitly stated how they wanted to see the XVII Gyalva Karmapa.

On January 28, 1989, the H Panchen Lama, one of the two Lamaist first hierarchs, died. On January 30, the government issued a directive signed by former Premier Lee Peng: The search and identification of the reincarnation of X Panchen Lama is carried out by the democratic management committee of Dashilhunpo Monastery (the traditional residence of Panchen lamas), the result of all this work is approved by the State Council of the People's Republic of China. A steering group was involved in the search for the reincarnation of the X Panchen Lama. Its composition and direction of activity were directly determined by the highest party and state leadership of the PRC. According to Li Ruihuan, a representative of the CPC Central Committee, members of the group were told to adhere to patriotism and recognize the leadership of the central government.

By taking the issue of the successor of X Panchen Lama entirely into their own hands, the party and state leadership of the PRC simultaneously ignored the historical tradition according to which the incarnation of the Panchen Lama is confirmed by the Dalai Lama, and he also decides on the election if there was more than one candidate.

REINCARNATION OF THE STATE COUNCIL OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA... TO THE DALAI LAMA

The Dalai Lama's attempt to name the XI Panchen Lama was met with hostility by the Chinese government. It has declared its exclusive right to appoint a new Panchen Lama. This was motivated by the precedent set by the government of the House of Qing in 1799. This was granted after the reincarnation of the previous Panchen Lama was identified by drawing lots. This was stated by a representative of the Department of Religious Affairs under the State Council of the People's Republic of China on May 17, 1995, to a Xinhua correspondent. On November 23, 1995, a drawing was held in the presence of a representative of the central government, and the reincarnation of the X Panchen Lama was identified. On November 29, the decision of the State Council to recognize it as such was announced. On December 8, 1995, the XI Panchen Lama was enthroned under the leadership and supervision of State Councilor Li Tein. On behalf of the State Council, Li Thein presented the XI Panchen Lama with a gold label and a gold seal with Chinese and Tibetan texts. Receiving the XI Panchen Lama on January 12, 1996, Chinese President Jiang Zemin instructed him: "The Party and the government hope that the XI Panchen Lama will succeed... he will defend the leadership of the party and love the fatherland dearly... love socialism dearly... it will contribute to the defense of the unity of the fatherland, national unity...".

The last official document outlining the state's position on religion in the PRC was the White Paper published by the Press Office of the State Council of the PRC in October 1997. It is indicative, in particular, of the special attitude of the Chinese leadership to Christianity as such. The xenophobia that has traditionally been inherent in the political thinking of the Chinese elite for centuries is also felt to a certain extent in it. Islam in the history of China has repeatedly acted as a factor of destabilization of the internal political situation in the country. But the White Paper does not say a word about this, but a large part is devoted to exposing "the unsightly role that the Catholic and Protestant churches played in China during the new history period."

WHY DOESN'T DAD JOIN THE CCP?

Without allowing the idea of the negative role of Christian missionaries in the life of the country to fade in the historical memory of the Chinese population, Beijing pursues well - defined political goals of the domestic and foreign policy order: to force the Vatican to abandon its mission.-

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The Government of the People's Republic of China considers it its prerogative to give up claims of interference in matters that the Government of the People's Republic of China considers its prerogative. The Chinese government, Beijing says, wants to improve relations with the Vatican. However, two conditions must be met for this: first, the Vatican must break the so-called " diplomatic relations with Taiwan, recognize the government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legitimate government of China, recognize that Taiwan is an integral part of the territory of the PRC, and secondly, the Vatican must not interfere in China's internal affairs under the pretext of religious activities".

The Vatican's plan to canonize 120 "saints" killed in China on October 1, 2000, was met with "indignation" by Chinese Catholics. Such behavior by the Vatican, the Chinese Catholic Church said in a statement, ignores its sovereignty. This statement lists the mistakes made by the Vatican: the wrong decision that resulted in a century-long ban on Catholicism in ancient China; the Vatican's demand for Chinese Catholics to remain "neutral" in relation to Japanese aggression against China in 1937-1945; the Vatican was the first to recognize the puppet regime of Manchukuo created by Japanese imperialists, which is serious The Vatican's hostility to the PRC after its founding in 1949 and its encouragement to speak out against the Government have hurt the feelings of the Chinese people.

Religious activities of foreigners in the PRC are always in the center of state attention. The most recent example of this is the publication of the "Rules for Managing the Religious Activities of Foreigners in the Territory of the People's Republic of China"on September 26, 2000.

The omnipotence of the bureaucracy, which often replaces constitutional acts with its willful decisions, creates constant problems in the relationship between the leaders of religious denominations and the state. It, represented by the highest state leaders, is forced to specifically instruct officials of the departments of religious affairs to behave correctly with believers, so that they have confidence in the political course of the state.

In February 1998, the then Premier of the State Council, Li Peng, held a meeting with the heads of religious affairs departments. He called for " actively directing the initiative of religious communities to promote the construction of socialism with Chinese characteristics." In this regard, it is very important, the Prime Minister stressed, to correctly follow the party's line in working with religious communities of various faiths. The Premier's call for the correct implementation of the CCP's policy is a recognition that there are negative phenomena on the ground in relations between the authorities and believers.

Among the various forms of interaction between the state and the church, one should mention periodic meetings of representatives of the central party and state apparatus with the clergy. These meetings are a kind of briefing by the authorities of churchmen. As reported, for example, by the Xinhua News Agency, on February 15, 1996 in Beijing, at the initiative of the United Front department of the CPC Central Committee, an interview was held with the participation of religious figures. Li Dezhu, Deputy Head of the United Front Department of the CPC Central Committee, wished them to make a new contribution to the interethnic cohesion, prosperity and unity of the Motherland. In turn, representatives of religious organizations, speaking at the interview, said that in the future they will continue to strongly advocate for strict compliance with laws, for the interests of the people, for interethnic cohesion and unity of the Motherland, and make efforts to implement the current five-year plan and the long-term plan until 2010, for the sake of prosperity and unity of the Motherland.

For a number of reasons, the problem of the status of religion in society remains unresolved for the state. It sees a certain way out of this situation in the creation of a patriotic united front of believers of all faiths. Speaking at a meeting with religious leaders on January 20, 1993, a member of the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee called on party organizations at various levels to pay "great attention"to religion and relations with believers. By implementing the principle of "unity and cooperation in politics and mutual respect for views" and firmly implementing this principle, we will certainly be able to unite patriotic forces in religious circles and the broad masses of believers, and create a patriotic united front.

The forced presence of the Dalai Lama, whom Lamaists consider a living personification of the Buddha, outside Tibet, the manifestations of militant religious nationalism in Xinjiang, the activities of the underground Catholic Church-all this gives reason to believe that the idea of the patriotic front of the faithful of the PRC under the leadership of the CCP is still waiting to be implemented.

In the 1990s, the case of the syncretic Falun Gong sect received a great response in China and abroad. The authorities saw its activities as a threat to public order and the health of citizens, and in 1999 this sect was banned. The legislative basis was the resolution of the supreme legislative body of the country, the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress. According to the Chinese Constitution and its laws, Chinese President Jiang Zemin told American journalists that people have the freedom to practice any religion.

In protest against the persecution of the Falun Gong sect, its adherents resorted to protests, including self-immolation attempts in Tiananmen Square, which was shown on Chinese and Russian television. These events once again show that the religious issue in China does not lose its sharpness. It receives unfavorable publicity for the government abroad. Western countries, especially the United States, use the issue of human rights in the PRC (which includes freedom of conscience) to interfere in China's internal affairs. The crackdown on political and religious activities in China has steadily worsened, according to the US State Department's annual Human Rights Report in 2001.

^{Bush, Jr.R.C.} 1 Religion in communist China. Nashwill. 1970, p. 268.

² Constitutional and Basic Legislative Acts of the People's Republic of China (1954-1958). Moscow, 1959, p. 50.

³ Constitution of the Republic of China. Government Information Bureau of the Republic of China. 1998, p. 4.

^{White M.K.} 4 Human rights trends and coercive family planning in the PRC. Issues and studies. Vol. 34, N 8, August 1998, p. 5.

⁵ Tibet and the Chinese People's Republic. Report to the International Commission of Jurists by Legal Inquiry Committee on Tibet. Geneva, 1960, p.3-4.

⁶ Religion in communist dominated areas. 1970, June. Vol. IX, N 11-12, p. 86.

^{Warikoo К.} 7 Ethnic religious resurgence in Xinjiang. Eurasian studies. Ankara, 1995/96. Vol. 4, N 2., p. 5.

^{Xiong Zijian.} 8 Zhongguo dalu zongjiao yuanxiao xiankuang fengxi - Zhongguo dalu yanjiu. 1996, vol. 39, No. 1, p. 37.

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