Towards the XXVII Congress of the CPSU

Control in a socialist state is an important component of the party leadership and state administration of the country. Control serves as an active form of involving workers in State administration. The scope of the control is to check the implementation of decisions of the Communist Party and the Soviet Government in the areas of administration, industry, agriculture, science, culture, and improving the material well-being of the Soviet people. At every stage of the development of socialist society, the supervisory authorities pay special attention to the work of the State and economic apparatus.

The essence, role and significance of control in the socialist state were defined by V. I. Lenin: "Accounting and control, if they are carried out by the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers 'and Peasants' deputies, as the supreme state authority, or according to the instructions and authority of this authority , - accounting and control is universal, universal , universal. the quantity of labor and the distribution of products - this is the essence of the socialist transformation, once the political rule of the proletariat is established and secured. " 1 Lenin paid great attention to the main activities of the People's control, and emphasized the need for constant leadership on the part of the party and its Central Committee .2
Specific directions of the work of the socialist control bodies of the 1920s and 1930s are defined in the resolutions of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the works of the leaders of the Communist Party and the Soviet Government .3 Of considerable scientific and practical interest are pamphlets, articles and speeches written by employees of the central and local control bodies in the 1920s and 1930s, as well as publications on the various forms of mass participation in control in those years, on the promotion of workers and peasants to the control bodies and the state apparatus, and on their training for this work. on the forms and methods of inspection activities in various areas of the national economy and the state apparatus 4 . The activities of control bodies have been investigated since the mid-1930s. However up to

1 Lenin V. I. PSS. Vol. 35, pp. 199-200.

2 Ibid., vol. 41, pp. 30-31; see also: vol. 33, pp. 5-120; vol. 36, pp. 184-187; vol. 37, pp. 20-23, 365-368; vol. 39, pp. 64-84, 181; vol. 44, pp. 127-132, 184, 189, 345 - 350, 364 - 370, 413 - 414; T. 45, p. 152 - 159, 343 - 348, 383 - 406, 413 - 414; etc.

3 Kuibyshev V. V. Rabota TsKK - RKI v svyazi s osnovnykh zadachami partii [The work of the Central Committee-RKI in connection with the main tasks of the Party]. Tasks of the CCK - RKI on the rationalization of the state apparatus in the RKI work plan for 1925-1926. The work of the CCK-RKI in connection with general party tasks. Tiflis, 1925; Andreev A. A. Problemy sotsialisticheskogo stroitel'stva i organizacii raboty KK - RKI [Tasks of socialist construction and organization of work of the KK-RKI]. Moscow-L. 1931; Yaroslavsky E. Ten years on a combat post. - For tempi, kachestvo, proverku, 1933, N 1-2; Dzerzhinskiy F. E. Izbrannye statii i rechi 1908-1926 gg. M. 1947; Ordzhonikidze G. K. Prirodnye zadachi TsKK - RKI. Articles and Speeches. Vol. 2. Moscow, 1957"; his. About the work of the CCK-RKI. Articles and Speeches, vol. 2, Moscow, 1957; Kalinin M. I. O chistke sovetskogo apparata [On the purge of the Soviet apparatus]. Baku. 1929; his own. Conversations with the People, Collection, Moscow, 1960; Kirov S. M. Articles and Speeches. Documents. L. 1936; et al.

4 Mitrofanov A. Kh. Promotion of workers and peasants, Moscow, 1926; Nikolaev V. On the promotion of female workers. Moscow -L. 1928; Lebedev D. Proletarskaya demokratiya i samokritika [Proletarian Democracy and Self-criticism]. Strengthening the apparatus of the proletarian dictatorship. Moscow-L. 1929; Kinzhalov F. "Light Cavalry" RKI. M. 1929; Peter Ya. About chist-

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In the mid-1950s, there were few works on this topic and only some aspects of RCT activity were considered in them. These works were based mainly on the analysis of publications, and archival sources were rarely used in them5 . The history of socialist control has been studied more actively since the second half of the 1950s .6 In the 60s and 70s, studies were published on the activities of workers 'and peasants' inspections in the republics and regions .7 Based on this literature and archival materials, this essay reveals in general terms the characteristic features of the formation and development of Workers 'and Peasants' inspection bodies, their activities to improve the state apparatus and combat bureaucracy.

The principles, methods, and structure of socialist control as a form of state and public administration were developed and tested in practice during the transition period in the context of class struggle and historically important political, economic, and social transformations. In subsequent years and at the present time, the main methods of control developed by Lenin were creatively improved and are being improved by the Communist Party, but the main features of socialist control remain partisanship, narodnost, and glasnost.

With the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat, an intensive search began for ways to organize control that would enjoy the workers ' authority and successfully perform their complex functions. It was a difficult case. First of all, there was no experience. There were not enough highly qualified cadres devoted to the ideas of the proletarian revolution, who were well versed in matters of state and economic management, and who were able to involve the broad masses of the working people in their activities.

ke sovetskogo apparata. M -l. 1929; his. Purge of the Soviet apparatus and control of the masses. M.-L. 1930; Nefedov G. A. Bureaucrats and how to deal with them. M.-L. 1929; Rozmirovich E. F. Principles of methodology and organizational policy in management techniques. M. 1930; ee same. Reconstruction of management techniques in 1926-1933, Moscow, 1933; Bakhtamov I. Combat issues of nomination, Moscow, 1930; Krasnopevtsev P. N., Obukhov V. V. Nominees and promotion, Moscow, 1930; Gorokhov V. Sections of the RKI in villages, Moscow, 1930; Popov I. F. Do not enter without a report, Moscow, 1930; Grekov A. Kak organize workers ' courts over bureaucracy, Moscow, 1932; Klevtsov V. Groups of assistance to RKI, Moscow, 1932; Braslavsky L. Work of socialist part-timers. Sverdlovsk. 1934.

5 Lunev A. E. Gosudarstvennyi kontrol ' v SSSR [State Control in the USSR]. Moscow, 1951.

6 Dorokhova G. A. Workers 'and Peasants' Inspection. 1920-1923 Moscow, 1959; Gosudarstvenny i obshchestvenny kontrol v SSSR [State and Public control in the USSR], Moscow, 1960; Ikonnikov S. N. Organization and activity of RKI in 1920-1925 Moscow, 1960. Creation and activity of the united bodies of the Central Control Committee-RKI in 1923-1934, Moscow, 1971; Morozov L. F., Portnov V. P. Organs of Party and State control (1923-1934), Moscow, 1964. Socialist control in the USSR. Historical essay, Moscow, 1984; Karateev N. P. Lenin's principles of organization of control. - Scientific notes of the Moscow Financial Institute, 1965; Lukyanov A. N., Rodionov V. A. Party-state control in industry, Moscow, 1965; Ozerov L. S. Lenin's principles of organization of control, Moscow, 1965; Gusev K. V. A brief sketch of the history of party - state control bodies in the USSR, Moscow, 1965; Lenin's system of party - state control. Lenin-organizer of Socialist Control, Moscow, 1967; Moskalenko I. M. TsKK in the struggle for unity and purity of Party Ranks, Moscow, 1973; Krasnov A.V. TsKK - RKI in the struggle for Socialism. The role of the CCK-RKI in the implementation of Lenin's plan for building socialism in the USSR (1923-1934). Irkutsk. 1973.

7 Vayner F. G. Implementation of the Leninist plan for the reorganization of the Workers 'and Peasants' Inspection in Ukraine (1923-1925) - Scientific Notes of Kharkiv University, 1964, vol. 148; Komissarov N. Control in Leninist style. Smolensk, 1964; Kurdyukova E. N. Purge of the Soviet apparatus in 1929-1930. (Based on materials from the Nizhny Novgorod Region). - Scientific Notes of the Gorky Pedagogical Institute, historical series, 1965, vol. 49; Malysh A.M. gubKK - RKI activities aimed at improving the state apparatus, restoring and developing the national economy in 1923-1928. Voronezh. 1967; Gadzhiev N. P. Activity of the Central Committee - RKI of Azerbaijan to solve the main tasks of the socialist industry of the Republic (1926-1929). Baku. 1968; Prokopenko A.V. Perestroika and organization of mass work of the Workers 'and Peasants' Inspection in Eastern Siberia based on the instructions of V. I. Lenin (1923-1928). Based on the materials of the Irkutsk State Duma. region and the Krasnoyarsk Territory. Irkutsk, 1967; Demin G. E. Deyatel'nost ' organov partiyno-gosudarstvennogo kontrolya v gody pervoi pyatiletki [Activity of party and state control bodies during the first five-year plan], Moscow, 1968; Atadzhanov A. R. TsKK - RKI Uzubizdaniya v bor'be za sotsializm. Tashkent, 1976.

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In December 1917, an attempt was made to create a control body to assist the party in implementing decisions taken by the Central Committee and the Soviet Government, in combating bureaucracy and red tape, and in strict compliance with the laws of the people's government. However, the Board of the Commissariat of State Control (Goskon) formed for this purpose, consisting mainly of officials who exercised control in pre-revolutionary times, did not justify itself. A month later, it was abolished and the Central Board, Accounting and Control Boards and local commissions were organized. 8 The outbreak of civil war and imperialist intervention suspended the experiment with control, but the search for its forms continued. At the end of 1918, workers began to create cells of the workers ' inspection. Lenin and the Central Committee of the party supported this initiative. In December 1918, the Council of People's Commissars approved the regulations on workers ' inspection developed by Lenin .9 The scope of the inspection cells was mainly limited to the area of food policy, which was particularly acute during the civil war. As early as the beginning of 1920, the cells operated at more than 300 enterprises, with more than 60,000 employees .10 In the same years, departmental control was born.

By the beginning of the 1920s, the country had three control systems: state, departmental and public in the form of a work inspection. Each system operated independently. Since this created parallelism and duplication, the question arose of creating a single body of state and public control. For this purpose, special commissions began to be created, which included prominent state and party figures: Y. M. Sverdlov, I. B. Stalin, F. E. Dzerzhinsky and others. After extensive research and discussions, it was proposed to create a Workers 'and Peasants' Inspectorate on a state basis. The corresponding People's Commissariat was formed by the decision of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee on February 7, 192011 . From that moment on, workers 'and peasants' inspections were also organized locally. By mid-October 1920, the RCP already existed in 56 of the 58 provinces. Grassroots cells emerged in enterprises. By November 1, 1920, there were more than 900 of them in Moscow and the Moscow Province alone .12
Before the new state and public control bodies, life has put forward complex tasks. The RCT was instructed not only to control the measure of labor and the distribution of its results, not only to monitor the implementation of party and government directives, to fight red tape and bureaucracy, but also to help institutions find rational, effective forms of management, and to serve as a model institution itself .13 The importance of the tasks assigned to the Workers 'and Peasants' Inspectorate increased with the introduction of the new economic policy. On Lenin's suggestion, the Board of the People's Commissariat of the RKI adopted a program of RKI activities on September 2, 1921. Special attention was paid to the broad involvement of the working masses in the work of the RCT14, checking the effectiveness of organizational and administrative documents adopted, practical actions of state and economic bodies, their compliance with the spirit of the times, specific conditions, and the general line of the Communist Party and the Soviet Government.

In an interview with A. A. Korostelev, a member of the Board of the People's Commissariat of RKI, Lenin said:: "We have introduced the NEP, but we know very little yet about how it will develop and what obstacles stand in the way. We need to ensure the correct development of the new economic policy as much as possible. Our staff is sluggish, bureaucratic, and clumsy. A good case can be ruined. Here you are, a member of the Board of the NK RKI, so a member of the government, access to all factories and plants is open to you... Pick up a small group of factory workers and some honest specialists; take a few enterprises, examine them, how they are supplied with fuel, food, money; find out who and what hinders their work, bring them to justice and try to use your power to help and assist them.-

8 Izvestiya Rabocheye-Krestyanskoy inspectoratsii, 1923, No. 9, p. 4.

9 SU RSFSR, 1918, N 90, Article 914.

10 people's control in the USSR. M. 1967, p. 51.

11 SU RSFSR, 1920, N 16, Article 94.

12 Voskresenskaya N. A. Uk. soch., p. 153.

13 Proceedings of the Workers 'and Peasants' Inspection, 1921, N 1-2, p. 2.

14 Ibid., No. 7, pp. 1-2.

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help businesses and workers. If we manage to remove the obstacles that lay in the way of the new economic policy, it will be very significant. " 15
In the conversation, Lenin outlined the high requirements for control not only in the conditions of NEP, but also for the long term. He stressed that the commission should be formed from workers and specialists, not too many objects should be selected for the survey, that it is necessary to study key issues, identify objective causes of shortcomings, develop specific proposals for their elimination, and, if necessary, take effective measures in the survey process. Lenin especially emphasized the "skillful correction in time" of the revealed shortcomings.

"The task of the Workers' and Peasants 'Inspection," he wrote, "is not only and even not so much to 'catch' or 'expose' (this is the task of the court, with which Rabkrin is in close contact, but by no means identical), but to be able to correct it. Skilful correction on time is the main task of Rabkrin." To do this, Lenin emphasized, "first, it is necessary to study and study the conduct of business in a particular institution, enterprise, department, etc.; second, it is necessary to make the necessary practical changes in time and implement them in practice." 16
Naturally, the RCT faced considerable difficulties in developing its work both in the center and in the field. The bottleneck remained the lack of trained personnel. The RCT had open and hidden opponents. Some of the workers who were promoted to leadership positions did not understand and underestimated the importance of control in the socialist state, various opposition groups hindered the strengthening of the RCT, and class enemies generally sought to prevent the working people from gaining control. In the discussions that unfolded on the issue of the rights and duties of the Workers ' Council, two extremes emerged: some argued that the RCT should have unlimited rights and report only to the Presidium of the All - Russian Central Executive Committee, while others suggested that its rights and duties should be reduced to a minimum or even completely abolished. In response to comments on the work of the deputies on May 5, 1922, Lenin wrote:: "With our desperate "departmental system",.. with a low level of employees, with internal intrigue... you can't do without a work screen now. We can and should work on it systematically and hard to make it an instrument for checking and improving all government work. Otherwise, there is no practical way to test, improve, or teach your work. " 17
While outlining a number of concrete measures to strengthen the Labor Department, Vladimir Ilyich first of all pointed out the need for strict selection of personnel. He proposed to get rid of incapable employees, reduce the number of employees of RCTs by 6 times (from 12 thousand to 2 thousand), increase the remaining salaries by 3 times 18 . In the articles "How can we reorganize Rabkrin" and "Better less, but better", written at the end of the discussion on control 19 , in January 1923, Lenin, as an important condition for turning the RKI into an exemplary and authoritative organ of the dictatorship of the proletariat, put forward a proposal to merge it with the party control body - the Central Control Commission (CCC) and the Central Control Commission (CCC). send the best party forces there. When selecting them, Lenin recommended taking into account the personal qualities of communists, their knowledge of the basics of the science of management, the work of the state apparatus, etc. 20 .

With the unification of the Central Committee and the RKI, it was necessary to prevent the substitution of state and public control for party control, and at the same time to increase the guiding and organizing role of the party and its Central Committee in the RKI and through the RKI in all areas of socialist construction, which, in turn, would strengthen the authority of the Rabkrin in Soviet society. Thus, it was necessary to find ways to mutually enrich the CCK and RCT in order to achieve a single goal.

15 Lenin V. I. On improving the state apparatus and on combating bureaucracy and red tape (Letters and Notes of 1917-1922). Moscow, L. 1930, pp. 22-23.

16 Lenin V. I. PSS. Vol. 44, p. 127.

17 Ibid., vol. 45, pp. 180-181.

18 See ibid., p. 181.

19 The discussion on control was stopped by the decision of the Central Committee of the Party of January 12, 1923 (see A. I. Chugunov, Organs of Socialist Control of the RSFSR, 1923-1934, Moscow, 1972, p. 35).

20 See Lenin V. I. PSS. Vol. 45, pp. 383-384.

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The plan for reorganizing Rabkrin was adopted by the February (1923) Plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP(b)21, and then approved by the XII Party Congress. According to the decision of the congress, the party control bodies - the Central Control Committee in the center and the control commissions (CC) in the field-represented the party faction in the socialist control, determined the direction of its work (some members of the Central Control Committee and CC were also employees of the RCP), at the same time they performed their special functions to prevent a split in the party, Rabkrin exercised control over the state and economic apparatus22 . To maintain constant close communication between the CCK and the RCT, and to develop methods of joint activity, an organizational and instructional department was established .23
The central joint bodies of party and state control were headed by experienced party and state figures. V. V. Kuibyshev became the first chairman of the Central Committee and People's Commissar of the RKI in 1923, at the same time he was Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the SRT (since 1934 - chairman of the Commission of Soviet Control). In 1926, G. K. Ordzhonikidze became the head of the Central Committee and the NK RKI. In 1930-1931, the chairman of the Central Committee and People's Commissar of the RKI was A. A. Andreev. At the same time he was Deputy Chairman of the SNK. At the final stage, the activities of the joint state and party control bodies from 1932 to 1934 were supervised by Y. E. Rudzutak. R. S. Zemlyachka (1926-1931) and M. I. Ulyanova (1932-1934) were responsible for the work with letters, complaints and applications of citizens in the CCK - NK RKI.

The activities of the united bodies of party and state control (their reorganization was carried out in 1924-1925) were based on the implementation of such tasks as improving and restructuring the state apparatus, monitoring its work at all levels; selecting, arranging, and educating leading cadres from workers and peasants; studying the causes of official crimes, mismanagement, and bribery; combating bureaucracy and red tape, and the lordly disregard for workers; checking the implementation of party and government resolutions 24 . In a letter to A.D. Tsyurupa "On the restructuring of the work of the SNK, SRT and Small SNK", Lenin, in particular, wrote:: "The most fundamental drawback of the SNCOM and SRT is the lack of verification of execution. We are being dragged down by a filthy bureaucratic swamp into writing papers, talking about decrees, writing decrees, and in this sea of paper the living work is drowning. Clever saboteurs are deliberately dragging us into this paper swamp... The center of gravity of your work should be precisely this reworking of our abominably bureaucratic work, the fight against red tape and red tape, and the verification of execution. Checking the execution, checking what is actually coming out - this is your main and main task. " 25
At the First All-Union Meeting of representatives of the CC - RKI in 1924, it was emphasized that during inspections it was necessary not to find fault with trifles, not to "catch" people at their word, but to deeply study the processes in the socio-political and economic life of the country, to find ways to combat negative phenomena. 26 Kuibyshev wrote in 1925 about the need to show a creative, analytical approach to business .27 At first, Rabkrin's opponents demanded that socialist agreements should be concluded between the RCTs and the objects under review, and that no conclusions of the control commissions should be presented without the consent of the controlled organization. This method would lead to endless approvals, and the role of control would be reduced to zero. At the XVI All-Union Party Conference in 1929.-

21 See Chugunov A. I. Uk. soch., p. 36.

22 The Twelfth Congress of the RCP (b). April 17-26, 1923. Stenogr. otch. M. 1968, p. 764.

23 See Morozov L. F., Portnov V. P. Organs of the Central Executive Committee - NK RKI in the struggle for improvement of the Soviet state apparatus (1923-1934). Moscow, 1964, p. 24.

24 CPSU in resolutions and decisions of congresses, conferences and plenums of the PC. Ed. 8th Vol. 2, pp. 447-448.

25 Lenin V. I. PSS. Vol. 44, p. 364.

26 TsGAOR USSR, f. 4085, op. 1, d. 321, l. 4.

27 Khozyaistvo i upravlenie, 1925, No. 4, p. 5.

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It was written about these erroneous views: "A good word: agree, this is the easiest way, everything can be agreed, everything can be washed away, all sharp corners can be smoothed out, no one is offended... But with this approach, there will be no control, and there will be no fight against bureaucracy. " 28
The supervisory authorities have improved their activities over time. During the period of socialist industrialization, end - to-end and comprehensive inspections were born, and during the years of collectivization, various sections of the RCT in rural areas, including under rural councils, "light cavalry" (an unexpected check - "cavalry raid"), were widely developed. By 1930, all REI inspections were conducted with the participation of workers and working peasants. In 1930, in each of the territories and regions of the RSFSR, an average of 4,000 activists were employed in surveys .29 The RKI Complaints Bureau, which in January 1928 was transformed into the Joint Complaints Bureau of the NK RKI of the USSR and NK RKI of the RSFSR, had a great asset .30 Bureaus were created, starting from the counties, under the authorized RCTs. There were many people willing to participate in the work of the Complaints Bureau. In 1928 alone, 4 thousand workers ' applications were received with a request to enroll them as activists .31
Broad participation of workers, peasants and labor intelligentsia in monitoring was ensured thanks to the active action of the posts of the complaints bureau, consisting of 3 to 9 people , 32 as well as the assessors of the complaints bureau , consisting of 5 to 11 people, 33 who were elected at enterprises, institutions and rural gatherings, discussing the actions of those who were guilty. All letters and oral statements received by the bureau were studied and considered collectively, with the participation of local workers and peasants, in a short time. This practice was very effective: often the perpetrators were asked to consider their actions anywhere but in front of workers and peasants .34 Work with the complaint was considered completed only after the final solution of the issue or practical elimination of the revealed shortcomings.

By the early 1930s, there were various forms of workers ' participation in RCTs. RKI support groups were widely used, and since 1920 they were elected at industrial enterprises, and then in institutions, collective farms, state farms,and MTS. They controlled production, economic and managerial activities, and made decisions only with the consent of local RCT bodies. The important role of RCT support groups was highlighted at the July (1931) Plenum of the CCK. The report of A. A. Andreev, Chairman of the Central Committee and People's Commissar of the RKI, stated that these are "the forces, the asset with which we must carry out all the work of the KK-RKI" 35 . Unlike other mass organizations that participated in public control, the RCT assistance groups, working under its general leadership and carrying out its individual assignments, also carried out independent control.

A significant contribution to the work of party-state control was made by industrial meetings at industrial enterprises and economic commissions in institutions created almost simultaneously - in 1924. Their activities were managed by factory committees and trade union committees, and within the provinces (regions) - branch offices under the general leadership of the provincial (regional) trade union. Production meetings studied the production process with a view to rationalizing it; economic commissions resolved issues of improving the work of state institutions. Both of these forms of public participation in state and industrial activities were the connecting links between the trade unions-

28 Yakovlev Ya. A. Results and immediate tasks of the fight against bureaucracy (Report and final speech at the XVI All-Union Party Conference). Moscow, 1929, pp. 79-80.

29 TsGA RSFSR, f. 406, op. 1, d. 805, l. 6.

30 See Grekov A., Kiselev V. Experience in combating bureaucracy, Moscow, L. 1930, p. 7.

31 Ibid., p. 9.

32 See Chernyakov B., Kogan A. Face to the complaint of the worker and collective farmer. Stalingrad. 1933, pp. 25-26.

33 See Konstantinov A. P., Ivanov V. M., Zubarev V. I. Leninist traditions of Party and state control. l. 1963, p. 124.

34 Grekov A., Kiselev V. Uk. soch., p. 31.

35 III Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b). Moscow, 1931, p. 30.

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zami and RKI in improving the work of socialist industry and the management system. Initially, production meetings operated on a factory and factory scale. During the period of socialist industrialization, they were created in workshops, shifts, and teams and became the center of mass economic work at the enterprise .36 Only at 451 enterprises of the RSFSR, where 855 thousand people worked, participants in production meetings made 31 thousand rationalization proposals in 1927, 80% of which were put into production 37 .

Temporary control commissions and work teams played an important role in the activities of the RCT. The first ones were organized for a short time (no more than two weeks), consisting of three people to perform specific tasks 38, mainly related to the proposals of workers on current and prospective issues of industrial work. They were in close contact with the production commissions. During the purge of the state apparatus, the scope of activities of control commissions has significantly expanded. They organized the working masses to fight bureaucracy and red tape, to check the implementation by the state apparatus of party directives and laws of Soviet power, and headed groups and brigades of workers ' control. By participating in the purge of the state apparatus, workers had the opportunity to see for themselves the advantages and disadvantages of managers. At the same time, they were convinced that their role in the implementation of socialist transformations was extremely important. Work teams were elected at meetings of labor collectives of enterprises and performed specific tasks of the KK-RKI.

Temporary control commissions and work teams made a significant contribution to eliminating the shortcomings revealed by RCTs in production and institutions, contributed to the introduction of advanced labor methods, the struggle to improve the composition of personnel and strengthen labor discipline. Of great importance was their participation in various forms of patronage of industrial enterprises over the state apparatus, which strengthened the proletarian influence on it .39 Patronage was the best form of "permanent mass workers' control over the Soviet apparatus. " 40 It was actively used by the RCT authorities in the fight against bureaucracy and red tape, and it promoted workers to state institutions. One large enterprise could patronize a group of institutions, several small enterprises could patronize a single institution, factory workshops could patronize parts of the state apparatus, an enterprise could patronize cooperative organizations in rural areas, and there were other types of patronage .41
An important role was played by the sections of the RCT that emerged in 1923 under the local councils. They fought against the kulaks, controlled the financial and economic activities of local authorities, promoted cultural and educational work, and involved peasants in social and political life .42
Active since 1928 in the system of party and state control "light cavalry". Its detachments were created at Komsomol organizations, the RKI complaints bureau, and the Komsomol press bodies. Detachments usually appeared unexpectedly on the site, and this gave a noticeable effect. In the districts and regions, the light cavalry detachments were led by specially created headquarters, which included representatives of the RCT. "Light Cavalry" participated in checking complaints, critical materials published in the press and wall newspapers 43 . The objects of her survey were very diverse. In the 1930s and 1931s, it most often operated in the field of trade and consumer services. This was due to the penetration of class-alien elements there, the negative influence on the socialist state.-

36 Production Magazine, 1927, N 8, p. 12.

37 Ibid., p. 17.

38 Handbook of the KK - RKI employee, Moscow, l. 1932, p. 83.

39 Krasnov A.V. Kommunisticheskaya partiya - organizator shefstva rabochikh nad gosudarstvennom apparatomom (1929-1933) [The Communist Party as an organizer of patronage of workers over the state Apparatus (1929-1933)]. Voprosy istorii CPSU, 1969, No. 8, p. 101.

40 Central State Administration of the RSFSR, f. 406, op. 1, 1223, l. 16.

41 Shklovsky G., Chelyakhov N., Khayevsky M. Purge as a method of struggle for the proletarian state apparatus. In: Power of the Soviets, Moscow, 1932, p. 168-169.

42 Vladimirov N. Sections of the RKI of village councils. Moscow-L. 1930, pp. 34-39.

43 Kinzhalov F. Uk. soch., p. 144.

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They tried to inculcate the spirit of haggling, speculation, and other methods alien to the socialist system.

KK-RKI, having its own asset, maintained constant contact with various public organizations, press agencies and workers ' associations. Raids were often carried out with them. Through the press, the CC-RCTs made public the materials of inspections, taught workers the art of control, and actively influenced the elimination of the causes of revealed shortcomings.

Relying on the broad masses of working people, the CC-RCI has done a lot of work to improve the state apparatus, reduce staff, and combat bureaucracy and red tape. Solving all these issues was then a difficult task. The state apparatus lacked management experience, and effective forms of socialist management had not yet developed. The remnants of the deposed exploiting classes continued to resist, and there were not enough new qualified personnel. Those who came from the working class and the peasantry were often imbued with alien morals and habits. With the introduction of NEP, the petty-bourgeois element was revived .

Bureaucracy in the Soviet state apparatus manifested itself in various forms. But the most common ones were "excessive centralism, the replacement of planned leadership by bureaucratic guardianship, the high cost of the apparatus, which eats up hundreds of millions of rubles necessary for the development of the national economy and the rise of culture, and the official arrogant attitude of individual elements of the apparatus towards the ordinary worker and peasant."45 The bureaucrat in the Soviet institution often acted secretly and cunningly, skillfully created the appearance of a deep interest in the work, in the destinies of the working people, and at the same time drowned the living cause, the real concern for the people of labor, in papers, unfulfilled promises, flattered, pleased his superiors, and tried to strengthen his position in all ways: he used power for personal enrichment, he created special conditions for himself and people who pleased him, promoted them in the service not on the basis of business and moral qualities, but on the basis of kinship, friendly relations, etc. 46 .

Sycophancy and obsequiousness became a dangerous habit for both the boss and the subordinate. "Some of our young people who don't know how to work properly yet, instead of choosing a real non-partisan asset, choose sycophants who would listen to them, who would be inferior to themselves. He himself is worthless and chooses even worse than himself, " G. K. Ordzhonikidze said in a report to the XV Moscow Provincial Party Conference in 1927.47 In the surveyed institutions of the Kaluga and Novgorod regions, the average duration of the movement of cases was 19 months 48 . To fulfill the order of the NKPS to transfer 19 locomotives to Turksib by the Tomsk Railway, it was necessary to send 19 instructions, which took several months .49
The persistence of bureaucracy was facilitated by the discrepancy between the cultural level of workers and peasants assigned to the state and economic apparatus and the task of socialist reconstruction of society, their inexperience, the working methods and customs of officials of the pre-revolutionary apparatus, who made up a significant percentage of employees in the first years of Soviet power, the imperfection of the state apparatus, the bulkiness of its structure, "glavkizm", excessive centralization, management equipment and document management support (accounting, reporting). "As long as the administrative apparatus exists as such, i.e., as an organization that stands out from the rest of the mass of citizens and is engaged in certain production processes (factory worker, peasant, handicraftsman, etc.)," it was said at the March (1928) Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b), " as long as the danger of separation remains this apparatus depends on the masses; to a greater or lesser extent, certain manifestations of bureaucracy will be possible in it (isolation within its own bureau, attempts to monopolize the functions of the head of state in its own hands).-

44 Morozov L. F., Portnov V. P. Sotsialisticheskiy kontrol ' v SSSR [Socialist Control in the USSR], p. 51.

45 CPSU in resolutions, vol. 3, p. 487.

46 TsGAOR USSR, f. 374, op. 2, 21, l. 39.

47 Ordzhonikidze G. K. Articles and Speeches, vol. 2, p. 37.

48 Tekhnika upravleniya, 1926, No. 11, p. 13.

49 Baevsky B. How to deal with bureaucracy, Moscow, 1929, p. 15.

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a formal attitude to business, an inattentive attitude to the needs of the population, especially to those who are less influential in this world, who come to the institution as a "supplicant", to the store as a buyer, etc.) " 50 .

Bureaucracy and red tape have not been eliminated even today, although their nature has changed: there is no element of class hostility in them now, since there is no class that would try to weaken the Soviet state apparatus and turn back history with the help of bureaucracy and red tape; however, the forms and methods of modern bureaucracy have similarities with the old ones, and the harm from them is considerable. Among similar forms: recruitment of personnel not based on business and moral qualities, but on kinship and friendly characteristics; use of official position for personal purposes; substitution of living leadership by writing papers; postscript in reports. Taking into account these and other circumstances, the Communist Party pays unflagging attention to the fight against bureaucracy and red tape, actively using the control bodies and the broad masses of workers for this purpose, and makes public the revealed shortcomings without fear of being misunderstood.

Mr. K Ordzhonikidze spoke about this at the xvth Party Congress , 51 and the leaders of the Communist Party and the Soviet Government still speak about it today. "An integral part of socialist democracy, the norm of all public life, is glasnost," it was pointed out at the All-Union Scientific and Practical Conference "Improving developed socialism and the ideological work of the party in the light of the decisions of the June (1983) Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU" on December 10, 1984. " Broad, timely and frank information is evidence of trust in people, respect for their minds and feelings, the ability to understand certain events for themselves. It raises the activity of workers. Transparency in the work of party and state bodies is an effective means of combating bureaucratic distortions, obliges a more thoughtful approach to decision-making and organizing control over their implementation, correcting shortcomings and omissions. " 52 An active and open struggle against bureaucracy and red tape strengthens the workers ' faith in Soviet power, in the strength of the Communist Party, its ideas and concrete decisions.

In the 20s and 30s, the most effective method of combating bureaucracy was to improve the state apparatus in such areas as improving the structure, accounting, reporting, and office management; reducing staff; increasing responsibility for the assigned task; replacing incapable employees with advanced workers and peasants; and bringing officials to strict responsibility for bureaucracy and red tape, regardless of social status. cultural revolution; preparation of the working masses for administration; constant monitoring of the activities of the administration.

Following the instructions of the party to improve the state apparatus, the control bodies at first focused on studying the general state of local Soviet, land and cooperative bodies, as they were just being created; they solved the main issues of strengthening the dictatorship of the proletariat, complex agricultural problems, and approved new forms of relations between the city and the countryside, the working class and the peasantry. Only in some cases have proposals been developed to improve the structure of local authorities and their staff. With the transition to socialist industrialization, the CC-RCTs became more thoroughly engaged in improving the state and economic apparatus. At the end of 1925-beginning of 1926, the State Institute of Control Technology (ITU) and special commissions in the center and in the field were established under the NK RKI for this purpose. With their participation, the number of institutions and staff was significantly reduced as early as 1927. In particular, the number of credit agencies decreased from 1,434 to 1,174, i.e. by 260 units, and their staff-by 3 thousand employees, which gave the state an annual savings of about 8 million rubles .53 On the recommendation of the supervisory authorities, 101 exchanges out of 115 were reduced

50 TsGAOR USSR, f. 374, op. 2, d. 9, l. 61; Chugunov A. I. Uk. soch., p. 185.

51 Cm. Ordzhonikidze G. K. O rabote TsKK - RKI [On the work of the Central Committee-RKI]. Vol. 2, pp. 67-69, 89-95.

52 Gorbachev M. S. Zhivoe tvorchestvo naroda [Living creativity of the people]. Moscow, 1984, p. 30.

53 Khozyaistvo i upravlenie, 1927, N 11-12, pp. 35-38.

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(having played a useful role in their time, they began to duplicate the functions of other institutions.) This resulted in savings of 11.5 million rubles 54 . A lot of work on staff reduction was carried out in the Union republics. In Uzbekistan, the central office of the republic was reduced in budget by 27.4% in the same year55 .

When improving the state apparatus, the CCCC-NC RCI and its local bodies paid great attention to improving office management, accounting and reporting. In the first half of 1925 alone, the NK RKI conducted a special survey in 145 institutions. Its materials noted the cumbersomeness, complexity of accounting and reporting, and non-compliance with the requirements of the socialist system of economic management. Uralmetal's financial statements, for example, were 9459 pages long. In six departments of the People's Commissariat of Education during the same time, 52 thousand outgoing and 64 thousand incoming documents were registered 56 . In cumbersome reports, the final information about the work of enterprises, transport, and various institutions was lost. In the textile industry, for example, according to the reports of enterprises, the profit for 1925 amounted to 132293 thousand rubles, according to the Supreme Economic Council - only 76537 thousand rubles, according to the People's Commissariat of Finance-160558 thousand rubles, and according to the survey of local CC - RKI-122 million rubles .57 This and other inspections of the control bodies made it possible to make concrete proposals for reducing in 1927 the reporting on Gostorg of the RSFSR by 75%, on Centrosoyuz-by 81.7%, on the People's Commissariat of Finance-by 80%, etc. 58 . Office work and documentation support of the department were streamlined.

However, record keeping and documentation of management activities were improved slowly and with great difficulties. 10 years of work of the CC-RKI in this area confirmed Lenin's conclusions about significant conservatism in office management. "In the whole sphere of social, economic and political relations," Vladimir Ilyich pointed out, "we are' terribly ' revolutionary. But in the sphere of reverence, observance of the forms and rites of office work, our "revolutionism" is often replaced by the most musty routine. Here, more than once, one can observe the most interesting phenomenon, how in social life the greatest leap forward is combined with a monstrous timidity before the smallest changes. " 59 Even today, the struggle against the paper billow, the abundance of instructions, regulations, and methods that substitute for real work and arbitrarily interpret the decisions of the party and Government, has not yet been removed from the agenda. The decision of the April (1985) Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU 60 speaks of the need to sharply limit them . At large industrial enterprises, only organizational and administrative documentation and internal correspondence reach 500 thousand originals per year, and with copies-about 2 million units of documents, a little more than 30% is taken on centralized accounting, and only about 4% is controlled 61 . While the Communist Party resolutely opposes the publication of unnecessary papers, it does not fight against documents as such; it is only a matter of regulating their handling.

Progress in improving the structure, forms and methods of work of state and economic bodies was more significant in the 20s and 30s. With the active participation of the CC-RKI, instead of six or seven structural divisions of the People's commissariats (main directorate, directorate, department, sub-department, department and reference table), only three (management or department, sub-department, department or production)were introduced62 . Changes were also made to the functions and management methods. Some institutions had a linear management system, while others had a functional one. Surveys have shown that the linear system was not rational. Departments,

54 Two years of work of the CCK-RKI of the USSR, Moscow, 1927, p. 69.

55 Atalzhanov A. R. Uk. soch., p. 112.

56 TsGA RSFSR, f. 406, op. 1, d. 580, l. 64.

57 Cm. Ordzhonikidze G. K. Articles and Speeches, vol. 2, p. 10.

58 TsGAOR USSR, f. 5446, op. 8, d. 83, ll. 3-6.

59 Lenin V. I. PSS. Vol. 45, p. 400.

60 Proceedings of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU. April 23, 1985. Moscow, 1985, p. 12.

61 Problems of documentation support for managing and maintaining a Unified system of organizational and administrative documentation. Vilnius, 1985, pp. 14-15.

62 TsGAOR USSR, f. 374, op. 2, d. 37, l. 118.

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those who were subordinate to the departments, although they formally had a certain range of tasks, in fact, were not independent in their solution and did not bear full responsibility for their implementation. They were waiting for instructions from the departments. In turn, the departments were not sufficiently independent. Such a system created parallelism, swollen staff, depersonalized performers, and constrained their creative initiative. The functional management system was built on the basis of personal responsibility of each performer and manager for a specific area of work. At the same time, they themselves determined the methods of specific activities. Such a system ensured the maximum specialization of each level and employee, which contributed to a more qualified statement of the case, introduced a strict principle of consistency in the work process, eliminated intermediate links and thereby brought the manager closer to the direct performer, made it possible to combine unity of command and collegiality. The functional method of management allowed simplifying the structure of administrative and economic bodies, and reducing the number of employees by 30-50%. 63
The KK - RKI bodies devoted a great deal of time to criticizing the judicial fuss, the enthusiasm of which caused great concern to the party. In eight institutions of the Murom district of the Vladimir Region alone, 250 plenums, meetings, meetings, and commissions were held during the first eight months of 1930, according to the materials of the RKI audit. They considered 1,400 questions and spent 1,300 hours on this task .64 Revealing the danger of the elements of endless meetings and resolutions, A. A. Andreev, speaking at the third plenum of the Central Committee, declared that this is "the most powerful element", and emphasized how much "this judicial system saves and hides bureaucrats, officials who are not capable of leading people" 65 .

The CCC - NC RCI and their local bodies did a lot of useful work in implementing the party's personnel policy. They paid special attention to the business, moral and political qualities, and social origin of cadres. The first surveys showed that in the countryside hostile classes infiltrated the organs of Soviet power in various ways and conducted counter-revolutionary activities under their "roof". In 1927, according to the materials of the control bodies, 6% of the members of local Soviets came from the kulaks66 . Urgent measures were taken to strengthen the volost and village councils. At the same time, the training of workers for working in the state apparatus was strengthened. Promotion began to unfold: advanced workers were carefully trained to perform certain managerial functions.

In total, 33.4% of all nominees were sent to state institutions in the country in 192767 . There were not many of them in the central and provincial government bodies, since more than half of those sent there were very soon transferred to grassroots institutions or returned to enterprises. Some were unable to cope with their duties because they lacked professional training and leadership experience, especially in the prosecutor's offices, banks, and the public education system; but many left because the old officials created difficult, sometimes unbearable conditions for the nominees. In this regard, the XV Conference of the CPSU (b) adopted a decision on securing nominees. It stated :" To wage a determined struggle against the resistance to the nomination system from bureaucratically rigid and inappropriate elements in the state and household apparatuses, systematically replacing these elements with the most capable, culturally and politically advanced workers. " 68
In the state and economic apparatus, it was recommended to nominate only hereditary workers-activists who had at least 10 years of work experience, who had shown themselves in the struggle for the implementation of the party's policy, and who had completed a mandatory course of theoretical training and practical training within the framework of the State and Economic Administration.

63 TsGA RSFSR, f. 406, op. 11, d. 979, l. 3.

64 For pace, quality, and verification, 1931, N 4-5 from 28-29

65 Pravda, 18. VII. 1931.

66 TsGAOR USSR, f. 374, op. 3, d. 59, l. 216.

67 Ibid., op. 2, d. 37, l. 223.

68 CPSU in resolutions, vol. 3, p. 394.

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your intended position. Promotion was under constant control of the CC-RCT. Nominees were discussed at working meetings and in party cells. In 1929-1930 alone, 12,000 workers were promoted and assigned to positions in institutions across the country .69 The Communist Party's measures to strengthen the state apparatus made it healthier, but they did not fully solve this difficult problem, although the necessary cadres of workers and peasants were trained to work in institutions.

There were still hostile and bureaucratic elements in the State and economic apparatus that disrupted the normal rhythm of the institution's work .70 It was necessary to get rid of them. The commissions created to clean the apparatus and worked under the leadership of the CC-RKI were selected ideologically hardened, crystal-clear honest people .71 In accordance with the decisions of the XVI Party Conference, 72 the purge was carried out in three directions: the dismissal of counter-revolutionary, decayed and bureaucratized elements from state and economic bodies; the involvement of workers and peasants in institutions; the restructuring of the entire structure of government bodies and bringing them closer to the specific cause and the working masses .73 Former criminals, socially hostile elements (former landlords, capitalists, gendarmes, policemen, ministers of religious cults), persons found guilty of bureaucracy (saboteurs, careerists, sycophants, pleasers, dignitaries, employees who treated workers rudely, etc.), a certain contingent of former officials (mainly employees of the government) were dismissed. those who held positions of responsibility before the revolution), are professionally unfit employees. At the same time, it was forbidden to dismiss children and relatives of former socially hostile elements, as well as officials, from the office only on the grounds of past social affiliation.

In addition to the main task of improving the state apparatus and verifying its activities, as well as the broad involvement of the working masses in the administration of the state, the control bodies carried out great work in the field of scientific organization of labor, improving the material and living conditions of the working class, socialist transformation of the countryside, the formation and development of Soviet trade, Special and departmental control bodies also carried out useful work in those years. The Transport and Communications Inspectorate and the Naval Inspectorate worked particularly well.

The general principles of organizing the work of the Workers 'and Peasants' Inspection, as well as ways to combat various shortcomings in the work of the state and economic apparatus in the 1920s and early 1930s, are of undoubted interest to the people's control bodies even today. We are not talking about the mechanical transfer of past experience, in particular, the study of the causes of the sustainability of some negative processes in the activities of the state and economic apparatus, the development and practical application of measures to prevent negative phenomena in management institutions, but about its creative use.

Long-term practice has confirmed the need for unflagging control over the strict implementation by all institutions of the decisions of the party and government, as well as the laws of Soviet power. Loosening of control in this area or formalism leads to serious negative consequences in the economic, political and social spheres, especially in the current conditions of accelerating development of Soviet society. It is no coincidence that these issues are now the focus of the CPSU's attention. They were discussed at the March and April (1985) Plenums of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the meeting of the Central Committee of the CPSU on scientific and technological progress on June 10-11, 198574 . At this meeting, attention was drawn to the need to strengthen control over scientific developments and their implementation in practice. It was stated that the control

69 TsGAOR USSR, f. 374, op. 1, d. 571, l. 60.

70 Kalinin M. I. O chistke sovetskogo apparata [On the purge of the Soviet apparatus], pp. 3-4, 6, 18.

71 TsGAOR USSR, f. 374, op. 1, d. 571, l. 3.

72 CPSU in resolutions, vol. 4, pp. 227-229.

73 TsGA RSFSR, f. 406, op. 3, d. 9796, l. 60.

74 Pravda, 12. VI. 1985.

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The State Committee for Science and Technology should be responsible for monitoring the scientific and technical level of all branches of production.

The experience of the socialist control of the 20s and 30s in improving the structure of the state and economic apparatus, clarifying its functions and tasks is relevant. It shows that the late detection of any defects in the state and economic apparatus leads to serious failures of the entire mechanism of management, life and activity of a socialist society. Today, in the context of the perestroika of the state and economic apparatus, the role of socialist control is significantly increasing. Experience shows that it should be carried out both in the field of checking the precise implementation of the decisions of the party and the government to restructure the management apparatus, and identifying the causes of possible failures in order to correct the situation in a timely and painless manner. The experience of socialist control in implementing the party's personnel policy is of great importance: studying the political, business, and moral qualities of employees of the administrative apparatus in practical matters, their ability to make decisions in a qualified, timely and competent manner, combine collegial principles and personal responsibility in solving issues, arrange subordinates taking into account their individuality, and educate them to be principled and socialist enterprising and the spirit of teamwork, to see and adequately encourage everything new and advanced, to strive for constant improvement of efficiency in work at any site. In this important matter, many methods have been tested. It is known which of them gave positive results, and which ones were not high enough. Repeating the mistakes of the past is the result of either ignorance of such experience, or inability, and sometimes unwillingness, to put it into practice.

Considerable experience of socialist control has been accumulated in the fight against bureaucracy and red tape. As the history of socialist construction shows, they are quite flexible and inventive, but the essence and forms of their manifestation in the past and now have a lot in common. Bureaucracy and red tape find fertile ground when the fight against them is weakened, when control is carried out either formally or limited to stating facts without proper concrete measures of influence. In these cases, bureaucracy and red tape also draw into their orbit those who, in an environment of demanding and effective control, would not allow the substitution of bureaucratic perversions for real business - most often these are young inexperienced cadres. One of the most effective measures to combat bureaucracy was and still is glasnost.

The experience of control in the 1920s and early 30s is of great importance in choosing various forms and methods of involving the working masses in its activities. This includes taking into account the creativity of the masses, taking initiative and striving to avoid mistakes, instilling a sense of ownership in the workers and peasants, and using the wisdom of the people in the interests of socialist construction. In preparing for the XXVII Party Congress, the CPSU consults widely with the people, and together develops a strategy for the twelfth five-year plan, aimed at radically turning the economy to methods of intensive development, and at comprehensively increasing the role of the working masses in all spheres of life and activity of socialist society.

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