P. B. KAMENNOV

Candidate of Political Sciences

Far East Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences

Keywords: China, defense modernization program, arms exporter, arms importer, growth of military-industrial complex capabilities, growth of export potential, import dependence, Russian-Chinese military-technical cooperation

China's position on the global arms market is determined by the policy of the country's leadership in the field of military construction, the growing production capabilities of the Chinese military-industrial complex and the rather high competitiveness of its products in terms of "price-quality" compared to the countries of the European Union. An important advantage of China, in comparison with other exporters, is non-interference in the foreign and domestic policies of the recipient countries of Chinese weapons.

The XVIII CPC Congress held in November 2012 confirmed the commitment to implement the national defense modernization program adopted in 2006, which includes three stages: until 2010 - the creation of the fundamental foundations of transformation (this stage has been successfully completed. - author's note); until 2020-achieving overall progress in the main areas of modernization; until 2050-achieving mainly the strategic goal of creating an informatized armed forces capable of successfully operating in wars using information technology ¹.

The main content of the program at the current (second) stage is: informatization and computerization of the ground forces and navy forces, strengthening the combat capabilities of the People's Liberation Army of China by improving the effectiveness of interaction between the armed forces and branches of the armed forces in joint operations. The ultimate goal is to create an armed force capable of effectively carrying out nuclear deterrence, successfully operating in a modern high-tech war on a local scale, as well as in conducting anti - terrorist operations.

The development of the military-industrial complex is considered by the Chinese leadership as the most important component of China's strategy in the field of military security.

At the same time, it is meant that preventive measures of a political, diplomatic and military nature aimed at creating favorable conditions around China should be combined with a course to improve the quality parameters of the defense potential based on science and advanced technologies.²

According to the program document "China's Military Strategy", which was first published in China in May 2015, the strategic concept of "active defense in the new conditions" is supposed to accelerate the modernization of national defense and the armed forces in order to ensure success in conducting local-scale computer-based wars.³ The range of tasks of the armed forces in the spatial dimension is significantly expanded and includes not only the protection of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country along the perimeter of borders, but also ensuring security on the seas, in the oceans, in the air, space and electronic information spaces.

Accordingly, the development of the Chinese military-industrial complex is carried out in the direction of creating an innovative system of science and technology that integrates military and civilian scientific and technological resources, including basic scientific research and research and development (R & D). The ultimate goal of designing and manufacturing military and civilian products is to create such an effective structure that would allow the use of high technologies for military and civilian purposes in the interests of both the defense and civilian sectors.⁴

To fulfill the above-mentioned tasks, the Ministry of Industry and Informatization was created in 2008, which, in particular, is subordinate to the newly formed Department of Defense Science, Technology and Industry. At the same time, the corresponding former structures - the State Committee for Defense Science, Technology and Industry, the Ministry of Informatics and the Office of the State Council for Informatization-ceased to exist.⁵

Currently, the economic aspects of military-industrial corporations are under the control of the State-Owned Assets Supervision & Administration Commission (SASAC) of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, ⁶ while the military areas are under the control of the Defense Science, Technology and Industry Department of the Ministry of Industry and Informatization.⁷

The policy of increasing the capabilities of the Chinese military-industrial complex to produce state-of-the-art weapons found new confirmation in the materials of the 3rd session of the 12th National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China held in March 2015; the report of Premier Li Keqiang on the work of the government in 2014 indicated the need to " ... significantly new high-tech types of weapons, to ensure the development of defense science, technology and the military-industrial complex " ⁸.

In the context of the continuing embargo on the export of dual-use (military and civilian) technologies from EU countries to China, much attention is being paid to measures aimed at deepening such functions of the military-industrial complex for the production of military and civilian products

products that would simultaneously promote access to advanced foreign technologies.

The current stage in the military-industrial complex is characterized by the active development of the latest methods of designing and developing military equipment using electronic systems, the modular principle, and standardization. The experimental base is being rapidly improved, as well as quality control systems for individual parts and components of weapons and military equipment, as well as for the assembly of the product as a whole, which can significantly improve the quality of products.

Foreign investment in some basic sectors of the Chinese economy, such as metallurgy, electronics, and others, contributes to creating favorable conditions for the modernization of the defense industry and dual-use industries. Currently, many joint ventures (with foreign capital) in China produce electronic components used in missile control systems, radio equipment, communications equipment, and military computers.⁹

Today, China's position on the global arms market is determined by the ability of the Chinese military-industrial complex to implement programs for the production of weapons and military equipment in almost all sectors of the military-industrial complex, including high-precision weapons, and at the same time-the continued dependence of many programs on the supply of critical components from abroad, such as aircraft engines for fighter It should be noted that with the growth rate of defense spending observed in recent years faster than the economy (for example, in 2015, official military spending increased by 10.1% to $145 billion, ¹¹ while GDP growth will be 7% ¹²), China's lag in the relevant areas of military technology can be overcome for 10-15 years.

NEW MARKETS, LARGE VOLUMES

In recent years, China has significantly strengthened its position in the global arms market. As an exporter, China, relying on the modernized research and production base of the military-industrial complex, which makes it possible to produce weapons and military equipment approaching world quality standards, is increasing its efforts to expand the geography and increase the volume of Chinese-made weapons supplies: 1992-2000 - $7 billion (Pakistan, Iran); 2001-2005 - $5 billion (Pakistan, Kuwait, Latin America and Africa); 2006-2012 - $14 billion (Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru, Indonesia)¹³.

According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), in 2010-2014, 60 states were involved in the supply of weapons and military equipment, but the bulk of deliveries are carried out by five countries. The five largest arms suppliers - the United States, Russia, China, Germany and France-supply 74% of all products on the international market. Overall sales of the top five companies have grown by 14% over the past 5 years; Chinese exports have grown by 143% to reach $7.162 billion, which has allowed China to increase its share of the international market from 3% to 5%. In the overall supplier ranking for 2010-2014, China rose to 3rd place, surpassing Germany and France.

China supplies its products to 35 countries (18 of them are African countries), with three buyers accounting for 68%: Pakistan receives about 41% of Chinese arms exports, Bangladesh - 16%, Myanmar - 12% ¹⁴. China's main exports include small arms, mortars, WZ-551 armored personnel carriers, IFVs, and MBT-2000 tanks; rocket and artillery systems;portable air defense systems; Y-8 and Y-12 aircraft; and K-8 ^{combat training aircraft}.

In Asia, the largest recipient of Chinese weapons is Pakistan. In addition to purchasing military equipment, Pakistan participates in numerous joint military-industrial programs with China. The largest of them include such projects as:

- joint development and production in China (at the factory in Chengdu, prov. Sichuan)FC-1 light fighters (Pakistani designation - JH-17 Thunder);

- joint production of K-8 jet combat training aircraft;

- Joint development and production of the Al Khalid main tank in Pakistan (based on the Chinese Type 90-II tank (MW-2000, which is a modified copy of the Soviet T-72 tank);

- licensed construction of the F-22P project frigate in Karachi using Chinese technology.

China-Pakistan cooperation on various missile programs is very extensive. Along with this, Pakistan is a source of some Western military technology for China.¹⁶

Particularly noteworthy is the increase in the supply of Chinese weapons and military equipment (IWT) to Latin America and Africa. China's proposals for military-technical cooperation (MTC) in these countries often serve as part of a package of economic, trade, scientific and technical assistance, which is especially attractive for underdeveloped countries. China is trying to present itself to developing countries as a "non-Western", "alternative" power.

In Latin America, the main buyers of Chinese weapons are Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia, which are unable to purchase weapons and military equipment from Western states due to obstacles from Washington. The beginning of cooperation with Venezuela can be attributed to 2008, when a contract was signed for the supply of 40 K-8 * combat training aircraft from China. In 2010, a contract was signed for the supply of 8 Y-8 military transport aircraft, radars, and equipment for command and control systems from China to Venezuela.

Ecuador also buys aircraft and radars from China: two MA-60 transport planes were ordered in 2006, two radars were ordered in 2009, and two radars were ordered in August 2010. Ecuador has expressed its intention to purchase an additional four radars.

* Light attack aircraft with the Ukrainian AI-25TLK engine.

In 2009-2011, a number of similar deals for the supply of Chinese weapons were concluded with Bolivia.

An extensive market for Chinese arms exports is Brazil, whose economic and political weight in global politics is steadily growing, which implies an increase in the country's military power. Here, China has long-standing bilateral ties, a nearly forty-year history of partnership in the field of nuclear technology, and a common program for the study of the Universe, which launched five artificial Earth satellites (AES) for monitoring natural resources into low - Earth orbit (the last one was on December 7, 2014). A major success of China was the contract for the construction of an oceanographic vessel "Letal de Oliveira" for the Brazilian Navy, which was performed in March 2015. ¹⁷

When selling weapons, China provides Latin American countries with special financial conditions, including, as a rule, 100% export financing and concessional lending with an interest rate of about 2% for a period of 20-25 years. Sometimes this is a crucial factor in choosing an arms supplier for a number of Latin American countries that are experiencing certain financial difficulties due to the limited defense budget.

Among the factors that make it difficult for China to enter the arms market of Latin American countries, we can mention the close institutional ties of many of them with the United States, including the isolation of the existing military infrastructure on American and European weapons. Doubts about the quality of Chinese weapons also play an important role ¹⁸.

To expand arms exports to African countries, China actively uses a number of objective prerequisites, including:

- not only moral, but also physical obsolescence of a significant part of military equipment in the general fleet of African states. At the same time, only South Africa and partly Egypt, Algeria and Nigeria have the ability to independently strengthen the material and technical base of their Armed Forces. The armed forces of other African countries are mostly equipped with military equipment supplied from abroad;

- insufficient effectiveness of national military R & D;

- the lack of programs for the introduction of high military technologies in the African region, although in some countries (South Africa) there is a fairly developed defense industry;

- maintaining inter-state and inter-ethnic contradictions in a number of states in the region, conducting counterinsurgency operations, which requires equipping the armed forces with modern weapons in order to increase their combat readiness;

- the realization by some leaders of African states that without sufficient combat readiness of their armies, it is difficult to pursue an independent or at least balanced policy towards major Western countries;

- the desire of a number of countries in the region to participate in the creation of peacekeeping forces, which requires strengthening and re-equipping local armed forces;

- the willingness of the leadership of some countries in the region to provide valuable mineral resources (diamonds, bauxite, etc.) as payment for the received weapons;

- in recent years, the overall economic performance of some countries in the region has improved (first of all, economic growth indicators, lower inflation, and growth in foreign exchange reserves) and their ability to pay more in terms of purchasing weapons and military equipment.

China exports weapons and military equipment to Zimbabwe, Sudan, Zambia, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Uganda, Tanzania, and Madagascar, while the strongest positions of China are noted in Tanzania, Nigeria, and Zambia19, i.e. in countries that are sources of mineral raw materials (Tanzania and Zambia) and energy resources (Nigeria).

Official data on China's military exports are not published. It was only in 2006 that China started submitting data to the UN Register of Conventional Weapons, but these reports, according to analysts of the Russian Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, are incomplete, meaningless and formal in nature.

According to Vasily Kashin, editor of the Moscow Defense Brief magazine and an expert at the Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, two main factors contribute to strengthening China's position in the global arms market: the overall growth in the technical level of Chinese military products and the expansion of export geography. In recent years, China has not only significantly strengthened its presence in the Middle East and Latin America, expanded beyond its traditional markets (previously, almost half of Chinese exports came from Pakistan), but also began to offer increasingly sophisticated weapons systems, including long-range anti-aircraft missile systems, modern artillery, and precision weapons. As China's political weight grows, more and more countries are turning to it for weapons for purely political reasons as well.²⁰

ALSO UKRAINE...

Due to Kiev's intention to re-equip the Ukrainian armed forces by purchasing inexpensive but modern military equipment, China may become the main partner in the future in re-equipping the Ukrainian army, which already has close ties with Ukraine in the field of military-technical cooperation. So far, Beijing has purchased engines for combat training aircraft and warships, protection systems for main battle tanks and engines for them from Ukraine; it has invited Ukrainian specialists to participate in the program for creating a new military transport aircraft. It is possible that soon China itself will start supplying weapons systems to Ukraine. Earlier, it was reported that Kiev is considering the possibility of purchasing Chinese L-15 combat training aircraft with installed engines manufactured by Motor Sich. The Ukrainian military is also actively exploring the capabilities of Chinese air defense systems.

The main areas of cooperation between Kiev and Beijing may be the purchase of such highly competitive Chinese military products as aviation equipment, anti-aircraft missile systems, engines for trucks and heavy vehicles.

vehicles, battlefield intelligence and surveillance systems, and unmanned aerial vehicles. At the same time, it is worth noting that, unlike the EU countries, Beijing is ready to provide a long-term loan for the supplied equipment and conduct mutual settlements in commodity form. The system of natural commodity exchange, in which one product is exchanged for another without monetary payment, which previously worked in trade between Russia and Ukraine, is also quite suitable for China, which is interested in supplying food and other resources it needs from Ukraine. In recent years, China has been using Ukraine to circumvent Russia's intellectual property rights in aviation and missile technologies.

For China, the supply of weapons to Ukraine may open up opportunities to enter the European market and gain access to military technologies and developments of Ukraine in exchange for aircraft and anti-aircraft installations.²¹

A distinctive feature of China's military-technical cooperation with foreign countries is its focus on developing countries in Asia, Africa, and more recently Latin America. The low price continues to play a key role for the most underdeveloped and poor countries in purchasing Chinese weapons. In addition, there has recently been a tendency on the part of a number of States to resort to military purchases in China for the purpose of political diversification. For this reason, the number of importers of Chinese weapons included such financially prosperous countries as Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, as well as Turkey, Algeria and Nigeria. There are prospects for the promotion of Chinese military products to Indonesia, Malaysia and a number of other countries with significant funds.²²

The main export items to these countries are small arms and artillery weapons and ammunition, mortars, anti - tank weapons, anti-personnel mines, man-portable air defense systems, military vehicles and, to a lesser extent, armored vehicles, transport aircraft, helicopters, patrol boats. However, as noted above, China is making vigorous efforts to expand the range of exported military equipment.

To promote its products, China actively uses the constant demand for them due to the ongoing armed conflicts. An important factor for the leadership of these states, which is favorable for the development of relations with China in this area, is non - interference in their internal affairs and the absence of political demands from China, which pursues its own purely pragmatic goals-economic benefits and ensuring access to sources of raw materials.

RUSSIAN-CHINESE MILITARY COOPERATION

While strengthening its position as an exporter on the global arms market, China remains one of the largest arms importers, ranking 3rd in the world in terms of imports in 2010-2014 (after India and Saudi Arabia).²³.

The main supplier of weapons and military equipment to China is Russia. This area is based on the provisions of the Russian-Chinese intergovernmental Agreement on Military-Technical Cooperation, signed on November 24, 1992, and the Memorandum of Understanding between the Governments of Russia and China on Military-Technical Cooperation of December 18, 1992. In accordance with the Agreement, a Russian-Chinese commission on military-technical cooperation was formed, which meets once a year in Moscow and Beijing alternately. An important step in the development of bilateral military relations between Russia and China was taken on November 11, 1993, when the parties signed an Agreement on military cooperation between the Ministries of Defense of the two countries.

The legal basis for Russian-Chinese relations was the signing in Moscow on July 16, 2001 by the President of the Russian Federation and the President of the People's Republic of China of the Treaty on Good-Neighborliness, Friendship and Cooperation, which covers all the main areas and directions of bilateral cooperation and is concluded for 20 years with the possibility of automatic extension for the next five-year periods. In accordance with the Treaty, Russia and China have committed themselves to develop equal partnership and strategic cooperation on a long-term basis, including in the military sphere. ²⁴

In the 1990s, the volume of Chinese purchases of Russian weapons and military equipment, as well as licenses for their production, averaged about $1 billion per year; in 2004, the total volume of purchases, taking into account implemented and ongoing contracts, exceeded $2 billion.²⁵

For the period from 1992 to 2002 China purchased: for the ground forces - a batch of guided artillery shells "Krasnopol-M" (1000 units); for the Air Force-76 Su-27 fighters, 76 multi-purpose Su-30MKK fighters, 1200 short-range air-to-air missiles, 300 AL-31FN aircraft engines (for the fighter "Jian-10" Chinese design), long-range anti-aircraft missile systems S-300P/MPU-1, S-300P/PMH-2; short-range anti-aircraft missile systems "Tor-M1" ; for the Navy - 12 diesel-electric submarines (including project 877EKM - 2 units, project 636-10 units), 4 destroyers of the Sovremenniy type, 28 Su-30MK2 multirole sea fighters, a batch of 3M-80E Moskit cruise missiles (for the Sovremenniy EM). In addition, China has acquired licenses for the production of 200 Su-27 fighter jets and Krasnopol-M guided artillery projectiles.²⁶ At the end of 2005, a major contract was signed for the supply of ³⁸ IL-76MD and Il-78MK aircraft from Russia to China in 2006-2010, as well as 240 aircraft engines for them27.

Thanks to the design documentation received from Russia for the Su-27SK fighter, licensed production of the Su-27SK under the designation "Jian-11" (J-11) has been organized in Shenyang (China) since 1998. In addition, this documentation, combined with the prototype T-10K (Su-33) aircraft received from Ukraine, made it easier for the PRC to create the Jian-15 (J-15) carrier-based fighter.

In 2010, Russia fulfilled a contract to supply China with 15 divisions of S-300 surface-to-air missile systems. We deliver to China-

There were also short-and medium-range air defense systems and complexes such as the Tor, Buk, and Tunguska ²⁸.

These purchases have enabled China to begin re-equipping its air force, navy, and air defense forces, as well as modernizing its military-industrial complex, with the ultimate goal of enhancing its defense capabilities in a new historical environment characterized by the increasing importance of high-tech in a possible war.

PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

At the same time, since 2006, military-technical cooperation between the two countries has faced a number of problems and has acquired a tendency to decline. First of all, the range of military equipment imported by China has been reduced. In 1992-2006, almost half of Russia's arms exports went to China. In 2007, there were changes - 28% of arms exports went to India, and 21% to China; new contracts concluded with China accounted for only 6%.

One of the reasons for this decline is that more than 10 years earlier, China had already purchased large quantities of Russian weapons and in some areas reached saturation with them. But this is also due to the fact that the quality of weapons supplied from Russia left much to be desired - these were samples created in Soviet times. Other problems include the question raised by Beijing about improving the technological level of military-technical products offered to China, as well as the question raised by Moscow about protecting the rights to Russian intellectual property.²⁹

These issues were discussed at the 13th meeting of the Russian-Chinese Joint Intergovernmental commission on Military-Technical Cooperation, held in Beijing in December 2008, which ended with the signing of two documents, including an Agreement on the Protection of Intellectual Property.³⁰ Nevertheless, unlicensed copying of Russian military equipment by the Chinese has not stopped, as evidenced by the production of the Jian-15 (J-15) carrier-based fighter, which is a copy of the Russian Su-33 aircraft, which became known at the end of 2009, as well as the release of the second batch of Jian-NV (J-11B) fighters.)- an analog of the Su-27 ³¹. Finally, the period after 2006 was marked by attempts by China, relying on the increased capabilities of the military-industrial complex, to master the production of modern weapons on its own.

There were also problems in the field of joint weapons development, which was particularly evident in the fact that China did not receive an offer from Russia to participate in the development of a fifth-generation fighter, while India received an official invitation.

According to Chinese analysts, this is due to the fact that there are disagreements in Russia on this issue. Russian military-industrial enterprises and design bureaus were in favor of China's participation, since it has quite adequate financial, personnel and military-technical base. However, some of the Russian military sees China as a potential threat to Russia and is categorically opposed to the transfer of the latest weapons to it.

Russia practices restrictions on the export of weapons to China, for example, Su-30, Su-34, Su-35 and Su-37 aircraft, while for India, the United Arab Emirates, South Korea and Malaysia, such restrictions do not exist. According to our assessment, one of the reasons for the mutual distrust that arose may have been China's unilateral withdrawal from the 1995 license agreement for the assembly of 200 Su-27SK fighters and the failure of the Russian side to meet the terms of the 2005 contract for the supply of Il-76MD and Il-78MK ³² aircraft to China.

In general, Russian exports to China retain good prospects, but require taking into account the growing capabilities of the Chinese military-industrial complex, diversification of forms of cooperation, as well as constant monitoring of compliance by the Chinese side with the aforementioned Agreement on the Protection of Russian Intellectual Property.

In recent years, Chinese imports from Russia, after a decline in 2005-2011 due to China's attempts to establish the production of weapons and their components on its own, have shown a renewed trend towards purchasing large quantities of Russian equipment; in 2011-2012, 140 AL-31FN engines were purchased for the Jian-10 (J-10) fighter jet. 100 RD-93 engines for the FC-1,184 fighter jet, D-30KP-2 engines for the IL-76 military transport aircraft and upgraded Khun-6 (H-6) and Khun-6K (H-6K) bombers; in early 2013, an agreement was reached to purchase 24 new Russian military aircraft. China remains interested in purchasing aircraft engines, Su-³³ carrier-based fighters, Il-76 military transport aircraft, S-400 anti-aircraft missile systems, and Project 677 (Amur) diesel-electric submarines from Russia.

The following major projects for China's purchase of Russian military equipment are known, which are at various stages of discussion::

- a batch of 24 Su-35 fighters. The relevant agreement between the two parties was signed in February 2012, and the terms of the transaction are being finalized;

- shipments of S-400 surface-to-air missile systems with delivery after 2017 (presumably, we are talking about a batch of four or eight divisions);

- four submarines of the modified project 677E ("Amur-1650"). The initiative in this matter came from the Chinese side and was presumably related to the deteriorating relations with Japan;

- the issue of resuming the contract for the supply of 34 Il-76 military transport aircraft to China, which was disrupted due to the fault of the Russian side, is being discussed. Production of a modified version of the IL-76MD-90A aircraft is currently being restored in Ulyanovsk and, according to Russian officials, delivery is possible starting in 2017.

In addition, agreements on cooperation in the supply of aircraft engines, in particular new 117c engines for promising Chinese fighters, may be at various stages of discussion. A number of topics related to joint R & D may also be discussed.³⁴

According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, at the end of the last decade, China was the largest importer of military equipment and weapons: in 2005-2009, its expenditures for these purposes amounted to $11.45 billion. In 2010-2014, this indicator decreased to $6.68 billion, which meant that China moved to the 3rd place in the world ranking of importing countries and the share of Chinese orders in the international market decreased from 9% to 5%.

The bulk of Chinese orders are received by Russia (61%), the second and third exporters to China in recent years were France (16%) and Ukraine (13%). The main reason for the decline in Chinese imports is the growth of the scientific and technical potential and production capabilities of the Chinese military-industrial complex. China produces a large number of necessary products independently; however, a significant number of products are still purchased abroad in terms of product nomenclature.³⁵

Until recently, one of the largest partners of China in military-technical cooperation was Ukraine, from which China received about 30 military technologies, including those related to the production of key elements of equipment and equipment, the design of large transport aircraft, as well as technologies used in the design and production of power plants for aircraft carriers and other large warships, tanks engines, air-to-air missiles. In particular, with Ukrainian support, China developed a project 052S destroyer, and improved Chinese air-to-air missiles by equipping them with a semi-active radar homing head manufactured at the Kiev Radar plant.

The Ukrainian partner took an active part in the development of the project of the Chinese passenger aircraft ARJ21, approved in 2002. In 2004, the Ukrainian Design Bureau carried out technological cooperation with Chinese engineers in the design of the Y-8F-600 transport aircraft. The joint efforts of the Antonov Design Bureau and the Second Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC II) created a joint engineering center in Beijing, whose task was to carry out design work on the design of a series of new transport aircraft ³⁶.

As for the prospects of military-technical cooperation between the two countries, Chinese analysts note that in the field of military technology, Ukraine remains in the same place as it was 20 years ago. In other words, the technological development of the Ukrainian military-industrial complex has stopped. On the one hand, this is due to the fact that during the Soviet period, the Ukrainian military industry was only part of the Soviet defense complex and one of the elements of the system, so, despite excellent achievements in certain areas, it has a limited base. On the other hand, the lack of investment in the military - industrial complex and the resulting mass outflow of Ukrainian industry specialists abroad became obstacles to the creation of military-technical innovations. However, despite this, China believes that the high scientific and technical level of Ukraine in the field of creating power plants, as well as in some other key technologies, deeper theoretical training in the design of heavy transport aircraft, and other achievements in certain areas preserve the ground for continued cooperation.³⁷

A factor that hinders the competitive advantages of Chinese equipment in the global arms market in terms of "price-quality" is the trend that has been determined in recent years to increase the level of wages at enterprises of the Chinese military-industrial complex in comparison with the industry of the civilian sector; in some areas, wages are at or above the Russian level.

The most favorable conditions for the expansion of Chinese arms and military equipment exporters have developed in countries with commodity economies that pursue a multi-vector or anti-Western foreign policy, as well as in states that are gradually becoming dependent on the Chinese investment market38.

In the near future, due to the new military strategy of China announced by the State Council of the People's Republic of China on May 26, 2015, which, in particular, provides for accelerating the modernization of the military-industrial complex39, China may seriously compete with Russia in certain segments of the global arms market, such as artillery systems, multiple launch rocket launchers, armored vehicles, small arms weapons, military vehicles, patrol ships and boats, training aircraft and simulators.

At the same time, China's achievement of world quality standards in the production of warships, aircraft, anti-aircraft missile systems, electronic control systems for troops and weapons, electronic warfare equipment and some other types of military equipment will involve dependence on the import of the most important high-tech components.

¹ Chinese National Defense White Paper 2006 - http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/book/194485.htm

² People's Daily. 18.11.2002.

³ Modernization requires a strong defense. China Daily, 27.06.2015.

⁴ Annual Report to Congress on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2005/Department of Defense, USA - http:defenselink. mil/news/Jul 2005/d20050719 china.pdf. P.18.

⁵ People's Daily online, 30.06.2008.

⁶ See the article by V. P. Kashin in the magazine "Arms Export". 2010, N 3(83).

⁷ http://www.uschina.org/public/china/govstructure/govstructure_part5/12.html

⁸ http://russian.china.org.cn/exclusive/txt/2015-03/18/content_35 085896.html

⁹ Annual Report to Congress "Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2006" / Department of Defense, USA - http://www.dod.mil/pubs/pdfs/China%20Report%202006.pdf

¹⁰ Express information N 1. Military-political problems and the armed forces of China, Moscow, 2004, pp. 75-76.

¹¹ http://top.rbc.ru/politics/04/03/2015/54f6f2c59a7947ef40e4a525

¹² http://russian.china.org.cn/exclusive/txt/2015-03/18/content_35085896.htm

^{Barabanov M. S.} 13, Kashin V. B., Makienko K. V. Oboronnaya promyshlennost ' i torgovle oboruzhenii PRC [Defense Industry and Arms Trade in the People's Republic of China]. Moscow, 2013, pp. 191, 193-195.

¹⁴ http://topwar.ru/71153-sipri-opublikoval-otchet-o-mezhdunarodnom-rynke-vooruzheniy-v-2010-2014-godah.html

¹⁵ http://www.aif.ru/infographic/1137465

^{Barabanov M. S.} 16, Kashin V. B., Makienko K. V. Decree of soch., pp. 196-200.

¹⁷ http://reportage24.info/rossiia-i-kitai-na-rynke-vooryjenii-brazihi/

¹⁸ http://spbu.ru/files/scientific_works/leksutina/10.pdf

¹⁹ http://www.africana.ru/news/magazine/010613_market.htm

²⁰ http://www.daokedao.ru/2015/03/17/kitaj-tesnit-rossiyu-na-rynke-vooruzhenij/

²¹ http://warfiles.ru/show-66042-kitay-mozhet-stat-osnovnym-postavschikom-oruzhiya-dlya-ukrainy.html

^{Barabanov M. S.} 22, Kashin V. B., Makienko K. V. Decree of soch., p. 196.

²³ http://topwar.ru/71153-sipri-opublikoval-otchet-o-mezhdunarodnom-rynke-vooruzheniy-v-2010-2014-godah.html

²⁴ http://ria.ru/spravka/20140520/1008416110.html

²⁵ ITAR-TASS. 12.12.2004.

^{Makienko Konstantin.} 26 Military-technical cooperation between Russia and China in 1992-2002: achievements, trends, prospects, Moscow, 2002, pp. 40-47.

²⁷ http://saint-petersburg.ru/show/153004

²⁸ http://ria.ru/spravka/20140520/1008416110.html

²⁹ ITAR-TASS. 23.05.2008.

³⁰ http://www.govoritmoskva.ru/russia/081211112434.html

³¹ http://periscope2.ru"target="_blank"rel="nofollow"> http://periscope2.ru

³² Elosa yanjiu. 2009, No. 1, pp. 87-116.

^{Barabanov M. S.} 33, Kashin V. B., Makienko K. V. Edict. soch., pp. 141, 147.

³⁴ Ibid., p. 186.

³⁵ http://topwar.ru/71153-sipri-opublikoval-otchet-o-mezhdunarodnom-rynke-vooruzheniy-v-2010-2014-godah.html

³⁶ http://inosmi.ru/world/20140213/217472299.html

³⁷ Хуаньцюван, 13.02.2014 - http://inosmi.ru/world/20140213/217472299.html (in Russian).

^{Barabanov M. S.} 38, Kashin V. B., Makienko K. V. Edict. soch., p. 271.

³⁹ http://www.rg.ru/2015/05/26/doktrina-site-anons.html

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