L. D. BONEY

Doctor of Economics

Far East Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences

Keywords: China, land market, land capitalization, land for construction purposes, public property, land requisition, land price, land rent

Over the past three-plus decades of economic reform and opening-up policies, while developing at an average annual rate of more than 10% until recently, China has evolved from an agrarian country to an industrial and agricultural power in the world.

Among the many factors that have contributed to China's remarkable success, it is safe to mention two that play a particularly significant role in the country's economic development. This is labor and land.

To understand the special role of the second factor, we will consider the mechanism of land capitalization in China under conditions of public ownership of land, the underlying system of rural land requisition and the system of paid assignment of state land on the land market, as well as ways to obtain the necessary land for construction purposes and financial resources (in the form of land rent) for the needs of local urbanization and industrialization.

The acute shortage of land resources in China*, especially in agriculture, in a market economy did not prevent the country's leadership - along with successfully solving the problem of production and food supply for more than a billion people - from allocating enough land for industrial and urban construction. So, for the period 2003 - 2012, the total annual volume of land provided for construction in the country increased from 286.4 thousand square kilometers. ha increased to 690.4 thousand ha, and the average annual growth rate of land supply for construction purposes was 10.27%¹, i.e. it was actually maintained at the level of China's GDP growth rate.

This turned out to be possible only by solving the problem of capitalizing the land in its own special Chinese way. Suffice it to say that the annual increment in land value during capitalization provides, on average, more than half of revenues to local government budgets and covers the main costs associated with the implementation of urban and industrial construction plans in the regions. This type of revenue from land value gains is called "land finance" or "land capital"in China. So, in 2014, the total annual income from land capitalization was about 4.3 trillion yuan, ² or more than $650 billion. In 2015, with the decline in China's average annual economic growth rate, this revenue, although declining, remained huge, amounting to 3.36 trillion yuan.³

Since the phenomenon of "land finance" provides almost only a market for land for construction purposes, let's take a closer look at this main type of land market in China. What are the systemic, legal and economic mechanisms that still allow us to receive such significant dividends from land cession?

MAIN FEATURES AND PECULIARITIES OF THE LAND SYSTEM IN CHINA

There is no private ownership of land in China, but there is a land market, and the revenue from land transactions on the market, as indicated above, is more than significant. The mechanism of land capitalization in a country is related to the nature and features of land legislation and land policy-

* With about 22% of the world's population, China has 7% of the world's arable land area; arable land is only 40% of the global average; on average, 0.0936 ha of arable land is available per capita.

countries that have developed in the last few decades.

First. In China, a system of public ownership (more precisely, "socialist public ownership") of land is implemented, with the property right* to land divided into ownership and use rights. Since, according to the law, the right of public ownership of land in China cannot be an object of purchase and sale, the function of land circulation is performed by the right to use land. In the country's land legislation, the term "land purchase and sale" is practically absent. Land in the country, according to the law, can only be "ceded for a fee", and then not the right of ownership, but only the right to use the land for a certain period of time on the basis of a contract and, of course, for money. Thus, when we talk about the land market in China, we are talking about the transfer of land use rights.

Second. Public ownership of land in China is represented by two forms -the system of state ownership (in the city) and the system of collective ownership (in the village). According to the Constitution of the People's Republic of China (1982), urban land, as well as mineral resources, water sources, seas, forests, mountains, meadows, wastelands, swamps and other natural resources are state property; land in the countryside and suburbs, with the exception of land established by special law, belongs to collective ownership, land under residential buildings (house) and subsidiary land of peasants also belongs to collective ownership.

Let us draw attention to the fact that the land in the city was officially transferred to the category of state property only by the Constitution of 1982. This step of a systemic nature made it possible to create the so-called mechanism of nationalization (nationalization) of urban land4, which was important for the formation and functioning of the land market in China.

The third. In the course of the rural reform (1978-1963), during the formation of the main economic system, the property right to land was divided into ownership rights transferred to the collective of rural peasants, and the right to use land transferred to the peasants on the basis of a contract and the principle of equalization.

The new, revised version of the "Land Management Law" (1998), which introduced a number of serious systemic innovations, further weakened the property status of subjects of collective ownership, while strengthening the positions of subjects of state ownership, which actually consolidated the unequal position of the two forms of public ownership in all respects.

In order to better protect arable land in the context of a sharp increase in demand for land for construction and accelerated urbanization, the new, revised version of the "Land Management Law" (1998) prohibited the assignment of collective land (purchase and sale) and the change of the intended purpose of agricultural land, it should be used exclusively for agricultural production. Now, in order to convert agricultural land into land for construction, you need to first commandeer it and pass it through the procedure of changing its intended purpose and changing the form of ownership. Since then, the role and significance of the land requisition system as the only tool for obtaining collective rural land for construction purposes has increased dramatically.

Fourth. At the same time, the "Law on Land Management (1998)" (before that there were several resolutions on this subject) approved the crucial role of the system of paid use of state-owned land in the management and placement of land for construction in the country, transferring to the state the exclusive right of paid assignment of land for construction in China. This means that the state, as the land owner, can assign the right to use state-owned land for a certain period of time, ceding it to the user by agreement, auctions, competitions, and the land user, in accordance with the concluded agreement, pays money to the state for the right to use land.⁵ Thus, the urban land nationalization mechanism (1982), according to which all urban land belongs to the state, became the legal basis for the system of paid use, including the paid assignment of state land in China. ⁶

Fifth. Even the Constitution (1982) and the "Land Management Law" (1986) established the existence of separate land management in the country in the city and village. The new, revised version of the "Land Management Law" (1998) developed and finally consolidated the principle of separate land management in the city and village.

The rights of peasants to use land in the village for non-agricultural purposes are limited: the collective can only use it for the construction of enterprises in volosts and settlements, and the peasant, as a member of the collective, can receive land for the construction of a house free of charge, having permission from the relevant authorities.

As for the subject of rights

* Property law is a legal expression of property rights; any property system has its own system of property rights.

the situation is different here. When the form of ownership of land changes (from collective to state ownership), local governments (counties, cities) capitalize land or "assign it for payment" through the market, having for this purpose, according to the law, the right to dispose of land for construction purposes, the right to introduce land into market circulation, the right of assignment and the right of income.

Thus, the system of separate land management in rural and urban areas covers two completely different and unequal areas of land use, based on different system bases. The first sphere is administrative administration, within which the system of land requisition in the countryside functions, the second is the sphere of the market, or rather, the "plan and market", i.e., the market mechanism combined with the state's monopoly on the primary land market; in this sphere, the system of paid assignment of state land functions.

These two leading systems that underlie the management and allocation of land resources in China - the system of land requisition and the system of paid use of state land (including "paid assignment of the right to use state land") - form the foundation of the land capitalization mechanism in China.

CHINA'S LAND ALLOCATION SYSTEM

According to the peculiarities of the land system and the nature of land use in China, the order or system of land allocation in the country is also built, it covers land resources of two forms of ownership - collective and state and includes the following::

Land in the village. All collective land in the village is divided into agricultural land and the rest, which has come to be defined as "land for construction purposes in the village". According to official statistics of the People's Republic of China, in 2013 arable land amounted to 121.5 million hectares. Agricultural land, including arable land, is distributed equalistically in the country (based on a member of the collective economic organization of the village) and transferred to the use of peasant households on the basis of a long-term contract system. Applying for the right to use contract land (assignment, exchange, lease) within one's village is the main way to redistribute and place agricultural land in the village, and recently also to form and develop new enlarged forms of management in the agrosphere.

All other land in the village, apart from agricultural land, is classified as "rural land for construction purposes". Since 2004, this category of rural land has become the main source of land replenishment for construction purposes in the city. The reason is an acute shortage of arable land*. According to the calculations of Chinese experts (2007), increasing the level of urbanization in the country by 1 percentage point due to arable land reduces them by 410 thousand hectares. By 2020, according to plans, the level of urbanization should reach 60%, therefore, the city will have to "absorb" 10.05 million hectares. With the mandatory preservation of the "red line" of arable land (120 million hectares), in the next 13 years, only 2.01 million ha will be allocated for construction purposes.⁷ These missing 8 million hectares can only be taken from the internal reserve in the countryside, i.e., from "rural land for construction purposes" ⁸.

Collective land for construction purposes in the village

includes land occupied under residential buildings and personal plots of peasants, under village and parish enterprises, industrial structures, public buildings (roads, wells), and other public service structures. According to scientists, the total area of these lands in recent years was ^18.9 million ha9, and in some areas, especially remote ones, up to 30% of the entire rural territory ¹⁰. With the departure of large quantities of surplus agricultural labor to the city, the land under the empty dwellings of the peasants accounted for approximately 10-15% of the total land for construction purposes in the village.¹¹ It is estimated that in 2012-2013 there was 5 times more land for construction purposes in the village than for the same purposes in the ^city12. According to Chinese criteria, this is a fairly large reserve, to which the main direction of requisition**has been switched since 2004.

State-owned land. In relation to state-owned land, there are currently two types of placement: (1) administrative allocation and (2) "paid use" (including "paid assignment"). For individual regions, 35% of all land for construction was allocated in the economically developed coastal province of Zhejiang (East China) in the period 1998-2003, and in the remote province of Shaanxi (North - West China) during the same period-all 50% ¹³. The method of allocating land administratively is most often used for government needs, land is allocated

* Between 1996 and 2010, the country's arable land decreased by almost 12 million ha (from 133 million ha to 121.2 million ha), while its per capita index decreased from 1.59 mu (0.1 ha) to 1.39 mu (0.09 ha).

** For more information, see: Bony L. D. Strategy of city and village integration in China: successes, problems, contradictions // Problems of the Far East. 2012. N 3. pp. 81-86.

It is distributed on a planned basis and free of charge among industrial or administrative divisions (for state organizations, military facilities, energy facilities, railways, irrigation facilities, and other similar infrastructure of national significance).

All other state-owned land intended for construction purposes of an economic nature (industrial, commercial construction, tourism, recreational projects, commercial housing, etc.) is distributed through the market under the full monopoly of the government (usually the local government), i.e. it is assigned through auctions, competitions at competitive prices through a market mechanism or by agreement of the parties ¹⁴.

CREATING A LAND MARKET FOR CONSTRUCTION PURPOSES

Since the late 90's of the XX century, with the acceleration of urbanization and industrialization, the demand for land for construction in the city has sharply increased, while the question of sources of funds for industrial and urban construction is becoming more acute. Having come to the conclusion that "in conditions of a shortage of land resources in the country, the use of an open, competitive price can provide the greatest degree of realization of the market value of land"¹⁵, the country's leadership set a course for creating a full-fledged competitive land market for construction purposes, since it was in this area that it was supposed to form the most effective mechanism for capitalizing land resources.

By this time, certain legal and institutional innovations had already been made, paving the way for the formation of the land market. This first step was the transformation of urban land into state land (1982), which made the state the owner and supreme administrator of state land and at the same time the owner of all land in the country for construction purposes.

The second step: the ban on the purchase and sale of collective land and on changing the purpose of agricultural land made requisition and the procedure for changing the purpose and form of ownership of land the only way to get it for construction. As a result, the state completely closed off the sources of receiving and offering land for construction purposes, setting an administratively low "price" for requisitioned collective land of peasants (i.e., the amount of compensation for land).

Thus, a special mechanism for land capitalization was created by creating "price scissors" for land: between the initially officially low price of collective land subject to requisition, and the high market price of the same land (after the change of its intended purpose - to urban for construction) and the form of ownership (to state).

The third. At the same time, a special "technology" of market operation was created that could provide a solution to the strategic task of accelerated urbanization and industrialization. It included special preferences in the supply of land for industrial construction - priority, sufficiency, low prices.

Fourth. In order to increase the level of marketing of land and, consequently, income from it, a consistent expansion of the scope of paid use of land for construction for state institutions, transport, energy, irrigation and other capital construction facilities, urban infrastructure, as well as various public capital structures has begun. Accordingly, the scale of gratuitous land allocation is being reduced.

As a result, the primary land market in China was initially formed - this is a monopoly market, where when buyers compete, there is a monopoly of the seller. The market was created and is actually managed by the state represented by the central and local governments through their structures as a "natural monopoly" market16.

Scientists of the Research Institute of Finance of the Ministry of Finance of the People's Republic of China, without denying certain negative features of such a monopoly market (corruption of local authorities, administrative pressure on pricing, etc.), argue that market supply and demand still remain the main regulator of prices in the land market, as evidenced by significantly higher profits from land assignments at auctions and by tenders compared to the cession of land under the agreement ¹⁷.

The nature of the primary land market in China largely reflects the specifics of the "socialist market economy" system, i.e., the current market system in the country, the theoretical basis of which is the concept of linking the "plan" and "market", when the development of the market remains strong macro-regulation of the state ¹⁸.

The system of land requisition in rural areas*: having emerged in the years of the planned economy, it later received a solid legal basis in the new Constitution of the People's Republic of China (1988) and land legislation ("Land Management Law" (1998) and

* Usually, when discussing the capitalization of land and obtaining an increase in its value (land rent), Chinese scientists and the country's leadership talk about the system of land requisition in the countryside, accurately indicating the main source of so-called "land finance".

The "Law on Property Law" (2007), etc., which authorized the requisition of collective land in the "public interest". China's existing rural land requisition system actually performs two functions: it provides land for urban and industrial construction, and mobilizes initial capital for accelerated industrialization and urbanization19.

At the same time, the growth rate of prices for land for industrial construction is much lower than for land for construction in trade and housing: while in 2000-2012 the overall level of prices for land for construction, prices for land for construction in trade and housing grew at an average annual rate of 10.04%, 11.4% and 14.4%. Accordingly, the growth of prices for industrial construction was only 3.35%²⁰. This inevitably led to a large gap between the income from the cession of land for industry and the income from the cession of land for commercial and residential construction.

With increasing competition in economic construction between regions, local authorities, adhering to the setting of low prices when ceding land for industrial construction, simultaneously use this factor (low prices) as an element of competition, attracting lower prices for entrepreneurs and capital to the industry of their area. This preferential policy for industrial development has undoubtedly played an important role in maintaining high industrial growth rates, but at the same time it has caused low land use efficiency in this leading sector of the country's economy. ²¹

The second function of the rural land requisition system is to mobilize construction funds, i.e., "building capital" for the needs of urbanization and industrialization. Officially, this first stage on the path of collective land to capitalization - through requisition-is briefly referred to by some scholars as"land purchase." In reality, the so-called purchase of land from peasants is an administrative forced withdrawal of collective land in the countryside at pre-determined low prices, which are much lower than its real market price. The fact is that during requisition, the price of land (the amount of compensation for rejected land) is determined on the basis of its agricultural purpose, and the price of the same land when assigned on the market increases significantly due to its new purpose as state land intended for construction purposes. The difference in the intended use of land plus the market mechanism plays the most important role in determining the price and is used to create the so-called land price scissors.

Thus, using the mechanism of land price scissors, i.e. the difference between the undervalued price at which land is withdrawn from farmers (more precisely, the amount of compensation), and the price of selling this land on the market as land for construction purposes, which is several times, and sometimes tens of times higher than the first, the state receives a huge land rent, that is, financial capital, known in China as "land finance". For example, in the Wuzhongqu district of Suzhou, this price difference reached about 30 times in 2001-2005. ²²

The size of this land capital received by the state in 2003 reached 542.1 billion rubles. In 2010, this figure reached 2.9 trillion yuan, accounting for 55% of local government financial revenues, and accounted for 30% to 70% of local budget revenues.

In recent years, the cost of requisitioning land, scrapping buildings, and resettling peasants as a share of income from land cession has increased significantly, while the share of urban construction expenditures has decreased accordingly. In 2008, in the income from land cession, expenditures on requisition, including the scrapping of buildings (old village buildings) and the relocation of peasants, and on urban construction amounted to 377.8 billion rubles separately. RMB 303.5 billion, or 36.4% and 29.3%, and in 2014 it was already 3.39 trillion and 725.86 billion. RMB, or 79.1% and 16.9% of all revenues, respectively ²³.

Data provided by Zhang Xiaoshan, former director of the Rural Development Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, reveals the most complete scope, structure, nature, and direction of the use of income received by local authorities as "land capital". According to these statistics*, the total amount of funds received by local authorities from the assignment of the right to use state-owned land in 2009 was 1.22 trillion yuan, or approximately 86% of the income from the assignment in the same year (i.e., income was 1.42 trillion), while the cost of compensation for land requisition, scrapping, etc. (housing of peasants) and resettlement (of peasants) - 477.4 billion, or 38.9% (of all expenses), land development expenses-124.9 billion, or 27.3% of all expenses; construction of infrastructure in the countryside-43.3 billion, or 3.5% of all expenses; compensation to peasants who were requisitioned for land - 19.5 billion rubles. RMB, or 1.6%²⁴.

These data speak eloquently, first of all, about the extent to which

* The data provided on land capitalization revenues for individual years, presented by different Chinese sources, may not coincide, may differ, depending on the source; at the same time, they are all of the same type, and the differences are small, but they are all generally correlated.

huge amounts of money are extracted from the countryside (1.42 trillion yuan in 2009) and how small is the share of peasants (or rather, the collective economic organization of which they are members) who lost their land in this income (1.6% of all expenses) as a result of the requisition and capitalization of their land; secondly, almost all the funds received by the farmers are allocated for construction purposes, went to the city (27.3%), and for the development of infrastructure in the village allocated only 3.5%.

Thus, huge funds and resources are being withdrawn from agriculture and rural areas, the scale of which significantly exceeds the volume of investments of the central budget in the agrosphere, and this is despite the proclamation of a strategic course of support for agriculture (the course of "repayment of debts to the village" and the course of "give more, take less, revive"). Scientists of the above-mentioned Research Institute of Finance once again confirm that this policy of expanding investment in support of agriculture, adopted in 2004, is based on the same sources of income from land rents, or so-called "land finance"²⁵.

FORMS OF "LAND CAPITAL"

This land capital received by local authorities in the process of capitalizing rural land takes the form of "land finance" and "land money". "Land finance" includes mainly tax revenues related to land, such as the land alienation tax, the real estate tax, and the land construction tax; and non-tax revenues of local governments are also related to land, such as funds from land leases, funds from the introduction of land into circulation, i.e., from cession. These latter funds (from the introduction of land into circulation or cession) have actually become the main source of local financial income. Surveys have shown that the share of taxes on real estate and construction in the budgets of local authorities reaches 40%, and revenues from land requisition - 60% or more (in prov. Zhejiang, Tianjin - over 70%) ²⁶.

"Land money". Despite the huge land cession revenues generated by local governments, they are far from sufficient for urban development (according to Chinese estimates, the construction of a single medium-sized city required at least $ 10 billion). RMB for 10 years in the early 2000s). The remaining funds, and even larger ones, are provided by local authorities through loans. For this purpose, so-called land money (tudi jinjun) is used, i.e. a part of capitalized land that is used as collateral for loans.

Thus, at the end of 2012, 84 large cities secured land with a total area of 348.7 thousand hectares for loans amounting to 5.95 trillion yuan, at the end of 2013, the same cities secured loans amounting to 7.76 trillion yuan against 403.9 thousand hectares of land, and in the first half of 2014, the total amount of loans received against land collateral it reached $ 8.7 trillion, i.e. the annual growth rate of loans exceeded 30%, which far exceeded the growth rate of investment in fixed assets and the scale of public finances throughout the country during ^the same period27.

"LAND RESERVE "

For the purposes of forming and accumulating land capital, local authorities, as a rule, create a special "land reserve"²⁸, where not only surplus land for construction is deposited, but also specially built up in reserve. The "land reserve" is an important tool for the implementation of the state monopoly on the land market and a kind of guarantee and symbol of the success of the local administration. It opens up a "green street" for local authorities to obtain a bank loan, provides a guarantee of investment security for capital construction on the ground. For this reason, local authorities attach particular importance to maintaining the "land reserve" at the proper level. Hence-the constant search and seizure of new portions of land to replenish it, since the very concept of land requisition "for public needs" in the laws is extremely vague. Moreover, through their" land reserve", local authorities regulate the state of prices on the real estate market in their area or zone.

As a result, the growth rate of land for construction purposes is several times faster than the growth rate of urban development areas. It is no coincidence that while urban construction zones more than doubled in size between 2000 and 2012, according to Liu Shouying, a leading expert on the country's land market, land value gains increased by more than 45-fold. ²⁹ Local authorities are interested in maintaining high real estate prices, because they depend on the real estate market. the amount of revenues to their budget also depends on this. This creates and maintains a "money bubble" in the real estate market. As a result, the circle of land capitalization is closing, tax revenues, non-tax revenues, employment, and regional GDP are growing, and development plans are being implemented.

By and large, experts of the Research Institute of Finance note that the creation of a network of "land reserves" in the country marked the formation of a holistic mechanism for implementing the policy of "paid assignment of the right to use state land" with the following links: "procurement of ³⁰ state-owned land".

land - storage (reservation) - development-assignment " ³¹. The paid assignment of the right to use state-owned land also provides considerable tax revenues to local budgets.

"LAND FINANCE " AND CHINA'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

The specific nature of China's land system and the resulting phenomenon of "land finance", according to many Chinese scientists, including sharp critics of the existing requisition system, were an important factor in ensuring the current model of economic development of the country, which maintained high economic growth rates for more than 30 years (over 10% per year). Despite the specific nature of China - "a lot of people, little land", i.e. an acute land deficit, thanks to the implementation of the so-called "land finance" strategy, China has avoided a situation where a shortage of land in market conditions leads to high land prices, which would have a negative impact on economic growth; and, on the contrary, relying on on the basis of the guarantee of a broad supply of land, it was possible to effectively support the growth of the economy ³².

Another important contribution of the "land finance" strategy is the creation of a favorable economic environment for attracting capital and entrepreneurs to the modernization process. "In the course of economic competition between regions, the initiative of local governments to attract capital and entrepreneurs and create a favorable atmosphere for economic development and modernization policies has played an important role. These two factors-land as a factor of resource investment and land as a factor of attracting entrepreneurial capital for development-have become two big "talismans"that have provided a win in the competition. Land has become the most valuable value resource distributed by local governments, as well as the mainstay of large-scale investment growth.

The use of land to attract entrepreneurial capital has become the main way to stimulate development. Advantages in land income and tax revenues from land capitalization have become the main tool of local authorities to attract entrepreneurs to their regions. " ³³

An extensive supply of land and a high level of resource expenditure ensured a high level of investment; the supply of land at a low cost, which restrained low land prices, guaranteed a high level of exports; the use of land to attract entrepreneurs ' capital ensured high rates of industrialization and urbanization, and stimulated high rates of local economic growth.

The country's land system reform34 and ^land requisition reforms, which have unfolded since 2013, are part of a compromise approach, and they are aimed at improving the requisition system (reducing its scale, increasing land reimbursement rates, creating a single market for land for construction in cities and villages, and creating a more equitable mechanism for distributing income from cession). collective land, improving the efficiency of land resources use). Until the end of 2017, various options for rural land reform and search for ways to improve the requisition system will be piloted in different regions of the country. There are heated discussions among scientists and specialists on these issues in the country.

Given the current economic situation in China (a significant decline in economic growth and a course to accelerate the change in the development model), as well as the" huge "strategic plans that should be implemented by 2020, it can be assumed that with certain improvements, the" land finance " strategy will continue to be implemented. For it is difficult to find other means in the country for the needs of ongoing modernization.

¹ Zhongguo gaige (Reforms in China). 2013. N 11. P. 12.

² http://rdi.cass.cn/show_news.asp&id=36355

³ Report of the Ministry of Finance of the People's Republic of China on the implementation of the Central and Local budgets for 2015 4th session of the NPC of the 12th convocation - http://russian.news.cn/2016 - 03 - 18/с135202062.html

^{Jia Kang and Lan Li.} 4 "Land Finance" in the historical process of marketing and urbanization in China and land system reform. Part 1 - http://rdi/cass.cn/show_News/asp?id=36355.

^{Han Jun et al} 5 2002-2012. Shanghai yuandong chubanshe (Reform in Chinese village. 2002 - 2012). 2012. p. 269.

⁶ Ibid., p. 272.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Jingji tizhi gaige (Economic System reform). 2010. N 4. P. 91.

⁹ Zhongguo nongcun gaige yu fazhan gailun (Reform in the Chinese village and the concept of development) / Chief Editor. Zhang Xiaoshan. Beijing, 2010, p. 55.

¹⁰ http://rdi.cass.cn/show_news.asp?id=26274

¹¹ Zhongguo gaige, 2011, No. 6, p. 83.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Report (based on survey materials) of politics in China's rural areas. Han Jun. Shanghai. 2008. p. 192.

¹⁴ Han Linfei - http://vasilieva/narod.ru/12 - 6-1998.htm

¹⁵ Law on Property Law. 2007. P. 250.

¹⁶ Ibid.

^{Jia Kang and Lan Li.} 17 Decree, Op.

^{Boni L. D.} 18 Kitayskaya derevnya na puti k rynku [Chinese village on the way to the market]. Moscow, IDV RAS, 2005, p. 38.

¹⁹ http://rdi.cass.cn/show_News.asp?id=31120

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ http://rdi.cass.cn/show_News.asp7id=36566

²² Tiaocha zhongguo nongcun (Survey of a Chinese village) / Ch. Ed. Han Jun. Beijing. 2009. p. 403.

²³ http://rdi.cass.cn/show_News.asp?id=36355

²⁴ Sannong Zhongguo (Agricultural China). 2011. N 14. P. 35.

²⁵ http://rdi.cass.cn/show_News.asp?id=36355

²⁶ Nongye jingji yanpju. 2012. N 5. P. 40.

²⁷ http://rdi.cass.cn/show_News.asp9id-36355

²⁸ Zhongguo nongcun zhengce baogao tiaocha (Survey reports on China's agricultural policy). Shanghai. 2008. Part II. pp. 194, 224.

²⁹ Jungo gaige ...

³⁰ Scientists from the Research Institute of Finance under the Ministry of Finance of the People's Republic of China cynically (from the author's point of view) call the forced withdrawal of collective land from peasants, the compensation for which is several times or more underestimated in comparison with the market price, as "purchases" of land.

³¹ http://rdi.cass/cn//show_news.asp&id=36355

^{Han Jun et al} Z2 Decree. op. p. 274.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ See: Boni L. D. Kitai: na puti k novoi modeli razvitiya sel'skogo khozyaistva [China: on the way to a new model of agricultural development]. 2014, N 11, 12.

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