E. N. PETELIN, Post-Graduate Student, Institute of the Far East, Russian Academy of Sciences

Keywords: China's foreign policy, energy security, international climate change regime

Environmental aspects have become an important part of China's foreign energy policy for a number of reasons. First, being one of the main (and since 2008 the main) emitters of carbon dioxide on the planet, along with the United States, Russia, India, Japan and Germany, the country seeks to preserve its "ecological image", otherwise the promotion of its peaceful development will drown in foreign criticism.

Secondly, China itself has become dissatisfied with the deterioration of the environmental situation and the realization that sustainable development is impossible without significant consideration of the environmental factor.

In June 2007, China published the "State Project of China's Response to Climate Change" and "China's Scientific and Technical Actions to Counteract Climate Change" [1].

CHINA AT THE HEAD OF THE ALLIANCE

Since 2007, the negotiation process related to the phenomenon of global climate change has intensified in the international arena. China actively participates in the implementation of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol to the Convention, as well as in the work of the Ad Hoc Intergovernmental Committee on Climate Change.

The Chinese side has officially put forward the principle of "common but differentiated responsibility", according to which developed countries should accept the main share of blame for the adverse effects of climate change. This principle is the basis of the Convention and the Kyoto Protocol, according to which developed countries should "play a leading role in combating climate change and its negative consequences" [2].

Under the Convention, the People's Republic of China is classified as a developing country. This means that it does not have specific commitments to reduce greenhouse emissions, but it has the opportunity to use the clean development mechanism*, receiving funding for environmentally important projects and related technologies.

China believes that the clean development mechanism should be maintained, facilitating the transfer of advanced technologies to developing countries. In addition to the fact that technology transfer under the Convention should not be limited to a market mechanism, governments of developed countries should reduce barriers to it, use incentive policies and facilitate the process of technology transfer [3].

The main problem of climate negotiations is who and how much to impose restrictions on greenhouse gas emissions (carbon dioxide, methane, nitrogen dioxide) into the atmosphere. The position of industrialized countries, led by the United States, is that mandatory restrictions should apply to all countries - and to a greater extent to those whose contribution to air pollution is most significant.

The position of developing countries, led by China, is stable-

Ending. For the beginning, see: Asia and Africa Today, 2014, No. 6.

* The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is established under Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol and is based on the fact that developed countries and countries with economies in transition can use "certified emission reductions" (CERS) obtained from projects aimed at reducing anthropogenic emissions or increasing greenhouse gas removals to meet their obligations under the Protocol, on the territory of developing countries.

The problem is that such restrictions should be imposed only on developed countries, while developing countries can limit their emissions only on a voluntary basis, which China did when it announced a 40% reduction in carbon dioxide emissions relative to GDP shortly before the UN Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen in late 2009 - 45% by 2020, compared to 2005 [4]. However, it is possible that the real volume of emissions will not decrease, but may even increase.

To strengthen its own position in the negotiation process, Beijing relies on cooperation with other developing countries. The largest forum for developing countries is the Group of 77, whose list of interests also includes development and environmental issues*.

However, the most powerful position in the negotiations is occupied by the BASIC group (Brasil, South Africa, India, China), or G4 (Group 4), which was formed by the agreement of November 28, 2009, when four major developing countries-Brazil, South Africa, India and China-agreed to act as a united front at the Copenhagen talks, including a joint protest if their position is met with resistance from developed countries.

China initiated the creation of this alliance and is its leading driving force. It was this group of countries that managed to coordinate the signing of the Copenhagen Treaty with the United States. And in January 2010. Contrary to the position of the United States and the EU, it designated the Copenhagen Treaty as a political agreement with no legal obligations.

Group 4 countries are working to develop a common position on limiting emissions and financing environmental programs. It discussed the possibility of providing technical and financial support to the less developed countries of the Group of 77. The Group of 4 encouraged other countries to conclude a legally binding universal treaty on long-term country action based on the United Nations Framework Convention on Environmental Protection and the Kyoto Protocol.

In December 2010, the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in Cancun, Mexico, adopted an initial package of decisions, in particular, on the establishment of a fund to finance climate change programs, mechanisms for adaptation and transfer of green technologies, and protection of tropical forests. In 2011, at the summit in Durban (South Africa), the parties approved the "Durban Platform", which provides for the extension of the Kyoto Protocol. Extension of this protocol until 2020. It was held in 2012 at the Doha Summit (Qatar), where it was decided to agree on a new legally binding climate agreement by 2020.

At the same time, representatives of a number of countries noted that the slow legislative process in the United States should not be allowed to dictate the pace of agreeing on a universal treaty [5]. BASIC statements, while referring to the "historical responsibility for climate change", call on developed countries to provide developing countries with "equal space for development", as well as funding, technology and support for the construction of appropriate capacities [6].

In 2013, the parties also agreed on positions on the financial obligations of developed countries: by 2020, annual financing should gradually increase and reach $100 billion [7]. However, the participants of the 19th UN Climate Change Conference in Warsaw in November 2013 were unable to agree on this point.

The researchers note that fast-growing countries (with a head start-

* The Group of 77 is the largest intergovernmental organization of developing countries operating within the UN and its bodies. The decision to create the grouping was made at a meeting of ministers of developing countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America in 1964.

emerging market economies) should coordinate their development strategies and interact within the existing BRICS format (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa). It is assumed that this format contains the potential for scientific and technological development, cooperation in the field of "green energy" [8].

Nevertheless, the BASIC format seems to be more productive in addressing specific energy and environmental issues, while the BRICS format can be used by its participants to influence the balance of power in more general issues of world politics.

PROTECTION OF MARITIME COMMUNICATIONS

One of the main issues of China's energy policy is the problem of ensuring the supply of energy resources, first of all, it concerns the transportation of imported oil. Marine communications used for oil transportation are extremely vulnerable. Moreover, there are three points on the map of sea communications that are called "noose around the neck of China": the Strait of Hormuz, which connects the Persian and Oman Gulfs, the Strait of Malacca between the South China and Andaman Seas, and the Taiwan Strait. Each point is a possible "site of aggressive disruption of oil transportation to China" [9].

The Strait of Malacca is considered the most vulnerable area for shipping to and from China. 70% of Chinese oil imports pass through it. The Strait, which is only 40 km wide at its narrowest point, can be controlled not only by the US Navy, but also by pirates and terrorists [10].

China has the legal right of military protection only for ships flying the Chinese flag. At the same time, only a small part of sea transportation is carried out by Chinese vessels. The goal was to increase the share of Chinese vessels in oil transportation by sea to 50%, which meant a significant increase in production capacity. Already in 2009, China surpassed South Korea in terms of shipbuilding, which has been a leader for the past 20 years, and thus reached the 1st place in the world. By the beginning of 2013, China owned 45% of global shipbuilding orders, South Korea-29%, and Japan-18% [11]. Moreover, the country's shipbuilding industry is now facing an excess of production capacity. In August 2013, the State Council of the People's Republic of China issued a Plan for reforming and improving the shipbuilding industry for 2013-2015, designed to stimulate the innovative development of the sector [12]. According to the plan, by 2015, China's shipbuilding industry should cover 25% of the global market for high-tech vessels.

At the same time, China encourages the development of the navy. In 2010, based on the results of large-scale exercises of the Chinese naval and air forces in the waters of South China-

Rear Admiral Zhang Huachen said that China's strategy at sea is changing: "We are moving from coastal defense to open sea defense." In October 2013, another naval exercise involving detachments of ships from the North China, East China and South China fleets of the PLA Navy completed a series of large training attacks aimed at testing the ability to break through the first chain of islands around China's territorial waters in the East China Sea. During these final exercises ("Maneuvers-5"), which lasted 15 days, participants practiced going beyond the first chain of islands and conducting combat operations in the western Pacific Ocean [14].

However, China's plans to protect its own vessels are unlikely to be implemented in the near future. Due to the lack of naval forces, the Chinese leadership will have to choose between protecting merchant ships and tankers and maintaining the necessary number of naval forces directly in areas of potential conflict [15]. Hence, there is a need for additional basing points on the way to transport energy resources to China. This function is intended to be performed by the so-called pearl necklace [16].

* * *

The introduction of China into the global energy system had both economic and political consequences of a global nature: Chinese companies contributed to the redistribution of the global energy market, the demand for energy resources in the PRC affects changes in world prices, China's political influence increased in a number of regions of the world (the Middle East, Central Asia, Africa, Latin America), the PRC one of the main driving forces or an active participant in most regional and global forums and organizations that have energy issues on their agenda.

The international climate change regime has a certain impact on China's energy policy, creating a platform for negotiations and an opportunity to coordinate climate and energy strategies with both developed and developing countries. At the same time, the specific content and effectiveness of the policy are determined by the tasks of China's internal development. As the "leader of the developing world", China actively uses international mechanisms, in particular the BASIC group of countries, to promote its own interests in the framework of climate negotiations.

China is not only encouraging the development of its own shipbuilding industry to transport energy resources from remote areas, but also building up its naval capabilities to protect maritime communications beyond its territorial waters.

China's international energy policy is part of the overall process of the country's rise as a global power. This goal implies equality with countries that play a key role in creating a new world order, and demonstrating to the world that they are ready to take responsibility for global development.

1. China's Policies and Actions for Addressing Climate Change (White Paper), October 2008 // Information Office of the State Council of the PRC - http://www.china.org.cn/ government/whitepaper/node_7055612.htm

2. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. UN (Ramochnaya Konventsia OON ob Izmenenii Klimata), 1992, FCCC / INFORMAL / 84. Art. 3.1.

3. China's Policies and Actions for Addressing Climate Change...

4. China announces targets on carbon emission cuts, 2009, November 26 // Xinhua - http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/ 2009 - 11/26/content_12544181.htm

5. BASIC group wants global deal on climate change by 2011, April 26, 2010 // The Hindu - http://www.thehindu.com/ news/article410314.ece

6. Joint Statement issued at the conclusion of the Third Meeting of BASIC Ministers. Cape Town, April 25, 2010 // The Ministry of Environment and Forest of India - http://moef.nic. in/downloads/public-information/BASIC-statement.pdf

7. Joint statement issued at the conclusion of the 17th Basic Ministerial Meeting on Climate Change, Hangzhou, China, 29 October 2013 // The Department of Environmental Affairs of the Republic of South Africa - http://www.environment.gov.za/ mediarelease/17thbasic_ministerial_meeting

8. Toledo Demetrio. Prospects of Scientific Cooperation among BRIC: Energy, Development and S, T&I Collaboration in Biofuels - in: BRIC in the New World Order, Observer Research Foundation, 2010, p. 111 - 117.

9. http://www.polit.nnov.ru/2009/01/26/usachina2wchi/

10. See: Berger Ya. M. Ob energeticheskoi strategii Kitayi [On the Energy strategy of China]

Energeticheskoy Strategii Kitaya // Problemi Dalnego Vostoka). 2004, N 3, _c. 34.

11. The Shipbuilding Market at a Low. 2013 Annual Review // Barry Rogliano Salles, 2013 - http://www.brs-paris.com/ annual/annual-2013/pdf/02-newbuilding-a.pdf

12. Zhu Junbi. Action Plan in Place to Fine Tune Shipbuilding Sector // China Economic Net, 2013, September 6 - http://en.ce.cn/Insight/201309/06/t20130906_1330327. shtml

13. Robert Maginnis. Winning the New Cold War // Human Events, 2010, June 8 - http://www.humanevents.com/2010/08/ 06/winning-the-new-cold-war/

14. David Lague. Special Report: China's Navy Breaks out to the High Seas // Reuters, 2013

15. Gabriel B. Collins, Andrew S. Erickson. Chinese Efforts to Create a National Tanker Fleet - in: China's Energy Strategy: the Impact on Beijing's Maritime Policies. Naval Institute Press, 2008. P. 100.

16. The term "pearl necklace" is applied to Chinese diplomatic activities in the Indian Ocean and South China Sea aimed at protecting maritime communications, including China's construction of the ports of Guadar in Pakistan, Hambantota in Sri Lanka, Sittwe in Burma, the port of Chittagong in Bangladesh, and military cooperation with Cambodia, construction of a military base on Hai Nan Island. The term was first coined in 2005 by Booz Allen Hamilton in a report to the Pentagon. For more information, see: Lebedeva N. B. Bolshoi Indiiskiy Okean i Kitayskaya Strategiya "Nit Zhemchuga" / / Aziya i Afrika segodnya, 2011, No. 9.

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